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Abstract 
 
 
In 1997, the Province of Ontario formed the City of Toronto, amalgamating one regional 
and six small municipalities into a single city government. This action altered the formal 
institutions of local governance, replacing what was once regional with a City Council 
meant to represent “city-wide” issues, and without providing a clear model for local or 
smaller-than-city decision-making. The purpose of this dissertation is to conceptualize 
the meaning of “local governance” within the City of Toronto as a result of the overlap of 
wards (as represented by councillors), community councils, business improvement areas 
and neighbourhood associations, each of which claim geographical boundaries as 
justification for the representation of locally-based populations, and claim to be open to 
participation to some degree. This research asks whether the overlap of these bodies has 
unrecognized consequences, in particular, the effect on historically marginalized 
residents. This dissertation offers a theoretical conceptualization of “local governance” 
grounded in legal pluralism and legal geography that presents the city as a set of uneven 
and overlapping local legal spaces operating on multiple scales. Using a mixed methods 
approach that includes doctrinal review, case studies, and semi-structured interviews, the 
dissertation finds that wards dominate the law and practice of local decision-making, and 
do not represent an inclusive local governance model in Toronto. BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations are unevenly distributed across and the city, exist mainly in 
the socio-economically privileged areas and have grown in number and broadened their 
mandates since Toronto’s 1997 amalgamation. Toronto’s community councils, which 
were initially conceived by the province as a means to provide “local” access to 
municipal decision-making, have failed to achieve their legislative potential. The 
dissertation concludes that reimagined community councils, grounded within a normative 
understanding of the urban commons, serve as a means to create a more inclusive and 
participatory local governance model in Toronto.
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Introduction 
 
In 2013, Toronto City Council decided to alter a recently-approved seven-stop Light Rail 
Transit (LRT) project in Scarborough, a suburban area that comprises about a quarter of 
the city’s land mass, to a three-stop subway.1 The LRT was meant to provide rapid transit 
access to some of the poorest residents of Toronto, who at present endure long commutes 
using a complex network of buses and an outdated rail line. The rationale for the shift in 
the plan, as asserted by the then-Mayor Rob Ford, was that Scarborough residents 
deserve equal consideration in city-wide decision-making.2 In his view, spatial and 
distributional justice demanded a rapid transit plan equivalent to those of other areas 
within Toronto. In the five years that followed, the subway dwindled to a single stop, 
exacerbating the “transit injustice” that has plagued Scarborough for years,3 and the price 
escalated from one to three billion dollars.4 The Scarborough subway decision alerts us to 
the need for transit plans that address the needs of Toronto’s poorest residents.5 However, 
it also raises another crucial issue at this point in Toronto’s municipal history: should 
local residents have a say in “city-wide” decisions? In the case of the subway, what role 
should Scarborough residents have had – especially the most vulnerable – in determining 
the policy actions that affect their day-to-day lives? 
 
The central question that this dissertation seeks to answer is what “local governance” 
means in the City of Toronto as a result of the overlap of various governance bodies, each 
with their own set of geographic boundaries and assertions of representation. In Toronto, 
these overlapping bodies are wards (as represented by councillors), community councils, 
business improvement areas and neighbourhood associations, each of which claims 
                                                
1 City Manager, Report to City Council: Scarborough Rapid Transit Options (12 July 2013), online: 
<https://perma.cc/9E5M-YZ3L>.  
2 Bob Hepburn, “Scarborough deserves respect, fairness,” Toronto Star (30 June 2016), online: 
<https://perma.cc/Z3F9-PB8L>. 
3 Roger Keil, Melissa Ollevier and Erica Tsang, “Why is there no Environmental Justice in Canada” in 
Julian Agyeman, Peter Cole, Randolph Haluza-DeLay, Pat O'Riley (eds), Speaking for Ourselves: 
Environmental Justice in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at 78. 
4 City Clerk, City Council Decision: Next Steps on the Scarborough Subway Extension, City of Toronto 
(28 March 2017), online: <https://perma.cc/W6N6-K5T6>. 
5 Rahul Gupta, “Scarborough group demands province study LRT plan,” Inside Toronto (25 April 2017), 
online: <https://perma.cc/U9MG-NQGA>. 
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geographical boundaries as justification for the representation of locally-based 
populations, plays a role in local governance, and claims to be open to participation to 
some degree. Fundamentally, this research asks whether the overlap of these bodies has 
unrecognized consequences and how these consequences affect marginalized people. 
“Representation” refers to the meaningful involvement of all demographics of the 
populations who reside within the applicable boundaries. “Marginalized people” are 
economically disadvantaged populations, although I recognize that gender and racial 
factors interpenetrate economic disadvantage. While the conceptual meaning of “local 
governance” is explored later in this dissertation, I start with a working definition of the 
term as a geographically identifiable community that makes a governance claim based on 
particular boundaries. Given that all of these governance bodies articulate their mandate 
in terms of a claim to “local governance,” I centre the theoretical examination of the 
meaning of this term and its implications.  
 
I. Why local governance? 
 
According to Saskia Sassen, the global city is a singular, territorially-specific entity 
alongside others that competes internationally for the ideal nexus of profitability and 
livability.6 At the same time, large cities are the sum of their local geographies, identified 
by boundary lines that demarcate neighbourhoods and communities.7 City decision-
making is often thought of in the context of City Council, a body comprised of a mayor 
and councillors that determines the municipality’s policies and by-laws. In reality, given 
the breadth of matters within their jurisdiction, large cities must delegate to committees, 
commissions and other bodies responsibility to consider certain matters, sometimes as 
final decision-makers. Outside of formal government and its “top down” powers of 
delegation, grassroots or “bottom up” publics form at the community or neighbourhood 
level within cities, nudging and urging transformation.  
 
My interest in this topic began while I was working in a senior policy role at the City of 
Toronto between 2009 and 2015. My areas of expertise were “city-wide” matters like 
                                                
6 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Pine Forge Press, 2012). 
7 Gerald E. Frug, “The Geography of Community” (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1047. 
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intergovernmental relations, housing, and infrastructure, which had clear routes of 
reporting into City Council. By contrast, I observed that “local” issues were comparably 
undefined and messy to my legally trained brain. I learned that the city’s electoral 
districts, called wards, divided Toronto into 44 geographic spaces each with an elected 
councillor. But, it was also evident that councillors varied extensively in their day-to-day 
involvement in negotiating ward-based matters. At that time, I observed that, despite their 
name, the city’s four community councils did not have a role in issues like housing, child 
care, community centres or transit, regardless of the local interest in such initiatives; 
these issues, instead, fell within the mandates of the “city-wide” standing communities. 
Public engagement changed a lot too, during my time at City Hall, including the 
disbanding of almost all of the city’s advisory committees and a loss of staff mandate to 
pursue “Civics 101,” an educational initiative to increase knowledge about municipal 
government. This wild west of messy local spaces, governance, and engagement was 
fascinating to me, and I eagerly wanted to understand how “local governance” was 
actualized in the city.  
 
Even before its genesis as a city in 1834, Toronto divided its geography based on 
“wards,” a construct borrowed from England, whereby an elected councillor represents 
the residents of each ward. Wards remained the connective tissue of the city’s governance 
throughout its many annexations and amalgamations, the most recent in 1998 when the 
Province of Ontario brought together seven municipalities to form the current City of 
Toronto. Until 2006, the Province of Ontario had the authority to draw municipal 
boundaries. The city’s current wards are a legacy of this provincial power: Toronto’s 44 
wards were struck in 2000 based on the federal and provincial electoral districts and then 
divided by two.8  
 
In 1998, the forced provincial amalgamation of one upper-tier and six lower-tier 
municipalities resulted in a lawsuit, a referendum, and unparalleled civic activism.9 The 
                                                
8 At the time of writing, Toronto’s 44 wards – now with very different populations – are being redrawn for 
the first time since 2000, a process detailed in Chapter 5. 
9 Mary Louise McAllister, Governing Ourselves?: The Politics of Canadian Communities (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2004) at 38. 
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resident opposition centered on the impact that the new “mega city” would have on 
public access to City Hall. The Province of Ontario included a last-minute change in the 
City of Toronto Act, 1997 that required the new City of Toronto to consider the inclusion 
of “neighbourhood committees” and “community councils” in its governance model. 10 
Caught between a fear of a decentralized model that would ultimately privilege the 
former municipalities and the political pressure to include governance bodies lying 
somewhere between the ward and City Council, the new City of Toronto created 
community councils with very little autonomy, no community representation, and a 
narrow set of issues defined as “local” delegated for their review.  
 
Since their inception, there has been little change in the mandates and composition of 
Toronto’s four community councils. Under the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (COTA), City 
Council has wide authority to determine who may serve on a community council and 
their corresponding authorities.11 The councillors within community council boundaries 
are the sole members. Community councils may make final decisions on specified “local” 
matters like on-street permit parking and traffic calming, but not matters affecting more 
than one community council, nor matters that have been determined to have “city-wide” 
significance. A seldom-used provision of the City’s procedural bylaw also gives 
community councils the power to consider “neighbourhood issues.” In conceptualizing 
community councils, neither staff nor City Council has explained the rationale for the 
“local” versus “city-wide” binary, nor how to reconcile arguments that an issue could, in 
fact, be both.  
 
This dissertation also examines the role of the two other bodies that play an important 
role in local decision-making. Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) have existed in 
Toronto since 1970 and are regulated through the city’s procedural bylaw. By contrast, 
neighbourhood associations are ad hoc organizations that are unregulated by and have no 
formal ties to the City of Toronto and correlate with higher than average socio-economic 
                                                
10 City of Toronto Act, 1997 (No. 2), S.O. 1997, c. 26 (this legislation was introduced to create the new 
amalgamated City of Toronto. Other than provisions to the contrary in this Act, the City of Toronto 
remained subject to the authorities prescribed under the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, as amended 
and, later, repealed). 
11 City of Toronto Act, 2006. S.O. 2006, Ch. 11 [hereinafter “COTA”].  
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demographics. Both BIAs and neighbourhood associations justify their advocacy and 
service roles by asserting that they represent local populations within specific boundaries. 
Both BIAs and neighbourhood associations engage in active lobbying and can play a 
highly influential role in the decisions that take place at the ward or community council 
level.  
 
Wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations each play a role in 
local governance. But, what does their overlap mean in understanding the term “local 
governance” and what are the effects on inclusive representation across Toronto? These 
are the questions that this dissertation seeks to answer. 
 
II. Mapping Toronto: Competing Tales of Prosperity and Inequality 
 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos writes that “maps distort reality in order to establish 
orientation.”12 Likewise, the maps used to describe Toronto orient our attention and 
establish a lens of analysis. In one city map, we see a growing, prosperous, diverse urban 
space. This account of Canada’s largest city, with a population of 2.6 million people at 
the last census count,13 is replete with distinctions such as eighth safest14 and fifth most 
livable city in the world;15 tenth most financially competitive city;16 and in fifth place for 
its labour and economic “attractiveness” in North America.17 In 2016, Toronto was 
chosen to join the Resilient Cities Network, an initiative of the Rockefeller Centre which 
provides funding for the hiring of a “Chief Resiliency Officer” to tackle the effects of 
globalization, urbanization and climate change, as well as networking opportunities with 
other “global cities.”18 This version of Toronto is the “economic engine” of the region, 
                                                
12 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading – Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law” 
(1987) 14 J.L. & Soc’y 281 at 458. 
13 City of Toronto, 2011 Census: Population and Dwelling Counts (last retrieved: 11 May 2017), online: 
<https://perma.cc/AN6N-PN4Z> at 1. 
14 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Safe Cities Index (2005), online: <https://perma.cc/W785-YS72>. 
15 Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Liveability Ranking (2016), online: <https://perma.cc/47C9-
NLUN>. 
16 Z/Yen Group Limited, GFCI 19 Introduction (2016). 
17 Toronto Region Board of Trade, Toronto as a Global City: Scorecard on Prosperity (2015), online: 
<https://perma.cc/2U8C-JANK>. 
18 Rockefeller Foundation, 100 Resilient Cities, Overview (2016), online: <https://perma.cc/X4EG-ZZ4V>. 
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province, and country, with 10% of the country’s GDP drawing from the activity within 
its boundaries.19  
 
This orientation reinforces Toronto’s emerging status as a “global city,” one of a small 
set of interconnected urban centres that dictate the flow of capital and attract 
investment.20 Likewise, Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class describes an 
economically-thriving, progressive urban centre like Toronto’s, where young, mobile 
workers flit across the globe, starting companies, painting hipster graffiti and ultimately 
strengthening the economic prosperity of those cities fortunate enough to attract them.21 
“The creative centres tend to be the winners of our age,” he writes. “Not only do they 
have high concentrations of creative economic outcomes in the form of innovative and 
high-tech industry growth. They also show strong signs of overall regional vitality such 
as increases in regional employment and population.”22 
 
This account of Toronto sees its sizeable newcomer population as evidence of the success 
of Toronto’s motto, “Diversity our Strength.” The BBC dubbed Toronto the “most 
multicultural city in the world,”23 with over two hundred racialized communities and 140 
languages spoken.24 This map portrays Toronto as a welcoming, growing, and thriving 
city, where people come to make their home and a better life for themselves. 
 
This vibrant characterization obscures Toronto’s growing spatial injustice, visible when 
the lens of analysis zooms in on localized areas of the city. Under this more focused 
view, low-income and visible minority residents inhabit different parts of the city than 
affluent or middle-class white Torontonians. Scholars Alan Walks and David Hulchanski 
have written extensively about the rising levels of income inequality over the last three 
                                                
19 Toronto Region Board of Trade, Toronto as a Global City: Scorecard on Prosperity (2015), online: 
<https://perma.cc/2U8C-JANK>. 
20 Saskia Sassen, “The Global City: Introducing a Concept (2005) XI:2 Brown Journal of World Affairs 27 
at 39. 
21 Richard Florida, “Cities and the Creative Class” (2003) 2:1 Cities and Commentary 3. 
22 Ibid. at 8. 
23 D. Flack, “Toronto named most diverse city in the world,” blogTo (15 May 2016), 
online: <https://perma.cc/KH7X-WH43>. 
24 Ibid. 
 	 7 
decades and the degree to which this inequality is spatialized.25 Hulchanski identified 
three geographically distinct cities in his 2010 report: one where incomes have increased 
by 20% since 1970; a second where incomes have increased or decreased by less than 
20%; and a third where incomes decreased by more than 20%.26  
 
Toronto’s spatial poverty is overlaid with racial inequality. As Roger Keil, Melissa 
Ollevier and Erica Tsang write, “Toronto’s view of itself as the most diverse city on the 
planet usually comes with the bravado of claiming normative superiority in questions of 
diversity, too.”27 The reality is a “paper thin veneer” of multiculturalism, when in fact, 
poverty and inequality are socio-spatially located.28 As a cautionary tale, they write, 
“Much of the literature on ghettos comes from the United States, where racial 
segregation, particularly of the black and Hispanic population, is a major concern. 
Although stark segregation like that in the United States does not (yet) exist, there are 
indications of increasing inequalities in Canadian cities, especially Toronto.”29 Keil, 
Ollevier and Tsang include housing amongst the most egregious environmental concerns 
in the city, with substandard housing in poor, racialized areas of the city laden with 
rodent infestations and hazardous odors.30  The least economically affluent areas are also 
“transit deserts,” meaning that they suffer from the poorest levels of transit service.31  
Since 2009, when Keil, Ollevier and Tsang wrote their piece, the geographic disparities 
of low-income and racialized communities have become even more acute. According to 
the Toronto Foundation’s 2016 Vital Signs report, income inequality is increasing by 
double the speed in Toronto as compared with the rest of the country.32 This report notes 
                                                
25 See e.g. Alan Walks, Income Inequality and Polarization in Canada’s Cities: An Examination and New 
Form of Measurement (Toronto: Cities Centre, 2013), online: <https://perma.cc/9J35-3VZJ>; and David 
Hulchanski, The Three Cities Within Toronto: Income Polarization among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods, 
1970–2005. (Toronto: University of Toronto Cities Centre, 2010). 
26 Ibid. at 7. 
27 Keil, Ollevier & Tsang, supra note 3 at 66. 
28 Ibid. at 66, referencing Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, “Spaces of Difference: Reflections 
from Toronto on Multiculturalism, Bourgeois Urbanism and the Possibility of Radical Urban Politics” 
(2005) 29:3 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 670. 
29 Keil, Ollevier & Tsang, supra note 3 at 71. 
30 Ibid. at 68. 
31 Martin Prosperity Institute, “Transit Deserts and Hulchanski’s Three Cities,” Martin Prosperity Insights, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto, n.d.) at 1. See also Keil, Ollevier & Tsang, supra note 3 at 78. 
32 Toronto Foundation, “Gap Between Rich and Poor” in Toronto’s Vital Signs Report (2016), online: 
<https://perma.cc/JA72-P3F6>. 
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that Toronto is the “child poverty capital of Canada” with over 28% of children living in 
poverty.33 Overall, more than 22% of Toronto’s residents live in poverty, similar to 
Boston and Los Angeles, and second only to London, UK.34 In Toronto, poverty is 
racialized. The 2011 National Household Survey notes that poorer areas tend to have 
more visible minorities and immigrants.35 White, non-immigrant children have the lowest 
poverty rates.36 The United Way recently concluded that, “Left unaddressed, Toronto is 
at risk of becoming the income inequality capital of Canada.”37 Perhaps as a reflection, 
the number of immigrants moving to Toronto dropped by 19% from 2011 to 2013.38 
 
This present study focuses on the zoomed in characterization of Toronto to analyze how 
the local governance model overlaps with and affects the city’s spatial inequality. 
 
III. Theoretical Considerations 
 
This dissertation brings together the scholarship of legal pluralists, in particular Santos,39 
with the work of property and local government scholars Gerald Frug,40  Sheila Foster 
and Christian Iaione,41 legal geographer Nicholas Blomley42 and interdisciplinary scholar 
Mariana Valverde,43 to conceptualize “local governance.” I advance a conceptualization 
of “local governance” drawn from notions of legal pluralism and legal geography that 
offers new insights into the spatiality of Toronto’s local boundaries and bodies, and their 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid, referencing World Council on City Data: WCCD Open City Data Portal. (2015), online: 
<https://perma.cc/28W7-JHHK>.  
35 Campaign 2000, Media Release (2015), online: <https://perma.cc/EW2U-Y8AF> (noting that National 
Household Survey data is given voluntarily, thus may not be as accurate). 
36 D. Macdonald and D. Wilson, “Shameful Neglect – Indigenous Child Poverty in Canada,” Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2016), online: <https://perma.cc/8A97-TLTE>. 
37 United Way, “The Opportunity Equation: Building opportunity in the face of growing income inequality” 
(2015), online: <https://perma.cc/K9S3-FYXV> at 3. 
38 Toronto Workforce Innovation Group, Local Labour Market Update (2014). 
39 See e.g. Santos, supra note 12. 
40 See e.g. Frug, supra note 7 and Gerald Frug, “Decentering Decentralization” (1993) 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
253. 
41 See e.g. Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, "The City as a Commons" (2016) 34 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 281 
and Sheila R. Foster, “Collective Action and the Urban Commons” (2011) 87:1 Notre Dame Law Review 
57. 
42 See e.g. Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space and Geographies of Power (London: The Guilford Press, 1994). 
43 See e.g. Mariana Valverde, “Time Thickens, Takes on Flesh: Spatiotemporal Dynamics in Law” in I. 
Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney & A. Kedar, eds. The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal 
Geography (Stanford University Press, 2014). 
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impact on the city’s most marginalized populations. This conceptualization holds that, 
first, “local governance” is pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple 
normative orders known as “local legal spaces,” which cannot be considered self-
enclosed, autonomous units; and second, that state iterations of local governance bodies 
create political, social, and spatial realities, through multiple overlapping institutions; 
incorporate other norms, orders, rules and practices; and include and exclude certain 
people and communities through the setting of boundaries and participation rules. This 
project advances both legal pluralism and legal geography project by recognizing 
localized areas of the city as multiscalar and interlegal in themselves, with a local 
governance model that is inclusive of a plurality of formal and informal bodies and 
geographies. 
 
This conception moves beyond the contours of legal scholarship to explore the 
implications of this study for notions of power. Valverde, Blomley, and Santos belong to 
the loosely defined and still-unfolding legal geographies project and consider how maps 
and geography can shed light on the dynamics of legal and political power. They and 
others within the legal geography project also explore the complexities of “interlegality,” 
meaning how norms and laws interact within particular spaces and over time, and how 
power is asserted and competing parties claim jurisdiction. As detailed in Chapter 3, 
Toronto’s local governance model embodies the overarching aim of these and other 
scholars to make sense of overlapping, discontinuous, and in some cases contradictory 
boundaries and institutions.  
 
Drawing on this conceptualization, I advance a normative argument that inclusive, 
participatory “local governance” should be conceived within the theoretical framework of 
the urban commons. In so doing, I apply Foster and Iaione’s model of the urban 
commons that, regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned, the city is a 
territorial space in which citizens claim to have a role or stake, a norm which is 
reinforced in law.44 Foster and Iaione draw on Elinor Ostrom’s famous study, captured in 
her book Governing the Commons, which meticulously challenged the assumption that 
                                                
44 Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, "The City as a Commons" (2016) 34 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 281. 
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common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and 
inefficiency.45 Foster and Iaione adapt Ostrom’s thesis to the urban form and, in 
particular, to the question of how public-private organizations can effectively play a role 
in governing specific city areas. They argue that to do so, they must incorporate “bottom-
up” governance practices by engaging the public. My dissertation draws on Foster and 
Iaione’s work to argue that the urban commons represents a helpful normative framework 
that values inclusive participation in the specific practices of laws and institutions created 
by local governments.  
 
However, Foster and Iaione rightly note that in considering the city as an urban 
commons, and in conceptualizing governance institutions, the question of inclusivity is 
crucial, even though they do not directly contend with this question in their work. As 
such, my normative theoretical contribution incorporates the work of Gregory Alexander, 
Eduardo Peñalver and Gerald Frug, also property law theorists, who delve squarely into 
the impact of boundaries on the representation of historically disadvantaged people in 
city spaces. These and other authors, including Richard Thompson Ford, have observed 
that creating neighbourhood boundaries and enabling local power also lead to “insiders” 
and “outsider” and disproportionately impacts racialized, low-income people, and others 
who have been historically disadvantaged. Through the notion of the urban commons, I 
apply the conceptualization of “local governance” to advance a normative understanding 
of the roles and mandates of Toronto’s local governance institutions. In doing so, 
Valverde, Blomley and Santos’ works complement notions of the urban commons in 
providing a framework for Toronto’s complex, messy local governance model for the 
analysis that follows in the dissertation.  
 
IV. Case studies: Exploring “Local Governance” in “City-wide” Decisions 
 
Under COTA, City Council is empowered “to represent the public and to consider the 
well-being and interests of the City.”46 Under the theoretical framework advanced in this 
dissertation, “city-wide” issues have disparate, specific and localized effects, meaning 
                                                
45 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
46 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 131(a). 
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that local impacts are created by decisions taken at the “city-wide” level. This dissertation 
introduces two case studies to evaluate the theoretical framework advanced in Chapter 1, 
including how wards, community councils, business improvement areas and 
neighbourhood associations are involved in decision-making on “city-wide” issues, and 
the effect of their roles on inclusive participation.  
 
In Chapter 4, this dissertation explores two casino decisions taken by City Council in an 
eighteen-month period with vastly different results. In the 2012-13 casino debate, four 
casino options were identified as possible locations for a new casino in the City of 
Toronto, all soundly rejected by City Council on the basis of “local” concerns such as 
traffic, planning and the localized effects of addiction and health. In 2015, the expansion 
of the Woodbine Racetrack to a casino in Rexdale, one of the city’s poorest areas, was 
approved. These decisions offer insights into how place-based notions of “local 
governance” are exercised unevenly across the city, examining how advocates in the 
downtown debate were able to modify governance practices to shift the scale of decision-
making, while “local” issues in suburban Rexdale focused exclusively on economic 
considerations, with the casino characterized as a rare opportunity for job creation with 
little attention to civic engagement, incorporation of community knowledges or 
consideration of the social effects of casinos. The studies query whether “local 
governance” served as a privileged, but ultimately unequal, assertion in contested 
jurisdictional claims and whether the spatiality of casino development demands attention 
to the empowerment of local communities amidst a landscape of socio-economic 
inequality.47 
 
                                                
47 See eg. Carissa Schively, “Understanding the NIMBY and LULU Phenomena: Reassessing Our 
Knowledge Base and Informing Future Research” (2007) 21:3 Journal of Planning Literature 255 
(analyzing the complexity of research related to ‘locally undesirable land use’ (LULUs) and “not in my 
backyard” (NIMBY) phenomena in cities); Tee L. Guidotti and Sheila Abercrombie, “Aurum: a case study 
in the politics of NIMBY” (2008) 26 Waste Management & Research 582 (examining the importance of 
the political history of the community in regard to community responses to LULU and NIMBY 
phenomenon); Prashan Ranasinghe and Mariana Valverde, “Governing Homelessness Through Land-use: 
A Sociolegal Study of the Toronto Shelter Zoning By-law” (2006) 31:3 Canadian Journal of Sociology 325 
(arguing that NIMBY phenomena related to municipal responses to homelessness are impacted by the 
specific “machinery” of municipal law, especially zoning bylaws, which are not guided by substantive 
democracy, equality or social justice). 
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Chapter 5 sets out the ward boundary review initiated in 2013. This case study took place 
over two terms of Council and concerned the drawing of new ward boundaries 
throughout Toronto. The ward boundary review was the first since the introduction of the 
City of Toronto Act, 2006, which gave the City of Toronto expansive authority to 
consider the design of its governance model, including the drawing of electoral districts. 
Like other governments, Toronto is bound by jurisprudence that mandates that wards be 
drawn, in part, to protect the boundaries of “communities of interest.”48 This case study 
directly examines the contested meanings of “communities of interest” asserted by 
councillors, BIAs, neighbourhood associations and others, and how these meanings 
overlay with the geographically-based placement of wards and other local governance 
bodies. This case study directly examines the bodies empowered in the review, and the 
interplay between wards and other “local governance” bodies, including BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations.  
 
The analysis presented in both case studies tests the conceptualization of “local 
governance” introduced in Chapter 1. The case studies also animate the central normative 
question in this dissertation, explored in Chapter 6: how can the framework of the urban 
commons advance an inclusive, participatory “local governance” model in Toronto? 
 
V. Structure of the Argument 
 
Chapter 1 articulates the theoretical framework that forms the backbone of this 
dissertation. I review the major debates in legal pluralism and legal geography related to 
the concept of “local governance.” Drawing on the work of Blomley, Valverde, and 
Santos, I theorize a meaning of “local governance” that builds on what I call “local legal 
spaces,” meaning the competing spatial claims to smaller-than-city areas of the city. I 
offer a conceptualization of “local governance” that recognizes the pluralistic and 
interlegal nature of “local legal spaces,” yet is framed by the state in political and spatial 
terms without necessarily incorporating other norms, orders, rules and practices, and may 
ultimately include and exclude certain people and communities through the setting of 
                                                
48 Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.) [1991] 2 SCR 158. 
 	 13 
boundaries and participation rules. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it advances 
the legal geography project by focusing on smaller-than-city spaces as pluralistic, 
comprised of multiple scales, and with significant implications for distributional justice. 
Second, it argues in favour of a normative conception of an inclusive and participatory 
local governance model based on Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s notion of the 
“urban commons.”  
 
Chapter 2 sets out the methodological approach used to understand the meaning of “local 
governance” within the City of Toronto. This dissertation uses a mixed methodological 
approach, combining doctrinal analysis with qualitative empirical methods of case 
studies, interviews, and ethnographic observation. In this chapter I set out the methods 
used to obtain data on wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations, 
and detail the criteria used to select the case studies, together with the role of doctrine, 
semi-structured interviews, data analysis, and ethnography to gather the data necessary to 
draw the conclusions reached in this dissertation. My theoretical framework and 
normative argument are interested in how “local governance” is constructed by official 
actors and within official city governance institutions, and, as such, I explain why the use 
of case studies to examine the localized effects of “city-wide” issues is critical to 
conceptualizing “local governance.” 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the City of Toronto’s existing model of local governance. The aim is to 
explain the “law in the books” in the city’s smaller-than-city governance and focuses 
specifically on wards and community councils, as well as the city’s neighbourhood 
associations and business improvement areas (BIAs).49 First, I set out the interplay 
between provincial requirements and the city’s bylaws as they relate to governance. This 
chapter explains the historical significance of the ward and the centrality of the ward 
councillor in local decision-making. Next, this chapter introduces community councils as 
“ghosts” of the former municipalities with largely unused powers to redefine and reframe 
local governance. Third, I show that neighbourhood associations and BIAs assert a role in 
                                                
49 For a concise description of “law in the books” and “law in action,” see Rebecca L. Sandefur, “When is 
Law in Action?” (2016) 77 Ohio State Law Review 59. 
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local governance both by advancing representation based on particular geographical 
boundaries, and through their privileged access to ward councillors and formal municipal 
governance bodies. The chapter details the histories, locations, and mandates of these 
organizations, setting out the differences and similarities in their relationship to the city. 
Drawing on quantitative and interview data describing the role of these bodies in local 
governance and their interaction with other actors, I argue that neighbourhood 
associations positively correlate with higher levels of homeownership and economic 
advantage, however, have significantly modified their structures and mandates to move 
beyond planning as the focus of attention.  
 
To further understand the meaning of “local governance,” Chapters 4 and 5 set out the 
case studies used in the dissertation: the 2012-13 and 2015 casino decisions, and the ward 
boundary review. The case studies were “city-wide” issues, meaning that they were 
identified under city policy as having city-wide significance and therefore requiring 
deliberation and decision-making by City Council and the Executive Committee. The 
objective of the thorough case study review is to examine more closely whether and how 
wards, community councils, neighbourhood associations, and BIAs are involved in 
deciding these “city-wide” issues through the assertion of a local role. The chapter sets 
out the meaning of “local governance” that emerged from each of the case studies, as 
well as the degree to which this governance was inclusive and participatory.  
 
Chapter 6 draws together the data presented throughout the dissertation to reimagine 
Toronto’s local governance model through the lens of an urban commons. The 
dissertation concludes that ward councillors are the chief representatives in decision-
making regarding the local impacts of city-wide issues; BIAs and NAs can play an 
important role in representing local issues at the ward level, but their presence varies 
spatially across the city; and community councils can use their authority under the 
procedural bylaw to mediate city-wide matters with community groups and gather 
expansive information on the local implications of city-wide issues, but these powers are 
seldom employed. The result, I argue, is a local governance model that operates unevenly 
across Toronto’s landscape of spatial inequality. The chapter applies the conceptual 
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meaning of “local governance” presented in Chapter 1 to the City of Toronto’s local 
governance model, querying what a reframing within the urban commons would mean 
for the city’s approach to local decision-making. The chapter concludes with an 
ambitious agenda in the making of “local governance” in Toronto that conceptualizes 
community councils by incorporating urban commons principles.  
 
VI. The Normative Aspiration 
 
Outside of its theoretical contributions, this research is timely and important from a 
normative perspective. First, scholars from numerous disciplines and decision-makers 
across governments continue to grapple with questions as to optimal approaches to 
decision-making, representation, and participation at the municipal level.50 From a 
theoretical perspective, scholars have presented compelling analyses as to why Jane 
Jacobs’ advocacy of neighbourhood-based decision-making can lead to inequalities in 
resident participation and resource sharing across cities in the United States, but fewer 
studies have taken place within the Canadian context.51 Also, many studies have focused 
on city planning rather than a broader set of issues that conceptualizes the meaning of 
“local governance.” This research sheds light on how Toronto’s overlapping local 
institutions contribute to understandings of local governance, both conceptually and 
geographically, and the impacts of this overlapping model on participation. This research 
hopes to advance an understanding of how the current model of local governance affects 
residents and to reconsider approaches to participation and representation.  
 
Second, this research aims to be specifically meaningful for policy-makers in the City of 
Toronto who may soon reconsider the role and scope of its local governance model. 
Toronto is now the sixth largest jurisdiction in the country with a population larger that 
many Canadian provinces. The policy areas within the City of Toronto's authority are 
                                                
50 See e.g. Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy 
(Princeton University Press, 2004); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: 
Toward a Redistributive Democracy” (2008) 26 Politics & Society 461. 
51 See e.g. Hoi Kong, “Toward a Federal Theory of the City” (2012) 56:3 McGill LJ 473; and Mariana 
Valverde, Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity (The University of Chicago 
Press, 2012). 
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tremendously broad. In a typical City Council meeting, issues under consideration range 
from street sign names to long-term regional transit planning and funding. Despite the 
city’s size and the complexity of the issues under review, City Council continues to make 
almost all decisions, with little delegation to other bodies. Regarding local governance, 
ward councillors representing approximately 60,000 residents exercise a tremendous 
amount of power, with little role for the city’s four community councils. At the same 
time, neighbourhood associations and BIAs have ballooned in number and broadened in 
mandate since amalgamation, seeking a broader role on matters of relevance to their 
neighbourhoods. As detailed in Chapter 5, Toronto is grappling with the re-design of its 
ward boundaries, where questions of jurisdiction, geographic boundaries, and who is 
included - and thus excluded – within the city’s mapped areas have been raised. 
Following the ward boundary review, the City of Toronto will turn its attention to the 
boundaries of community councils and, perhaps, their role and composition. This 
dissertation aims to contribute to this ongoing dialogue by asking how the City of 
Toronto can conceive of a local governance model that better represents its diverse 
residents. 
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Chapter 1 – A Theoretical Map-Making of “Local Governance” 
 
This dissertation conceptualizes the meaning of “local governance” by asking how local 
spaces within the city of Toronto are created, imagined and governed by law. This 
chapter sets the theoretical framework for the dissertation, which focuses on “local 
governance” as comprising overlapping geographies and competing claims to 
representation, and examines how the overlap impacts meaningful, inclusive 
participation. I offer a conceptualization of local governance that is grounded within legal 
pluralism and legal geography, and that is meant to serve both explanatory and diagnostic 
purposes. By “explanatory,” I mean the principles or statements used to explain facts or 
phenomena, to be tested later based on the methodological approach outlined in Chapter 
2. By “diagnostic,” I mean the identification of causes and contributions to particular 
outcomes. I introduce a roadmap of the various literatures that come together to explain 
the meaning of local governance within the context of legal pluralism and legal 
geography.  
 
A key area of exploration – the one that will be the chief focus of this dissertation – 
expands on what has been termed “vertical tensions” within legal geography, meaning 
the many scales that operate with a given jurisdiction.52 Drawing on the work of Gerald 
Frug, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Mariana Valverde, the theoretical framework of 
the dissertation queries vertical tensions within the “local legal spaces” of the city, asking 
how scale operates within this smaller-than-city scale. In my project, I limit the question 
to which formal and informal actors and institutions claim to represent those within 
localized areas of the city, examining their legal structures, the geographies that they 
advance, and the implications for the meaningful participation of residents across the city. 
Following this conceptualization of “local governance,” chiefly meant to theorize how 
local legal spaces overlap and impact inclusive participation in local governance, this 
chapter argues that the “urban commons” as advanced by Sheila Foster and Christian 
Iaione may serve as a useful normative framework for an inclusive, participatory local 
                                                
52 Nicholas Blomley “What sort of a legal space is a city?” in Andrea Mubi Brighenti (ed.) Urban 
Interstices: The Aesthetics and the Politics of the In-between (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2165083)>. 
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governance model. The aim of the dissertation broadly – and of this chapter specifically – 
is to defend a conceptualization of local governance that is subsequently evaluated in the 
case studies that follow. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, this chapter sets out the legal geography 
framework that serves as the basis for the conceptualization of local governance, 
including the meaning and relevance of interlegality, legal pluralism, and local legal 
spaces. Second, as the core element of this chapter, I bring together these literatures to 
offer and defend a two-part conceptualization of local governance according to which, 
first, local governance is pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple normative 
orders such that local spaces cannot be considered self-enclosed, autonomous units; and, 
second, that state iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, and spatial 
realities, through multiple overlapping institutions; incorporate other norms, orders, rules 
and practices; and include and exclude certain people and communities through the 
setting of boundaries and participation rules. The chapter concludes by arguing that 
Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s meaning of the urban commons may be used to 
normatively evaluate how local bodies make overlapping and contradictory claims about 
their legal jurisdiction over segments of the city; and, second, that the impact of local 
governance may be assessed based on the degree to which it provides meaningful and 
inclusive participation of historically marginalized people. 
 
I. Legal geography: interlegality and the significance of space 
 
There has been a growing shift in the treatment of space in legal theory. Before the 
1990s, legal theorists saw space as a background upon which legal norms could be 
considered, but not a factor that needed closer integration and analysis.53 Much of the 
scholarship later identified or attributed to the legal geography  project didn’t expressly 
intend to broaden a legal geography project; instead existing scholarship was considered 
                                                
53 Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, “The spatial turn in legal theory” (2010) 10:1 Studies in Culture, Polity 
and Identities 39-62, online: <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2349533531.html>.  
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to be “speaking” legal geography all along.54 For example, Gerald Frug, who wrote about 
“localism” and “regionalism,” is an example of a legal scholar who questioned the 
relationship of law and geography prior to the conceptualization of “legal geography.”55 
Santos’s innovative use of cartography to illustrate his conclusion that “laws are maps; 
written laws are cartographic maps; customary, informal laws are mental maps” critically 
married law and space long before the legal geography project was coined.56 While the 
connections did not explicitly recognize or draw on geography scholarship as a tool to 
better understand legal dynamics at play, space itself was recognized as an active and 
important subject of analysis rather than a benign and irrelevant backdrop. In this 
dissertation, I assert that the legal geography project’s recognition of the interrelationship 
of law and space is crucial to understand the meaning of local governance as embodying 
both geographic spaces and legal rules.  
 
Scholars began drifting to a more common and identifiable understanding of the 
connections between law and geography, owing in part to the critical legal studies 
movement.57 Those interested in the intersections between law and geography suddenly 
found each other, beginning to form intellectual linkages reflected in consequential 
bridging work.58 These connections ultimately resulted in work that had the following 
recognizable attributes in common.59 First, all sought to reexamine the “legal in terms of 
the spatial and the spatial in terms of the legal” to see whether former ideas or 
                                                
54 Nicholas Blomley, “Introduction” in I. Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney & A. Kedar, eds. The 
Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford University Press, 2014) at xvii. 
55 Frug, supra note 7. See also Hoi Kong, “Toward a Federal Theory of the City” (2012) 56:3 McGill LJ 
473, who summarizes American and Canadian literature relating to localism (“Localists stress the values of 
local-governance legitimacy, measured in terms of citizen participation in governance, and effectiveness, 
measured by the extent to which public-good provision matches consumer preferences”) and regionalism 
(“Regionalists stress the values of distributive fairness and effectiveness, which is defined in terms of 
metropolitan regions’ global competitiveness”). 
56 Santos, supra note 12 at 282. 
57 Irus Braverman et al., “Expanding the Spaces of Law” in I. Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney & A. 
Kedar, eds. The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford University Press, 2014) at 
4. 
58 Nicholas Blomley and Joel Bakan, "Spacing Out: Towards a Critical Geography of Law" (1992) 30:3 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 661-690. For representative works during this period, see e.g. Nicholas 
Blomley, Law, Space and Geographies of Power (London: The Guilford Press, 1994); David Delaney, 
Race, Place and the Law (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998); and Davina Cooper, Governing Out of 
Order: Space, Law and the Politics of Belonging (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1998).  
59 Nicholas Blomey, David, Delaney, and Richard, Fords (eds.), The Legal Geographies Reader (1991).   
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conclusions were challenged or altered in light of new gaps revealed.60 In so doing, the 
spatial imagination could be broadly envisaged to include geographically demarcated 
boundaries as well as institutions of governance. Second, all works examined how social 
space is produced, maintained and transformed through the use of legal terminology such 
as “property” and “rights.” Third, the works sought to understand how the “legal” and the 
“spatial” were aspects of each other and were fundamental parts of another “more 
holistically conceived social-material reality.”61 One of the aims of this dissertation is to 
examine how legal rules that demarcate boundaries create, transform and sanction what is 
deemed to be “local legal space,” influencing the conceptualization of “local 
governance.” As in the legal geography project, the theoretical framework proposed here 
considers the “spatial” and the “legal” to be interconnected notions in the framing of 
“local governance.” 
 
Legal geography is concerned with the production and political importance of law and 
space.62 Legal geography engages in spatial policy analysis to understand how legal 
frameworks influence and change landscapes and social processes.63 This 
interdisciplinary intellectual project – also referred to as “braided lines of inquiry”64 - 
seeks to understand how spaces within the public sphere are negotiated and understood.65 
The foundation of this theoretical movement, often called critical legal geography, was 
grounded in David Harvey’s 1973 work on territorial social justice.66 It initially began as 
a specialized branch of political geography and sought to understand the underlying 
social processes that shape the legal and physical landscape.67 It has since moved on to 
capture social regulation and jurisprudence as it relates to geography, recognizing that 
law is “literally constitutive of the nation state, the community, the firm, the market and 
                                                
60 Blomley, supra note 54 at xvii 
61 Ibid. at xvii. 
62 Sarah Keenan, “Property as Governance: Time, Space and Belonging in Australia’s Northern Territory 
Intervention” (2013) 76:3 MLR 464 at 468. 
63 Melinda Harm Benson, “Mining Sacred Space: Law’s Enactment of Competing Ontologies in the 
American West” (2012) 44:6 Environment and Planning 1443 at 1445. 
64 I. Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney & A. Kedar, eds. The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal 
Geography (Stanford University Press, 2014) at 1. 
65 Nicholas Blomley, “Public Space” in Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, Richard T. Ford, eds. The Legal 
Geographies Reader: Law, Power and Space (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2001). 
66 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1973). 
67 Benson, supra note 63 at 1445.  
 	 21 
the family” and that “social relation … is also shaped by and understood in terms of 
space and place.”68 Now, legal geography aims to both draw on and contribute to broader 
social and humanities studies and, perhaps, to develop a distinct theoretical and 
methodological framework that can be translated into a broader range of contexts.69 This 
means that the project must move beyond recognizing where the “legal” takes place 
within the “spatial,” and instead to engage in examinations of “lived geographies,” in 
which the understandings and practices of legal forms and their geographies are 
examined as mutually constitutive.70 This project seeks to contribute to this broader 
debate by theorizing the meaning of local governance within a legal geography 
framework, first by advancing how smaller-than-city spaces have multiple scales 
represented by a plurality of legal forms that operate unevenly across the city. 
 
Examining space and law in tandem illuminates questions of power by seeing how they 
intersect, inform and identify such power: “[T]he connections between the legal and the 
spatial in the world may, in some situations, be so tight as to be identical. Is the state a 
legal or spatial entity? Is eviction a legal or spatial state of affairs? Is deportation a legal 
or spatial (corporeal) experience? What is revealed by regarding them through one lens 
but not the other? What is obscured? What might hinge on what is being obscured 
remaining so? Ultimately, perhaps, the relation of law and space is an instance of the 
relationship between meaning and world.”71 Likewise, in this dissertation, identifying 
local governance means an illumination of how space and law enable belonging and, in 
particular, whether the formal processes of local enable meaningful, inclusive 
participation. Put another way, how do the formal and informal bodies that define and 
create local governance affect the representation of those located within smaller-than-city 
boundaries of the city? 
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Investigations (2010). Delaney argues that temporal objects of attention rooted as “law” and “space” – 
homes, public spaces, borders, etc. - do not exist autonomously in separate realms, but are already known 
and fused. These nomoscapes are ideological products that co-exist and are mutually entangled. 
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The theoretical framework offered by this dissertation is both diagnostic and normative. 
It seeks to explain how the overlap of formal and informal bodies define and create “local 
legal spaces,” which assert competing geographic boundaries and claims to 
representation that form the basis of local governance. The dissertation aims to contribute 
to the legal geography project by identifying how the work of Blomley, Valverde, Santos 
and others informs what may be understood as “local legal spaces.” Drawing in particular 
on Blomley’s work on interlegality and Santos’ notions of scale, this dissertation 
examines the local legal spaces that assert multiple and competing geographic and 
representative claims, theorizing how “local governance” may be conceptualized as 
multi-scalar, influenced by a plurality of formal and informal rules and norms, and which 
includes and excludes particular populations. Following this conceptualization, the 
chapter outlines how a normative understanding of “local governance” grounded in an 
urban commons framework may guide how the City of Toronto could enable a more 
inclusive, participatory city through the design of their legal processes and institutions 
enacted in a local governance model. This study explicitly adopts a legal pluralist lens, 
expanding on the scope and applicability of “interlegality” within the legal geography 
project. I next explore this pluralist lens. 
 
“Legal pluralism” 
 
The version of legal pluralism that I invoke distinguishes between “state law,” which I 
take to mean law that is formally enacted by a governmental power, and “social orders” 
which are rules and norms created by non-state actors.72 The chief struggle in identifying 
the rules and norms created by non-state actors is avoiding oversimplification. As Sally 
Engel Merry writes,  
 
Where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social 
life? Is it useful to call these forms of ordering law? In writing about legal 
pluralism, I find that once legal centralism has been vanquished, calling all 
forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law confounds the analysis. 
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The literature in this field has not yet clearly demarcated a boundary between 
normative orders that can and cannot be called law.73  
 
This dissertation recognizes that “state” and “non-state” are rudimentary distinctions that 
are not, in practice, simple to distinguish.74 This dissertation enters this debate by seeking 
to understand how local, as a legal space, encompasses and is molded by state and non-
state rules and norms. In this way, I assert a claim that state law is a dominant force that 
can and does direct non-state actors.75 I also see descriptive merit in conceptualizing local 
governance as a nameable legal object with attached rules to advance conclusions as to 
what is “law” within Toronto’s governance model, even as I agree that such labels are 
socially constructed, not a priori facts.76 I believe that such labels can help in identifying 
rights and responsibilities, and create more opportunities for the exercise of political 
power.  
 
To Moore, law consists of some combination of social norms, rules, customs, and 
practices, as well as “hard” legal rules created and sanctioned by the state.77 In what she 
calls the “semiautonomous social field,” which describes the multiple systems of ordering 
in ordering in complex societies, Moore suggests that social norms, rules, customs and 
practices can be created internally, yet are vulnerable to the rules and decisions 
emanating from the larger world within which they are surrounded.78 Moore sets out a 
version of legal pluralism that allows for semiautonomous social fields with different 
strengths and powers, and which are more or less bound by the rules of the larger world. 
Although Moore does not refer to this “larger world” as state-based with powers to 
compel, other scholars have framed it in this respect.79 Peter Fitzpatrick suggests that 
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state law is comprised of a plurality of social forms, which he calls “integral plurality.”80 
He uses this term to build on Moore’s notions of how social fields and the larger world 
continuously engage in interaction. Fitzpatrick names state law as affecting and 
influencing other social forms in a “contradictory process of mutual support and 
opposition.”81 Unlike Moore, who sees the larger world as framing social forms, 
Fitzpatrick believes that state law is influenced and altered by other social forms, 
including organizations, the workplace and family, and that these social forms are also 
influenced and altered by state law. Influencing factors may also include spaces that exist 
in practice or memory.82  
 
Moore’s identification of the semiautonomous social field is a helpful broad framework 
in this present study for its clarification that many social orderings have their own rules 
and customs, yet are framed and affected by external rules, as a way of understanding 
overlapping local governance bodies generally speaking, especially when coupled with 
Fitzpatrick’s view of state law and social orders as continuously affecting and altering 
one another.83 I assert that “local governance” is comprised of an overlapping set of 
formal and informal, and state and non-state laws, that each comprises a semiautonomous 
social field. Legal pluralism allows me to look beyond formal law, as chiefly described in 
provincial laws and municipal codes, to understand how local is governed and the many 
levels of norm creation.84 Moore’s language of semiautonomous social spheres captures 
the interconnected nature of local governance bodies as not just reducible to law/non-law 
and private/public binaries, but as an overlapping set of norms, orders, rules and practices 
that govern Toronto’s local spaces. I assert that there is both a theoretical and descriptive 
importance to understanding what is law/non-law in order to identify and understand the 
exercise of power in localized spaces in the city. 
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My pluralistic account of law is further informed by the work of Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, who draws on transnationalism to add a political dimension to legal space. Santos 
challenges the view that the state should be understood in its Hegelian form as a “well 
ordered political life,” meaning a neutralized, bureaucratized set of rules, on the basis that 
it fails to incorporate the power of political challenge.85 Instead, Santos believes that legal 
orders, which include the many rules within the state,86 do not merely coexist in the same 
political space, but are interpenetrated and superimposed legal spaces.87 Santos notes the 
three phases of legal pluralism: the colonial and post-colonial period (which includes the 
work of Moore and Fitzpatrick), legal pluralism within modern capitalist societies and, 
third, a postmodern view of the law.88 The differences are based in part on the scale that 
is being studied, from “local, infrastrate legal orders coexisting within the same national 
time space” to, now, “suprastate global legal orders coexisting in the world system with 
both state and infrastate legal orders.”89 To Santos, thinking of suprastate global legal 
orders expands both the idea of law and the idea of politics, and allows for “a 
revitalization of democratic content within a broader legal configuration.”90 Thus, it is not 
just that entities or institutions co-exist and influence one another, entities impact notions 
of politics, democracy and belonging which in turn affect actions and then again impact 
these and other entities and institutions. According to Franz and Keebat von Benda-
Beckmann, “places are defined by reference to the persons occupying them,” showing the 
degree to which legal spaces are informed by non-state phenomena.91 
 
Scholars, including Santos, have highlighted that legal pluralism should also extend its 
analysis beyond identifying state law and social spheres and the resulting interlegalities, 
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but to understanding power dynamics as well.92 As von Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz 
state, “Law thus embodies power positions and power relationships.”93 As Santos writes 
in his examination of the political transformation that resulted from grassroots 
participatory budgeting in Brazil: “[Participatory budgeting] involves both state official 
law and non-state (or quasi-non-state), unofficial (or quasi-unofficial) law played out in 
forms of confrontational or complementary legal pluralities and interlegalities.”94 I 
suggest that legal pluralists’ emphasis on identifying interlegalities achieves a crucial first 
step in understanding power relations: seeing and understanding the state and non-state 
law and their scales in operation. The notion of “interlegality,” and its relevance to local 
legal spaces, is explored next. 
 
Interlegality 
 
Interlegality alerts us to the existence of formal legal codes that may govern our 
encounter, in addition to informal understandings of the law. As we saw from legal 
pluralism and especially the work of Santos, interlegality connects us back to legal 
pluralism through the intersection and interstices of different normative orders. Blomley 
likens the relationship between and among governments to a “Russian doll-like 
conception of spatial order, in which some levels are higher or lower, or bigger or 
smaller; and in which one scale nests within another, in an ordered hierarchy.”95  This 
conception is not new. Santos, in charting his use of maps to illustrate law, stated: “The 
legal developments reveal the existence of three different legal spaces and their 
correspondent forms of law: local, national and world legality. It is rather unsatisfactory 
to distinguish these legal orders by their respective objects of regulation because often 
they seem to regulate the same kind of social action.”96  
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Interlegality has been applied to urban law, where provincial governments have legal 
jurisdiction over municipalities, and federal policies are said to be separate from cities. 
Blomley states, “The complexities of politics, for example, are fit into and explained by 
scalar categories (is homelessness a local, regional or national issue?), running the risk of 
unduly narrowing the conversation. The city is treated as inevitably situated in the ‘local’ 
categorical box, with all that this smuggles in. That which is designated ‘local’, for 
example, is assumed to have certain distinctive characteristics, set apart from other 
scales.”97 To Blomley, local is “here,” described later as its own scale rather than a 
miniaturized version of another level of government.98 
 
This narrowing is acute when examining urban issues, as city governments – and 
especially the country’s largest urban areas – frequently take leadership roles that cross 
jurisdictional lines, such as their involvement in enacting policies to address 
homelessness, immigration and settlement, and the development of transit strategies. 
Thus, rather than conceiving of “levels” or “orders” of government “operating 
simultaneously on different scales and from different interpretive standpoints,”99 one may 
look for the interactions of legal spaces with geography to see what emerges. Valverde 
asks the fundamental question, “what would happen if, for example, those who have 
breached the criminal code were governed as if the criminal law were local? What if 
climate change were imagined as a municipal or regional issue? What if cities seceded 
from the state? Why can cities not have foreign policy, or national states engage in land 
use planning?”100 
 
While this dissertation does not take up the connection between transnational norms and 
city space, Santos’ postmodern view of the law as grounded within legal pluralism offers 
an additional dimension relevant to this dissertation: it expands an analysis of the co-
existence and interaction of state law and legal orders to include representation and 
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participation.101 His insistence on drawing attention to representation and participation 
within the context of scale makes his approach especially fruitful in articulating a 
theoretical framework for local governance. To Santos, current approaches to 
representation and participation focus on “top down,” meaning state coordinated, rather 
than “bottom up” efforts to engage citizenry as “stakeholders” in political processes.102 
He writes, “By default or design, those doing the imagining are the elites or the members 
of the middle class with the economic or culture capital to count as ‘stakeholders’.”103 
Missing from the picture are the grassroots organizations and community leaders who 
“mobilize resistance to neoliberal legality,” even though these hidden voices are shifting 
and shaping the law.104 Similarly, this research seeks to understand how state law shapes 
narratives of engagement and participation and to understand which voices are included 
and excluded within usual engagement practices. Invoking a legal pluralist lens allows us 
to better understand how power is invoked in legal spaces, as described next. 
 
Legal spaces 
 
Legal geography has been the subject of ongoing internal debate about its limitations, 
potential, and future possibilities. For example, Delaney notes, “there is an increasing 
sense that this project has gotten stuck in its bridging phase and that inherited conceptual 
dualisms are impeding further progress.”105 These “conceptual dualisms” are the lenses of 
geography and law, each of which may have their own language and analysis for making 
sense of the world. In this dissertation, I build on existing conversations on legal 
geography’s focus on legal spaces to understand how such spaces can inform the 
meaning of local governance. In the conceptualization advanced next, I argue that the 
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legal spaces that inform local governance must acknowledge the multiplicity of scales in 
operation in smaller-than-city spaces. An analysis of scale is not only relevant when 
looking at the overlap of international, national, state and local; scale can also reveal 
important implications for distributive justice.106  
 
Like legal pluralists, legal geographers have recognized that law is not just present in 
formal, bureaucratic structures, but also in everyday situations.107 What legal geography 
adds to the conversation is a more thorough emphasis on “legal spaces” as the foci of 
analysis and, in this present study, what is meant by a “local legal space.”  
 
Legal geography helps to deepen what is meant by the term “legal spaces,” which I use as 
a foundation or focal point to understand how such spaces are governed. To von Benda-
Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, space is a “constituent element of social life and 
organization” that helps conceptualize social interactions and relationships, even with the 
understanding that notions of space are ultimately social constructions.108 In this 
dissertation, legal spaces refer to notions of space that have been given formal legal 
meaning, as well as an articulation of alternative norms, rules, customs and practices 
within these same spaces. While individual understandings of space can differ, spaces are 
replete with a complex range of interconnecting institutions and entities that have been 
given social meaning, which in turn affect individual understandings of space.109 Notions 
of space can be cemented into law, assert validity or even supremacy, and connect 
numerous legal and non-legal spaces through rules and norms, even though other 
conceptions of space may exist, too. Many dynamics operate in tandem – some in formal 
law, some not.  
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Adding to the complexity is the notion of formal law as a rich layering of codes, bylaws, 
policies, laws, regulations and other rules. They may operate at the municipal, provincial 
or federal level, or within carved-out subsets of these government orders. State laws also 
create physical boundaries and, in this way, they are spatial in nature.110 I assert that the 
way in which laws are described by governments tells us a part of the story in 
understanding the legal space in operation, but such descriptions are not determinative 
and can even mislead.111 Instead, it is imperative that a layered, creative approach is used 
to understand the legal dynamics at play in the creation and enforcement of jurisdictional 
boundaries. As Blomley notes, “To trace such interstitial connections requires an 
imaginative and conceptual leap, a necessary condition for which is to think around scale, 
while recognizing its powerful hold.”112 
 
Legal spaces also include historical iterations of boundaries and bodies. One of the 
noteworthy areas of analysis taking place in legal geography is a purposeful inclusion of 
time. Time helps to advance the idea that legal space is not a separate, fixed notion; 
instead, it is as understood by Doreen Massey: “dynamic and heterogeneous – not the 
dead, inert matter which time runs over the top of, but the constantly evolving, politically 
important dimension of multiplicity itself.”113 Mariana Valverde affirms Massey’s focus 
on time as an important category of analysis, lamenting that “there is a tendency to 
privilege space and isolate it from time and to reduce time to empirical history.”114 She 
invokes the notion of a “chronotype” from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, to conceptualize 
one way that space and time can be understood without reducing them to “separate 
dimensions to be considered one after the other.”115 Bakhtin invoked the Agora and 
Roman family as chronotypes to understand space-time, whereby “time, as it were, 
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged 
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and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history.”116 Space and time cannot be 
discrete, separated concepts; they are instead part of one another. Valverde points to the 
chronotype as a vehicle that has and can reframe the tendency to either exclude time or 
study it within a compartmentalized way. 
 
My theorization of local governance incorporates this aspect of Massey and Valverde’s 
work by arguing that the legal spaces include historical events, boundaries, laws, and 
norms that were previously enacted in the law, and continue to exist even where their 
legal frameworks like wards or municipalities no longer remain. I suggest that legal 
spaces may continue to include historical versions of legal realities, even where they are 
no longer acknowledged in formal law. These legal “ghosts” remain a part of local legal 
spaces and are therefore relevant to the meaning of local governance. As an empirical 
matter, in examining the local legal spaces of Toronto, time is a not just relevant, but a 
crucial element of analysis. The boundaries of the City of Toronto, a single-tier 
municipality since 1999, were previously comprised of seven municipalities: the 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (”Metro Toronto”) and six smaller municipalities – 
Toronto, York, North York, East York, Scarborough, and Etobicoke.117 The provincial 
decision to amalgamate means that what was once regional (Metro Toronto) is now city-
wide (the post-1999 City of Toronto), and what was a city is now “local.” What is 
“regional” is also subject to many different geographic configurations, including the 
Greater Toronto Area (GTA),118 the Greater Toronto Hamilton Area (GTHA),119 
Metrolinx, a regional transportation agency set up to improve the coordination and 
integration of all modes of transportation in the GTHA municipalities,120 and the Greater 
Golden Horseshoe,121 each of which is used provincially to advance particular legislative 
initiatives.  
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A focus on legal spaces also alerts us the notion of scale by examining the cascade of 
spatial boundaries of smaller-than-city decision-making and the resulting implications for 
an inclusive, participatory governance model. Here, I advance Santos’ scholarship related 
to scale to ask how much one focuses in or out on spaces and therefore offers a more or 
less detailed perspective, and applies this lens of scale to decision-making.122 Santos 
offers an analogy between maps and law by distinguishing between “large scale” and 
“small scale.” A large-scale map shows less land but far more detail (“a miniaturized 
version of reality”) and small-scale more land, showing relative positions, but ultimately 
less detail.123 Scale differs in its presentation of detail or relative positions, and may 
“zoom in” on particular phenomena. Scale is relevant in how law is crafted, as “laws use 
different criteria to determine the meaningful details and the relevant features of the 
activity to be regulated.”124 Scholars have capably observed how a “zooming in” to micro 
scales of the city ultimately leads to the exclusion of the most vulnerable.125 This 
dissertation examines how competing notions of local governance “zoom in” to city 
spaces and the degree to which the scale of decision-making impacts inclusivity. 
 
While Blomley and Santos focus their studies of interlegality on the normative orders at 
the local, provincial or state, national and international scales, this dissertation explores 
interlegality within the local scale only, meaning the many governance bodies and their 
boundaries within smaller-than-city spaces, as outlined below. Building on the meaning 
of legal spaces, the next section orients local legal spaces as the “zoomed in” spaces that 
are the subject matter of this dissertation. 
 
“Local legal spaces” 
 
This section defends local legal spaces as an important site of inquiry. Blomley remarks 
that, “Jurisdictions are conceived as technical devices, sorting mechanisms that can be 
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used to allocate people and objects to particular categories.”126 One of these “sorting 
devices” is the localized boundaries within city spaces. One way of thinking about the 
law of local government centres on the power of municipal governments operating under 
the authority of provincial or federal law.127 Under this view, scholars grapple with the 
manner in which boundaries should be drawn, and the nature and type of bodies best able 
to govern at the local level.  
 
This scholarship has also included a focus on the boundaries and decision-making 
authority of smaller-than-city spaces like the “neighbourhood” and “community.” 
Deborah G. Martin writes that the neighbourhood is constructed “based on common 
ideals of what we expect an urban neighborhood to be.”128 In her view, the 
neighbourhood is the locale upon which human, political and economic activity is centred 
and where “everyday life is situated.”129 Pragmatically, the neighbourhood may be the 
place where the needs and circumstances of individual residents and families most clearly 
come together.130 “Community” has been defined as a particular spatial setting where 
social interactions occur and regarding the kinds of social interactions that occur.131 
These studies help to locate the city and the legal spaces within them as important objects 
of study. 
 
In Canada, there is a small, but growing legal scholarship related to the legal spaces of 
cities.132 The centrality of law in relation to the city is highlighted by Hoi Kong, who 
writes, “Whether one conceives of a city broadly as a community of interest, or more 
specifically, as a municipality, laws shape cities, and the relevant issues of law are 
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distinct from those of political theory.”133 Indeed, the law serves a critical role in 
empowering people and communities within an urban space to engage and act. Sassen 
describes large cities as “a new frontier zone.”134 She says: “Access to the city is no 
longer simply a matter of having or not having power. Urban spaces have become hybrid 
bases from which to act” through robust governance structures.135 Such governance 
structures are critical to action: “If we really want to understand how democratic 
institutions support effectiveness and accountability in government, we must be clear 
about which governance entities have the legal authority to deliver services.”136 The law 
also helps to define the micro spaces and bodies within the complex city that play a role 
in local and city-wide decision-making. 
 
This study builds on this scholarship by conceptualizing local governance as concerning 
the boundaries and decision-making that takes place in “local legal spaces” that operate at 
the smaller-than-city level. I seek to add precision to the plural claims and orderings of 
these spaces across Toronto, arguing that local governance in Toronto includes multiple, 
competing bodies at the smaller-than-city level, notably wards, community councils, 
business improvement areas (BIAs) and neighbourhood associations. Wards or “electoral 
districts” are created for administrative and representative purposes;137 community 
councils are public, deliberative bodies with a mandated set of responsibilities over a 
particular set of issues and represent a particular geographic area with a smaller-than-city 
space;138 BIAs are privately run organizations operating under city approval which aim to 
supplement public services within geographically defined boundaries through a 
compulsory tax on local property owners and/or businesses;139 and neighbourhood 
associations are “a civic organization oriented towards maintaining or improving the 
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quality of life in a geographically defined residential area.”140 Each of these bodies has its 
own set of boundaries that may or may not overlap in whole or in part, and claims to 
represent some or all interests within its boundaries.  
 
To summarize, the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation builds upon the 
existing scholarship by expanding upon notions of legal pluralism and interlegality as 
articulated by Blomley, Santos and Valverde to conceptualize how “local legal spaces” 
are governed in Toronto. I argue that local legal spaces are affected by bodies that assert 
their own geographies, belongings and histories, whether formally through the state, 
informally through non-state bodies, or as a result of historical iterations of legal realities, 
even where they are no longer acknowledged in formal law. The conceptual framework 
advances that local governance can be recognized as an interlegal legal space within 
multiple semiautonomous social spheres rather than a single self-enclosed autonomous 
unit; and that state iterations of local governance create political, social, and spatial 
realities through multiple overlapping institutions, are impacted by other norms, orders, 
rules and practices, and include and exclude certain people and communities through the 
setting of boundaries and participation rules. This framework contributes to the legal 
geography project by arguing that these smaller-than-city legal spaces are multi-scaled 
and affected by historical iterations of boundaries and bodies that continue to have 
contemporary meaning, and have important implications for inclusive governance.  
 
This theorization contributes to legal geography by focusing Blomley’s notion of 
interlegality on the local sphere itself is an interlegal space, governed by multiple laws, 
norms and rules, and itself a product of the shifts in mandates and power of plural bodies 
operating both within and outside the formal governance model. This conceptualization 
includes Valverde’s notion of temporal relevance by viewing past iterations of law and 
boundaries as not simply empirical data or linear storytelling, but as “local legal ghosts” 
that continue to have relevance in the meaning of “local governance,” and by 
incorporating Santos’ idea of multi-scalar spaces, as well as the implications of power 
based on how the formal governance model understands and privileges particular scales. 
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The dissertation aims to contribute to distributive justice in the city by articulating an 
inclusive local governance model that serves a broader range of residents.141 
 
Following the conceptualization of local governance, which I elaborate in the next 
section, I then argue that the notion of the urban commons offers an inclusive, 
participatory framework to normatively evaluate local governance.  
 
II. Conceptualizing local governance 
 
In practice, as is explored in the chapters that follow, local governance is a contested 
legal concept used interchangeably with terms like “community” and “neighbourhood,” 
and without precision in much of the research on urban boundaries and governance. As 
noted in the survey of theoretical literature above, local governance carries distinct and 
critical theoretical questions, specifically: how smaller-than-city boundaries are legally 
constructed and constituted; which bodies are empowered to make decisions; and to what 
extent the relevant institutions are organized formally or informally. 
 
I propose a conceptualization of local governance that consists of the following two 
components, drawn from the analysis set out earlier in this chapter and further explained 
below:  
 
1.       A pluralist conception of local governance recognizes the interlegality of multiple 
normative orders such that local spaces cannot be considered self-enclosed autonomous 
units; and 
 
2.       State iterations of local governance bodies: 
a) create political, social, and spatial realities through multiple overlapping 
institutions; 
b) incorporate non-state norms, orders, rules and practices; and 
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c) include and exclude certain people and communities through the setting of 
boundaries and participation rules. 
 
 
 
1. A pluralist conception of local governance  
 
Legal pluralism outlines the combination of social norms, rules, customs and practices 
that operate alongside formal legal rules created by the state. Moore and Fitzpatrick 
understand state law and social norms as affecting and altering one another. Legal 
pluralism frames local governance beyond state law as follows.  
 
First, a legal pluralist orientation helps us to see the many bodies operating within 
smaller-than-city spaces. This descriptive component of the meaning of local governance 
suggests that the legal spaces of local consist of an overlapping set of norms, orders, rules 
and practices.142 Within this space are a set of semiautonomous entities or institutions that 
co-exist and influence one another. I suggest that the first step in understanding local 
governance is to acknowledge its inclusion of multiple interconnected spheres beyond 
state law and including the norms, orders, rules and practices that may also operate within 
smaller-than-city spaces. The underlying premise articulated in this first part of 
understanding local governance is that the entities and institutions within a local space 
are shaped and re-shaped by one another, transforming the entities or institutions over 
time.  
 
Highlighting legal pluralism as a first step in local affirms what von Benda-Beckmann 
and Spiertz affirm as “power relationships,” meaning the importance of the specific 
context in articulating relationships.143 Conceptualizing local governance through the lens 
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of legal pluralism helps to see that many entities and institutions overlap within a 
localized space. It also affirms that the specific context – which bodies, what history, 
what articulations of power – are central to defining and understanding local. 
 
The next component of local governance is to understand the specific norms, orders, rules 
and practices that penetrate an interlegal, semiautonomous order. This means grappling 
with whether and how boundaries and institutions may encapsulate communities in any 
meaningful way as an embodiment of local,144 or whether such boundaries and 
institutions are simply political devices that ultimately have no real meaning.145 I suggest 
that by identifying the laws in existence and to whom they belong is a critical component 
of local governance. 
 
2. State iterations of local governance 
 
Drawing in particular on Santos’ notion of scale, Blomley’s work on interlegality, and 
incorporating aspects of Valverde’s observations of time, this second part of the 
conceptualization focuses on the multiple competing legal spaces of local governance. In 
this dissertation, legal spaces refer to notions of space that have been given formal legal 
meaning, as well as an articulation of alternative norms, rules, customs and practices 
within these same spaces. This part of the conceptualization of local governance clarifies 
what state law has done to cement an understanding of local governance and how other 
entities and institutions have been included in this legal framework, if at all. This 
diagnostic step allows us to understand what has been included in – and what has been 
left out of –state law’s conceptualization of local. 
 
a) State iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, and spatial 
realities through overlapping governance and institutions  
 
                                                
144 Frug, supra note 7; Frug, supra note 42; Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, “Properties of 
Community” (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127 (2009). 
145 Richard C. Schragger, “The Limits of Localism” (2001-2002) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371. 
 	 39 
Understanding local governance means examining the relevant state and non-state 
iterations. These state and non-state claimants each assert political, social, and spatial 
realities. In her brilliant response to the Localism Act, 2011, legislation introduced in the 
United Kingdom that aimed to define what was meant by local,146 Antonia Layard writes 
that the legal construction of “local” in the UK context may have jarred with other 
conceptualizations of the term and the place.147 “Yet once legally implemented with 
defined boundaries,” she rightly observes, “a locality or neighbourhood takes on a new 
administrative, political and sometimes socially constructed reality.”148 In Toronto’s 
context, numerous iterations of the city’s local boundaries have been created through law 
and policy and over time, with corresponding institutions and governance models 
introduced as well. Amalgamation disrupted what was considered to be “local,” “city-
wide” and “regional” even within the same physically bounded area, challenging the 
rules and norms that structured power and relationships. To Layard, law’s work in these 
institutions and governance has taken on a “constructed reality.”149 Put more simply, law 
cements an understanding of local governance even where other – and often competing – 
conceptualizations of the term exist.  
 
Based on existing literature, as detailed below, city governments may draw formalized 
boundaries and bodies based on three rationales: the desirability of civic engagement and 
participation; the importance of local autonomy or “subsidiarity;” and the utilitarian need 
for further delegation at the municipal level.150 These boundaries and bodies that emerge 
as a result of these decisions are the formal local legal spaces, or the “constructed 
realities,” of which Layard speaks. 
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On the first rationale, as argued by Enid Slack and Richard Bird, local bodies allow large 
single-tier cities to have greater public access and accountability to residents.151 Scaling 
access to municipal government to a smaller level than city council allows residents to 
have their issues heard and feel that they have some agency over their interests.152 This 
argument may be particularly compelling for very large urban centres on the basis that a 
more populous and geographically widespread city necessitates localized governance 
bodies in addition to a single city council to adequately consider the range of needs or 
interests within a particular set of boundaries. In this context, bodies like wards and 
community councils, canvassed in Chapter 3, enable closer contact with elected officials. 
This rationale may also matter more in the case of amalgamated cities, where the 
previous municipalities had histories, boundaries, and cultures that were meaningful to 
residents. Such cities might wish to maintain some degree of continuity and therefore 
continue some form of organizational structure to maintain these connections.  
 
This dissertation argues that mere listening is insufficient. Participation must be linked to 
decision-making power. In a Toronto-based study, Deborah Cowen and Vanessa Parlette 
concluded that municipal action that is entirely separated from consultation, skills 
building and leadership opportunities for a broad range of residents, but especially those 
most commonly excluded from decision-making power, ultimately fails to address the 
larger systemic causes of poverty that are outside of the power of municipal 
governments.153  
 
Localized bodies may be seen to fulfill the democratic ideal of representation that is 
closer to the community. In the 1950s, Jane Jacobs passionately advocated the 
importance of neighbourhoods in the built form and the decision-making of urban 
areas.154 In her view, local decision-making was more legitimately democratic and 
connected to the interests and desires of those within neighbourhoods. The fundamental 
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question was the degree to which residents should have a role to play in the policies that 
affect them. In their study on whether neighborhood associations encourage more 
political participation, Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney and Ken Thomson argue that the “key 
to making America more participatory may be making political participation more 
meaningful in the context of the communities people live in.”155 They suggest that 
collective challenges are best understood in a more narrow geographical space and 
ultimately lead to decisions that are better for society as a whole. Erwin Chemerinsky and 
Sam Kleiner tout the benefits of local councils, including that they are uniquely 
positioned to allow historically marginalized residents to engage in the political life of the 
city.156 Elena Fagotto and Archon Fung conclude that such bodies permit “deliberative 
democracy” based on increased neighbourhood capacity for collective action and 
neighbourhood development.157  
 
Some scholars believe that localized power protects smaller-than-city areas from 
provincial/state and federal policies which aim to offload responsibility to municipalities 
without corresponding funding. According to Richard Briffault, local governments 
should be given more autonomy and power.158 Briffault suggests that many claims to 
localized autonomy draw on the Greek polis, Aristotle and Rousseau to invoke “a mythic, 
golden era in the history of democracy when political communities were small enough to 
give each citizen an effective voice and the citizenry exercised a collective role in politics 
and as a contemporary exhortation to vest power in today's cities.”159 To Briffault, 
“Localist ideology masks local power and hides the privatization of local public life 
behind the rhetoric of efficiency, participation, community and local self-
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determination.”160 He believes that the “nostalgia” for parochial political autonomy leads 
to increased delegation to the local level without an appreciation for the many matters 
which cannot be solved by such small political units. Moreover, it exacerbates the “us” 
and “them” exclusion of particular populations, especially the most economically 
marginalized, by ghettoizing landscapes as “inner city” and poor. The result is that upper-
level governments – in Canada, the provincial and federal governments – may offload to 
smaller, localized units as a way of deflecting their responsibility. Briffault suggests that, 
instead, participatory initiatives must be combined with state support and funding for 
local action.161  
 
Put another way, the rationale for creating state-based conceptions of local is the logic 
that such bodies are best able to ensure fair and participatory governance within the city. 
Many scholars assert specific proposals for such state-based conceptions. To Will 
Kymlicka, negotiation must ultimately lead to a set of rules or policies that articulate the 
boundaries and rules of particular environments. Kymlicka urges that “political 
boundaries be drawn to ensure that the community has sufficient powers to define and to 
protect itself.”162 Gerald Frug advocates for the adoption of “charettes,” particularly in 
planning, which are lengthy negotiation sessions that bring together diverse interests like 
developers, neighbourhood residents, bankers and city officials to provide concrete 
feedback on development projects and to educate people on the costs of zoning 
policies.163 Frug argues that these and other community creating strategies should be 
firmly embedded in the fabric of local government law, that community is something that 
can be asserted, not merely facilitated, and that there is an obligation on local 
governments to do so. The obligation that Frug speaks of is based on the normative view 
that municipal governments have an obligation to facilitate political participation.164 Frug 
believes that participation, especially at the individual level, is an important value that is 
best realized through small political units and, that to be meaningful, there must be a 
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genuine transfer of power.165 In each of these conceptions, the state can and should retain 
the power to craft local boundaries and governance bodies. This dissertation, too, seeks to 
understand what role the “state” (and which “state” we mean) should play in creating 
boundaries and governance models. 
 
Fung and Erik Olin Wright encourage an increase in public participation, writing that 
programs that devolve powers to associations,166 invite associations to share in public 
power,167 or open public decisions to citizens directly168 all tie active citizen participation 
closely to the exercise of public power. They suggest that tying public power to 
participation can “forge connections between associative life and the quality of 
democratic governance” in several ways. For example, when the medium of public 
decision making becomes participation rather than money, status, or certified expertise, 
weaker voices may be more easily included and heard.169 Their arguments acknowledge 
that the balance of power in the municipal setting is disproportionately weighted towards 
those with greater resources, putting the obligation squarely on these “weaker voices” to 
take part in participation exercises, to be “easily heard.” 
 
The second rationale in favour of local bodies is that the local scale deserves protection 
based on legal principles. The principle of subsidiarity holds that “the smallest possible 
social or political entities should have all the rights and powers they need to regulate their 
own affairs freely and effectively.”170 From a legal perspective, the idea of a lower scaled 
forum is connected to the principle of subsidiarity, which provides that government 
powers should always reside at the lowest level possible.171 The roots of the term 
subsidiarity trace back to philosopher Thomas Aquinas and ask fundamental questions 
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about the relationship between political power and civil society.172 Subsidiarity in the 
Canadian sense is a flexible legal principle that accommodates the involvement of 
multiple scales in decision-making. Likewise, American scholar Gerald Frug argues that 
smaller bounded jurisdictions – such as neighbourhoods – have a right to govern 
themselves.173 Subsidiarity can be conceived as either negative, where the larger entity 
must not intervene when the smaller can manage its affairs on its own, or positive, where 
the smaller entity must be given powers to accomplish its goals.174 One of the aims of this 
dissertation is to understand the appropriate scale of subsidiarity in different local legal 
spaces of Toronto. 
 
In Canada, the principle of subsidiarity has resulted in judicial deference to municipal 
decision-making. In Canada, municipalities are not a constitutionally recognized form of 
government.175 Their authority emanates from provincial statutes.176 Despite the fact that 
subsidiarity is absent from the Constitution itself, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) 
has ruled that the principle of subsidiarity supports deference to decision-making by 
municipal governments based on their closeness to the residents that they represent, 
regardless of whether the subject matter of the decision falls within the strict scope of the 
municipality’s prescribed powers.177 In the 2001 Spraytech decision, the SCC considered 
the constitutionality of a municipal by-law that restricted the use of pesticides. Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the majority, stated, “The case arises in an era in which 
matters of governance are often examined through the lens of the principle of 
subsidiarity. This is the proposition that law-making and implementation are often best 
achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens 
affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to 
population diversity.”178 The court ruled that matters related to the environment are not 
                                                
172 Brouillet, supra note 170 at 604. 
173 Frug, supra note 42. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,  
App. II, No. 5., section 92(8). 
176 Constitution Act, 1867, section 92(8). 
177 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 SCC 40 
[hereinafter “Spraytech”]. 
178 Ibid at paras. 3-4. 
 	 45 
exclusive to any particular level of government, but instead require the intervention of all, 
thus permitting the by-law to stand. In a sense, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé echoes 
Blomley’s conception of different legal spaces operating simultaneously in certain 
contexts. 
 
The SCC’s interpretation of subsidiarity has echoes in Santos’ work in asking how much 
one focuses in or out on spaces to offer a more or less detailed perspective.179 Scale is 
relevant in how law is crafted, as “laws use different criteria to determine the meaningful 
details and the relevant features of the activity to be regulated.”180 A community or 
neighbourhood body can thus be thought of in the context of large-scale law, where there 
is a zooming in on the localized area and a study of the effects on the community. This 
scale is the zoomed-in area of the city, enabling a more careful consideration of the 
policies that affect a localized area. Subsidiarity acts as a legal principle to include this 
scale in its decision-making model. In this dissertation, subsidiarity is understood as a 
dynamic principle that offers “a degree of flexibility to governance by striking a balance 
between respect for the diverse entities present and a level of state cohesion.”181 The 
dynamic, flexible nature of subsidiarity means that it cannot prescribe specific normative 
outcomes. Alain Delcamp states: “[i]t is evident that the notion of subsidiarity is 
unfocused and cannot itself, except with great difficulty, generate legal effects.”182  
 
When applied to state-based notions of local governance, subsidiarity thus serves as a 
defense for delegation of power rooted in the assertion that a micro-examination of the 
impacts of urban change is best made at a localized scale. However, as Delcamp states, 
the dynamic nature of this term means that there are ever-changing arguments as to which 
localized institutions and boundaries are the idealized sites for decision-making. In 
Toronto’s case, as we will see in Chapter 3, wards and community councils each serve as 
constructed realities, formalized by City Council yet operated flexibly through a 
combination of rules and custom. Their roles in decision-making differ based on the local 
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legal space that they occupy within Toronto. The rationality of subsidiarity enables 
localized governance, yet the lack of precision in the specific roles of these formal units 
of governance leads to disparate effects in differing parts of the city. 
 
The third argument in favour of local governance concerns legislative efficiency, or the 
better operation of government through delegation. The suggestion is that such local 
bodies should have responsibility for certain localized functions like planning, parking 
and zoning decisions to give City Council the time and mandate to focus on issues that 
affect the city as a whole.183 Delegation need not be final decision-making power; it can 
also mean that a committee or body deliberates on a matter to work out the relevant 
policy issues before it comes to city council for final approval. However, in both cases, 
the objective is to reduce the number of matters that appear on city council agendas for 
debate and decision-making.  
 
Delegation weakens centralized power where final decisions are made in a localized 
forum. This is especially significant where a uniform policy across the city is desired or 
where particular people are left vulnerable to localized decisions. The phenomenon of 
“not in my backyard” or “NIMBY” refers to local protest movements opposing a 
proposed development or land use.184 NIMBY is almost always used in a pejorative sense 
and refers to participation that is self-interested and unrepresentative of the views of the 
larger community.185 There are many concerns with an expanded delegation. In 
particular, the issues of fairness and exclusion in neighbourhood decision-making have 
been well-documented by numerous scholars. In the Unites States, Frug has written about 
the effects of NIMBY decision-making at the neighbourhood level, and has argued that 
marginalized and poorer residents disproportionately feel the ramifications of such 
thinking.186 Ford suggests that too much delegation to the neighbourhood scale has the 
effect of using zoning laws to push out or reduce the number of marginalized 
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inhabitants.187 Young advocates that to address neighbourhood protectionism, final 
decision-making must take place at the regional level, not at the local scale.188  
 
In the Canadian context, Valverde writes that neighbourhood decision-making leads to 
unfair, racist practices and that the regional level is better equipped to balance the 
competing interests in question.189 She believes that community-level decision making, 
rather than centralized planning, will lead to further inequality within Toronto.190 
Valverde offers compelling evidence that the City of Toronto must revisit and reject Jane 
Jacobs’ “village life” ideal of community involvement in favour of deeper governance 
models that recognize the representative needs of complex cities. She highlights two 
important reasons for regional rather than local decision-making: first, the “dysfunctional 
dance of local governance” by local politicians and city staff who are more likely to 
validate complaints if they are received from well-connected residents or groups.191 
Second, she believes that community consultations exclude certain voices (mainly those 
of vulnerable persons) in introducing housing designed to assist disabled, homeless, and 
other marginalized persons. Kong, in arguing in favour of a regional body, argues that 
“The regional district system enables representatives of municipalities to decide amongst 
themselves what the relevant geographical contours of governance challenges in a 
regional district are, and to determine the appropriate responses to these challenges.”192  
 
Schragger notes that it is difficult to differentiate between local decisions that are meant 
to affirm a way of life for one community and those meant to exclude. Both may, in fact, 
be the same decision.193 Valverde cautions against delegating decision-making to 
localized bodies, arguing that such bodies may exclude certain voices, particularly those 
of vulnerable persons. She advances the notion that centralized planning may reduce 
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inequality within Toronto.194 Young and Briffault have asserted that regional decision-
making leads to more equitable decision-making, whereas the scale of the neighbourhood 
results in exclusionary policies. The theme common to all these authors is that localized 
decision-making means more exclusive, less equitable decisions, whereas regional or 
city-wide decisions will consider a broader range of residents.  
 
Ultimately, from the perspective of local governments, the identification of local 
boundaries and bodies is an exercise that aims to find the proper site and scale of 
governance, balancing political representation, inclusivity, and fairness in decision-
making. This dissertation, too, aims to theorize how local boundaries and bodies can 
achieve these distributive justice aims, but seeks to include other conceptions of local 
governance, namely community-based bodies, explored next. 
 
b) State iterations of local governance bodies incorporate other norms, orders, rules, 
and practices 
 
The next component in understanding local governance is to see the interplay between 
state law, as articulated above, and other norms, orders, rules and practices. Although 
state and non-state bodies co-exist and can be thought of as mutually constitutive, the 
naming of norms, orders, rules, and practices outside of state law helps to identify what 
state law has not included in its articulation of local governance. Given that different 
legal orders are conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same political space, 
naming these interlegal spaces may not be accepted by all as the legitimate encapsulation 
of what is meant by local governance. My theoretical framework and normative argument 
focus on how local governance is constructed by official actors and within official city 
governance institutions and, as such, interviews with city officials together with other 
data are the basis of my methodological approach. This analysis is meant to parse out 
how non-state local boundaries and bodies are woven within the formal governance 
model. The advantage of this analysis, within the context of the theoretical framework, is 
to identify which interests are included within formal iterations of a local governance 
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model. This stage of analysis sets the stage for the next, which is to conceptualize which 
boundaries and bodies are excluded. 
 
According to Jurgen Habermas, there is an ongoing negotiation between and within 
groups regarding the boundaries of “neighbourhood” or “community.”195 This is 
especially true in Toronto, where residents and businesses at the neighbourhood and 
community level craft boundary lines around particular geographies, forming associations 
to reflect their interests and shifting the balance of power. According to Schragger, 
communities are the products of contested political norms dependent on borders to define 
them. He writes: “[T]he definitional work of “community” is accomplished intrinsically – 
at the borders between places. The legal rules for incorporating or excluding others 
generate both a community's identity and its claim to self-govern.”196 Similarly, Martin 
writes that neighbourhoods are ultimately created by the political actions of those that 
define and constitute neighbourhoods. As she says, “We do not know neighborhoods 
when we see them; we construct them … based on common ideals of what we expect an 
urban neighborhood to be.197”  
 
Local governance must include knowledge of actors and bodies beyond the state.198 
Robert Dahl observed that, within urban areas, many interests are involved in the policy-
making process, all interests are reflected by an interest group and these groups are 
equally powerful when it comes to negotiating decisions.199 According to Clarence Stone, 
cities consist of “regimes,” which are the informal arrangements through which a 
community is governed.”200 Certain regimes are more stable and powerful, and thus have 
more power in the democratic model. In the Canadian context, scholars Christopher Leo, 
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Timothy Cobban, and Kristin R. Good, all agree that, outside of formal governmental 
institutions, a multitude of actors influence decision-making in Canadian 
municipalities.201 Aaron Moore believes that scholars must consider the many interests, 
bodies, and structures beyond the formal institutions of municipal government to 
understand how decisions are made.202 Like Stone, this dissertation seeks to understand 
which institutional actors influence local decision-making, although it does not assess 
whether these actors form a regime, nor whether their relationship adds stability to the 
political system.  
 
This dissertation focuses on BIAs and neighbourhood associations as non-state bodies 
that play a role in local governance. While this argument is fleshed out further in Chapter 
3, for this theoretical framework BIAs and neighbourhood associations are the principal 
non-state bodies that reinforce the notion that local governments are not the sole 
decision-makers in municipal action.203 This is true of such bodies in other jurisdictions 
as well. In a comprehensive study of the nature of BIA governance, researchers Göktug 
Morçöl, Triparna Vasavada, and Sohee Kim studied BIAs in Center City, Pennsylvania to 
evaluate the role of BIAs in urban governance. They noted that BIAs are conceptualized 
in three different ways: as tools of governmental policies, as actors in urban governance 
networks, and as private governments.204 The study showed that BIA directors play a 
profoundly important role in this overall question of urban governance, as their 
involvement in the city’s governance became “deeper and wider” over the years.205 
Similarly, in a study of Toronto’s Downtown Young BIA, researchers observed that the 
objectives of BIAs tend to evolve from basic operational and tactical tasks to more 
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strategic tasks. This leads to improved data, cost-effective decision support, and increased 
coordination at the city, regional, provincial and national levels.206 Likewise, as seen in 
Chapter 3, Toronto’s BIAs differ dramatically in size, budget and mandate. 
 
Neighbourhood associations may also influence local governance. Some scholars suggest 
that neighbourhood association can influence development projects.207 Chaskin and 
Greenberg believe that neighbourhood associations are central to local governance, 
through fostering collective decision-making and encouraging civic engagement, whether 
or not they are offered administrative and financial support (Los Angeles and New York) 
or not (Chicago).208 Even where neighbourhood associations are not part of formal 
processes, they are embedded in governance mechanisms by leveraging relationships 
with allies and partners and negotiating on behalf of their membership.209 In Chicago, 
they have been able to use this “interstitial” space successfully to shape policy and 
allocate resources in the public realm, ultimately playing a more direct role in 
governance.210 Buckman believes that neighbourhood associations representing their 
interests should be listened to and involved in the development process.211  
 
Two main concerns have been raised by theorists with regard to BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations, both of which concern the decision-making power of these bodies and each 
of which is relevant to understanding how these non-state actors may influence the 
boundaries and governance of the “local.” First, some theorists are concerned that 
utilitarian notions of neighbourhood and community can have negative consequences. 
Alexander and Peñalver believe in a human or political need to belong, to participate and 
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to contribute.212 Under this conception, community is not a place; it is a coming together 
of people. They argue that the territorial conception of community – namely that 
boundaries create togetherness, has destroyed the conditions under which the intimate 
relationships that characterize communities may develop. As a result, associations and 
institutions are the “new” community, where “solidarity is based on transitory 
convergences of instrumental objectives, have replaced community as the dominant mode 
of group life in modern America.”213  
 
Toronto’s 184 neighbourhood associations are not officially sanctioned by the city, but 
are instead private organizations comprised of neighborhood residents that are scattered 
unevenly across the city.214 Chaskin and Garg suggest viewing the neighbourhood 
association along a spectrum. At one end they serve as parallel institutions providing an 
alternative form of provision of public good; farther along the spectrum they are separate 
but complementary institutions to local government, offering goods and services beyond 
the scope of local government; yet farther along, they are incorporated into local 
government as formal methods of representation and action; and at the other end they are 
in opposition to local government, advocating for change.215  
 
BIAs go even farther in exacerbating the tension between “public” and “private,” as they 
represent private interests, yet are often officially sanctioned by municipal governments. 
Some studies have shown that BIA staff, especially executive directors, do not believe 
they have any close identification with governmental institutions and see themselves as 
firmly part of the private sector rather than any form of government.216 In his piece on 
BIAs, Richard Briffault notes that the “public” and the “private” spheres are 
interconnected in relation to BIAs, stating: “... the public’s use and enjoyment of the 
streets, parks, squares and other public spaces that are at the heart of urban living, 
[BIAs]—whatever their place on the public-private continuum—can enhance the public 
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environment and contribute to an enrichment of the public life.” Similarly, Wolf 
emphatically states that BIAs are “a part of urban governance and public 
administration.”217 He argues that BIAs must be placed within the public administration 
context, even if their objectives focus on the “private” concerns of their members.218 In 
answering the degree to which BIAs govern the public and the private, the conversation 
must in part include the differing roles of BIAs within a single city. Lewis notes that as 
BIAs become service providers, development brokers and place makers, there is a 
corresponding retreat of municipal government.219 Randy Lippert and Mark Sleiman 
suggest that BIAs “defy a public or private designation, encounter resistance and failure, 
and produce and transfer knowledge for their own and other institutions’ purposes.”  As 
such, they are not simply private actors seeking additional power, and they do not fit 
easily within particular descriptions as exclusionary or inequality-enhancing. Instead, 
they are complex organizations that cannot be easily categorized. Similarly, this 
dissertation seeks to understand the role and significance of these bodies across the city, 
including the effect of BIAs on residents. 
 
Second, theorists note that neighbourhood associations and BIAs disproportionately 
allow for the public engagement and influence of economically privileged residents.220 
Neighbourhood associations, in particular, are seen as dominated by homeowners who 
are white and middle class, who do not reach out to other members of the communities, 
and focus largely on land use rather than social issues.221 Leslie notes that BIAs shape 
boundaries, marketing neighbourhoods, and affect who may participate in governance.222  
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Government-like powers are given to a group of business and property owners through 
the establishment of BIAs.223 In Washington, BIAs have purportedly contributed to racial 
and cultural inequality by favouring the views of mostly white property owners in their 
decision-making.224 Some question whether the organizations emphasize the power of 
affluent neighbourhoods in comparison to more vulnerable parts of the city, in part 
because poor sections of the city do not have BIAs despite the existence of commercial 
areas supporting residents.225  
 
This means that BIAs and neighbourhood associations may exacerbate spatial and social 
injustice.226 Susanna Schaller and Gabriella Modan argue that BIAs increase tensions 
within localized areas.227 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and 
ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, and where access to decision-making processes 
varies.228 BIAs limit democracy and exclude particular perspectives of residency and 
public space.229 The BIA framework reinforces political dynamics that exclude 
marginalized and low-income residents, as well as small businesses.230  
 
Richard Ford argues that social exclusion is exacerbated in a local-focused approach to 
decision-making.231 He states: “Residence in a municipality or membership in a 
homeowners association involves more than simply the location of one’s domicile; it also 
involves the right to act as a citizen, to influence the character and direction of a 
jurisdiction or association through the exercise of the franchise, and to share in public 
resources” which ultimately disadvantages racialized residents.232 Martha Mahoney, 233 
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and Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton234 argue that wealthier neighbourhoods will 
use municipal tools such as zoning to limit the range of who may access the 
neighbourhood. Gerald Frug recognizes that there are implications for those not included 
within neighbourhoods, which at its most extreme can create the “other,” or classes of 
“undesirable” people whom neighbourhood decision-makers seek to create a policy to 
exclude.235  
 
The conceptualization of local governance as proposed in this dissertation asserts the 
relevance of these non-state entities. This study seeks to understand the extent to which 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations are important actors in Toronto’s governance 
model when overlapped with state-based local governance bodies like wards and 
community councils.  
 
c) State iterations of local governance bodies include and exclude certain people and 
communities through the setting of boundaries and participation rules 
 
Next, a conceptualization of local governance must account for inclusion and exclusion 
through the drawing of boundaries and based on the mechanisms for participation. This 
next component of analysis considers the inclusivity of the local governance model, 
including judgments about who is eligible to participate, in what manner, and with what 
power. This step draws on Santos’ belief that there are a multiplicity of laws, institutions 
and boundaries operating formally and informally, and that one articulation of law may 
be rejected if it differs too dramatically from other notions of representation and space.236 
In this dissertation, the empirical analysis of this component of the conceptualization of 
local governance incorporates Santos’ examination of the orders, practices and 
knowledges that produce unequal power relations.237  
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The creation of boundaries necessarily identifies who is and isn’t included. Richard Ford 
notes that “the work that jurisdiction does is left largely unquestioned” and that once 
jurisdictions are created, institutions and legal orders take on a life of their own.238 
Boundaries literally mark which residents are included, but can also be understood in a 
participatory sense, where particular persons may not access or influence decision-
making. It may not always be clear when city boundaries are meant to affirm a way of 
life for one community and to exclude others from participating.239 As Schragger notes, 
the creation of communities is ultimately a political process with equally plausible 
“alternative localisms” existing as well, and that “the hardest questions are … choosing 
between one iteration of the community and numerous other possible iterations of the 
community.”240 The problem is that once created by government, these boundaries have 
consequences, especially if they result in institutions with decision-making power. 
Fundamentally, this means there is no single set of boundary lines that necessarily make 
sense over others, but once drawn, these lines have significant consequences.  
 
Scholars dispute what is a “just” local boundary line. American scholar Iris Marion 
Young believed that metropolitan-wide or regional governments were preferable, in part 
to address the inequality that may result from smaller units of government thinking only 
of their own interests. Young concluded that, to promote the normative ideal of city life, 
cities themselves “should cease to have sovereign authority.”241 Instead, “the lowest level 
of governmental power should be regional.”242 She adopted this position because she 
assumed that decentralizing power to cities means ceding power to separate, autonomous, 
mini-states.  She believed that local governments will act selfishly with disregard to the 
needs of their neighbours, and that it is only through the adoption of regional policy that a 
fairer distribution of urban resources will result. In the regional structure she imagined, 
she tried to give neighborhoods some influence over decision-making, but did not 
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meaningfully try to decentralize political power. She transferred to a regional government 
all of the conventional city functions: “powers of legislation, regulation, and taxation, 
significant control over land use and capital investment, and control over the design and 
administration of public services - without significant change.”243 Similarly, Valverde 
concluded that, in the context of planning, regional is the appropriate scale of decision-
making based on the lack of inclusion and dominance by privileged residents at a more 
localized scale.244 
 
As noted by Young, Valverde and others, there are significant implications for those not 
included within neighbourhoods, which at its most extreme can create the “other,” or 
classes of “undesirable” people whom neighbourhood decision-makers try to exclude.245 
In advancing the argument that a stronger role for localized decision-making will enhance 
participatory democracy, Archon Fung argues that the design, membership, and authority 
of local bodies must be carefully considered by a broad range of stakeholders, and must 
be regularly reviewed to ensure that they advance inclusion and meaningful 
participation.246 
 
This dissertation queries the boundary lines that are created as part of local governance, 
asking how these lines are crafted and the resulting implications for inclusive 
participation. My assertion is that the diagnostic stages above provide a conceptual 
understanding of how local as a legal space is understood and advanced within the 
governance model articulated by municipal governments. I suggest that these components 
of a conceptualization of local governance provide a framework to evaluate Toronto’s 
local governance model in Chapters 4 and 5. This conceptualization also provides a 
foundation for advancing a normative theorization of local governance, described next. 
 
III. Characterizing local governance as an urban commons 
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Ultimately, this dissertation aims to promote distributive justice in the context of the city. 
To acknowledge that a plural set of bodies play a role in local governance, to enhance the 
legitimacy of state law in crafting particular boundaries and legal orders, and to offset 
some of the effects of exclusion, I assert that local governance should be understood in 
the context of an urban commons. Seeing local governance through the normative lens of 
a commons clarifies that smaller-than-city legal spaces are comprised of public and 
private spaces, and that the sum total of these spaces should be inclusive and 
participatory. The urban commons, as an offshoot of progressive property theory, is one 
way of conceptualizing how the law can be used to advance social justice. I argue that 
viewing local legal spaces through the lens of an urban commons, founded on the norms 
above, advances the normative objectives of a more inclusive, participatory framework of 
local governance. 
 
1. The meaning of the urban commons 
 
The academic discourse on the commons is vast and varied. The notion of an “urban 
commons” has no uniform definition or agreed upon principles, and includes the 
application, critique, and acclaim of Ostrom’s view across a wide range of disciplines. In 
law, notions of the commons have been applied to environmental law, communications 
law and the rights of the homeless, to name a few.247 Christian Borch and Martin 
Kornberger state that the city “is not a frictionless agglomeration of commoners, but 
rather a site for ongoing contestation about what counts as a common and who counts as 
commoners.”248  
 
There are countless definitions of the “urban commons” making it challenging to offer a 
singular definition that captures the many facets of the term, whether as a political 
movement or a theoretical framework.249 This normative framework of local governance 
focuses on the urban commons as a form of governance, in particular where multiple 
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bodies claim to have rights to govern within an urban context, who mediates such claims, 
and how.250 This is a different conception of the urban commons from Harvey, who 
suggests that spaces become urban commons through social action. Like Maja Hojer 
Bruun, this understanding of the urban commons believes that “the commons are 
characterized by overlapping right to and claims in the commons.”251 However, while 
Bruun focuses on the moral right possessed by people and communities who claim an 
interest in the commons, this paper limits its scope to the conceptualization of the 
governance of local legal spaces within an urban commons framework.  
 
This conversation about the urban commons places property law at the centre of the 
debate.252 Property law, in particular, serves a key role in this complex terrain of city 
governance, both conceptually and because of its connection to planning. In regard to the 
larger conceptual question, Blomley notes the centrality of property law in this way: “Not 
only does the making of property entail the making of space … but property’s enactments 
are also caught up in the creation of particular landscapes that are simultaneously 
material and representational.”253 Many property scholars would agree. From the early 
days of law school, students are taught that property’s lineage back to the origins of 
English common law provides a stabilizing model upon which much of the legal system 
can be understood. Property courses typically begin by categorizing the world into four 
sometimes overlapping categories that more or less explain how title to land and goods 
can be understood: private, common, public, and non-property or open access.254 In this 
model, private property is the property owned by individuals who can exclude others 
from access. Common property is collectively owned, while public property is managed 
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and controlled by government. The final category has no ownership and can be freely 
used by all.  
 
Sarah Hamill notes that these categories are “hopelessly inadequate for the real world.”255 
Similarly, recent years have seen an explosion of critique regarding what is understood as 
an overly simplistic, strictly doctrinal understanding of property, with scholars opining on 
tenets including the oversimplification of “owner” and the degree to which it obscures the 
many parties who have legal and other interests in property,256 the link between 
belonging and property,257 whether property includes obligations to third party, non-
interest holders,258 and the transformative effects of environmental and indigenous law on 
property.259 To Larissa Katz, the crucial question is who sets the agenda for the private 
property in question.260 Alexander and Peñalver state: “Property stands so squarely at the 
intersection between the individual and community because systems of property are 
always the creation of some community.”261 Blomley notes the variety of communities 
who live on land and put it to work, including squatters, without any desire to formalize 
their rights.262  
 
Common property presents a particular problem for traditional notions of property law.263 
Common property interests are shared amongst many users, without necessarily having 
divided lines, hierarchical interests, or the capacity to exclude, each of which features in 
traditional conceptions of private property.264 In The Tragedy of the Commons, biologist 
Garrett Hardin asserted that open-access commons were an unsatisfactory form of 
interest based on the inevitability that depletion and destruction would occur as individual 
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parties do not have an interest to conserve or sustainably use the resource.265 This has 
been referred to as the “tragedy of the commons.” In this worrisome tale, free-riders will 
take advantage of the public nature of the good or land and, because there are no 
consequences to this abuse, the common property will ultimately be destroyed. By 
contrast, Carol Rose has disputed the characterization of common property as an 
inevitable tragedy, arguing instead that “inherently public property,” which is both owned 
and managed by society at large, is not a tragedy, but a comedy.266 Common property can 
be understood as a comedy because it can both expand wealth and bring community 
members together, the latter of which she calls “sociability.”267 Rose asserts that law 
allocates access to certain lands to the public because “public access to those locations is 
as important as the general privatization of property in other spheres of our law.”268 
Henry George understands common property as integral to understanding and addressing 
injustice, including within cities.269 
 
Ostrom critiqued Hardin’s work on the basis of governance, among other reasons. She 
asserted that a commons is not solely a resource, as Hardin would understand, but is 
instead a resource plus the social community and its corresponding values, rules and 
norms that are used to manage or govern the resource. In her book, Governing the 
Commons, for which she won the Nobel Prize in 1999, Ostrom offered real-world 
examples of the management of common goods such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, 
and farmlands.270 She found that the tragedy of the commons could be avoided and 
identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management: first, the 
resource should have definable boundaries; second, there should be a perceptible threat of 
resource depletion and it must be difficult to find substitutes; third, there should be small 
and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting 
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conservation; and fourth, there should be appropriate community-based rules and 
procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for 
overuse.271 This facet of the commons – the implications for governance in the context of 
local legal spaces – is explored next. 
 
2. Connecting the urban commons and local governance 
 
Under Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s version of the urban commons, the resources 
in question within the urban commons are very broad and diverse, including public 
streets, public parks, public and neighbourhood amenities, and public spaces.272 To them, 
shared urban resources that include local streets, parks, spaces, and neighbourhood 
amenities are subject to Hardin’s free-rider problem regarding resource depletion since it 
is difficult to exclude potential users who lack incentives to conserve or use them.273  To 
Vinay Gidwanu and Amita Baviskar, the urban commons are public goods that may be 
classified in two ways: first, as ecological commons (e.g. air, water, landfills), and, 
second, as a civic commons (e.g. streets, public spaces, public transit, public schools).274 
The commons are a dynamic, collectively owned variety of resources governed by 
custom and are constantly negotiated through law or social norms and values. To these 
scholars, the urban commons are inclusive of the resources that are shared among all 
persons which lie at frontiers or within a particular territorial area. Put another way, all 
spaces and resources within the city’s boundaries form part of the “urban commons.”  
 
By asking how Foster and Iaione’s conception of the “urban commons” maps onto “local 
legal spaces” presented in the first part of this chapter, I assert that the urban commons 
framework can be normatively applied to the governance of local legal spaces, regardless 
of the underlying legal interests within those spaces. In Foster and Iaione’s conception of 
the urban commons, it does not matter how the resource in question is owned, whether  
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privately or publicly.275 Likewise, to Blomley, the idea of an “urban commons” includes 
community gardens, land trusts and squatting, as well as his own description of a large 
private property development in downtown Vancouver which resulted in the eviction of a 
sizeable homeless population.276 Blomley recommends that the lens of the commons be 
rethought as a model that is not as “radically dissimilar from private property as one 
might suppose.”277 He recognizes the political heft of property as enabling “individuals 
and groups in the city a language for naming, blaming and claiming.”278 Here, the 
“commons” uses the language of a private property right to assert that non-property 
owners have a right to a parcel of land. Blomley is not troubled, as Hamill is, by an 
understanding of the urban commons that includes a private property ownership model of 
the right in question.279 
 
Instead, for Blomley, the focus is on the nature of governance. Institutions are meant to 
protect and enhance shared resources in a city.280 Under this view, urban commons are 
unrestricted and unregulated open access resources which enable uncoordinated 
stakeholders to overconsume or overexploit finite city resources. Land use regulations are 
seen as an avenue to manage the enhanced utility or value within an urban landscape. To 
some scholars, the city government is the appropriate decision-maker.281  
 
However, Foster and Iaione suggest looking to Ostrom’s work on the commons to 
appreciate a third option: cooperation among private actors to manage certain 
resources.282 Foster and Iaione explicitly critique the notion that there are only two 
possible choices in ensuring the urban commons, between centralized governmental 
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regulation and privatization of the urban commons. In their view, these choices do not 
include the alternative avenues for decision-making and management for the urban 
commons such as those for cooperative natural resource management regimes. It is 
uncertain how Foster and Iaione’s vision of governance dovetails with Rose’s notion of 
decision-making in regard to “inherently public property,” although presumably a local 
government consents to this collaborative approach.283 
 
Foster and Iaione link Ostrom’s resource management factors to qualities possessed by 
common resources in the city, especially the lack of rivalry in consumption and a lack of 
excludability in access to and enjoyment of their benefits.284 This conceptualization is not 
meant to undermine the existence of private property rights in the city; instead, Foster 
and Iaione argue that the city as a whole is an urban commons. They demonstrate the 
applicability of an urban commons framework to the city through the observation that, if 
a local government does not properly manage the urban commons for whatever reason, 
“regulatory slippage” can occur, whereby the common resource is degraded in value or 
attractiveness for other types of users and uses.285 At this point, the space in question 
“creates conditions which begin to mimic the type of commons problem that Hardin 
wrote about—that is, such resources become rivalrous and prone to degradation and 
perhaps destruction.”286 The openness of many cityscapes produces benefits of social 
value but quickly mimics the susceptibility of a common pool natural resource to overuse 
in either volume or intensity. Similarly, Tara Lynne Clapp and Peter Meyer further use 
the commons framework to describe the governance practices of institutional actors 
regarding the environment.287 Clapp and Meyer critique the ability or city governments to 
limit environmental depletion owing to existing municipal institutions of varying scales, 
regulatory structures, land markets, and state and local government policies and 
regulations. Thus, they argue, to ensure distributional equity, municipal institutions 
should allow for communities to protect themselves from harm through the establishment 
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of shared cooperative normative structures. In this way, governance beyond the state 
achieves a degree of fairness that is otherwise not possible. 
 
Under this view, if the city government is not acting as a proper steward of city space, 
some other form of governance can and should be invoked to limit the degradation of city 
resources. Foster and Iaione refer to this form of commons governance as “bottom up,” 
making room for co-partners, or co-collaborators, users of the commons and other actors 
who have a stake in the commons.288 They focus their analysis on the possibility of 
bringing more collaborative governance tools to “decisions about how city space and 
common goods are used, who has access to them, and how they are shared” among a 
diverse urban population.289 Under their view, urban commons are spaces that afford 
residents shared access to local urbanized resources, thus urban residents who are 
accessing urban resource pools have a common stake in ensuring the longevity of the 
resource.290  
 
The purpose of looking at the local governance model through the lens of the urban 
commons, especially where non-government actors play an important role, is to protect 
the “common good.”291 Zoning bylaws can be rethought as tools to promote the common 
good, for example, the use of exclusionary zoning tools as a tool to open access to the 
particular areas of the city to those who have been excluded.292 Non-state actors can get 
involved in a governance model where governments are too strained to address a broader 
range of city issues. Beyond pragmatic considerations, Foster and Iaione assert this 
broader claim in support of the view that, regardless of whether spaces are privately or 
publicly owned, the city is a territorial space in which citizens claim to have a role or 
stake, and this claim is reinforced by law.293  
 
This dissertation adopts Foster and Iaione’s conception of the urban commons to argue 
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that this framework may serve as a helpful model for a normative understanding of the 
smaller-than-city spaces to which a local governance model is then applied. The next 
section details the advantages of such a framework.  
 
3. The urban commons as a normative framework for local governance  
 
Local governance as understood within the lens of an urban commons framework is the 
crucial normative pillar in identifying and advancing a framework to understand a local 
legal space. What, then, would such a “local” urban commons look like? How would it 
advance the theoretical framework of a local legal space? The urban commons is 
consistent with a framework of local legal spaces that is multi-scaled, continuously 
created and recreated as a function of time, and measured based on the degree to which it 
enables a more inclusive, participatory approach to governance. This is the conception of 
local governance advanced in this dissertation.  
 
Viewing local governance through the lens of an urban commons has three normative 
benefits. First, the scalar logic of urban governance means that local governance can be 
understood as a cooperative decision-making model that moves beyond the state to 
include empowered non-state actors. To Foster and Iaione, the urban commons can be 
governed in a manner that empowers the local government and persons by having 
conditions that allow communities to autonomously decide on and enforce the rules for 
sharing and managing commons resources. In Foster and Iaione’s view, it is possible to 
re-situate city’s role as an enabler and facilitator of collaboration. Here, the state would 
create the conditions under which a city’s residents can develop collaborative 
relationships with each other and with public authorities. The idea is that the urban 
commons can then be used as a tool to reverse city inequalities by “empowering residents 
to collaborate in order to undertake the care and regeneration of the resources.”294 This 
collaboration, they argue, can take place across multiple scales, including more localized 
versions that exist in Toronto. For example, Foster provides extensive evidence that this 
is already taking place through organizations like BIAs and park conservatories that 
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receive authority to manage a city resource.295 This presumes that common interests exist 
among residents, local governments and other parties, such as businesses. 
 
Foster and Iaione use the concept of subsidiarity to “re-orient public authorities away 
from the central state to an active citizenry willing to cooperatively govern common 
resources.”296 As mentioned, the principle of subsidiarity provides that government 
powers should reside at the lowest level possible.297 The commons makes room for 
“bottom up” governance by co-partners, or co-collaborators, users of the commons and 
other actors who have a stake in the commons at the city-wide scale. Foster and Iaione 
endorse the urban commons as an opportunity to include collaborative governance tools 
in “decisions about how city space and common goods are used, who has access to them, 
and how they are shared” among a diverse urban population.298 They suggest that 
subsidiarity can be a design feature for urban commons governance as the citizen is 
conceived as active and willing to take care of shared resources. Perceived this way, 
residents have a role in the ongoing decision-making related to the city. Building on 
Santos’ notion of scale, this dissertation looks at the scale of local governance to 
understand how boundaries and governance would be impacted by such a reorientation 
and what it means for inclusivity.299 This first consideration is mindful of debates about 
neoliberal shifts in urban power and the retreat of governments and, as such, maintains 
that inclusive participation must be the underlying objective of a normative framework of 
local governance.300 
 
Second, the urban commons is consistent with the theoretical framework of local 
governance advanced in this dissertation in regard to flexibility. Norms and rules in 
respect of boundaries and governance shift over time, as is described in Toronto’s case in 
Chapter 3. Local legal spaces are continuously created and recreated. In pursuing the 
                                                
295 Ibid at 133. 
296 Ibid. at 326. 
297 Blank, supra note 127 at 279. 
298 Foster & Iaione, supra note 44. 
299 Santos, supra note 85 at 460. 
300 See e.g. Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (eds.), Of States and Cities – The Partitioning of Urban 
Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Susan S. Fainstein, The just city (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010). 
 	 68 
objective of a local legal space that enables participation and inclusivity, this dissertation 
adopts a flexible and contextualized approach to governance. This flexibility is inspired 
by the work of scholars who urge a less rigid concept of commons management.301 
According to Santos, the model for this public engagement and involvement should be 
complex and sophisticated to reflect the importance of overlapping, multifaceted, 
multiplayer decision-making at the municipal level. He favours this decisional 
complexity in stark contrast to the approach of Max Weber, who argues instead for 
rational bureaucracy. Santos proposed the following hypothesis: “in internally 
differentiated societies, the stronger the bond between democracy and distributive justice, 
the more complex the methodology that guarantees such bond tends to be. The decrease 
of complexity that bureaucracy allows for cannot but bring about the loosening of the 
bond between democracy and distributive justice.”302 Thus, a rational system of decision-
making misrepresents the messy reality of participatory democracy, which is 
interconnected with tugs and pulls of representation and delegation. Santos notes the 
tendency that, “irrespective of the plurality of normative orders circulating in society, 
each one of them, taken separately, aspires to be exclusive, to have the monopoly of 
regulation and control of social action within its legal territory.”303 But, what might 
happen if the foci of local governance are shifted without rigidity as to particular 
configurations? Can local legal spaces be contextual and flexible, even varied across 
different geographies?304  
 
Third, I argue that the urban commons provides a normative framework for distributive 
justice. Foster and Iaione state that, “The core impetus to conceive of the city as a 
commons aims at changing the democratic and economic functioning of the city,”305 to 
move towards “a system which at its core redistributes decision making power and 
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influence away from the center and towards an engaged public.”306 To Foster and Iaione, 
“a commons-based governance approach envisions cities as vehicles for collaboration 
across formal governance arrangements toward social and economic inclusion.”307 Foster 
and Iaione flag the following issues as ones to be considered in an urban commons: 
“[A]re collaboration arenas able to guarantee equal access by underrepresented groups 
who are too often unable to access political and larger decision making processes, or can 
the potential of such collaborative processes represent a significant step towards a more 
egalitarian process than currently exists? How can we avoid the risk that the collaborative 
ecosystem produces output that results in a patchwork, instead of a network, of 
governance arrangements for the urban commons?”308  
 
Likewise, this dissertation argues for a normative framing of local governance that is 
inclusive and participatory. In Chapter 6, I develop this normative argument in relation to 
Toronto’s local governance model, advancing four principles for local governance. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation uses the conceptualization of local governance as set out in this chapter 
to investigate the overlapping geographic boundaries and decision-making roles of 
Toronto’s four main localized governance bodies. This chapter sets out the framework to 
be used in the dissertation. First, this chapter sets out the framework that serves as the 
basis for the conceptualization of local governance, including the meaning and relevance 
of interlegality as drawn from legal pluralism and legal geography. 
 
Second, as the core element of this chapter, I bring together these literatures to offer and 
defend a two-part conceptualization of local governance that, first, local governance is 
pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple normative orders such that local 
spaces cannot be considered self-enclosed, autonomous units; and, second, that state 
iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, and spatial realities, through 
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multiple overlapping institutions; incorporate other norms, orders, rules and practices; 
and include and exclude certain people and communities through the setting of 
boundaries and participation rules.  
 
The chapter concludes by arguing that this conceptualization of local governance, 
examined alongside Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s concept of the urban commons, 
may be used to explore and evaluate how local bodies make overlapping and 
contradictory claims about their legal jurisdiction over segments of the city; and, second, 
to propose a local governance model that improves the inclusivity and participation of 
historically marginalized people.  
 
We next turn to the methodology adopted by this dissertation to understand the legal 
spaces of Toronto’s local governance model. 
 	 71 
Chapter 2 – The Methodological Puzzle 
 
Susan Fainstein writes, “[L]ocal policies make life better or worse for people. There are 
many decisions, especially involving housing, transport, and recreation, made at the local 
level that differentially affect people’s quality of life.”309 Taking the City of Toronto as 
its focus, this dissertation asks how local governance is conceptualized and reflected in 
the overlap of formal bodies empowered under applicable law and through the uneven 
involvement of non-state bodies that assert geographic boundaries and a representative 
role in local areas of the city. Fundamentally, as a dissertation rooted in law, it asks how 
legal rules may be used to foster inclusive connections and a just city.310   
 
On the one hand, this is a dissertation about how the law is used to create and reinforce 
physical boundaries and overlapping governing institutions within the city. On the other 
hand, this study also seeks to understand how institutions are used and acted upon outside 
of the formal contours of law. As such, the dissertation steps outside of a doctrinal review 
of applicable legal codes to invite a mixed methodological approach. The methodology 
adopted in this study combines doctrinal analysis with qualitative and basic quantitative 
empirical methods.  
 
My methodological approach is informed by the interplay of theory and method, and by 
the concept of positionality. Socio-legal researchers whose academic training is in law 
have been criticized as “methodologically unsophisticated.”311 To avoid such criticism, 
Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney suggest careful consideration of the adoption of an 
approach and method in light of the research question; review of academic literature on 
theory and method; and waiting until the research method and theoretical approach are 
clear before proceeding to the collection of data.312 While my approach included careful 
consideration of the underlying theory and method, and was clear as data collection took 
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place, I left space to undertake what Elinor Ostrom called “moving back and forth from 
the world of theory to the world of action.”313 As Ostrom notes, without theory, one is 
unable to understand the many dynamics that operate in different situations. Empirical 
work helps to centre theoretical work. This meant, during field work, continually coming 
back to my theoretical approach and research question to ensure intellectual honesty. 
Ostrom’s approach is consistent with those of Allaine Cerwonka, and Liisa H. Malkki, 
who do not agree with a reduction of observed practices to mere illustrations of ideas and 
who instead reflect on the process of observation as “partial understanding, as well as 
floods of insight.”314 An interpretive process in the approach of Ostrom, Cerwonka, and 
Malkki involves a “continuous movement between explanations (theories) about the 
object or process at issue and the parts that force adjustment or reaffirm the researcher’s 
initial “guessing.”315  
 
This interplay of theory and method held true in my research process. I initially decided 
to focus on community councils as my sole object of inquiry. As time progressed, I 
realized that a singular examination of community councils as expressions of local 
governance would limit my ability to understand the many bodies that informed how 
smaller-than-city spaces are governed, and that I needed to broaden the study to 
incorporate wards, neighbourhood associations and business improvement areas, each of 
which claimed physical boundaries and a mandate of representation.  
 
This realization mirrors the recognition in my theoretical framework that the nuances of 
local areas of the city are instrumental to understanding how these legal spaces are 
crafted through boundaries and governance. I began my dissertation with a reasonably 
clear sense of the theoretical framework that I would use during the study, believing that I 
would engage Gerald Frug’s meaning of “community” as a spatiotemporal concept that 
had limited application in Toronto given the differences in municipal legal structures in 
Canada and the United States. However, as I began to craft my detailed project outline 
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and to research the “law in the books” related to governance (what is now Chapter 3), the 
theoretical framework went through a period of adjustment. As I learned new details 
about the City of Toronto’s local governance model, my theoretical lens shifted, seeking 
to better explain what I was learning. I expanded the literature that I was engaging with 
beyond the familiar contours of legal scholarship, discovering theorists including 
Valverde and Blomley, whose research became central to my own. As my writing 
progressed, I used this work to articulate a conceptualization of local governance that 
could be evaluated using the case studies. 
 
The research question also became more refined as my field work and writing progressed. 
In late 2015, I had developed a conceptualization of local governance outlined in Chapter 
1 and was grounded within a prescriptive framework. As I interviewed councillors and 
senior staff members and explained the project to them, I observed the absence of a 
normative objective in my research question. This led me to consider the larger question 
of what I intended to advance as a theoretically-grounded meaning of local governance, 
ultimately leading me to consider the urban commons. What does this concept mean in 
the case of Toronto and its local legal spaces? Can the urban commons animate the goals 
of legal geography to move beyond analyzing how the “legal” and the “spatial” are 
mutually constitutive and instead to examine what the legal forms and geographies mean 
for inclusive, participatory governance grounded within an urban commons 
framework?316 Attending academic conferences and obtaining feedback on this 
intellectual and methodological journey were – and continue to be – particularly helpful 
tools to refine and make sense of the material with which I was engaging.  
 
My work is also deeply impacted by my own experiences working at Toronto City Hall 
and, as such, my positionality and prejudgments can never be erased from the knowledge 
production process that I engaged in throughout the data collection period. At the time 
that I began my doctoral work in 2012, I was working full-time as a civil servant in the 
City Manager’s Office working on intergovernmental files, mainly related to transit, 
infrastructure, and housing. I very consciously chose a topic that was unrelated to my 
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day-to-day work in order to create an intellectual distance between my dissertation 
project and what I called my “professional work.” I wanted to avoid concerns regarding 
ethics of engaging with relevant material outside of the strict parameters of permissible 
methods of data collection. However, my desire to engage in doctoral work was 
motivated by a gap in the analysis of Canadian urban governance that I had observed as a 
civil servant. In the transit, infrastructure and housing files that I worked on, I observed a 
lack of systemic processes for addressing the “local” aspects of city-wide decisions. This 
puzzle has undeniably influenced my perspective on local governance, much as I tried to 
avoid bridging my academic and professional work. This background further contributed 
to the desire for a normative understanding of “local governance ” that may guide how 
governments may enable a more inclusive, participatory city through the design of legal 
processes and institutions. 
 
The interplay of practical experience and scholarly work is not new in academia, 
particularly in the field of law, as constitutional law professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
observed in his scholarly work related to the development of neighborhood councils in 
Los Angeles.317 Chemerinsky recounted his role as a commissioner setting up the 
councils, including working with community stakeholders, weighing options and 
confronting political realities, observing at the end, “As with everything else in charter 
reform, the provisions concerning Neighborhood Councils were a compromise. It made 
me appreciate how much the United States Constitution, too, was a compromise.”318 
Thus, his expertise as a scholar and day-to-day experiences as a commissioner could not 
be disassociated, but instead merged in both his experience in city government and his 
analysis of neighbourhood councils.  
  
Philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer observes that method does not properly capture how 
knowledge gathering occurs.319 Instead, the act of interpreting always involves a “fusion 
of horizons” influenced by the historical specificity of the researcher, and the history and 
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character of the object of study.320 What we see as researchers is necessarily mediated by 
a vantage point that prioritizes particular information and questions to understand the 
phenomenon.321 In this study, my experiences at City Hall, both before and during the 
crafting of the dissertation, informed my interest in the topic, the lens through which I 
understood the issue, and facilitated connections to interview subjects that might not have 
otherwise been available to me. 
 
Research is “an attempt to discover something.”322 It is with the methodological tools 
described below that I embarked on the discovery that follows in this dissertation. 
 
I. Doctrinal analysis: textual review of case law and legislation 
 
Hoi Kong remarks that cities are “creatures of the law.”323 Likewise, this dissertation 
advances the idea that the legislative foundation of the city of Toronto provides an 
essential context for understanding the city’s governance institutions, as well as its view 
of what “local governance” means. While this dissertation draws on interdisciplinary 
work – particularly from the legal geography project – to challenge core concepts, the 
analysis is fundamentally rooted in a study of law. From a legal perspective, Toronto’s 
governance model is set out “in the books,” including provincial legislation and 
municipal bylaws. Similarly, this research seeks to understand how state law shapes 
narratives of engagement and participation, and to understand which voices are excluded 
within usual engagement practices, necessitating knowledge of how legal codes set out 
the local governance. The dissertation incorporates the analysis of legal doctrine, which 
includes both statutory interpretation and case law, to set out and understand Toronto’s 
institutions, legislative powers, and governance rules. This approach is also called “black 
letter law” or “formal” law and assumes that there exists a systemization of law that can 
be interpreted and known.  
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There is no agreement by legal theorists on the nature of doctrine as a discipline and the 
degree to which it draws from hermeneutic, argumentative, logical and normative 
elements.324 In property law, which I view as the legal family within which this study 
resides, a doctrinal approach has typically been used, professing to relate what the law is, 
not what it should be.325 Property law is considered to be a particularly complex exercise, 
where the question of “what is the law?” is the most difficult research question of all.326 
Mary Jane Mossman accounts for this complexity as follows:  
 
[P]roperty scholarship must take account of statutes, both ancient and modern, 
which are interwoven with common-law principles; as well, it must 
accommodate a background of ideas, often only implicit, about the 
constitutional protection of property interests. The tasks of enunciating the law 
and demonstrating the efficacy of its application in a particular context may be 
overwhelming in themselves; and these difficulties may provide at least a 
partial explanation for the absence of property scholarship that advances 
beyond explication of this sort. Moreover, the combination of provincial 
jurisdiction over property and the nature of property law analysis - an amalgam 
of statutes, common law, and constitutional principles - makes the task a 
daunting one indeed.327  
 
In Chapter 3, I follow these steps to set out the applicable law as it relates to the City of 
Toronto’s governance model. The legislation, namely COTA and other statutes such as 
the Planning Act, 2000, constitutes the City of Toronto as a corporate entity under 
provincial dominion. This legislation sets out the city’s boundaries, obligations and 
powers. I analyze provincial legislation that outlines Toronto’s powers and constraints, as 
well as legal decisions, particularly of the Supreme Court of Canada, that have 
interpreted the scope of municipal authority. There are nuances in the applicable law, 
especially regarding the interplay of provincial law and municipal bylaws, and of court 
cases and decisions of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). The dissertation benefits 
from a close textual reading of the relevant provisions, in particular the rules and 
                                                
324 Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
325 Martin Dixon, “A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law Scholarship: Who Cares and Why?” (2014) 3:3 
Prop L. R. 160. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Mary Jane Mossman, “Toward ‘New Property’ and ‘New Scholarship’: An Assessment of Canadian 
Property Scholarship” (1985) 23.4 OHLJ 633 at 635. 
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performance of community councils. I also examine the legislation that previously 
defined Toronto’s powers and obligations, particularly at the time of amalgamation in 
1998, as part of the story of how the city’s governance model has evolved.  
 
Chapter 3 describes wards and community councils as the local governance bodies 
formally endorsed by the city, analyzing the roles that these bodies play in local planning 
and other decisions. The city is divided into discrete electoral districts called wards, each 
of which has a population of approximately 60,000 residents who elect a councillor to 
represent them. In the 1998 amalgamation of seven municipalities to form the City of 
Toronto’s current municipal boundaries, the Province of Ontario created “community 
councils,” which were intended to bring the local voices of the pre-amalgamated 
municipalities formally within the city’s political structure. The City of Toronto’s 
procedural bylaw permits community councils to operate differently from other standing 
committees. This section illustrates the history and role that wards and community 
councils play in the City of Toronto’s formal local governance model.   
 
However, the city’s authorities under provincial legislation, and wards and community 
councils as the city’s formal local bodies, are only one part of the City of Toronto’s local 
governance story. As such, Chapter 3 examines business improvement areas (BIAs) and 
neighbourhood associations (NAs) as institutions that play a key role in the city’s 
governance. I explain how these bodies are created, managed and integrated into city 
decision-making in and outside of the law, including significant distinctions between the 
two types of bodies in their connections to councillors and bureaucrats, their uneven 
presence in the city, and their involvement in local planning decisions. Chapters 4 and 5 
each set out case studies to illustrate how Toronto’s formal local governance bodies 
(wards and community councils) interplay with informal bodies (BIAs and NAs) in 
decision-making at the smaller-than-city scale.  
 
The approach taken in this dissertation has two principal strengths. First, this dissertation 
contributes to an emerging legal scholarship on municipal governance in the Canadian 
context. In 2006, Ron Levi and Mariana Valverde published an article on the legal status 
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of Canadian cities by canvassing relevant doctrine and noting the lack of constitutional 
space for an expanded municipal authority.328 Since then, Hoi Kong has published several 
articles on cities, federalism, and administrative law.329 Kong’s articles include statutory 
interpretation and analysis of case law, contributing an understanding of the evolving 
political role of cities and the legal instruments that are used to both frame their powers 
and enable self-governance.330 My work builds on this emerging scholarship on Canadian 
municipal law by conceptualizing what is meant by local governance and how the urban 
commons may apply a normative framework in the Canadian urban context. I add to this 
conversation by theorizing the city in the context of legal pluralism and legal geography 
as comprising a plurality of laws, norms, and codes, and both state and non-state bodies 
that unevenly impact decision-making. Ultimately, I share many Canadian scholars’ 
objective to understand how municipal authority contributes to more inclusive cities.  
 
Second, legal analysis can expose particular aspects of the law through a careful textual 
analysis and a thorough reading of legislation and case law. Here, a close reading of the 
legislation and municipal bylaws in Chapter 3 suggests a set of powers for community 
councils that are rarely practiced. Thus, a review of law demonstrates a law “in the 
books,” but not “in action.”331 Likewise, Chapter 3 sets out an argument concerning 
subsidiarity that can be used in subsequent arguments for an augmented municipal 
authority. This approach also emulates Ostrom’s approach in her commons research 
whereby careful attention was placed on definitions and the institutional structures at the 
heart of the research.332 This dissertation’s doctrinal analysis will contribute to an 
understanding of how the law shapes Canadian cities that may be used by legal educators 
and practitioners, as well as those in the academy.333 
                                                
328 Levi & Valverde, supra note 134. 
329 See e.g. Kong, supra note 55 at 475. 
330 See e.g. Hoi Kong, “Subsidiarity, Republicanism and the Division of Powers in Canada” (2015) 
45 Revue de droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke 13. 
331 Valverde, supra note 191. 
332 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons 
(2011) 5:1 Int’l J of the Commons 9, online: < http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/SSRN-
id1962336.pdf>. 
333 Richard Posner, “Legal Scholarship Today” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314 at 1316, online: 
<http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2833&context=journal_articles> at 1317 
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However, in this dissertation and elsewhere, this traditional approach to legal analysis is 
rapidly expanding to include theoretical approaches such as law and economics, critical 
legal studies, law and society, critical race theory and others, resulting in transformations 
in the kinds of methodologies used.334 For example, scholars who ground their studies 
within a critical legal studies approach may move beyond doctrine to include semi-
structured interviews or participatory observation, in part, because doctrinal analysis does 
not acknowledge the liberal bias inherent in the law’s professed rationality and logic.335 
As Blomley notes, the way in which laws are described by governments does not assist us 
in fully understanding the legal space in operation.336 If black letter law or legal doctrine 
is the limit of the inquiry, then the research is failing to address the social, political and 
economic reality in which the rules sit.337 However, there is no consensus as to the extent 
to which these “non-law” or societal perspectives must be considered.338 At minimum, 
Mary Jane Mossman argues that an acknowledgment of the perspective from which a 
scholar is writing, their underlying values and assumptions, and the limits of rational 
discourse are essential in property law scholarship.339 In property law classes, these 
perspectives are referred to as “relevant policy considerations and societal goals.”340  
 
But, is this enough? I suggest that a layered, creative approach that moves beyond 
doctrine may better understand the legal dynamics at play in the creation and 
enforcement of jurisdictional boundaries, as well as the nature and inclusivity of the 
resulting governance model. This dissertation recognizes that “state” and “non-state” are 
                                                                                                                                            
(questioning whether the core audience for legal scholarship should continue to be legal practitioners like 
lawyers and judges or whether ideas are meant to be chiefly circulated amongst academics). 
334 Ibid. at 1316.  
335 Mossman, supra note 327 at 640. 
336 Blomley, supra note 50. 
337 Dixon, supra note 325. 
338 Harry T. Edwards, “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession” 
(1992) 91 Mich L R 34, 42-43 (1992)  
339 Mossman, supra note 327 at 651. 
340 Peter T. Wendel, “The Perfect Blend of Methodology, Doctrine & Theory” (1999) 22 Seattle Univ L R 
1031 at 1040, online: 
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rudimentary distinctions that are not, in practice, simple to distinguish.341 However, 
incorporating a qualitative approach through the methods described below provides a 
more fulsome analysis of Toronto’s governance model than reviewing provincial and 
municipal statutes, and by examining case law, which provides an incomplete picture as 
to how wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations inform the 
meaning of local legal spaces in Toronto. From an information-gathering perspective, 
learning from those who both designed and work within these bodies helped me to 
understand why decisions were made or events took place, absent data available on 
paper, in City Council decisions or on Hansard. To understand the local governance role 
of councillors, watching community council and other meetings helped me to observe the 
dynamics between councillors, representatives of neighbourhood association and BIAs. 
The two case studies allowed for an exploration of how geographic boundaries and 
overlapping governing institutions used and acted upon in city decision-making. In short, 
a methodological approach that integrated an examination of both doctrine and 
qualitative methods was consistent with the theoretical framework that guides this 
research. 
 
II. Case studies 
 
The lens of legal pluralism helps to see that many governance entities and institutions 
overlap within a localized space. This dissertation adopts a case study approach to 
understand how Toronto’s boundaries and governance institutions overlap.342 Case 
studies are used to explore a particular context and to understand how the people within 
interact with one another and the outside world.343 As stated by Chris Hart, case studies 
allow a researcher to “evaluate research within the paradigm in which it has been 
conducted,” in this case permitting me to understand the process of local governance 
                                                
341 Note also Peer Zumbansen’s thoughtful contributions regarding the challenge in distinguishing between 
legal and a non-legal forms of regulation within the context of transnational law (Zumbansen, supra note 
74). 
342 G. Thomas, “A Typology for the case study in social science following a review of definition, discourse 
and structure” (2011) 17(6) Qual Inquiry 511. 
343 Satnam Choongh, “Doing Ethnographic Research: Lessons from a Case Study” in Mike McConville and 
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) at 70 
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within the structures that it is operating.344 Case studies are not meant as a tool to create a 
grand, generalized theory of urban governance in Toronto or elsewhere; rather as a way 
of understanding how local governance occurs in a particular place and time.345 Authors 
must make clear why the case studies have been selected amongst the universe of 
possible studies and should set out sufficient contextual boundaries.346  
 
Case study research is helpful in illustrating, capturing and gaining insights on the 
complexity of Toronto’s local governance model. Most importantly, I selected cases that 
allowed me to test the conceptualization of local governance advanced in Chapter 1 as to 
how wards, community councils, BIAs and NAs framed their geographies and roles in 
regard to decision-making, and to identify which geographies and roles are included and 
excluded by the formal local governance model. This both serves a diagnostic purpose, 
meaning the application of the conceptualization of local governance, and sets the stage 
for the normative goal, which is to advance local governance that incorporates an urban 
commons framework.  
 
I used four criteria to determine case study selection. The first criterion, overlapping local 
governance institutions, means that wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations played or could have played a role in decision-making. This meant that the 
case studies must have been limited to the boundaries of the City of Toronto, rather than 
a decision that involved multiple municipalities. I did not purposely decide upon case 
studies that necessarily involved these four governance bodies; instead, I wanted to 
observe without prejudging the degree to which wards, community councils, BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations did or did not assert themselves as relevant. Second, I 
selected as case studies matters that were deemed to be “city-wide” issues – that is, 
matters where Toronto City Council served as the final decision-maker under applicable 
law. As will be described in Chapter 3, numerous studies have concluded that Toronto’s 
                                                
344 Chris Hart, Doing a literature review: Releasing the social science research imagination. (London: 
Sage, 1998). 
345 G. Thomas, “Doing case study: Abduction not Induction, phronosis not theory” (2010) 16(7) Qual. 
Inquiry 575 at 578. See, contra, Andrew Bennett, Case Study Methods: Design, Uses and Comparative 
Advantages 
346 Nerida Hyett, Amanda Kenny and Virginia Dickson-Smith, “Methodology or Method? A critical review 
of qualitative case study reports” (2014) 9 Int’l J of Qual Stud on Health & Well-being. 
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councillors are rulers of “fiefdoms,” exercising an overwhelming degree of power within 
their wards. As such, the case studies are each of “city-wide” issues, meaning that they 
are not confined to a matter solely concerning a single ward.347 Third, I selected case 
studies that concerned or tested geographic boundaries of local governance, meaning that 
the spatial aspects and governance elements were considered in tandem. Fourth, the case 
studies concerned distributive justice in that the issues to be decided would have 
localized implications for the health, safety and democratic power of residents.  
 
These criteria were consistent with the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 1. The 
two-part conceptualization of local governance queries what state law has done to cement 
an understanding of local and through what legal mechanisms and the competing legal 
notions of local within one context. Case studies allow for the exploration of a particular 
context or setting to understand how local governance is understood and shaped. The 
focus on specific case studies reveals how state iterations of local governance base 
themselves on rationales of closeness to residents, subsidiarity and legislative efficacy. It 
allowed me to test how entities and institutions are included in performances of local see 
what has been included in – and what has been left out of –state law’s conceptualization 
of local governance. 
 
Ultimately, three case studies were chosen. Chapter 4 sets out the first two, the 2012-13 
and 2015 casino decisions. In the 2012-13 casino debate, four casino options in two 
community council areas were identified as possible locations for a new casino in the 
City of Toronto. The 2015 casino decision concerned the expansion of the Woodbine 
Racetrack in the northwest part of the city. These two case studies provided insight into 
whether the site of a casino is a “local” or a “city-wide” matter and which bodies should 
be included in decision-making. It also illustrates differing levels of involvement of BIAs 
and neighbourhood associations as participants in the City of Toronto’s governance 
model.  
 
                                                
347 Moore, supra note 202 at 154. 
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Chapter 5 sets out the third case study, the ward boundary review, which was initiated in 
2013. This case study took place over two terms of City Council and concerned the 
drawing of new electoral district boundaries in Toronto. This was the first fulsome ward 
boundary review since amalgamation, as a more limited review in 2000 gave the City an 
opportunity to divide the 22 federal electoral districts in two to create 44 wards. This case 
study examined the meaning of local governance by examining which parts of the city’s 
local governance model was and should be engaged in decision-making; how 
“communities of interest” can and should be identified; and the interplay between wards, 
BIAs, neighbourhood associations and other bodies. The chapter also examines broader 
claims to local governance made during the review, including the number, mandate, and 
design of community councils and other place-based local governance institutions. 
 
III. Empirical research methods 
 
For my empirical research (namely, the case studies and the characterization of the 
institutional framework of the City of Toronto’s governance model), I employed a mix of 
qualitative methods including semi-structured interviews, participant observation at 
meetings and consultation sessions, archival research, and media analysis. I also used 
geographic information systems (GIS) and other quantitative data to illustrate other 
findings. This combination of methods allowed me to draw on a variety of sources and 
perspectives to develop a nuanced understanding of local governance. 
 
1. Semi-structured interviews 
 
The strengths of interviews, particularly semi-structured interviews, as a research method 
are well documented. As Kevin Dunn states, interviews are a respectful and empowering 
method for research participants, in that their views can be heard. As Gill Valentine 
notes, participants are free to respond openly, as opposed to providing fixed, categorized 
 	 84 
responses, and have the opportunity to explain their responses and redirect the question, 
which is not possible with techniques like questionnaires.348  
 
Semi-structured interviews rely on a predetermined line of questioning but allow for 
additional questions during the process of the interview.349 I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with former and current city staff and city councillors. The interviews are cited 
in Appendix A. City staff described the circumstances that led to the creation of and 
changes to community councils, how the ward boundary review and casino decisions 
were initiated, the way in which BIAs and neighbourhood associations are included in 
decision-making, and relationships between ward councillors and city staff. City 
councillors provided information on their roles and participation in the casino debates in 
particular, including how they saw their role in the local decision-making of a “city-
wide” issue and the degree to which they interacted with and involve BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations. I focused on interviews with staff and councillors to 
understand how they see the operation of local governance through the lens of formal 
structures. The purpose was to understand how these formal municipal actors understand 
the roles of BIAs and neighbourhood associations in decision-making processes. I drafted 
and forwarded to participants a list of broad questions in advance, but ultimately 
structured the interview as a conversation, rather than a series of rehearsed and carefully 
worded questions. In some cases, participants agreed to have the interviews taped, in 
which case they were recorded on a digital recorder and later transcribed. For those who 
preferred not to have their interviews recorded, I took detailed notes during the interview. 
In accordance with applicable human participant research standards, I honoured the 
requests of individuals to remain anonymous.  
 
Community councils were created at the time of amalgamation and were intended to 
serve as the locus of local participation, consultation and decision-making within the 
boundaries of the pre-amalgamated lower-tier municipalities. Community councils were 
                                                
348 Gill Valentine, “Tell me about…: Using interview as a research methodology” in R Flowerdew and D 
Martin, Methods in Human Geography: A Guide for Students Doing a Research Project (Edinburgh: 
Longman Press, 2005). 
349 K. Dunn, “Interviewing” in Iain Hay, Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography (2nd ed) 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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later reviewed by city staff, resulting in changes to the City of Toronto’s procedural 
bylaws setting out the role and function of these bodies. I was especially interested in 
speaking with senior staff from the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and the former 
pre-amalgamated municipalities who were involved in the creation of community 
councils in 1998, and those who authored the City of Toronto report on community 
councils in 2003 to better understand the rationale for the boundaries selected and the 
mandate of the community councils.350 As set out in Chapter 1, this dissertation argues, 
as Valverde and Massey do, that space and time are not discrete, separated concepts; they 
are instead part of one another. Similarly, the history of Toronto’s governance model, and 
especially the story of amalgamation, is present in contemporary rules and practices, too. 
These municipal actors are or were senior decision-makers in the city involved in the 
three case studies, so I was able to solicit information on how wards, community 
councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations were involved in their decision-making 
processes. Having engaged in work at the City of Toronto, I drew on my own knowledge 
and professional networks as starting points for who to interview. I asked each 
interviewee who would be helpful to interview next until I began hearing the names of 
those who had already been interviewed.351  
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the categories and number of interviewees. 
 
Interviewee 
category 
 
Number of 
interviewees  
Interview dates Focus of interview Relevant 
municipal 
governance body 
City staff 
(retired and 
current) 
 
6 • December, 
2015 
• March 2015 
• April 2016 
• February 
2016 
• February 
2016 
• Ward role in 
local decision-
making (6) 
• Decision-
making in city-
wide debates (6) 
• Design of 
community 
councils (3) 
• Ward 
• Community 
Council 
• BIA 
• NA 
 
                                                
350 See esp. City of Toronto, The process to establish community councils, online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/committees/community_councils_background.htm>. 
351 Annie Rochette, personal communications (31 May 2016). 
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• May 2016 • 2012-13 casino 
case study (3) 
• Ward boundary 
review (3) 
• Approaches to 
civic 
engagement (2) 
• Decision-
making in local 
planning 
processes (1) 
• 2015 casino 
case study (1) 
 
Municipal 
councillors 
(past and 
current) 
4 April 2015 
 
• Ward role in 
local decision-
making (4) 
• Decision-
making in local 
planning 
processes (4) 
• Decision-
making in city-
wide debates (4) 
• Design of 
community 
councils (4) 
• 2012-13 casino 
case study (3) 
• 2015 casino 
case study (2) 
• Ward 
• Community 
Council 
• BIA 
• NA 
 
Civil 
society 
activists 
 
3 March 2015 • Origin of the 
2012-13 casino 
debate 
• Role of 
councillors in 
the 2012-13 
casino debate 
 
Ward 
 
Table 2.1 - Interview participants and topics 
 
There are two limitations to my interviewing approach. First, three of the four councillors 
that were interviewed were from the Toronto-East York Community Council area. These 
 	 87 
three councillors were interviewed to understand their role in the 2012-13 casino debate 
in particular and their novel use of community councils in decision-making, as they 
represented wards identified as possible sites for a casino. I also wanted to interview 
councillors who were involved in the 2015 casino decision, which involved a ward in the 
Etobicoke-York community council area, but despite many attempts to reach out I was 
not able to secure interviews with these councillors. I attempted to overcome this 
limitation through a careful review of news media during the six-month period of the 
municipal debate, as well as interviews with a city staff member who was involved in the 
file. However, the lack of participation of councillors from this area serves as a 
significant limitation of the 2015 casino case study. 
 
Second, except for the 2012-13 casino decision case study, wherein I interviewed three 
activists who were the public of the involved in the opposition to a downtown casino, I 
did not interview non-staff members or non-councillors who attended consultations or 
interacted with ward councillors, community councils, BIAs or neighbourhood 
associations. This dissertation was focused on local governance as constructed by formal 
actors and within formal city governance bodies rather than the direct experiences of 
residents. For information on city engagement and civic participation in city processes, I 
relied on the work of scholars including Deborah Cowen and Vanessa Parlette, as well as 
news media.352 To understand the roles of BIAs and NAs, I supplemented my qualitative 
research with GIS mapping and quantitative methods, as outlined below. 
 
2. GIS data and Quantitative methods 
 
When I started the research, I was able to locate some case studies on the roles of BIAs 
and NAs in past municipal decisions, as well as a central databank of information with 
raw data on the city’s 81 BIAs.353 However, there was very little information on NAs. 
                                                
352 See esp. Deborah Cowen, “Suburban Citizenship? The Rise of Targeting and the Eclipse of Social 
Rights in Toronto” (2005) 6(3) Social and Cultural Geography 335; Vanessa Parlette and Deborah Cowen, 
“Dead Malls: Suburban Activism, Local Spaces, Global Logistics” (2010) 35:4 Int’l J of Urb & Reg Res 
794; Cowen & Parlette, supra note 153; and Lisa Marie Freeman, Making Room: The Geography of 
Rooming House Regulation in Toronto (University of Toronto: Dissertation, 2013).  
353 See Chapter 3. 
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There were also no studies such as the ones by Jill Gross examining the overall data on 
such bodies within a specific city.354 Given the dissertation question, I felt that an 
important exercise was gathering information on the locations, sizes, and budgets of BIAs 
and NAs throughout the City of Toronto. This exercise was relatively straightforward in 
the case of BIAs, where a great deal of information could be found on the City of Toronto 
website or obtained from city staff. As detailed in Chapter 3, the process was 
significantly more difficult in the case of NAs, as there is no centralized information, 
organizations may be inactive, and activities rely on the volunteer efforts of NA 
members. This methodological approach was invaluable in understanding the role of 
BIAs and NAs in governance, by identifying where they are geographically located, how 
they overlap with wards and community council boundaries, and their organizational 
sizes within different geographies of the city. 
 
Chapter 3 includes maps produced using GIS, setting out where BIAs and NAs exist 
within the city. Their locations are compared with ward and community council 
boundaries. The chapter also sets out the locations vis-à-vis other indicators including 
income levels to provide further information on the role of these bodies within particular 
areas of the city. This part of the dissertation also provides more quantitative data, 
including descriptive statistics on the specific locations of these bodies, their 
organizational size, budget, mandate and creation date. As noted in Chapter 3, this 
information was collected by canvassing the websites of BIAs and NAs, and by e-mailing 
them directly. Chapters 4 and 5 also include GIS maps of the showing the locations of 
BIAs and NAs in relation to the specific case studies. The purpose of these maps is to 
better illustrate the significant differences in the presence of these bodies across ward and 
community council areas and the overall effect on city governance. 
 
I did not interview representatives from BIAs and NAs, opting instead to use GIS 
mapping and the use of quantitative methods. This decision was based on three 
rationales. First and most importantly, my theoretical framework and normative argument 
                                                
354 Jill Simone Gross, "Business Improvement Districts in New York City's Low-Income and High-Income 
Neighborhoods" (2005) 19:2 Economic Development Quarterly 174. 
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are interested in how local governance is constructed by official actors and within official 
city governance institutions and, as such, I concluded that I could base my analysis on 
interviews with city officials together with other data. Second, I was able to locate 
information on the roles of BIAs and NAs in the case studies that form part of this 
dissertation. Many BIAs and NAs have detailed websites that include their deputations to 
the city, positions on issues, and commissioned planning reports. Also, the contributions 
of BIAs and NAs were noted in the reports prepared by the ward boundary review 
consultants and in media reports, especially newspaper articles. In my observations of 
ward boundary review open houses, I was able to observe the actions of BIA and NA 
representatives. Third, I was able to gather a significant amount of detail on the way in 
which these bodies understood their overall role in governance through their websites and 
by contacting them directly. As a result, I concluded that I had data outside of interviews 
to draw on regarding the local governance role of BIAs and NAs in the case studies and 
concerning the overall research question.  
 
3. Participant observation 
 
Participant observation is “the systematic description of events, behaviors, interactions, 
and artifacts (objects) in the social setting chosen for study."355 This approach allows 
researchers to locate themselves within the natural setting of the people or institutions 
under study through observing activities.356 Irus Braverman notes that observation and 
ethnography have specific relevance to legal scholars, suggesting that due to “our 
familiarity with administrative  structures  and  bureaucratic reasoning, as well as our 
affiliation and heightened access to professional experts and government schemes,  legal 
scholars may play an  important  role in what cultural anthropology has termed ‘studying 
up’, ‘multi-sited’, ‘engaged’, and ‘para’-ethnographies.”357 She states that in exercising 
                                                
355 Catherine Marshall & Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Singapore: Sage 
Publications, 2016) at 79. 
356 Kathleen Musante DeWalt & Billie R. DeWalt, Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers 
(New York: Altamira Press, 2002) at vii. 
357 Irus Braverman, “Who’s Afraid of Methodology? Advocating a Methodological Turn in Legal 
Geography” in Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar (eds), The 
Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) at 120-
121. 
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this role, legal scholars are “familiar with legal language and therefore ‘insiders’ in the 
legal world. As a result, we are probably both better-situated and better-equipped than   
scholars   in   other   disciplines   to   explore   the   intricacies   of   various administrative 
structures.”358  
 
Participant observation allowed me to understand the practices of community council 
meetings and consultations. Toronto’s four community councils meet monthly, other than 
in August, on the same day. I attended one of each monthly community council meetings 
in 2015 and 2016, staying from 9:30 am, when the meeting began, either to the 
conclusion or until 5:00 pm, whichever was earlier. I also attended committee meetings 
where issues relevant to the case studies were considered, such as the Executive 
Committee meeting in May 2015 where the expansion of the Woodbine Casino was 
considered. In addition, I attended and participated in two consultation sessions in 
Toronto and Scarborough concerning the ward boundary review.359  
 
By attending these meetings and observing dynamics, I was able to see how councillors 
and staff interacted, the types of sub-issues considered, and the role and engagement of 
the public, including BIA and neighbourhood association representatives. Community 
councils largely serve as local planning committees, with oversight over matters like 
amendments to the city’s zoning bylaw, whether trees may be removed from private 
property, and front-yard parking. At the first community council meeting that I attended, 
I became aware of the difference in atmosphere when certain planning issues were 
considered by the community council, and the room transformed into what I call “trial-
like.”360 In the morning, developers and lawyers sat at a table in front of the community 
council members and were interrogated as to height densities and other similar matters. 
Later, when issues like street parking and trees were considered, the developers and 
lawyers left, and the room felt relaxed, with councillors and members of the public 
speaking far more informally with one another. Likewise, at the meeting of the Etobicoke 
                                                
358 Ibid. 
359 Ward boundary review consultation session, Metro Hall, 55 John Street (October 7, 2015, 7-9 PM) and 
Ward boundary review consultation session, Wilmar Heights Event Centre, Scarborough (October 17, 
2015, 10 AM - 12 PM).  
360 Toronto-East York Community Council, Committee Room 1 at Toronto City Hall (February 18, 2015). 
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Community Council on January 19, 2016, I felt the physical separations limiting the 
degree to which residents could see councillors sitting at the front of the room. I was also 
able to see distinctions amongst the four community councils, including the degree to 
which “community” issues beyond transactional planning matters were raised.  
 
Observing meetings also helped me understand who was attending, including 
representatives of BIAs and NAs. This proved to be especially important to the ward 
boundary review consultations, as representatives of BIAs and NAs were the main 
attendees and contributors. While the ward boundary review consultants published 
detailed accounts of the meetings, attending in person helped to understand their roles 
and contributions to the debate. By attending the meetings in person, I was better able to 
understand the nuanced operation of community councils. Without attending in person, 
the only records are the electronic meeting agenda, the list of deputants, the motions 
introduced and the voting record. Unlike City Council and the Executive Committee 
meetings, community council meetings are not recorded on video. In some ways, they are 
like any other City Council committee, delegated a decision-making role over a particular 
subject area and operating with a sharp division between councillors and the public. 
However, they also have attributes of the community or neighbourhood forums that were 
originally intended when the City of Toronto was amalgamated in 1998, and the 
procedural bylaw was redrafted in 2006. These experiences would not have been possible 
without attending the meetings. 
 
4. Archival research 
 
Archival research consists of documents and textual material by and about an 
organization created in the past that may not be otherwise available.361 Consistent with 
the theoretical framework that underlies this project, I understand that archived material 
is created within particular institutional, social, political and economic contexts and that 
the documents that I was reviewing were telling a very specific version of history, mainly 
from the perspective of councillors and staff members. While the archived materials are 
                                                
361 Marc J. Ventresca and John W. Mohr, “Archival Research Methods” in Joel A. C. Baum, ed. 
Companion to Organizations (Blackwell Publishers, 2001) at 2. 
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not a “true, accurate or absolute account of the past,”362 they do offer a part of the story 
and, in particular, additional materials beyond the online repository for staff reports to 
add context and understanding to the decisions made at particular junctions.  
 
As Marc Ventresca and John Mohr observe, written records can act as an essential tool of 
bureaucratic decision-making: “Indeed the production of written documents may well be 
the most distinctive quality of modern organizational life. Few official actions of any sort 
are conceived, enabled, or enacted without having been written down both in advance, in 
retrospect, and invariably several more times in between.”363 The crammed boxes from 
city councillors, filled with drafts and redrafts of selected city staff reports, meeting 
minutes and agendas, reflected these materials as the tools of city government. 
Documents are a fundamental element of bureaucracy, solidifying the positionality of the 
actors who tell the story of particular events.364 Even the Toronto City Archives itself, a 
municipal department, exhibits bureaucratic control, requiring researchers to sign in to 
access boxes, introducing finding aides, and expecting researchers to interact with 
archived materials in very specific ways, such as working exclusively on one desk and 
limits on copying or photographing material.  
 
The pluralist framework of this dissertation recognized that formal laws are based on 
official decision-making, and the on-line and archived materials affirmed that municipal 
and provincial governments considered and enacted rules that framed the city’s “local” 
boundaries and governance bodies. The minutes, agendas, staff reports and studies 
contained within the busy archived boxes included notes written in margins by 
councillors, noting the points that they acknowledged as especially important in debates. 
The boxes also contained newspaper clippings. 
 
I canvassed two kinds of archives: the online archives, available through the City of 
Toronto website, and boxes and materials found at Toronto City Archives. The archival 
research took place in the early stages of this project to help in defining the key questions 
                                                
362 Ibid.  
363 Ibid. at 3. 
364 Ibid. at 4. 
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of the dissertation and to establish a base of evidence for events that took place in part 
decades ago.365 I used these materials to create an inventory of decisions on the creation 
of local boundaries and governance bodies that had been taken by the Province of Ontario 
and relevant municipal governments, including the City of Toronto and the pre-
amalgamated municipalities. This inventory served as a timeline that was drafted and re-
drafted as more information became known.  
 
Attention was placed on finding reports, notes and decisions related to three key events in 
the consideration of local legal spaces: the consideration of community councils by the 
Toronto Transition Team in 1997-98; the Toronto ward boundary review in 2000; and the 
refinement of community councils in 2002-2003. The online archive system for the 
period in question resulted in limited findings, so visits to Toronto City Archives were 
crucial in retrieving relevant materials. For example, only by going through archived 
boxes was I able to find hundreds of pages of meeting materials of a 2003 sub-committee, 
chaired by then-Councillor David Miller, devoted to the question of community councils. 
This discovery was an “aha!” moment in this early period of research.366 This material 
was invisible in the city’s online archive system. 
 
Online archives were invaluable in finding more contemporary information on the case 
studies. The City of Toronto’s online portal includes all staff reports, attachments, voting 
records, motions and lists of deputants for all City Council and committee decisions 
dating back to 2006. Having worked at the City of Toronto, I was comfortable and adept 
at navigating the online portal.  
 
It was my intention to help to tell part of the story through the material gathered, 
particularly the way in which local legal spaces were considered and crafted by city 
officials. While unexpected, these archived materials were also helpful for the conduct of 
semi-structured interviews. Staff reports and other written materials were used to 
“trigger” the memories of key staff members who were a part of key decisions. Within 
                                                
365 Ibid. at 4. 
366 Alexis E. Ramsey, Ad Dressing the Past: A Critical Methodology for Archival Research in Rhetoric and 
Composition (Unpublished Dissertation: Purdue University, 2008) at 96. 
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the pluralist framework of the dissertation, the use of archived materials helped me to 
revisit with interviewees the environment of the city between 1997 and 2003, when 
amalgamation took place, and key decisions were made regarding ward boundaries and 
community councils, and to interpret the rationale and context for the production of 
certain reports by city staff.367  
 
5. Media analysis 
 
This dissertation also adopted media content analysis. The principal use was to overcome 
a methodological weakness of not having secured interviews with councillors in the 
Etobicoke-East York community council area regarding the 2015 casino debate. As 
media analysis was a supporting methodology, I adopted clip-counting, which means, 
“relevant articles are collected and typically sorted chronologically or by date.”368 I 
conducted a careful review of these news media during the six-month period of the 
municipal debate.  
 
In conclusion, this dissertation adopted a mixed methods approach to investigate the 
conceptualization of what local governance means in the City of Toronto as a result of 
the overlap of various local governance institutions. This is a dissertation primarily 
rooted in law, and therefore details the relevant legislation, case law and policy reports 
that inform this question, in particular, the role of wards and community councils as the 
bodies with formal authority to represent local geographies and residents. However, this 
dissertation adopts a mixed methodological approach to understand how formal and 
informal bodies claim to represent those within smaller-than-city areas of the city, 
examining their legal structures, the geographies of local that they advance, and the 
implications for the meaningful participation of residents across the city. The theoretical 
framework and the conceptualization of the term local governance identified in Chapter 1 
inform the methodology outlined in this chapter and are then queried in the empirical 
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studies that follow. The intention is to provide a deeper account of the meaning of local 
governance in Toronto. 
 
 
 	 96 
Chapter 3 – Demystifying Toronto’s messy local governance model 
 
Local legal spaces in Toronto are governed by a complex set of municipal, provincial and 
federal statutes, bylaws, and policies, as well as informal processes and relationships. The 
aim of this chapter is to analyze local legal spaces in law and action and to apply the 
conceptualization of local governance provided in Chapter 1. This chapter animates the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 1 by conceptualizing “local governance” as a pluralist 
space comprised of state and non-state actors that assert boundaries and rules and 
analyzes the implications for who is excluded as a result of this model. I argue that 
amalgamation led to a gap in inclusive, participatory local governance which the city 
government has yet to fill, a weakness in the model that this dissertation seeks to address. 
I argue that four factors contributed to an uncertain and unequal local governance model: 
the unfulfilled, post-amalgamation mandate of community councils; the empowerment of 
the ward, rather than the community council, as the site of local decision-making; the 
geographically uneven rise in the number and influence of neighbourhood associations 
and business improvement areas; and the City of Toronto’s procedural distinction 
between “local” and “city-wide.” In Chapter 6, this dissertation turns to the normative 
question of how understanding local governance within the framework of an urban 
commons could be used to reimagine the City of Toronto’s local governance model.  
 
This chapter first sets out the legal framework for understanding the evolution of 
Toronto’s authority and the power it presently has to determine its governance model. 
This section first provides context for how local governance changed as a result of 
amalgamation, shifting what was once regional (Metro Toronto) to city-wide (City of 
Toronto), but without empowering  local legal spaces within the new governance model. 
The purpose is to clarify that under COTA and case law that advances subsidiarity as a 
judicial principle, Toronto has sufficient power to create a governance model that 
empowers localized decision-making.  
 
Second, I set out the law and role of the city’s formal local legal spaces: community 
councils and wards. Community councils, while purportedly set out in law as 
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replacements for pre-amalgamated municipalities, are in practice disempowered planning 
committees that rarely exercise their procedural mandate to consider “neighbourhood 
issues.” This section revisits the literature canvassed in Chapter 1, arguing that the city 
has opted not to delegate greater authority to community councils, notwithstanding their 
capacity to bring a broader set of voices to local decision-making. Here, I introduce and 
critique the city’s procedural distinction between “local” and “city-wide” issues. 
 
I argue that, within this formal model, ward councillors serve as the principal drivers of 
local decision-making. Wards themselves have long served as defenders of boundaries 
that define particular communities and interests, some of which have historical 
significance as distinct villages or towns. In this capacity, wards are meant as spatial 
areas that serve both as the locus of public contact with decision-makers and empower 
ward councillors to represent the interests of those within their boundaries. However, 
drawing on interviews with senior staff members and councillors, I suggest that the 
absence of other formal local legal spaces leaves councillors serving as the “ward boss,” 
granted considerable deference in matters that affect the spatial and other decisions 
within their boundaries. The power of the councillor includes the extent to which 
community councils will be used as bodies considering “neighbourhood issues.” 
 
Third, I analyze the role and rise in number of business improvement areas and 
neighbourhood associations since amalgamation. Scholars including Moore and Martin 
have observed the crucial importance of these bodies in particular when it comes to city 
governance.369 Like wards and community councils, these bodies are spatially based 
within smaller-than-city areas within the city. They each claim to represent some or all 
residents or businesses within their boundaries. From this perspective, they appear to 
challenge the formal city structure as bodies with other versions of boundaries, and their 
distinct claims of representation and participation. These bodies also interface with 
elected and city officials in a range of manners, with delegated powers for park 
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redevelopment or city beautification.370 From a legal perspective, their connection to city 
governance manifests differently, with BIAs having a formal connection to the city, as 
“city boards” with access to funding and with institutional assistance, while NAs serve as 
local lobbyists with uneven roles across the city. The purpose of this part is to highlight 
the importance of these bodies in framing local governance within certain localized areas 
of the city, while at the same time contributing to significant challenges for inclusive 
representation.  
 
I conclude the chapter by drawing on the work of Santos and Valverde to argue that a 
ward-based power at the local level leads to uneven governance. Local legal spaces in 
law are framed within a ward-based model, highly contingent on the objectives and 
practices of individual councillors. Ward councillors serve as the primary local decision-
makers despite the existence of community councils, which have authority “in the books” 
to exercise more power in local decision-making. The City of Toronto reinforces the 
focus of local governance to the ward level by creating an artificial procedural distinction 
between “local” and “city-wide,” and by exercising considerable power in the creation 
and operation of BIAs and neighbourhood associations, which themselves are 
unrepresentative of the residents within their boundaries. The effect is a governance 
model that empowers the ward councillor, disproportionately focuses attention on 
planning issues to the detriment of other city matters, and undermines the inclusivity of 
participation.  
 
I. Governing Toronto 
 
The city has been an object of study in countless disciplines, both in and outside the 
law.371 It has also been studied amongst disciplines – for example in politics and law - in 
recognition that it is an inherently interdisciplinary subject.372 Cities have been studied 
                                                
370 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
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371 Kong, supra note 53 at 478. 
372 Joan C. Williams, “The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of 
City Status in American Law” (1986) Wis. L. Rev. 83, online: 
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from the “bottom up” and the “top down,” and within the context of street-level activity 
through to its relationships at regional, provincial, federal and international levels. As a 
corporation and a government, it is a fascinating site for legal and socio-legal study, as it 
is enabled and restricted by legislation, owns and manages its land, and has fiduciary and 
other kinds of obligations. The city is also understood as a party with interests that it may 
assert concerning other governments or actors – it can sue and be sued, buy and sell, and 
create legal structures for its effective operation.  
 
The city may be understood within the context of the one or more pieces of legislation 
that empower it to exist and to act.373 “Municipal” in this context means the one or more 
statutes that give corporate entities their powers. The term “city” is, in statutory terms in 
Ontario, undefined. The most recent set of municipal statutes removed references to titles 
like “city,” “town” and “village.”374 However, my framing of the “city” within the 
context of legal pluralism and legal geography places it outside of the familiar and safe 
contours of municipal statutes.375 In particular, this chapter situates Toronto’s local 
governance model as an overlapping set of “local legal spaces” that explicitly include 
“formal” bodies set out in law and “informal” bodies with relationships to the City of 
Toronto, each of which represents distinct boundaries and governance roles. I suggest 
that the local governance model impacts who may participate in decision-making by 
privileging particular organizations and city issues deemed to be “local” under city 
bylaws and provincial law, namely ward-based planning decisions.    
 
This first section of the chapter focuses specifically on the legal history of the City of 
Toronto since amalgamation to demonstrate how the legal meaning of “local,” “city-
                                                                                                                                            
that political perspectives on municipal autonomy and excessive governmental power guide judicial 
decision-making, rather than precedents relating to cities' resources and responsibilities). 
373 In Ontario, there are two principal pieces of legislation that determine the powers and obligations of 
local governments: COTA, supra note 11 applies exclusively to Toronto, while the Municipal Act, 2001, 
S.O. 2011, c. 25 applies to all other 444 municipalities. There are dozens of other pieces of legislation that 
impact local governments as well, including the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P. 13, the Places to Grow 
Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 13, and Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.50, to name a few. 
374 Municipal Act, s. 457(1). 
375 Note e.g. Statistics Canada’s 2011 changes in the definition of “urban” which offers three categories to 
reflect what it calls the “urban-rural continuum”: Statistics Canada, From urban areas to population centres, 
online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/subjects/standard/sgc/notice/sgc-06>.  
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wide” and “regional” has changed as a result of new provincial legislation, case law, and 
changes to municipal bylaws. The section builds on the work of Frug, Layard and 
Schragger to explain how the City of Toronto sets out its local governance model, 
including applicable institutions and geographies under the various rules to which it is 
bound and has considerable authority to redesign its local model. This section provides a 
foundation for the remaining sections of this chapter by setting out the vertical tensions 
and interlegalities that claim to represent smaller-than-city areas of the city and the 
implications for the meaningful participation of residents.  
 
1. A brief history of Toronto’s boundaries 
 
The land upon which the City of Toronto sits has a rich history of colonial desettlement 
of indigenous peoples, incorporations, annexations, amalgamations, legislative 
enactments and governance reviews.376 The British government asserted power over the 
Indigenous communities residing in what it is the City of Toronto beginning from the 
period of contact ultimately leading to treaties that limited the expression of indigenous 
sovereignty over this land.377 European populations gradually moved into these spaces, 
and many of the areas that are now known as “wards” were independent villages and 
towns. Since 2001, the Province of Ontario has granted authority to municipalities to set 
city-wide (meaning the boundaries of the city as a whole), as well as local or ward 
boundaries, otherwise known as “electoral districts.”378  
 
In Chapter 1, I introduced local legal spaces as including the notion of time as integrated 
and interpenetrated.379 As an empirical matter, as we will see in this section, time is not 
just a relevant, but a crucial element of analysis. Toronto began as a minor post and 
warehouse as part of the French fur trade but had been long inhabited by Indigenous 
                                                
376 This dissertation does not consider Indigenous settlement and claims over what is now the City of 
Toronto, but acknowledges that it is the traditional territory of the Huron-Wendat, the Mississaugas of the 
New Credit and the Haudenosaunee peoples, known as Turtle Island. 
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Toronto: Unpublished Dissertation, 2010). 
378 Municipal Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 25, s 222. 
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peoples prior to this time.380 Lieutenant-Colonel John Graves Simcoe incorporated York 
(later Toronto) as a township in 1793, bounded by George, Berkeley, Adelaide and Front 
streets.381 It was essentially a garrison town, given its strategic proximity to the Great 
Lakes.382 Simcoe entrenched in Upper Canada (part of present-day Ontario) “top-down 
government in the colony, and encouraged York’s superiority, with its haughty customs 
and attitudes, and the distinctive British and Anglican character it would retain for 
decades.”383 It was incorporated as a city and renamed “Toronto” in 1834 and, by this 
point, the boundaries extended from Parliament, Bathurst and Queen streets down to 
Lake Ontario.384 The first elected mayor was Canada’s future prime minister, William 
Lyon Mackenzie.385 Upon its incorporation, the city was divided into five wards: St. 
Andrew’s, St. David’s, St. George’s, St. Lawrence and St. Patrick’s.386 The legal 
authorities of the city included police, firefighters, taverns, Sabbath observance and 
billiards, and the mayor served as chief magistrate for city quarter sessions, which 
deliberated on issues of public morality, like drunken and disorderly conduct.387 The 
mayor of the city was chosen by the ten aldermen elected in five wards who, along with 
ten common councilmen who represented the city as a whole, formed Toronto’s first city 
council.388 From 1834 until the 1880s, the outer boundaries of what was then the City of 
Toronto largely remained unchanged.  
 
Toronto grew substantially during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries by 
annexing surrounding territory, an approach to municipal expansion that occurred in 
many other cities in North America. Many of these communities continue to maintain 
strong identities and are acknowledged in ward names and by neighbourhood 
associations, as we will see in the next section. These annexed areas were previously 
                                                
380 J.M.S. Careless, The Rise of Cities in Canada before 1914 (The Canadian Historical Association, 
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comprised of both incorporated and unincorporated communities. By 1901, the 
boundaries of Toronto extended west to High Park, north to the country beyond Yorkville 
Village, and east to the Don.389 These annexations included the Yorkville Village in 
1883, the Annex in 1887, Seaton Village in 1884 and, the following year, the town of 
Parkdale, all of which have retained their names and have been maintained as 
“communities of interest,” as we will see in Chapter 5.390 After the war, the city expanded 
to St. Clair Avenue, past Danforth Avenue and west to Jane street.391 In terms of notable 
land masses, High Park was given to Toronto in 1873, along with a deed that the park 
remain, “for the free use, benefit and enjoyment of the citizens of Toronto.”392 West 
Toronto Junction and North Toronto were annexed in the early 1900s. After 1910, most 
districts located outside of the city core incorporated as separate political entities.393 By 
1941, the western suburbs included the Village of Swansea, Long Branch, Mimico, New 
Toronto, the Townships of York, North York and East York, together with the Villages 
of Forest Hill and Leaside. To the east, Scarborough Township remained largely rural.  
 
The ward has remained constant in Toronto’s history since its colonial creation in 1834, 
regardless of assertions of legislative power that have molded geographic boundaries and 
authorities to govern. The concept of a ward has its genesis in the United Kingdom, 
where it served as an administrative division of a country with its own local decision-
making body, represented by land owners, which met monthly and was used to resolve 
private disputes and criminal matters.394 Now, the ward is an electoral district of a city or 
borough that is represented by an elected official.395 The “ward” is not defined in 
Ontario’s provincial or municipal statutes, but serves a crucial role in the city’s 
governance model for the representation of local interests.396 Within this model, wards 
                                                
389 Ibid at 87. 
390 Ibid at 87. 
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serve as demarcated boundaries that define particular “communities of interest” some of 
which have historical significance as distinct villages or towns. Then and now, wards are 
also entrenched in the city’s governance model as vehicles for representative democracy, 
with councillors playing both a legislative and constituency role.397 In their legislative 
roles, they pass laws, create policies and programs, determine the service mix and service 
levels, and oversee the work of departments.398 In their constituency activities, they are a 
direct connection between their residents and city governments, a function that absorbs a 
substantial amount of their time.399 As a City of Toronto senior staff member told me, 
“One of the advantages of the ward and riding system is there actually is somebody to go 
to and somebody who can convey a geographic area’s interest… So each councillor has 
dual roles, they’re part of a government, in the absence of a party, they’re all part of a 
government, but they’re also representatives of community.”400   
 
In 1954, the Province of Ontario formed a regional (or upper-tier) municipality, 
comprised of members from lower-tier municipalities, called the Metropolitan Toronto 
Federation (“Metro”).401 Metro had the same geographic boundaries as the current City of 
Toronto. At the time, there were 13 lower-tier municipalities, later amalgamated to form 
a total of six cities and boroughs.402 One of the purported reasons for the decision to form 
a regional government was the great inequality across the Metro region, and the belief 
that Metro would more fairly equalize transit and core social services.403 Metro would 
manage matters of “regional” interest, while the six lower-tier municipalities including 
Toronto would oversee “local” matters.404 However, at the local level, the municipalities 
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in the metropolitan area, except Mimico, “guarded their respective neighbourhoods like 
medieval warlords.”405   
 
 
Illustration 3.1: Map of Pre-amalgamated City of Toronto, 1967-1997406 
 
Illustration 3.1 shows the boundaries of the pre-amalgamated City of Toronto between 
1967 and 1997. The period between 1954 and 1997 saw changes to the division of power 
amongst the upper and lower-tiers and the way in which decisions were made within the 
municipalities. For example, representation on both the Metro and lower-tier councils 
were initially decided based on the electoral district: two councillors were elected from 
each ward and the one with the most votes represented the ward on both their local and 
the Metro council, while the second-place finisher served on the lower-tier council.407 
The result was that success for Metro councillors ultimately meant preoccupation with 
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local issues and interests.408 This changed in 1988, where councillors were directly 
elected to serve on Metro council.409 Continued friction ultimately led to the 
establishment of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Task Force, led by Anne Golden, on 
April 1, 1995.410 The Task Force’s mandate was to recommend a governance model best 
suited to address lagging economic growth, costs urban development patterns and 
authority for service delivery, among other concerns.411 
 
As such, the timing of provincial legislation to reconsider the governance of the Metro 
area was not entirely surprising, although the lack of clarity around the rationale was 
mystifying.412 In 1997, the Province of Ontario introduced Bill 103, a highly 
controversial piece of legislation that would ultimately establish the new amalgamated 
City of Toronto. At the time that this legislation was introduced, seven municipalities 
existed within the geographical boundaries of the City – the upper-tier Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto (“Metro”), which was responsible for “regional” issues like transit, 
regional planning and libraries, as well as the six local municipalities of the Borough of 
East York, the City of Etobicoke, the City of North York, the City of Scarborough, City 
of Toronto and the City of York. What was once regional (the upper-tier Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto) would become city-wide (the amalgamated City of Toronto), 
although some of the regional functions – in particular, transit and planning – were 
retained by the province rather than delegated to the new City of Toronto. 
 
The power to create a ward system has only very recently been delegated to 
municipalities. At amalgamation, the Province set the number of single member wards at 
57, down from the 106 elected officials across the regional and local municipalities, and 
gave the next City of Toronto the power to create to designate the number and location of 
wards.413 This power was revoked by the province within a year and only reinstated with 
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the introduction of COTA. 
 
In December 1998, shortly after amalgamation, City Council adopted a new ward 
structure based on 57 single member wards for the 2000 election. A March 1998 staff 
report set out the purpose of moving to a single member ward structure – rather than 
emulating the Metro structure of a two-tier representative model – was to “increase the 
accountability of Members of Council and reduce confusion on the part of residents.”414 
Staff explored five possible approaches and ultimately recommended the creation of 57 
wards on the basis that, “The average ward population per elected official would remain 
at its current level of around 39,000.” City Council enacted By-laws Nos. 228-1999 and 
275-1999 to create the new wards.415 These by-laws were appealed to the Ontario 
Municipal Board (OMB), and were upheld, with some amendments, but were never put 
into effect.416  
 
Instead, in 1999, the Province introduced the Fewer Municipal Politicians Act, aimed at 
reducing the overall number of councillors.417 The legislation tied Toronto’s ward 
boundaries to those of the Province, who had adopted the same boundaries as the federal 
electoral districts in the mid-1990s. The Province designated 44 wards for Toronto: the 
22 provincial/federal ridings, divided by two.418 Federal ridings are strictly reviewed 
every ten years by an independent commission based on population and other criteria.419 
The Act also removed Toronto’s just-granted authority to enact a by-law to change the 
ward structure or Council composition, although allowed Toronto to recommend how 
each of the 22 provincial electoral districts should be divided to create 44 wards.420 Over 
a single month, in January 2000, the City through the City Clerk’s Office held public 
                                                
414 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., and Thomas Ostler. 
Toronto ward boundary review: background research report (2014), online: <https://perma.cc/27K7-
VPJH>.  
415 City of Toronto Clerk, City of Toronto Council and Committees" (1999), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/2000/agendas/committees/adm/adm000111/it001.htm>. 
416 Canadian Urban Institute, et al. supra note 414. 
417 Bill 25 Fewer Municipal Politicians Act, 37:1 Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1999. 
418 Canadian Urban Institute, et al. supra note 414 at 2-3. 
419 Ibid. at 3. 
420 Ibid. at 33. 
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open houses to gather public input concerning the appropriate boundaries.421 On January 
19, 2000, City Council adopted recommendations to divide the 22 electoral districts into 
44 wards and forwarded those recommendations to the Minister. On March 20, 2000, the 
provincial government issued Ontario Regulation 191/00, establishing the City of 
Toronto's new ward structure, effective December 1, 2000. Illustration 3.2 shows the 
current ward boundaries of the City of Toronto, which have remained unchanged since 
2000. 
 
As a result of COTA’s enactment, the city now has full authority over its system of 
representation, including powers related to “establishing, changing or dissolving 
wards.”422 The Act clarifies this power in section 128(1), where it states: “Without 
limiting sections 7423 and 8,424 those sections authorize the City to divide or redivide the 
City into wards or to dissolve the existing wards.” The City is empowered to determine 
its manner of representation – whether through the election of councilors based on wards, 
elected at-large, or some combination of the two.425 This means that the City may also 
eliminate all wards. 
 
                                                
421 City Clerk, Toronto Staff Report: Request to Change a Ward Boundary Ward 27 Toronto Centre-
Rosedale and Ward 28 Toronto Centre-Rosedale, City of Toronto (2001), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/2001/agendas/committees/adm/adm010206/it017.pdf>. 
422 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 4(3). 
423 Ibid. at s. 7 states: “The City has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person for the 
purpose of exercising its authority under this or any other Act.”  
424 Ibid. at s. 8(2) states: “The City may pass by-laws respecting the following matters: 1. Governance 
structure of the City and its local boards (restricted definition).” 
425 Ibid. at s. 129. 
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Illustration 3.2: Map of Toronto’s ward boundaries in 2016426 
 
However, provincial law again includes a minimum standard for Toronto’s governance 
decisions: the Act empowers five hundred electors in the City of Toronto to petition City 
Council to pass a bylaw dividing or redividing the City into wards or dissolving existing 
wards.427 If the City does not pass a bylaw within 90 days after receiving the petition, any 
of the electors may apply to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) to divide, re-divide or 
dissolve the wards.428 The OMB may hear the application and make an order.429 The date 
the order will come into force depends on when the OMB order is made.430 The order is 
deemed to be a by-law of the City, which may be subsequently amended or repealed.431 
The irony of this legislative provision is that the process for conducting a ward boundary 
review, as we will see in Chapter 5, is long and complex, with numerous required rounds 
of public consultation and that may, in turn, be appealed to the OMB. By contrast, city 
                                                
426 City of Toronto, Ward Profiles (last retrieved: 13 April 2016), online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=2394fe17e5648410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD>. 
427 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 129(1) and (2). S. 129(3) defines “elector” as “a person whose name appears 
on the voters’ list, as amended up until the close of voting on voting day, for the last regular election 
preceding a petition being presented to council under subsection (1).” 
428 Ibid. at s. 129(4). 
429 Ibid. at s. 129(5). 
430 Ibid. at s. 129(6). 
431 Ibid. at s. 129(8). 
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staff estimated that the timeline required for the introduction of new ward boundaries 
would be at least two years, far more than the 90 days prescribed in the Act.432 It is 
notable that this section of the Act has not been triggered, despite the sharp inequalities in 
representation across the City’s wards, as detailed in Chapter 5. 
 
This articulation of historical events is relevant to this dissertation for two reasons. First, 
it demonstrates that the City of Toronto is the product of many local areas that have been 
added and adjusted over almost 200 years. These changes have been imposed by colonial 
and later provincial governments, creating municipal corporations that in themselves may 
not identify as particular communities. Second, many of these annexed towns and 
amalgamated municipal entities continue to have defined identities as “legal ghosts” in 
Toronto that continue to be maintained by the geographies of the city’s wards and the 
influence of other kinds of bodies – namely neighbourhood associations – which advance 
decision-making claims, as we will see later in this chapter.  
 
The next section shows how Toronto’s legal authority to govern has evolved over time. 
 
2. Toronto’s decision-making authority 
 
Valverde notes the benefits in setting out the specific laws that apply in particular 
settings. This “inventory of laws” both clarifies the specific laws that apply and illustrates 
the complex overlapping of rules that govern particular issues. Figure 3.1 provides a 
detailed inventory of the laws and institutions applicable to local governance in 
Toronto.433 I argue that a reading of these laws, coupled with case law advancing 
subsidiarity, gives the City of Toronto sufficient authority to determine a local 
governance model premised on a more inclusive, participatory framework. 
 
                                                
432 City Manager, Staff Report: A Ward Boundary Review for Toronto (13 May 2013), online: 
<https://perma.cc/GP9R-8B3C>. 
433  Valverde, supra note 189 at 21, 28. This visual representation is an adaptation of Valverde’s “legal 
inventory of laws,” which aims to provide an overview of the “basic legal architecture” engaged in 
particular disputes. 
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Figure 3.1. Inventory of Laws 
 
Municipal authority in Ontario has been shaped by four key factors: a nineteenth century 
doctrine of municipal authority known as Dillon’s rule, the Constitution Act, 1867, 
legislation introduced by the Province of Ontario, and case law. “Dillon’s rule” is an 
important doctrine that has framed Canadian municipal authority. It emerged in reaction 
to municipalities incurring massive debts to finance public improvements. Dillon’s rule 
refers to the framework of municipal authority established by John Dillion, a 19th-century 
American jurist who objected to “municipal largesse and waste.”434 Under this doctrine 
of “prescribed powers,” municipalities can act only when expressly authorized by 
statute.435 This doctrine reinforces a long-standing narrative on the negative aspects of 
cities. As Frug notes: “From colonial times to the present day, a long and powerful 
tradition of anti-urbanism has been articulated by a wide variety of Americans: the 
founding fathers (Jefferson, Franklin), major novelists (Hawthorne, Henry James), 
philosophers (Emerson, Dewey), architects (Frank Lloyd Wright), even the classic works 
of urban sociology.”436 In the Canadian context, Dillon’s rule suggests a relationship 
between municipalities and provinces like that of a parent and child, with provinces 
keeping a “watchful eye” on how municipal powers are exercised in concern that they 
will be inappropriately used.437 On a practical level, it means that municipal authority 
                                                
434 Levi & Valverde, supra note 132 at 418-19. 
435 Ibid. at 416. 
436 Frug, supra note 7 at 1055. 
437 Eugene Q.C., Meehan, Robert, Chiarelli & Marie-France, Major, “The Constitutional Legal Status of 
Municipalities 1849-2004: Success Is a Journey, but Also a Destination” (2007) 22 Nat'l J. Const. L. 1 at 5. 
Municipal
Procedural	bylaw;	
the	Official	Plan;	
zoning	bylaw;	
staff	reports;	
policies
Provincial
City	of	Toronto	
Act;2006;	
Planning	Act;	
OMB	Act;	and	
other	legislation
Federal
Constitution	Act,	
1982;	Charter	of	
Rights	and	
Freedoms
 	 111 
may not be exercised unless the Province explicitly grants these governments explicit 
power to do so.  
 
Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 states that “municipal institutions in the 
Province” are within the province’s exclusive jurisdiction. With municipalities 
colloquially referred to as “creatures of the province,” provincial governments are 
constitutionally empowered to set rules regarding what municipalities can and cannot 
do.438 While early jurisprudence debated whether municipalities were to be considered 
governments or corporations under the law, it is now well-established that both provincial 
and municipal decisions are subject to review per the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Courts have interpreted the provisions of provincial acts as enabling municipalities to act 
as “governments” based on powers delegated from the provincial legislatures, and that 
municipalities must be able to govern based on the best interests of their residents and 
based on conceptions of the public good.439  
 
The notion of cities as “creatures of the province” was fervently articulated in the 1997 
decision of the Ontario Superior Court in East York v. Ontario (Attorney General). 440 
This case challenged the unilateral decision of the Province of Ontario to create the 
Toronto's megacity in 1998 without the consent of the amalgamated six municipalities. 
While referencing the lack of evidence of consultation and the vast number of people 
who voted against the amalgamation, the Superior Court concluded that the unilateral 
action did not exceed the province's constitutional authority to make laws relating to 
municipal institutions in the province. The court determined that the power to restructure 
Toronto is within provincial authority under section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, and set 
out four “clear” principles regarding the constitutional status of Canadian cities:441 
 
(i) municipal institutions lack constitutional status; 
                                                
438 Ibid. at 416. 
439 Pacific National Investment Ltd. V. Victoria (City), 2000 CarswellBV 2439, 2000 CarswellBC 2441, 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 919, reconsideration/rehearing refused 2001 CarswellBC523, 2001 CarswellBC 524 
(S.C.C.). 
440 (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 789 (Gen. Div.), aff'd (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 733 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
refused, [1998] 1 S.C.R. vii. 
441 Ibid. at 797-98. 
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(ii) municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial 
legislation so provides; 
 
 (iii) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are 
subject to abolition or repeal by provincial legislation; and 
 
 (iv) municipal institutions may exercise only those powers which are conferred 
upon them by statute.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada referenced Dillon’s Rule most recently in 1993 in R. v. 
Greenbaum. This case involves a street vendor who was unable to receive a permit to sell 
t-shirts on Toronto streets as a result of a city by-law. In critiquing the City’s exercise of 
unauthorized power, Justice Iacobucci stated in Greenbaum:  
 
The courts, as a result of this inferior legal position [of municipalities], have 
traditionally interpreted narrowly statutes respecting grants of powers to 
municipalities. This approach may be described as 'Dillon's rule,' which states that a 
municipality may exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those 
powers necessarily or fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and 
those indispensable powers essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation 
of the purposes of the corporation.442  
 
Less than ten years later, the Supreme Court of Canada challenged the idea that 
municipalities are mere creatures of the province. In Spraytech v. Hudson,443 the Court 
allowed the town of Hudson, Quebec, to ban the use of aesthetic pesticides, although 
considered non-toxic by provincial and federal regulators. In permitting a municipality 
the power the protect the general welfare of it residents, the Court relied on a key text in 
Canadian municipal law, quoting that: “the legislature cannot possibly foresee all the 
powers that are necessary to the statutory equipment of its creatures…”444  
 
                                                
442 R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674 at 688-689. 
443 Spraytech, supra note 177. 
444 Ian M., Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., Looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 
1971); quoted in Spraytech, supra note 179 at 258-59. 
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The Court also introduced a conceptual approach to interpreting municipal authority. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé invoked the European Union's principle of “subsidiarity.”445 As 
Levi & Valverde note: “This principle, which European Union sources stress is not a 
justiciable legal doctrine but rather a political principle, is invoked to elaborate the basic 
political character of municipalities, with the Court addressing something much larger 
than the traditional questions of ultra vires and the standard of review…”446 While 
subsidiarity cannot override the status of municipalities as creatures of the province, it 
operates as a principle affirming that “legislative action is to be taken by the government 
that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in the best position to respond to 
the citizen’s concerns.”447 Peter Hogg describes subsidiarity as “a principle of social 
organization that prescribes that decisions affecting individuals should be as far as 
possible, be made by the level of government closest to the individuals affected.”448  
 
In Croplife, the Ontario Court of Appeal adopted this expansive interpretation of 
municipal authority, stating that general welfare powers are to be interpreted broadly and 
generously within their context and statutory limits to achieve the legitimate interests of 
the municipality and its inhabitants.449 The court signaled a shift away from the 
traditionally restrictive, prescribed approach to the interpretation of municipal power in 
favour of a broad purposive approach recognizing more flexibility in municipal 
government.450  
 
Alongside judicial decisions, there were important legislative progressions that 
contributed to more expansive power for municipalities, especially Toronto. Most 
notably, the Province of Ontario introduced COTA, which was enacted when Premier 
Dalton McGuinty and Toronto Mayor David Miller were in power.451 The intention was 
                                                
445 Spraytech, supra note 177 at 249. 
446 Levi & Valverde, supra note 132 at 424-25. 
447 See Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 SCR 457 at para 183. But note ibid at 72, 
“subsidiarity does not override the division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.”  
448 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 114. 
449 Croplife, 2005 CarswellOnt 1877; 10 M.P.L.R (4th) 1 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, 2005 CarswellOnt 
6587. 
450 Galganov v. Russell (Township), 2012 ONCA 409, 99 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, leave to appeal refused 2012 
CarswellOnt 15189, 2012 CarswellOnt 15190 (S.C.C.). 
451 COTA, supra note 11. 
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to give Toronto more expansive powers to self-govern in matters within its 
jurisdiction.452 A major change brought about in the new legislation was the introduction 
of section 8, which granted broad discretion to the City to pass laws related to “general 
health and safety.” This “permissive” legislation has been likened to the unique “home 
rule” status of some American cities, who are given exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
within areas of responsibility, such as education, zoning, and planning, although in 
practice, Toronto’s powers fall well short of those in home rule jurisdiction and the 
province has retained its power to override the municipality’s decisions.453 The 
province’s deference to the City of Toronto has been inconsistently applied: at times, the 
province refuses to endorse municipal decisions;454 other times it defers to them 
entirely.455 
 
However, unlike home rule, which confers full authority to local governments within 
clearly demarcated areas of authority, the City continues to be subject to numerous 
restrictions, ranging from the mechanisms it may use to raise revenue to the levies of tow 
truck drivers.456 In addition to COTA, the Province of Ontario has introduced many 
pieces of legislation that impact Toronto’s decision-making powers, including the 
Planning Act,457 the Ontario Municipal Board Act,458 the Municipal Conflict of Interest 
Act,459 the Municipal Elections Act, 1996,460 and the Municipal Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act.461 These and other pieces of legislation restrict the actions 
that municipalities may take and set out the consequences of any breach.  
 
Lower courts over the last five years have proven not to be comfortable in interpreting 
                                                
452 Friends of Landsdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), 2012 ONCA 273 (referring to a similar provision in the 
Municipal Act, 2001). 
453 Levi & Valverde, supra note 134 at 454-55. 
454 See e.g. Robert Benzie, “Kathleen Wynne Stopping John Tory’s Plan For Tolls On DVP, Gardiner” The 
Toronto Star (26 January 2017). 
455 Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Minister says stripping Ford of mayoralty powers was legal, appropriate” The Globe and 
Mail (19 November 2013). 
456 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 93(1). 
457  R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13. 
458 Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.28. 
459 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.50. 
460 S.O. 1996, c. 32. 
461 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56. 
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subsidiarity to disregard the division of powers as set out in the Constitution Act and 
granting unlimited authority to municipalities. In 2012, the Ontario Superior Court struck 
down a municipal bylaw banning the possession, consumption, and sale of shark fin 
products on the basis that the bylaw was ultra vires Toronto’s legislative powers.462 The 
court held that, although the power to make decisions on “municipal issues” is broad, the 
issue to be addressed by a bylaw must relate to the municipality as a local entity. The 
court stated, “A by-law must have a proper municipal purpose; otherwise it falls outside 
the jurisdiction of the City and the powers delegated to it by the City.”463 In this case, the 
protection of sharks could not have been a concern of the City of Toronto, as there are no 
sharks near the city. It also failed the health and safety prong as there is no threat to the 
health of Torontonians due to the consumption of shark fin soup. As such, the shark fin 
ban was not a “municipal issue” as it did not concern the environmental well-being of the 
city, protect sharks, and or protect the health and safety of consumers. Put another way, 
the courts appear to have pulled back on the strong presumption of validity for municipal 
laws.464 
 
In Magder v. Ford, the court held that even with the “generous approach” to 
interpretation of municipal powers, courts have never departed from the principle that 
municipalities are creatures of the province.465 Similarly, in Wainfleet Wind Energy Inc. 
v. The Corporation of the Township of Wainfleet, the court found that a bylaw prohibiting 
wind farms within two kilometres of “a property” was void for vagueness.466 The court 
also commented in obiter that, while the township could enact bylaws related to the 
economic, social and environmental well-being and the health, safety, and well-being of 
persons, the Province of Ontario already had enacted the Green Energy and Green 
Economy Act, 2009 and, thus, there are significant limits on a municipality’s ability to 
enact bylaws which touch on defined areas of provincial authority.  
                                                
462 Eng v Toronto, 2012 ONSC 6818. 
463 Ibid at para. 19. 
464 Friends of Lansdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), 2012 ONCA 273 (CanLII), para. 14; Ontario Restaurant 
Hotel & Motel Association v. Toronto, 2005 CanLII 36152 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 4268 (C.A.), para. 3; 
Spraytech, supra note 177, para. 21 and 26 
465 Madger v. Ford, 2013 ONSC 263, 2013 CarswellOnt 387, 113 O.R. (3d), add’l reasons 2013 
CarswellOnt 3752  
466 Wainfleet Wind Energy Inc. v. The Corporation of the Township of Wainfleet [2013] O.J. No. 1744. 
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Thus, the constitution empowers provincial governments to constrain and regulate 
municipal authority in Ontario generally by permitting the provincial government to 
override municipal decisions. Also, the principle of subsidiarity complicates the notion of 
“creature of the province.” We are left with a constitutional and legislative framework 
that leaves uncertain the extent to which municipal decisions may later be determined to 
be ultra vires or beyond their jurisdiction. Despite this uncertain framework, the next 
section argues that considerable deference has been given to City Council to determine its 
governance model.  
 
3. Authority for local governance  
 
This section sets out the legislative provisions and judicial interpretations that enable the 
City of Toronto to delegate some of its powers to local bodies. This section then outlines 
the City’s decision in relation to these powers, including delegation to committees and 
staff under the procedural bylaw. In addition, to provide context for one of the chief 
arguments in favour of delegation to local governance bodies – namely, enabling richer 
resident involvement in decision-making – this section provides information on the legal 
requirements for public participation. 
 
COTA was enacted to provide the city with a broader, more flexible framework within 
which to work.467 It begins with the centrality of governance, stating: “The City of 
Toronto exists for the purpose of providing good government for matters within its 
jurisdiction, and the city council is a democratically elected government which is 
responsible and accountable.”468 Section 2 of the Act pronounces that, “The purpose of 
this Act is to create a framework of broad powers for the City which balances the 
interests of the Province and the City and which recognizes that the City must be able to 
do the following things in order to provide good government,” including the power to, 
                                                
467 Fourth Generation Realty Corp. v. Ottawa (City), 2005 CarswellOnt 1939, 197 O.A.C. 389 (C.A.); 
1786889 Ontario Inc. v. Toronto (City), 2013 CarswellOnt 14904, 2013 ONSC 5697. 
468 COTA, supra note 11 at section 1(1). 
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“Determine the appropriate structure for governing the City.”469  
 
Section 6 of COTA also gives broad powers to the City of Toronto to design its 
governance model, stating: “The powers of the City under this or any other Act shall be 
interpreted broadly so as to confer broad authority on the City to enable the City to 
govern its affairs as it considers appropriate and to enhance the City’s ability to respond 
to municipal issues.”470  It further provides that, “The City may pass by-laws respecting 
… Governance structure of the City and its local boards.”471  
 
Notwithstanding this broad permissive language, COTA carves out power for the 
Province to make specific regulations that fall squarely within the city’s powers 
enumerated above, including that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may: require the 
city to establish an executive committee472 and may prescribing the composition, powers 
and duties of the committee; requiring the head of council to appoint the chairs and vice-
chairs of specified committees of council and specified local boards; and requiring 
council to appoint specified committees composed of members of council elected from 
specified geographic areas of the city and requiring the city to delegate prescribed powers 
and duties to the committees.473 COTA also sets out that the City must pass a procedure 
by-law for “governing the calling, place and proceedings of meetings,”474 and provides 
                                                
469 COTA, supra note 11 at section 2. 
470 Ibid. at section 6 (1). 
471 Ibid. at section 8(2). COTA defines “local board (restricted definition)” as “a local board other than, 
(a) a society as defined in subsection 3 (1) of the Child and Family Services Act, 
(b) a board of health as defined in subsection 1 (1) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act, 
(c) a committee of management established under the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, 
(d) a police services board established under the Police Services Act, 
(e) a board as defined in section 1 of the Public Libraries Act, or 
(f) a corporation established in accordance with section 148. A “local board” means “a city board, 
transportation commission, public library board, board of health, police services board, planning board, or 
any other board, commission, committee, body or local authority established or exercising any power under 
any Act with respect to the affairs or purposes of one or more municipalities, excluding a school board and 
a conservation authority” (COTA, supra note 11 at Section 3 (1)). 
472 Under the Act, “committee” means any advisory or other committee, subcommittee or similar entity of 
which at least 50 per cent of the members are also members of one or more municipal councils or local 
boards other than a police services board or public library board (COTA, supra note 11 at section 189 (1). 
473 COTA, supra note 11 at section 152 (1). To date, the Province has not exercised this power. 
474 Ibid. at section 189 (2). “Meeting” is defined as “any regular, special or other meeting of city council, of 
the local board or of a committee of either of them” (Section 189 (1)). 
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that the city shall adopt and maintain policies with respect to:475 
 
5. The manner in which the City will try to ensure that it is accountable to the public 
for its actions, and the manner in which the City will try to ensure that its actions are 
transparent to the public;  
 
… 
 
7. The delegation of its powers and duties. 
 
Rather than asserting provincial dominance, these provisions establish the minimum 
requirements of the city’s governance model, which were implemented by the City of 
Toronto shortly following COTA’s introduction. The province has yet to intervene on the 
City of Toronto’s decisions about its governance model. 
 
Indeed, COTA contemplates the primacy of City Council as the chief decision-making 
body of the city. The overarching role of City Council is referenced in section 132. (1) of 
the Act, which states: “The powers of the City shall be exercised by city council.” As a 
senior staff member at the City told me: [O]ne of the messages that I’m really trying to 
get across to people when I explain governance … is the main sentence in the City of 
Toronto: ‘all the powers of the city must be exercised by city council.’ [I]t’s not a throw-
away line, it’s a very important line because it establishes the paramountcy of council, it 
establishes the weak mayor system, it establishes the foundation for delegation.”476  
 
However, in setting out City Council’s role, COTA does not suggest that all or most 
decisions must be made by City Council. Instead, it enumerates City Council’s role as 
stewarding the city through actions such as: representing the public; considering the well-
being and interests of the city; determining which services the city provides; ensuring 
                                                
475 Ibid. at section 212 (1). 
476 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
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accountability and transparency in operations; and maintaining the financial integrity.477   
 
Within this framework, certain actions must be taken by City Council and, therefore, 
cannot be delegated. This includes the power to impose taxes, to adopt or make changes 
to the official plan, or to adopt or amend the city budget.478 However, COTA clearly 
provides for delegation to committees and other bodies, subject to various restrictions. 
COTA sets out that the city can delegate its powers, including its administrative 
powers.479 The words “administrative” and “administration” are broad enough to 
encompass all conduct engaged by a governmental authority in furtherance of 
governmental business and otherwise.480 A delegation may be revoked and may be 
subject to any conditions that City Council considers appropriate.481  
 
The resulting rules regarding delegation are also broad. Under the Act, legislative and 
quasi-judicial powers may be delegated to: 
 
(a) one or more members of city council or a council committee; 
(b) a body having at least two members of whom at least 50 per cent are, 
(i) members of city council, 
(ii) individuals appointed by city council, 
(iii) a combination of individuals described in subclauses (i) and (ii); or 
(c) an individual who is an officer, employee or agent of the City.482 
 
Read together, these sections of COTA point to the primacy of City Council as the chief 
governance body, subject to the inclusion of certain outlined governance bodies and 
bylaws. COTA also provides that the city may delegate many of its functions to “local” 
governance bodies, subject to the enumerated restrictions. We now turn to the rules and 
institutions that the City of Toronto has created for local governance. 
                                                
477 COTA, supra note 11 at section 131. 
478 Ibid. at section 22(1). 
479 Ibid. at section 22(2). 
480 Doublesweet Investments Ltd. v. Toronto (City), 2012 ONSC 6377, 2012 CarswellOnt 15863 (Div Ct). 
481 COTA, supra note 11 at sections 20 (2) (1) and (5). 
482 Ibid. at section 21 (1). 
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4. The community council: Toronto’s “local” governance body? 
 
In Toronto, community councils were created as a hasty political response to the 
perceived lack of direct access to city hall as a result of the 1998 amalgamation. This 
section canvasses the legal role of community councils and concludes that community 
councils fall short of their intended local role, despite legislation that positions them as 
possible stewards of a broader local area than the ward. This section sets out their history, 
structure, membership and authorities, and the distinction between “local” and “city-
wide,” which lies at the foundation of their function.  
 
The forced amalgamation led to unprecedented civic activism throughout the former 
municipalities, focused largely on what would happen to local identity and the ability to 
access more localized bodies. Globe & Mail journalist Colin Vaughan wrote at the time: 
“Those who fear their local neighbourhood will sink into the megacity morass should 
prepare themselves for grimmer news. The province has promised that neighbourhood 
issues will be dealt with by six advisory community councils made up of local, elected 
officials from the megacouncil along with hand-picked local residents. … But there is no 
mention of such bodies in Bill 103, the legislation setting up the megacity, just a vague, 
two-line reference to the establishment of neighbourhood committees: without a mention 
of powers and responsibilities.”483  
 
Referendums were held in each of the six lower-tier municipalities in Metropolitan 
Toronto.484 The turnout for the referendums was 36%, and opposition to the proposed 
amalgamated City of Toronto ranged from 70 to 81% of voters depending on the 
municipality.485 The referendum results were not binding on the Province and would not 
change the provincial government’s decision.486 The former municipalities also launched 
a lawsuit against the Province of Ontario, challenging the amalgamation under sections 
                                                
483 Colin Vaughan, “Anomalies of amalgamation,” Globe and Mail (3 March 1997). 
484 East York (Borough) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 1997 CanLII 12263 (ON SC). 
485 McAllister, supra note 9 at 39. 
486 East York v. Ontario, supra note 484. 
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2(b), (d), 7, 8 and 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.487 Among other 
arguments, the municipalities argued that the amalgamation would weaken the 
representation of citizens. Justice Borins of the Ontario Court (General Division) 
ultimately held that section 92 of the Constitution allowed the province to amalgamate 
the municipalities, regardless of the “megachutzpah” of the action. He also noted that 
among the six-member Transition Team’s responsibilities was active community 
consultation in reviewing the role and scope of responsibility of community councils.488  
 
The Province appointed a Transition Team comprised of councillors from the former 
municipalities489 to address legislative and governance issues related to the 
amalgamation, including “community councils and neighbourhood matters” as one of the 
eight governance issues to be studied in detail.490 As part of their process, the Transition 
Team undertook extensive consultations with residents, bureaucrats, and local politicians. 
They produced, first, an interim report and, following more consultation, a final report 
with recommendations. As a senior staff member from the City of Toronto told me, this 
legislation “left it up to the city to decide what the community councils would do. So 
when it started off, the province set up this Transition Team with Alan Tonks491 and they 
came up with a model, it wasn’t all that well thought through, it was an absolute 
compromise… So it was a cobbled together, very quick, political compromise.”492 
 
The Transition Team recommended the creation of six community councils with the 
boundaries of the former municipalities, with stewardship as a primary responsibility. To 
the Transition Team, stewardship went beyond local planning matters to “keeping in 
                                                
487 Ibid. at para 5. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Transition Team, New City, New Opportunities (Toronto, December 1997). The members of the 
Transition Team were Chair Alan Tonks (Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto), Willis Blair (East York), 
Michael Gee (Toronto), Lois Griffin (Etobicoke), Paul Sutherland (North York) and John Wimbs 
(Scarborough). 
490 The Transition Team identified the eight principle issues as (1) A New Civic Mission, (2) Leading the 
New City: Political Structure, (3) Stewardship of Toronto’s Communities, (4) Building a Strong City-
Region, (5) Encouraging Citizen Involvement, (6) A New City Administration, (7) Local Agencies, Boards 
and Commissions, and (8) Improving Services to the Public (Toronto Transition Team, New City, New 
Opportunities (Toronto, Clerk’s Department, 1997). 
491 Alan Tonks was a member of the 1997 City of Toronto Transition Team. 
492 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted. 
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touch with citizens and their concerns” and that “community councils should be a focal 
point for involving people in community affairs.”493 This stewardship would be executed 
through three functions: local planning and development matters, other neighbourhood-
related issues, and involving the community and monitoring its well-being.494 The 
transition team ultimately concluded that: “people want to be able to influence what 
happens in their neighbourhoods” with a government “that understands local community 
matters.”495 Under the Transition Team’s recommendation, community councils were 
meant to act as the voice of the former local municipalities. It was believed that these 
councils would soften the negative response the government received from amalgamation 
and would provide for decentralized governance within the province’s new, large 
municipalities.496 Ultimately, community councils were not given budgets, and roles for 
community and neighbourhood organizations were not included as part of their function. 
A senior staff member at the City, who helped design the community council model, said, 
“community councils were a last minute addition, they were thrown in as a softening 
blow to amalgamation.”497  
 
At the core of the governance review was the notion of “local” and “city-wide.” These 
concepts were both a question of jurisdiction (where the matter would be decided) and 
content (what matters apply only to localized areas as opposed to the city as a whole). 
Under city rules, “local” issues may be determined by the ward or community council, 
but the “city-wide” issue may only be decided by City Council.  
                                                
493 Transition Team, supra note 489. 
494 Ibid. at 66. 
495 Ibid. at 65. 
496 Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2011) at 155. 
497 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
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Illustration 3.3: Map of City of Toronto wards and community council 
boundaries498 
 
Illustration 3.3 shows the City of Toronto’s ward and community council boundaries. In 
1999, the City of Toronto had six community councils – Etobicoke, Toronto, East York, 
Midtown, Humber, and Etobicoke. Their boundaries were based on those of the former 
municipalities, and their members were those councillors whose wards existed within the 
boundaries. In 1999, shortly after the amalgamated city was created, the Province of 
Ontario introduced the Fewer Municipal Politicians Act.499 As detailed in Part II of this 
chapter, under this legislation, the Province mandated that the ward boundaries within the 
new City of Toronto be reduced from 57 to 44.500 The City of Toronto was required to 
quickly undertake a ward boundary review that would divide each electoral district in two 
to create 44 wards. The result was that the membership of some of the six community 
councils became very small. For example, only two councillors served on the East York 
                                                
498 City of Toronto, “Community Council Boundaries & Electoral Wards Map” (2015), online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=687c7d353c460410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD>. 
499 Fewer Municipal Politicians Act, 1999, c. 14, S.O. 1999. 
500 At the time of amalgamation, there were 107 councilors serving the seven municipalities. See Alan 
Redway, Governing Toronto: Bringing Back the City that Worked (Victoria: Friesen Press, 2014). 
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Community Council.501  
 
In considering the role and mandate of Toronto’s community councils at the time of 
amalgamation, the transition team concluded that: “people want to be able to influence 
what happens in their neighbourhoods” with a government “that understands local 
community matters.”502 Their view was that stewardship was crucial: “Stewardship of the 
community implies more than making decisions on local planning matters. It means 
keeping in touch with citizens and their concerns. The community councils should be a 
focal point for involving people in community affairs. It also means understanding how 
the community is doing.”503 This stewardship was intended to be executed through three 
functions: local planning and development, other neighbourhood-related issues, and 
involving the community and monitoring its well-being.504 More than fifteen years after 
amalgamation, one of these three functions does not occur at the community council level 
in Toronto. Local planning decisions are at the core of the core the community council’s 
mandate, while neighbourhood-related issues, and involvement of the community and 
monitoring its well-being instead form part of the mandate of other standing committees.  
 
In 2003, City Council reduced the number of community councils to the current-day four: 
Etobicoke, North York, Toronto-East York and Scarborough.505 Other than in 
Scarborough, community council boundaries only roughly match those of the pre-
amalgamated cities and towns. At present, each community council is aligned with the 
city’s service districts (planning, building, licensing and transportation functions) and 
represents close to the same number of City of Toronto residents, similar to the current 
average ward population size of 61,000, as noted in Table 3.1.506 
 
                                                
501 Ibid. at 226. 
502 Transition Team, supra note 489 at 65. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid. at 66. 
505 Enid Slack and Richard Bird, “Merging Municipalities: Is Bigger Better?” IMFG Papers on Municipal 
Finance and Governance, no. 14 (Toronto: Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance, University of 
Toronto, 2013) at 28. 
506 City Clerk, Staff Report: City Governance Review, City of Toronto (24 April 2003), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/2003/agendas/committees/pof/pof030508/it001.pdf>. 
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Name Councillors 2011 Population Representation 
(councillors/population) 
Etobicoke 11 620,180 56,380 
North York 11 667,840 60,713 
Scarborough 10 624,675 62,468 
Toronto-East York 12 701,145 58,429 
 
Table 3.1: Population and representation of City of Toronto community councils507 
 
In 2005, in anticipation of COTA’s introduction, city staff embarked on a governance 
review to redesign the city’s governance model. The governance review was led by a 
three-person Governing Toronto Advisory Panel (the “Panel”), which embarked on a 
detailed study of Toronto’s existing governance model, undertook extensive 
consultations, and ultimately made a series of recommendations that were forwarded to 
City Council for review.508 The Panel’s task was monumental: it aimed to look critically 
at the existing governance model, eight years in from amalgamation, and consider how 
the model could be rethought given COTA’s potential. Specifically, the Panel was given 
the mandate to provide information, findings, and options to Council to make decisions 
about its governance system; to ensure “a civil, robust and informed discussion of options 
among all sectors of Toronto society interested in a well governed City”; and to integrate 
related issues resulting from the final report of the Bellamy Inquiry.509  
 
The Panel remarked that a strong city-wide agenda was necessary to achieve COTA’s 
purposes.510 It stated: “The new City of Toronto Act will give Toronto, for the first time, 
                                                
507 Original research (October 29, 2015). Data drawn from City of Toronto, Community Council Area 
Profiles (last retrieved: 29 October 2015), online: <http://bit.ly/1a3RHt2>. 
508 Governing Toronto Advisory Panel, The City We Want—The Government We Need: The Report of the 
Governing Toronto Advisory Panel (November 2005), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/2005/agendas/committees/pof/pof051129/it004att.pdf>. The three 
members of the Panel were: Ann Buller - President of Centennial College (Panel Chair), Sujit Choudhry - 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and Martin Connell - ACE Bakery Ltd. co-
owner/co-founder and Toronto Community Foundation Chair. 
509 Denise E. Bellamy, Denise E. 2005. Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry / Toronto External Contract 
Inquiry Report (Toronto: City of Toronto, 2005).  
510 Governing Toronto Advisory Panel, supra note 508 at 6. 
 	 126 
the power to choose how it governs itself. Torontonians will have the power to choose the 
system that will deliver the city we want. Toronto’s system of democratic self-
government was designed for a different era. It is inherently unable to cope with the 
policy challenges of the 21st century, or to wield the promised new powers to address 
those challenges under a revised City of Toronto Act.”511 The fundamental cause of the 
city’s governance issues, the Panel felt, was that City Council had two roles: as a 
legislature, whereby broad planning, social policy and taxation issues needed to be 
decided; and as an administrative decision-maker, which involved the implementation of 
policies already decided.512 The latter types of decisions dominated City Council’s 
agenda leading to long meetings and insufficient time to focus on city-wide matters. As 
such, the Panel recommended that the City introduce a governance model that delegated 
more powers to the local level. 
 
In regard to governance in smaller-than-city areas, the Governing Toronto Advisory 
Panel recommended an empowered set of community councils, with delegated functions, 
at least four annual engagement sessions, the role of interfacing with neighbourhoods, 
meeting in the evening to ensure greater public attendance of meetings, and incorporating 
neighbourhood input using the City’s 140 identified neighbourhoods.513 They also 
identified the need for greater citizen engagement and recommended the retention of 
wards “to help ensure that marginalized communities are not further disadvantaged.”  
 
The proposed changes were an opportunity for councillors to demarcate the forums in 
which they were to examine issues from a localized or city-wide perspective. 
                                                
511 Ibid. at 26. 
512 Ibid. at 25. 
513 The City’s 140 neighbourhoods were identified in 2005 by staff in the Social Development and Finance 
Administration Division (SDFA) to measure community well-being. SDFA has used the neighbourhood 
delineation to further identify “neighbourhood improvement areas” (NIAs), which are the city’s most 
economically and socially marginalized neighbourhoods, as a means of prioritizing infrastructure and social 
programs. The 140 neighbourhoods and NIAs have not generally played a role in the City’s community 
councils. See e.g. 
http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=ae17962c8c3f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89R
CRD&vgnextchannel=cf8a42f18beb2410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD; 
http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=4ea8f40f9aae0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89R
CRD; http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2014.CD27.5; 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2014/cd/bgrd/backgroundfile-67382.pdf; and 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2014/cd/bgrd/backgroundfile-67350.pdf. 
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Amalgamation ultimately eroded the two-tier perspective but integrated large parts of 
what were regional issues to the municipal level. As a senior staff member told me that 
“the two-tier did give you the ability for different people to look at things differently. 
Either from a sort of citywide, or region-wide perspective and a local perspective.”514 
Now, politically, councillors have to look at both a local and city-wide lens and “it’s hard 
for them to do both, it really is, it’s almost impossible.”515  
 
The City considered the Panel’s recommendations and ultimately introduced significant 
changes in the City’s governance model.516 One of the main objectives of the new 
governance structure was to reduce the number of days that councillors say in City 
Council meetings, which required delegation to committees. The new governance model 
introduced an Executive Committee and seven city-wide standing committees.517 
However, City Council did not implement the recommendations related to community 
councils.518  
 
In 2007, City staff set out the following principles to determine which issues should be 
considered “local” and “city-wide”:519 
 
1. local routine matters should be delegated to Community Council for final 
decision;  
2. only matters that can be legally delegated will be delegated; 
                                                
514 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
515 Ibid. 
516 City Manager, Staff Report: Implementation of a new Council Governance model for the next term of 
Council, City of Toronto (7 June 2006), online: < 
https://portal.publicpolicy.utoronto.ca/en/ContentMap/citiesandcommunitydevlopment/UrbanPolicyandMu
nicipalGovernance/Practice%20Area%20Library/City%20of%20Toronto%20-
%20Implementation%20of%20New%20Council%20Governance%20Model%20-
%20staff%20report%20(June_2006).pdf>. 
517 The committees are: Economic Development Committee, Community Development and Recreation 
Committee, Public Works and Infrastructure Committee, Planning and Growth Management Committee, 
Licensing and Standards Committee, Parks and Environment Committee, Government Management 
Committee (§ 27-126). 
518 See Part III. 
519 City Manager, Report to Executive Committee: Delegation of Certain Matters to Community Councils, 
City of Toronto (2 January 2007) at 3, online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2007/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-586.pdf>. 
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3. matters that are City-wide will not be delegated; and 
4. Community Councils should not have final decision-making powers on matters 
that fetter Council’s subsequent decision on a City-wide matter or on a matter that 
cannot be delegated.  
 
According to a senior staff member who made recommendations on which powers should 
be delegated, one of the central criteria regarding the distinction between “local” and 
“city-wide” was the notion of “tolerance” for different rules across the city. As this 
interviewee states, “What tolerance do we have for things evolving in a different 
approach? Can we tolerate the approach to four-way stop signs being different?” City 
Council decides what matters may be “tolerated” as being different across the city and 
which ones should have uniform applicability. This has resulted in the tree canopy as a 
“city-wide” issue, whereas cycling lanes have gone back and forth between local and 
city-wide.520  
 
Now, the procedural by-law sets out a confusing description of when community councils 
may consider “local” or “city-wide” matters. The term “city-wide” has no definition in 
the staff report or in Chapter 27, other than in Appendix B-IV (5), where community 
councils are given authority to make recommendations on policy and research about 
“local” matters, tautologically suggested to be matters that are “not of city-wide 
interest.”521 Community councils may also get involved in “city-wide” interests, but only 
those involving recommendations to the Planning and Growth Management Committee 
(PGMC)522 on reports of the Chief Planner about planning applications of city-wide 
                                                
520 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
521 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 5 §27-152 states that community councils have: 
“The authority to make final decisions with respect to the following matters, to the extent that the authority 
has not already been delegated to staff, is delegated to the Community Councils, with the exception of 
matters affecting more than one Community Council, and matters that, in the opinion of the City Manager, 
have City-wide significance.” 
522 Planning and Growth Management Committee [hereinafter “PGMC”] is a standing committee of City 
Council as set out in Toronto Municipal Code § 27-126 (B)(4). 
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interest,523 and convening community meetings to inform the public of planning 
applications of city-wide interest and to hear public presentations.524  
 
Regarding local or neighbourhood issues, community councils are given broad authority 
to make public presentations and recommendations on “neighbourhood” matters, 
including exemptions to ravine and tree by-laws525 and any matter “which affects more 
than one Community Council.”526 Community councils may only make recommendations 
to City Council on City's official plan and zoning by-law amendments that concern a 
local focus,527 and make recommendations to City Council on other planning applications 
that are not of City-wide interest (emphasis added).528  
 
In practice, “local” issues end up as whatever matters fall under the laundry list of powers 
delegated to community councils. The specific powers are set out in § 27-152 of the 
Toronto Municipal Code and its Appendix B-IV, and can be roughly grouped into three 
categories: planning; community land use; and community interest. To better understand 
what kind of matters community councils considered, I reviewed all community council 
decisions in 2013, counting what kinds of decisions community councils were making 
based on these three categories.529 The objective was to understand how community 
councils were fulfilling their delegated duties and to understand what other kinds of 
decisions, if any, they might be playing, to better understand their local role. The 
following chart sets out the decisions of each community council according to the three 
categories outlined above.  
 
 Planning/ 
Zoning/Heritage 
Land use Community 
interest 
Total 
Etobicoke  77 258 38 373 
                                                
523 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 6 
524 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 7 
525 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 1.1(1) 
526 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 1.1(4) 
527 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 8 
528 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Appendix B, IV, 9 
529 This analysis was conducted in October 2015. The year 2013 was selected as it was the most recent full 
year of meetings that was not an election year. 
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North York  114 222 22 358 
Scarborough  54 150 29 233 
Toronto-East 
York  
251 504 35 790 
 
Table 3.2: Number of community council decisions by category (2013)530 
 
Table 3.2 presents the number of community council decisions by category of activity 
and yields the following observations. First, community councils may hold quasi-
legislative hearings on matters within the urban area the Community Council represents 
unless the subject matter is of city-wide interest or is within an area represented by more 
than one Community Council.531  These decisions involve amendments to the Planning 
Act and the city’s zoning by-law, but not “minor variances” which are the responsibility 
of the four committees of adjustment, whose boundaries align with those of the 
community councils.  
 
In evaluating local planning decisions, the members of community councils balance the 
following considerations: whether proposed changes to lands located in an areas 
designated as “neighbourhoods” in the Official Plan are “sensitive, gradual and generally 
fit the existing physical character;”532 the degree to which city-wide housing policies 
should be assessed in regard to individual neighbourhoods;533 and the relationship 
between local zoning and the Official Plan in a rezoning application.534 Community 
councils may make decisions related to heritage matters. In this category of authority, 
community council decisions are not final. Local planning decisions are subject to the 
review of the applicable committee of adjustment where proposed developments do not 
adhere to the city-wide Official Plan. Community Council decisions must then be 
approved by City Council, and may, in turn, be appealed to the OMB. When community 
councils consider these issues, the committee room in which the hearings are held 
                                                
530 Original research (November 2, 2015). 
531 Toronto Municipal Code s. 27-129 (C). 
532 Leaside Property Owner’s Association (Re), 2015 CanLII 22087 (ON OMB). 
533 Toronto (City) v. R & G Realty Management Inc., 2009 CanLII 42397 (ON SCDC). 
534 Toronto (City) v. Romlek Enterprises, 2008 CanLII 52618 (ON SCDC). 
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transforms dramatically into a quasi-judicial forum. One staff member described them as, 
“more like attending court than a meeting.”535 Community councils act almost as mini-
courtrooms, with a large degree of formality, rather than sites where the public can come 
with community issues for discussion and resolution. 
 
Second, community councils are responsible for the regulation of specified activities and 
land use matters which affect neighbourhoods and local businesses. These include on-
street traffic regulation and permit parking, noise by-law exceptions, street food vending, 
liquor licenses and boulevard café permit appeals.536 City Council has delegated final 
decision-making authority for most of these powers, but not others. Through my 
observations of community council meetings held in 2015, the environment is far more 
casual when these decisions are heard. There is an exodus of about half of the audience, 
suit jackets are removed, and there is far more movement of councillors throughout the 
committee room. The environment comes closer to what the Transition Team imagined 
as a community forum for hearing “local” issues. 
 
Third, under the procedural bylaw, community councils can hear matters of “community 
interest.” By this, I mean presentations on matters taking place within the community 
council boundaries, appointments to community bodies such as Business Improvement 
Areas, requests for staffing at meetings, and community matters like the siting of 
rooming houses and casinos.  
 
The findings conclude, first, that the vast majority of community council decisions relate 
to planning, zoning, heritage and land use matters. This is consistent with Enid Slack’s 
observations in 2005 that community councils are essentially “local planning 
committees.”537 Rather than serving as forums for the consideration of neighbourhood 
issues, their major function is as a councillor-led body making quasi-judicial decisions 
under the Planning Act. This perspective was affirmed by a senior staff member at the 
                                                
535 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
536 Toronto Municipal Code s. 27-129 (E). 
537 Enid Slack, Assessing Municipal Amalgamation In Toronto, Canada (2005) 11: 71 Nat’l Sec & Def 49, 
online: <http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD71_eng.pdf> at 57.  
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City of Toronto, who said, “The term ‘council’ ascribes more … autonomy, or more of 
governance role than I think in reality. … I just see them as geographic standing 
committees of council.”538  
 
Second, Toronto’s community councils do not generally consider neighbourhood or 
community issues and, of those that are considered, the bulk relate to the appointment of 
residents to museum and community boards rather than public presentations and 
recommendations on “neighbourhood” matters. The exception to this general finding is 
the Scarborough Community Council, which opens each of its meetings with a 
presentation on a community issue that is affecting Scarborough.539 Community council 
members hear the presentations, ask questions and, at times, pass motions related to the 
issue. In the fifteen years since community councils were introduced, Toronto’s 
community councils have focused largely on local planning, with minimal attention to 
“community” issues that the Transition Team and Governing Panel considered integral 
for Toronto’s local governance model.  
 
Third, little authority is delegated to community councils, despite municipal power to do 
so. As a senior staff member of the City of Toronto told me, “We actually have the tools 
and the legislation to further empower the community councils. We can delegate more to 
the community councils than we have delegated. And you leave the big council to deal 
with policy frameworks, strategic things. There’s actually very little legislation that 
cannot be delegated. It’s the official plan, it’s the budget, it’s things like that, which 
should not be delegated, they’re the framing things.”540 In this staff member’s view, not 
only can the city delegate, they should: “The city council should set the broad policy 
framework …, the measures to protect, and what is the decision making process,” then 
                                                
538 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
539 See e.g. update on the services offered by Variety Village, the University of Toronto – Scarborough 
Master Plan (June 18, 2013), and the Rouge Valley Health System and The Scarborough Hospital 
(November 19, 2013). 
540 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted.  
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delegate decision-making to a local body.541 Put simply, “There’s not enough being 
delegated.”542 
 
Thus, in the fifteen years since they were introduced, Toronto’s community councils have 
focused largely on local planning issues, with minimal attention to the stewardship role 
originally intended. Wards and community councils, as the city’s formal local 
governance model, include limited participatory spaces for residents to engage in 
decision-making. Community councils do not include residents as representatives, nor do 
they allow for residents to raise issues related to their neighbourhoods. Little is delegated 
to community councils, other than certain powers under the Planning Act, and these 
decisions include considerable deference to the local councillor and minimal 
opportunities for the public to engage beyond giving deputations.  
 
Thus, community councils do not serve the purpose they were original intended: as 
stewards of a local spaces larger than the ward, but smaller than the city. Instead, they 
have limited delegated powers and do not act as spaces for civic participation. In the 
absence of a formal local body, the next section considers the overlapping roles of wards, 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations in local decision-making. 
 
II. The governance of Toronto’s local legal spaces 
 
Wards and community councils are the two formal articulations of local governance in 
Toronto, each with their own histories and authorities as smaller-than-city entities. 
Building on the earlier part of this chapter, this section outlines the role of ward 
councillors and community councils, concluding with the argument that this formal local 
framework has resulted in a local governance model that prioritizes the ward, with 
community councils serving a different role than is articulated under the city’s procedural 
bylaws.  
 
This section builds the foundation of the next section of this chapter, which adopts legal 
                                                
541 Ibid. 
542 Ibid. 
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pluralism as a lens to look beyond formal law, as chiefly described in provincial laws and 
municipal codes, to understand how local is governed and the many levels of norm 
creation.543 I later argue that, in reaction to this formal model, two chief bodies – the BIA 
and the neighbourhood association, have asserted themselves as representative bodies 
within this framework.  
 
1. Formal spaces: wards and community councils 
 
Under the law, wards serve a two-fold function in the City – as demarcated boundaries 
that define particular communities, some of which have historical significance as distinct 
villages or towns. They define the spatial areas with communities or histories, which are 
in turn represented by a councillor that assists them with day-to-day matters, providing 
information, and helping to resolve neighbourhood disputes.544 Second, wards act as a 
unit of representation for city-wide decision-making, whereby the councillor represents 
the interests of his or her residents as located within particular spatial boundaries. 
However, in practice, wards serve as a crucial foundation for local governance in Toronto 
by asserting an enormous degree of power in the mediation and exercise of local power. 
This section builds on the early information in this chapter by setting out the power of the 
ward in law and practice.  
 
Wards are empowered by their election of councillors who serve as a Member of 
Council, each of which has the power of a single vote on City Council. In law, wards act 
as demarcated boundaries and as a unit of representation for city-wide decision-making, 
whereby the councillor represents the interests of his or her residents as located within 
particular spatial boundaries. 545 In practice, wards serve as a crucial foundation for local 
governance in Toronto, exercise a considerable degree of power. The overwhelming 
sentiment in my interviews from municipal staff members and councillors alike was the 
extent to which councillors hold local decision-making power.  
 
                                                
543 Zumbansen, supra note 74 at 326. 
544 Governing Toronto Advisory Panel, supra note 508 at 11. 
545 Ibid. at 11. 
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Wards have been described as “fiefdoms,” with one senior City of Toronto staff member 
affirming this point by stating, “Oh yeah, absolutely, it’s characteristic of our system, for 
sure.”546 Staff acknowledged the advantages of this model, namely that “there actually is 
someone to go to and somebody who can convey a geographic area’s interest. It’s not a 
bad thing,” however, “the ward is not the government.”547 Another senior staff member 
told me, “so much does depend on the councillor and they provide the leadership on a lot 
of projects and issues at a local level.”548 This contact later characterized councillors as, 
“The ward boss.”549 Another staff member said, regarding the power exerted by 
councillors, “This is supposed to be a democracy? No, it’s a fiefdom.”550 This power may 
be even handed down to the next generation. As one person said, referring to the three 
councillors who are the children of previously-elected Members of Council, “Look what 
has happened in terms of the children of ward councillors getting into power. How many 
sons of former politicians are coming into power? It’s a complete fiefdom.”551 
 
Councillors agree with this characterization, with some questioning the extent to which 
such power was appropriate. In affirming the ward councillor as having considerable 
power, one councillor told me that it is, on te one hand, “democracy with all its 
foibles.”552 This same councillor said, “The doorway to make something a bigger deal is 
the councillor – “inevitably, you’ve got to go through that doorway,” and “There’s a lot 
of power with the local councillor in the City of Toronto, especially around planning 
matters.”553 Later, this same councillor said, “One of the consequences of having a 
relatively weak civil society in certain large geographies in the city is, is that the guys 
                                                
546 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
547 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted.  
548 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
(18 May 2016) – author conducted. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
553 Ibid. 
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who get elected can get away with murder”554 One councillor went even farther, saying 
that the authority held over spending from development monies meant that, “I had way 
too much power,” and concluding, “it’s a terrible thing.”555  
 
The interviewees noted some of the drawbacks of the power held by councillors. First, it 
limits the extent to which changes to governance are possible. As one staff member told 
me, “[Councillors] want to be the ones who are the white knights who are the fixers … 
maybe that’s one of the limitations of having a ward system”556 As a result, individual 
councillors “are very resistant to giving up control of individual, on-the-ground 
decisions.”557 One concrete example of limits to change was the inability to create 
neighbourhood committees following amalgamation: “[T]he politicians would not allow 
that to happen, because they want to be ward bosses.”558 This characteristic of local 
governance is important as there tends not to be a lot of councillor turnover. For example, 
in the 2014 municipal election, all but one of the 37 councillors who ran for office again 
were re-elected.559 As one person I interviewed said, “There has to be some shift, and 
legislative shift, in terms of the power of the incumbent. The power of incumbency is just 
too much, it does not allow for new blood in it.”560  
 
A second issue is the extent to which “city-wide” issues can be adequately addressed. As 
one staff member told me, “The two-tier [metropolitan government] did give you the 
ability for different people to look at things differently. Either from a sort of city-wide, or 
region-wide, perspective, and from a local perspective. Whereas now, politically, 
[councillors] have to do both and it’s hard for them to do both, it really is, it’s almost 
                                                
554 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
555 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
556 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted.  
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid. 
559 McGregor, R. Michael, Aaron A. Moore and Laura B. Stephenson, “Incumbency and the Importance of 
Campaigns” in The Toronto Election Study (2015). 
560 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.  
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impossible”561 This means a focus on localized effects rather than the implications from 
the city-wide level, “We have too many people on council who are very quick to take 
positions [on city-wide issues], without taking any responsibility for the consequences of 
those positions.”562 Put another way, councillors “have a tendency to look at the issues in 
a very isolated way; they don’t connect it to the larger whole.”563  
 
A third issue concerns the extent to which councillors serve as “brokers” of other 
governance bodies, both formal and informal. Regarding the councillor role in decisions 
regarding his or her ward, councillors will not trump other councillors’ decisions at 
community council: “for sure the councillor wins.”564 One staff member told me that the 
relationship between the city and residents is “brokered through the councillor,”565 which 
can also mean that councillors pick and choose how they engage with the community.566 
In some cases, “councillors have been in their wards for so long and they’ve been in 
power for so long that they’ve created pockets of interest groups.”567 This means that 
some councillors will help to form some interest groups like business improvement areas 
and neighbourhood associations, canvassed in the next section, “because it makes our 
lives easier. Because if I have to consult … on a change in traffic, or in the on-street 
parking, I’d have to go and consult every single business. Whereas with the BIA, the BIA 
does it. And [neighbourhood associations] are the same thing.”568 The councillor role in 
creating them is crucial: “if the councillor’s offices don’t see value in it and don’t put the 
time in then they’re never going to happen.”569 The brokered relationships between the 
                                                
561 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
562 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted.  
563 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.   
564 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
565 Ibid. 
566 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #4, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 August 2016) – 
author conducted. 
567 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.   
568 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
569 Ibid. 
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councillors and residents, “depends on their own style and electoral prospects.”570  
 
In short, the amalgamation of the City of Toronto led to what was “regional” to become 
“city-wide” without the introduction of a “local” level of governance. When the province 
amalgamated seven municipalities to form the current-day City of Toronto, it included in 
the legislation a requirement to consider the introduction of “community councils.” As 
detailed in this section, their roles, boundaries, and mandates have since been reviewed 
several times. Despite provisions that enable them to have a more participatory, inclusive 
role in local decision-making, community councils remain disempowered local planning 
committees with few delegated powers.  
 
Ward councillors thus serve a leadership role in formal determinations of local 
governance, with community councils acting under a limited mandate rather than as 
spaces for inclusive, participatory governance. This reinforces the notion that local 
governance is comprised of formal and informal spaces that, as Santos asserts, normative 
orders seek exclusivity and control within their legal territory.571 As noted in Chapter 1, 
legal spaces refers to notions of space that have been given formal legal meaning, as well 
as an articulation of alternative norms, rules, customs and practices within these same 
spaces. While individual understandings of legal space can differ, such spaces are replete 
with a complex range of interconnecting institutions and entities that have been given 
social meaning, which in turn affect individual understandings of space.572 We now turn 
to a study of other competing bodies – BIAs and neighbourhood associations – to better 
understand local governance in Toronto.   
 
2. BIAs and Neighbourhood Associations as competing spaces of local governance 
 
The previous sections outlined the City of Toronto’s local decision-making as it pertains 
to formal city bodies. It identified the ward as the locus of local representation and 
community councils as geographically-based committees that largely conform to 
                                                
570 Ibid. 
571 Santos, supra note 85 at 458. 
572 Ibid. at 31-32. 
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Toronto’s pre-amalgamated boundaries. While wards and community councils are the 
state bodies that purport to represent groups of Toronto’s residents based on geographic 
areas, BIAs and neighbourhood associations purport to be representative of particular 
members within their boundaries based on this geographic affiliation and claim that they 
are inclusive of and beneficial for their residential populations broadly speaking. They 
exist unevenly across the city and work together with ward councillors as pivotal 
institutions in defining local boundaries and influencing decision-making. My defence of 
BIAs and NAs to the exclusion of other local bodies in Toronto was outlined in Chapter 
2. I also set out details of the primary research that I conducted on the organization and 
geography of these bodies in Toronto.  
 
A core goal of this dissertation is to understand the role of state and non-state actors 
within Toronto’s local governance model and how they inform the local legal spaces of 
the city. Their presence helps to reveal what other interests are excluded or included in 
decision-making. This dissertation advances the argument that BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations affect Toronto’s local governance model, both as non-state actors involved 
in ward-based decision-making and as bodies that unevenly map within the city, leading 
to differences in representation. 
 
As a study rooted in legal pluralism, this dissertation suggests that the governance of 
local legal spaces is not merely about the bodies that are created by municipal 
governments, nor are these bodies fixed in time or geography. Other studies have 
similarly concluded that non-state bodies affect local decision-making processes, in 
particular through their emphasis on political participation within localized areas of urban 
spaces. In their seminal study on neighborhood associations, Berry, Portney and 
Thomson argue that the “key to making America more participatory is by making 
political participation more meaningful in the context of the communities people live in” 
by looking at the depth and breadth of democratic bodies.573 Thomson articulates that 
small-scale decision-making bodies are fundamental to civic participation, but that there 
must be a link between these bodies and the public and these groups must have a link to 
                                                
573 Berry, Portney & Thomson, supra note 157 at 4 and 54-55. 
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political decision-making.574 Put another way, these small-scale bodies are “brokers” 
between the public and democratic institutions. This section asks how BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations assert their own boundaries and roles in governance in 
smaller-than-city spaces in the city. Based on their legal structures, degree of formal 
connection to city councillors and staff, and geographies, are BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations “brokers” meant to represent local interests? Do they govern exclusively the 
private interests of their constituents, or are they part of the larger fabric of public 
governance?575  
 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations each play a role in local governance in Toronto. 
Each use geographically demarcated boundaries to determine and represent their 
members. Neighbourhood associations serve largely to shape planning decisions, while 
BIAs actively aim to change the public realm. Both types of organizations may carry out 
roles typically reserved for municipal governments, namely graffiti removal, street 
beautification and consultations with residents. At times, the functions of these bodies 
overlap, with some neighbourhood associations purporting to represent business interests 
and BIAs permitting non-business owning residents to sit on their boards.576  
 
There are also important distinctions between these two forms of bodies. BIAs have 
institutional support from the City of Toronto. This support includes collecting 
information on the city’s 81 BIAs and storing it in a publicly accessible website; 
providing training and support to their organizations in regard to their governance; 
collecting and remitting a levy which enables BIAs to hire staff and consultants, hold 
events in their neighbourhoods, and promote local business; and councillor membership 
on every board. From a legal perspective, BIAs are bound by the requirements of 
                                                
574 Ken Thomson, From Neighborhood to Nation: The Democratic Foundations of Civil Society (Hanover: 
Tufts University Press, 2001) at 5. 
575 Lorlene Hoyt & Devika Gopal-Agge, "The Business Improvement District Model: A Balanced Review 
of Contemporary Debates" (2007) 1:4 Geography Compass 946 at 955. 
576 Note also that residents’ associations and BIAs have sometimes clashed over the management of the city 
centre, with residents wanting to have some voting power on the BIA Board. In some cases BIAs have 
asked residents in the area to contribute towards BIA costs on the grounds that residents are benefiting from 
enhanced security provision and landscaping (Mark Steel, & M. SYMES, The Privatisation of Public 
Space? The American Experience of Business Improvement Districts and their Relationship to Local 
Governance (2005) 31:3 Local Government Studies, 321 – 334 at 326). 
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Toronto’s procedural bylaw and must adhere to strict accountability and representation 
requirements.  
 
In contrast, neighbourhood associations do not have institutional support beyond the 
assistance that local councillors and planning staff may provide. Their budgets rely on 
donations and membership fees and are typically limited.577 As a result, there are 
significant differences in the mandates, memberships and practices of neighbourhood 
associations across the city, and an absence of clear information on elections and other 
internal practices that could shed light on their adherence to principles of democracy and 
meaningful representation, and their commitment to accountability practices. The only 
legal requirements to which neighbourhood associations must adhere are those contained 
in legislation where such bodies are incorporated.578 Such legislation, however, does not 
concern any responsibilities relating to the associations viz the public, including 
accountability.579 To staff, however, there may not be significant differences between 
BIAs and neighbourhood assoications. When asked the difference, a senior staff planner 
told me, “they’re stakeholder groups, I wouldn’t weigh one over the other necessarily. 
I’m very interested in making sure that we hear from them both.”580 
 
To understand the role that BIAs and neighbourhood associations play in local 
governance, I first set out the legal status of and data on BIAs and NAs. I drew from 
provincial legislation, city bylaws and policies, and decisions of the City of Toronto’s 
Committees of Adjustment and the OMB, as well as COTA’s key provisions. I also set 
out the findings of primary research that I conducted aimed at understanding the range of 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations in Toronto. Next, I draw on the academic literature 
referenced in Chapter 1 to analyze the role and significance of BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations in conceptualizing local governance in Toronto.  
 
                                                
577 For example, FoNTRA’s annual budget is based on a levy from its neighbourhood association members.  
578 See e.g. Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.38. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
(18 May 2016) – author conducted. 
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a) Business Improvement Areas  
 
The Waterfront BIA created the “Whose Job Is it?” poster reproduced in Illustration 
3.4.581 Alongside City departments, BIAs plays a role in maintaining the public realm. 
The poster suggests that BIAs see themselves as reflecting more than just the interests of 
their direct stakeholders (local businesses and property owners), but the public as well, in 
maintaining city streets and the flourishing of the built environment. This poster 
encapsulates the questions of the role of BIAs in local governance: where are they 
located, who do they represent, and how does their power and authority differ across the 
city? 
 
 
Illustration 3.4: “Whose Job is it?” 
 
There is no single, uniform definition of BIAs.582 Other terms have been used to describe 
the construct, including “Business Improvement District” or BID, which is often used in 
                                                
581 City of Toronto, “Clean City, Beautiful City”, online: 
<http://www.waterfrontbia.com/pdf/Who_Does_What.pdf>. 
582 As this dissertation focuses on this organizational form in the Toronto context, focusing in particular on 
their legal structure and implications, I will use the term “Business Improvement Area” and the acronym, 
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the United States and the United Kingdom, and “City Improvement District,” the name 
adopted in South Africa.583 
 
Toronto defines a BIA as an association comprised of commercial and industrial property 
owners and business tenants within a specified geographic area district, which is 
officially approved by the City to stimulate business and improve economic vitality.584 I 
prefer Gopal-Agge’s definition of BIAs, which are “privately directed and publicly 
sanctioned organizations that supplement public services within geographically defined 
boundaries by generating multiyear revenue through a compulsory assessment on local 
property owners and/or businesses."585 Hoyt and Gopal-Agge’s definition encompasses 
three crucial features that are not necessarily made clear under Toronto’s meaning: first, 
the BIA is meant to provide a specific set of powers to business and property owners in 
order to achieve their mandate, most notably an organizational structure and direct access 
to the local councillors who serve on their boards. Second, BIAs are funded through a 
required levy against local property owners or businesses, which functions as a form of 
taxation. Local businesses cannot back out of paying even if they voted against forming a 
BIA or disagree with their activities.586 Third, the definition acknowledges that BIAs 
supplement public services offered by the City, which more broadly defines their 
entrenched governance role.  
 
Toronto was the first city in the world to create a BIA, introduced in Bloor West Village 
in 1970. The BIA advocated in favour of an independent, privately managed body that 
would have the power to impose an additional tax on all commercial property owners in 
the area to be directed to local revitalization initiatives.587 Local business leaders believed 
                                                                                                                                            
BIA, when referring to the Toronto context specifically. However, I use the term, “Business Improvement 
District” or BID where used in research. 
583 Elisabeth Peyroux, Robert Pütz & Georg Glasze, “Business Improvement Districts (BIDs): The 
internationalization and contextualization of a ‘travelling concept’” (2012) 19:2 European Urban and 
Regional Studies 111 at 118. 
584 City of Toronto, “Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) – Board Governance Structure” (2016), online: 
<http://bit.ly/1QORKKe>. See also Lorlene Hoyt & Devika Gopal-Agge, "The Business Improvement 
District Model: A Balanced Review of Contemporary Debates" (2007) 1:4 Geography Compass 946.  
585 Gerald Frug, “The Seductions of Form” (2010) 3 Drexel L. Rev. 11. 
586 Ibid.  
587 Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 575 at 947. 
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that a stable and effective funding source, drawn from member businesses, would help 
with beautification and improvement, promote urban business areas, and ultimately allow 
them to compete with suburban malls, which were increasingly replacing traditional 
business areas in localized areas.588  
 
The Province of Ontario passed the enabling legislation as an amendment to the then-
Municipal Act, authorizing the City of Toronto to pass a bylaw to establish BIAs.589 
Through the provincial legislation, Toronto and other municipalities were legally 
permitted to require the payment of a levy by the businesses in the area, with the levy 
then directed to the BIA as a steady source of revenue. The organizational form has not 
changed substantially in the 45 years since it was introduced.  
 
The following details are meant to illustrate the extent to which they are regulated in 
Toronto. Section 8(2) of COTA broadly enables the City to establish BIAs as they 
concern the “Economic, social and environmental well-being of the City.” Under COTA, 
BIAs are defined as “local boards,” which has been affirmed under Chapter 19 of the 
Toronto Municipal Code and in case law.590 Their purposes are to oversee the 
improvement, beautification, and maintenance of municipally-owned land, buildings and 
structures in the BIA beyond City standard levels; streetscaping; promotion; graffiti 
removal services; safety and security measures; strategic planning; and advocating on 
behalf of the interests of the BIA.591 The establishment of BIAs is set out in detail in the 
Procedural Bylaw and their funding is collected through the city’s formal levying 
authorities, coordinated through an office dedicated to supporting their operations.  
 
BIAs are subject to strict requirements under COTA, and are highly regulated, but 
empowered local bodies. To one staff member, they are “self-funding, defiant 
                                                
588 Pivot Legal Society v. Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Association and another (No. 6), 
2012 BCHRT 23 (CanLII), online: <http://canlii.ca/t/fq493> retrieved on 2016-03-03 at para 26. 
589 City of Toronto By-law no. 170-70. 
590 COTA, supra note 11 at sections 189-190. Toronto (City) (Re), 2009 CanLII 45432 (ON IPC), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/25fhp> retrieved on 2016-01-06 
591 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 19-3. 
 	 145 
organizations that operate in neighbourhoods” that “aren’t very democratic.”592 A 
councillor called them, a “little tiny city.”593 BIAs must pass a procedure bylaw for 
governing the calling, place, and proceedings of meetings.594 All meetings must be open 
to the public unless the subject matter of the meeting falls within one of the enumerated 
exceptions.595 Whether or not the meeting is closed, the BIA must record all resolutions, 
decisions and other proceedings at a meeting of the body.596 The city may appoint an 
investigator to review whether a BIA has properly complied with COTA’s requirements 
where it opts to close all or part of a meeting to the public.597 BIAs must also retain and 
preserve their records in a secure and accessible manner.598  
 
The Municipal Code sets out further procedures guiding the establishment and operation 
of BIAs and are detailed here to illustrate the extent to which BIAs are municipally 
regulated.599 Many steps are required for City Council to pass a by-law designating a 
BIA.600  The first step is for local business and property owners to form a steering 
committee that, together with city staff, defines the boundaries of the BIA area and 
creates a communication strategy for businesses in the area.601 Next, city staff conducts a 
formal public consultation meeting with all commercial and industrial property 
owners.602 If there is sufficient interest, the General Manager then recommends that 
Council enacts a by-law to establish a new BIA.603  “Sufficient interest” is determined by 
a secret ballot at the formal public consultation meeting, whereby 50 percent plus one of 
                                                
592 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
593 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
594 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter, s. 189(2). 
595 Ibid at s. 190(1). 
596 Ibid at s 190(8). 
597 Ibid at s 190.2(1). 
598 Ibid at s 200(1). 
599 Toronto Municipal Code, "Chapter 19, Business Improvement Areas" (2016), online: < 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/municode/1184_019.pdf>. 
600 City of Toronto, “City of Toronto Procedural Bylaw”, section 19-4. These provisions also apply to the 
expansion of a BIA if the expansion is not considered to be minor. A minor expansion is defined in section 
19-7(A) as a change that represents an increase of total commercial and industrial property assessment 
value of less than ten percent of the existing assessment value of properties within the existing BIA 
boundary. 
601 Ibid. at 19-4 (A). 
602 Ibid at s 19-4 (D). 
603 Ibid at s 19-4 (E).  
 	 146 
those potential BIA members in attendance must agree to proceed with the creation of the 
BIA.604 The next step is to proceed to the polling of BIA members. A minimum of 30% - 
or 100 - of businesses and commercial or industrial property owners must reply. And, of 
the parties that reply, at least 50% must agree to the creation of the BIA.605 
 
Once a BIA is established by bylaw, a Board of Management for the BIA is created.606 
The Board of Management is considered to be “a City board and is an agent of the 
City.”607 The directors of a board are be appointed under delegated authority by the 
community council within whose geographic area the BIA is located.608 The number of 
directors is fixed by bylaw609 and, as an exception to the City's Public Appointments 
Policy, directors are not required to be residents of the City of Toronto.610  
 
Each director and the board must operate in compliance with all applicable law and City 
policies including, but not limited to, COTA, the Municipal Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, and Public 
Appointments Policy.611 This means that BIAs have significant limitations in the exercise 
of their authority, including a requirement that it does not borrow or lend money, pass a 
resolution or take a position contrary to any Council-approved policy or decision, support 
political candidates, or participate in OMB or committee of adjustment hearings unless 
members agree.612 
 
Once a BIA is approved by City Council, every business within its boundaries 
                                                
604 Ibid at s 19-4 (F). If the potential business improvement area members decide not to proceed with the 
notification process set out in Subsection F, another formal public consultation meeting relating to any part 
of the same area shall not be held for at least one year from the date of the formal public consultation 
meeting at which the decision was made (§ 19-4 (G)).  
605 Ibid at s 19-5 (H). A repeal of a BIA bylaw is substantially more difficult. If a BIA is to be repealed, the 
number of accepted ballots must be the lesser of 66% of the notices mailed and 200 ballots. And, of the 
parties that reply, 40% or more may not respond in the negative (§ 19-9(I)).  
606 Ibid at s 19-13(A). 
607 Ibid at s 19-13(B). 
608 Ibid at s 19-15(A). 
609 Ibid at s 19-15(G). 
610 Ibid at s 19-15(E). 
611 Ibid at s 19-15(K). 
612 Ibid at s 19-14. Despite these limits, courts have acknowledged the right of BIAs to challenge Council 
decisions if they negatively affect the BIA. See e.g. Ontario Inc. v. City of Toronto, 2013 ONSC 5697 28 
(CanLII). 
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automatically becomes a member. Once designated, any and all businesses within the 
BIA boundary area are required to pay BIA levies.613 The City collects an annual levy 
from local businesses and forwards it directly to the BIA, which becomes its budget for 
the year.614 All members of the BIA are legally obligated to pay the municipality their 
portion of the levy, which is based on the assessment values of the individual and 
neighbourhood properties. The levies are collected by the City through the property tax 
billing process and remitted in full to the BIA. No remuneration is paid to members of the 
Boards of Management.615 BIAs may also raise funds and eligible for City of Toronto 
grants. Lower courts have affirmed the legality of municipalities establishing a BIA and 
imposing a BIA levy that all member businesses must pay.616  
 
Appendix B sets out data regarding Toronto’s 81 BIAs. The budget amounts under the 
authority of BIAs are considerable. Collectively, BIAs levy approximately 35 million per 
year for commercial area improvements, marketing and promotion, and other economic 
development initiatives.617 There is wide variation in the amounts of levies in individual 
BIAs across the city, from a few thousand dollars to $2,508,760 for the Bloor-Yorkville 
BIA.618 Some BIAs operate with volunteers, while other BIAs require paid staff to run 
day-to-day operations. The size of the BIA budget is largely a function of the assessment 
base in the area; BIAs with large assessment bases are often able to levy more funds from 
its members at the same tax rate as a smaller BIA with smaller assessment base. In 
practice, BIAs receive considerably more from their member businesses in the Toronto-
East York community council area than BIAs receive from their members in other parts 
of the city.619  
                                                
613 Ibid at 795. 
614 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 329(12). 
615 City of Toronto, “Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) – Board Governance Structure, online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=0e53811db1704410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD>. 
616 City of Brandon v. Artistic Tattoo, 2003 MBQB 133 (CanLII). 
617 Ibid. 
618 City Council, Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) – 2015 Operating Budgets - Report No. 1 ED1.5 
(December 14, 2014) and City Council, Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) - 2015 Operating Budgets - 
Report No. 2 ED2.5 (March 31, 2015), with additional BIA budgets to be approved in supplementary 
reports. 
619 The average amounts received by BIAs from member businesses across the city are: Toronto-East York 
($1,585.03), Scarboorugh ($936.19), North York ($863.44), and Etobicoke ($897.83). 
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In practice, there is wide variation in the budgetary power of BIAs, largely along 
geographic lines. Most represent under 500 businesses and have budgets of under 
$400,000 per year. In respect of the 2016 budgets, most or all of Etobicoke, North York 
and Scarborough’s BIAs have budgets under $400,000. The vast majority of Etobicoke 
BIA budgets are under $200,000. In contrast, almost all of the BIAs with budgets over 
$700,000 are located in the Toronto-East York community council area, with three of 
these BIAs having annual budgets over $2,000,000.620 The largest BIAs are located in the 
Toronto-East York Community Council area and have budgets of over $1,500,000. This 
is significant because it means that not all sections of the city have these bodies taking 
part in governance or municipal service delivery, nor are all BIAs playing the same role 
in local governance based on their size and locations.  
 
The City’s bureaucratic structure includes oversight over and partnerships with BIAs, 
housed within the same office. The City of Toronto has a BIA Office in the Economic 
Development & Culture Division, which provides professional operational and 
administrative support to BIAs to ensure compliance with the Municipal Code and other 
relevant City policies.621 The BIA Office oversees partnership projects with BIAs, 
including a BIA capital cost-share program, which includes approximately 100 
streetscape improvement projects per year with an annual value of approximately $5 
million. These revitalization and street beautification initiatives are implemented at half 
the cost to the City through the 50% cost-share formula with BIAs. The BIA Office also 
administers the Commercial Façade Improvement Program, where the City provides 
approximately $500,000 per year in grants to commercial property owners within BIAs 
across the City to upgrade the physical appearance of their buildings. 
 
                                                
620 The three BIAs in the Toronto-East York area with budgets over $2,000,000 are: Toronto Entertainment 
District ($2,079,199), Downtown Yonge ($2,583,899), and Bloor Yorkville ($3,019,696). Emery Village, 
located in Etobicoke, has a budget of $2,500,034. 
621 City of Toronto, Business Improvement Areas, online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=93782a481057b410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD&vgnextchannel=3426ea64460b3410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD>. 
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In contrast to neighbourhood associations, BIAs have strong connections to city 
government, both through the involvement of the local councillor in setting up and 
serving on BIA boards, and within the administrative structure of the city. Ward 
councillors may be deeply involved in setting up a BIA, with the rationale that having the 
organization allows the councillor to work more effectively when it comes time for 
consultation. That said, helping to set up BIAs may have “a lot to do with the councillor’s 
own priority,” as one councillor told me. “If the priorities aren’t organizing businesses, 
and maybe that they’re just not aware of how important a vehicle it can be, or just not 
have the experience of how you go about a project like this, going from point a to point b 
from a community organizing standpoint.” The desire to set up BIAs may also speak to 
the style of representation of particular councillors. One councillor helps to create BIAs 
within their ward to “strengthen the voice of our neighborhoods, to make them a player 
and active in the organized, political structure, rather than just be ambivalent and not 
know what’s going on.”622  
 
b) Neighbourhood associations 
 
Neighbourhood associations are defined as, “a civic organization oriented towards 
maintaining or improving the quality of life in a geographically defined residential 
area.”623 They are also known by such terms as “resident,” “ratepayer” or “homeowner” 
associations or organizations. In this section, the term “neighbourhood association” is 
broadly used to include all such organizations. One Toronto councillor described them 
this way:  
 
[T]here is no sort of legal, or political structure around what [neighbourhood 
associations] are. And so you have different models, there’s the ratepayer 
association, the resident’s association, and the community association. Ratepayer 
being property owners, or residential property owners. Resident being residents, so 
tenants are included. And community association, which from time to time will take 
                                                
622 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
623 Logan & Rabrenovic, supra note 139 at 68. 
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in, say, a representative of a hospital that’s in the neighborhood, or some businesses. 
So there are no clear boundaries in terms of who is allowed in and who isn’t.624  
 
Toronto’s South Rosedale Residents Association (SRRA) is one of Canada’s oldest 
ratepayer groups. 625 It was incorporated in 1931 to represent the residents of South 
Rosedale, an affluent neighbourhood.Some neighbourhood associations have been 
enormously successful in shifting political debates in the city, the most famous of which 
are the lobby efforts of the Annex Residents’ Association (ARA), which resulted in the 
defeat of the proposed Spadina Expressway. The legacy of this involvement is the view 
that neighbourhood associations “can be a tremendous force for improvement, and for 
creativity,” according to a staff member in the city’s planning department interviewed for 
this project.626 
 
Very little is documented regarding the sizes, geographical boundaries, objectives and 
sources of revenue of the city’s neighbourhood associations. One councillor affirmed that 
there is, “no sort of legal or political structure around what those things are.”627 Toronto 
has hundreds of neighbourhood associations, which differ dramatically in their size, 
structure, formality, history and involvement in local governance. Neighbourhood 
associations are not formally embedded within the City’s bureaucratic structure and, 
therefore, data collection is difficult, as neighbourhood associations come and go over 
time and the organizations generally have limited resources. However, there is no official 
list of neighbourhood associations. Unlike New York’s community committees628 or Los 
                                                
624 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
625 South Rosedale Residents, “about us” (2016), online: <http://southrosedale.org/about-us/>. South 
Rosedale Residents Association (SRRA) is one of Canada’s oldest ratepayer groups and certainly one of 
the most active and influential. 
626 Rachel Mendleson, “Big Ideas: Why residents’ associations are making a comeback”, The Toronto Star 
(2 September 2014), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2014/09/02/big_ideas_why_residents_associations_are_making_a_com
eback.html>. 
627 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
628 City of New York. “About Community Boards” (17 January 2017), online: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/cb/about.shtml (New York has five borough presidents, one for each of 
the amalgamated boroughs. There are 59 community boards across the city, each with 50 members 
appointed by borough presidents and based on nominations. and are comprised of civic leaders who reside, 
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Angeles’ neighbourhood councils,629 there are no departments within the City of Toronto 
tasked with assisting or otherwise keeping track of neighbourhood associations. The only 
formal interface with the city is the retention of an outdated consultation list. In Toronto, 
the only way to understand or contact the city’s neighbourhood associations was to 
engage in a scavenger hunt, identifying how many there are, their geographic placement, 
and the roles they play in local government. This information was necessary in order to 
understand what role they play in local governance. There is considerable contrast with 
the accessibility of neighbourhood association and City of Toronto’s support of the 81 
BIAs, which are listed with contact information, offered training and given other forms of 
institutional support. 
 
To understand more about neighbourhood associations, including their location within 
the city, I decided to create a detailed list of each organization. I took the following steps 
to do so. First, I started with a map created by a David Topping, a city resident630 who 
created the map because, “I moved to a new neighbourhood and couldn't figure out where 
I could go if I wanted to get more involved. I figured other people might benefit from the 
same information for their neighbourhoods. And so it went. That was four years ago and 
I'm still updating this damned map every month or so.”631 Asked how he updates the 
information, Topping remarked, “The data comes from each organization's website, for 
the most part, if they have one—or from members if they don't have a website. Some 
organizations I knew about and found information about myself; others came from people 
who saw the map and wanted to help make it as up to date and accurate as it could be.”632 
I used Topping’s map as a starting point for my data collection. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
work or have an interest in the community. Anyone may attend community board meetings. Community 
boards have minimal budgets, and play an advocacy role on local and city-wide issues). 
629 City of Los Angeles, “Neighbourhood Councils Empower LA” (16 May 2017), online: < 
http://empowerla.org> (The City of Los Angeles funds 96 neighbbourhood councils, whose members are 
elected by residents. Councils must establish bylaws and go through the certification process with the 
Board of Neighborhood Commissioners and the Department of Neighborhood Empowerment before they 
can operate. The public sets the boundaries for the local bodies and serves an advocacy role by meeting 
with the Mayor, and receiving advance notice of issues of concern to residents). 
630 David Topping, “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015), online: < 
http://davidtopping.tumblr.com/torontoresidents>. 
631 David Topping, Correspondence (March 31, 2016). 
632 Ibid. 
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After comparing Topping’s map to lists of neighbourhood associations elsewhere, I 
prepared a “master list” of Toronto’s neighbourhood associations.633 I took the master list 
to create a chart with each of Toronto’s neighbourhood association, including columns 
for the association name, date of establishment, its geographic boundaries, eligibility for 
membership, whether the association charged a membership fee, its mandate, its 
community council and ward locations, and a section for any addition information. I 
reviewed the neighbourhood association websites, where available. Where the 
information was incomplete or unavailable, I conducted extensive online searches for 
contact information for the applicable neighbourhood associations. In many cases, I was 
unable to locate the information needed to complete the chart.  
 
Based on this research, 184 neighbourhood associations in Toronto, scattered throughout 
the city, are listed in Appendix C to this dissertation. I was able to find comprehensive 
information on 100 of these organizations. As set out in Appendix D, I recorded their 
year of creation, their locations within Toronto, whether they collect dues, who may be a 
member, whether they were incorporated, and the purposes of the organization. These 
categories relate to the overall purposes of this chapter of the dissertation, which seeks to 
understand how organizations exercise and assert themselves within the notion of 
Moore’s semiautonomous social fields with different strengths and powers, and which are 
more or less bound by the formal rules within localized areas of the city.634 To what 
extent are neighbourhood associations self-contained organizations with power to make 
decisions, versus connected to or reliant on state-based decision-making? 
 
Notwithstanding thorough online searches for websites and active contact information, 
such as the email account of a member of the association. In some cases, websites and 
                                                
633 Federation of North Toronto Residents Associations, "Member Associations" (2016) FONTRA, online: 
<http://fontra.com/member-associations/>; Confederation of Resident & Ratepayer Associations in 
Toronto, "MM7.1 Request to Protect 250 year old Red Oak Tree at 76 Coral Gable Drive City Council 
Meeting No. 7: June 10, 2015" (2015) CORRA 1, online: 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/mm/comm/communicationfile-53063.pdf; Federation of Urban 
Neighbourhoods (Ontario), "Members and Their Affiliates By Municipality" (2016) 1, online: 
<https://urbanneighbourhoods.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/2013-federation-of-urban-neighbourhood-inc-
membership.pdf>. 
634 Merry, supra note 73 at 879. 
 	 153 
email addresses were located, but attempts to confirm information with the associations 
revealed that email addresses were defunct. There are countless possible explanations - 
the neighbourhood association may be dormant, defunct, led by someone without 
computer access, or the association may conduct its work offline. This may be the result 
of neighbourhood associations forming as a result of some sort of planning controversy 
or development, then become dormant once the issue had concluded.635 For example, the 
Victoria Village Ratepayers Association operated for forty years as a robust, incorporated 
association.636 However, in the, early 2000s the association unincorporated due to 
volunteer apathy and stopped asking for membership revenue, and they now serve as a 
forum for community news and information, and advocate for or on community issues as 
needed. Similarly, the Woodbine Park Residents Association was formed in the late 
1990s due to concerns about the impact of new developments on basement flooding.637 
The organization had major achievements, including the introduction of new City of 
Toronto policies regarding the monitoring of melt water and rain water, safety issues, and 
the development of Woodbine Park. After about fifteen years of work, the association 
retracted its functions, took down their website, and no longer collects dues. For this 
study, the absence of a formalized governance role means that definitive information is 
not available on all of the city’s neighbourhood associations. 
 
Based on the data in Appendix D, neighbourhood associations vary widely in their legal 
structures, membership requirements and fee structures. Based on this data, I analyzed 
how pre- and post-amalgamated neighbourhood associations differ. More than half of 
Toronto’s neighbourhood associations were established following amalgamation. Post-
amalgamation associations differ in their functions, with more a greater emphasis on 
community events, environmental objectives, safety, and information dissemination. By 
contrast, pre-amalgamation associations placed a greater emphasis on planning and 
concerns regarding the economy within their spaces of the city. Another key difference 
                                                
635 This dissertation does not consider the evolutionary paths of neighbourhood associations, nor their 
emergence, institutionalization/consolidation, and termination.  
636 Toronto Neighbourhood Guide, "Welcome to Victoria Park Village" (2016), online: < 
http://www.torontoneighbourhoods.net/neighbourhoods/north-york/victoria-park-village>. 
637 See e.g. Woodbine Park Residents Association, “Group Description”, online: 
<https://ca.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/WPRA/info. 
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between pre- and post-amalgamation neighbourhood associations is that the latter are far 
less likely have a resident-only policy; instead, non-residents and businesses may also 
serve as members. Post-amalgamation associations are also significantly less likely to 
collect a membership fee. 
 
However, for both pre- and post-amalgamation neighbourhood associations, 83% of 
neighbourhood association cite planning as a core function. In addition, 52% are 
incorporated either provincially or federally, as non-profits or for-profit corporations, 
which means they can participate in OMB hearings. Participation in OMB hearings is an 
important aspect of planning. As such, this data supports the findings that 83% of 
neighbourhood associations are created to impact planning and land use in the area. This 
is consistent with Moore’s conclusions that Toronto’s neighbourhood associations may 
have broad or general mandates, but their predominant function is to represent their 
members in regard to planning.638  
 
c) BIAs, neighbourhood associations and local legal spaces 
 
The following section analyzes the data above to analyze the roles played by BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations in the local governance model. 
 
The geographies of BIAs and neighbourhood associations 
 
As noted, Toronto has 81 BIAs. 639 There are several observations to be made about the 
locations of these bodies. First, BIAs are not uniformly located across the city. The 
Toronto-East York Community Council area has the vast majority of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations, as seen on Illustration 3.5. Etobicoke and North York are 
next with a roughly equal number of BIAs, while Scarborough has the least, at 7%. In 
some cases, the boundaries of the associations overlap, whereby multiple neighbourhood 
                                                
638 Moore, supra note 202. 
639 Rebecca Melnyk, BIAs drive ethnic retail neighbourhoods (Tuesday, April 7, 2015) Canadian Property 
Management, online: < https://www.reminetwork.com/articles/bias-face-change-in-ethnic-retail-
neighbourhoods/>. 
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associations claim to represent a particular area.640 Illustration 3.5 shows the locations of 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations in Toronto. The map indicates which 
neighbourhood associations are inactive. 
 
 
Illustration 3.5: Locations of BIAs and neighbourhood associations641 
 
Also, BIAs and neighbourhood associations are located in similar parts of the city. This 
means that certain sections of the city have representation from both BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations. As seen in Illustration 3.6, the locations of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations lie alongside the areas of the city with the highest income 
                                                
640 See e.g. a block of Marion Street, a one-way street near High Park, that is represented by at least three 
neighbourhood associations. It is within the stated boundaries of the Sunnyside Community Association, 
the Roncesvalles-Macdonell Residents’ Association, and the Parkdale Residents Association (David 
Topping, “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015), online: < 
http://davidtopping.tumblr.com/torontoresidents>). 
641 Original research (Alexandra Flynn). 
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levels.642 This means that some parts of the city have overlapping bodies representing 
residents, while other parts are representing only by wards and community councils. 
 
 
Illustration 3.6: BIAs and neighbourhood associations, and income levels643 
 
Examining the map alongside the data gathered on neighbourhood associations, just two 
of Toronto’s neighbourhood associations are located in the city’s vulnerable areas.644 
Rather than focusing on planning issues, these two neighbourhood associations instead 
collaborate with social providers. For example, the Bathurst Finch Network (BFN), 
which began in 2009, describes itself as “a group of community residents and workers 
from community agencies and the City of Toronto in the Bathurst-Finch neighbourhood. 
We work together to plan community-based programs and make positive change in our 
neighbourhood and our city.”645 The BFN is located in one of the City of Toronto’s 13 
                                                
642 The areas noted darker blue are the more affluent areas of the city, meaning locations where residents 
have an annual income greater than $75,000 based on the 2011 Census. BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations are disproportionately located in these higher income areas. 
643 Original research (Alexandra Flynn). 
644 These two organizations are the Bathurst Finch Network and the Mount Dennis Community 
Association. 
645 Bathurst Finch Network, “Welcome to the Bathurst Finch Network!), online: 
<https://sites.google.com/site/bathurstfinchnetwork/home>. 
 	 157 
priority neighbourhoods, and currently one of the eight transitioning neighborhood under 
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy.646 It uses participatory processes to create and 
run community-based programs, including a monthly community women's dinner; a 
monthly 'free school' exploring topics of interest in a community setting; a talent night; a 
monthly immigration legal clinic; and a weekly English conversation circle.647  
 
Post-amalgamation role in local governance 
 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations have each doubled in number since amalgamation. 
Their increased presence suggests a replacement for a direct connection to local 
government. In their evaluation of changes in the City of Toronto’s approach to 
governance given COTA and other legislative and policy initiatives, Meghan Joy and 
Ronald K. Vogel reference “the ascendance of neoliberalism as the governing 
philosophy.” They posit that federal, provincial, and city governments have each adopted 
“a neoliberal policy agenda grounded in austerity policies that include lower taxes, 
greater reliance on market processes, scaling back or dismantling the welfare state, and 
embracing new public management policies.”648 They state: “Post-amalgamation Toronto 
operates like a private corporation and participatory processes often appear as an 
afterthought rather than a space to let citizens proactively bring their issues to city staff 
before policies and plans are made.”649  
 
BIAs can be characterized as forms of organization that allows the state to govern at a 
distance, characterized as a form of neoliberal management meant to “compensate for 
declining public resources” in increasingly privatized economies.650 BIAs reflect an 
“ethos of low taxation” in an era of “if you want it, you’re going to have to fund it 
yourself.”651 On the other hand, councillors help to form and further the involvement of 
                                                
646 Ibid. 
647 Bathurst Finch Report, "The Real BFN report" (2013) 1, online: < 
https://sites.google.com/site/bathurstfinchnetwork/home/the-real-bfn-report>. 
648 Meghan Joy & Ronald K. Vogel, “Toronto’s governance crisis: A global city under pressure” (2015) 49  
Cities 35. 
649 Ibid at 49. 
650 Lewis, supra note 217 at 187. 
651 Ibid. 
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BIAs and neighbourhood associations in their wards, as “the glue between different 
neighbourhoods,”652 bodies that allow councillors to have “greater reach within a 
community,”653 and that serve as “citizen experts.”654  
 
However, these bodies may exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities within and between 
neighbourhoods.655 BIAs contribute to increased space-based tension both in areas with 
and without BIAs.656 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and ethnically 
mixed neighbourhoods, and where access to decision-making processes varies.657 The 
result is a limit to democracy and the exclusion of particular perspectives of residency 
and public space.658 In Washington, BIAs have purportedly contributed to racial and 
cultural inequality by favouring the views of mostly white property owners in their 
decision-making.659 Some question whether the organizations emphasize the power of 
affluent neighbourhoods in comparison to more vulnerable parts of the city, in part 
because poor sections of the city do not have BIAs despite the existence of commercial 
areas supporting residents.660 This dynamic enhances Washington’s support of vocal and 
well-organized areas, rather than poorer, largely African American neighbourhoods.661  
 
There are three chief concerns relating to inclusivity in the context of Toronto’s BIAs. 
First, BIAs exacerbate inclusivity issues through their internal governance model. Areas 
with BIAs may advocate for particular kinds of inclusivity. There is little question that 
                                                
652 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
653 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
654 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
655 Lewis, supra note 217 at 205. But see Richard Schragger, “Does Governance Matter: The Case of 
Business Improvement Districts and the Urban Resurgence” (2010) 3 Drexel L. Rev. 49, who advocates for 
caution in drawing connections between such bodies and negative effects on inequality. 
656 Susanna Schaller and Gabriella Modan, “Contesting Public Space and Citizenship Implications for 
Neighborhood Business Improvement Districts” (2005) 24:3 Journal of Planning Education and Research 
94. 
657 Richard Briffault, “A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban 
Governance” (1999) 99:2 Columbia Law Review 365 at 394. 
658 Ibid. at 395. 
659 Lewis, supra note 217 at 206. 
660 Ward, supra note 225. 
661 Lewis, supra note 217 at 206. 
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BIAs themselves do not represent the overall community, as residents have few if any 
votes on BIA boards.662 Some argue that this organizational structure leads to 
undemocratic practices where power is concentrated amongst property and business 
owners. This undemocratic structure is called into question because BIAs play a role in 
the management of public space.663 BIAs both shape boundaries and affect who may 
participate in governance.664  
 
Second, Toronto’s large BIAs go beyond representing businesses through activities like 
street fairs and marketing and instead play an active advocacy role for the benefits of 
their members.665 For example, one of the largest of Toronto’s BIAs is the Toronto 
Entertainment BIA. It was created in 2008 and is located in the Toronto-East York 
Community Council area. It straddles two wards, owing to its large size of 156 blocks. It 
represents over 1,800 businesses and had a budget in 2016 of $2,079,199. In 2013, it 
funded a Master Plan drafted by consultants, setting out in over 100 pages the BIA’s 
proposals for the public realm, focusing on details such as streetscaping, planters, cycling 
lanes and other matters squarely within the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto.666 
Regarding any city proposals relating to the BIA area, the Master Plan outlines in what 
circumstances the BIA should provide “official written endorsements,” only where “the 
BIA is assured that the spirit and intent of the Master Plan are respected.” It proposes a 
                                                
662 But note that, in contrast, BID boards in New Jersey (Freehold Center Partnership and the Union Center 
Special Improvement District) have granted residents voting power by including residents in the governing 
structure (J. B. Justice and R. S. Goldsmith, “Private governments or public policy tools? The law and 
public policy of New Jersey’s special improvement districts” (2006) 29(1-3) International Journal of 
Public Administration 107; Richard Briffault, “A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement 
Districts and Urban Governance” (1999) 99:2 Columbia Law Review 365; Göktug Morçöl and Patricia 
Patrick, “Business Improvement Districts in Pennsylvania: Implications for Democratic Metropolitan 
Governance” (2006) 29 International Journal of Public Administration; Susanna Schaller and Gabriella 
Modan, “Contesting Public Space and Citizenship Implications for Neighborhood Business Improvement 
Districts” (2005) 24:3 Journal of Planning Education and Research 94. 
663 Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 575 at 951. 
664 John Paul Catungal, Deborah Leslie & Yvonne Hii, “Geographies of Displacement in the Creative City: 
The Case of Liberty Village, Toronto” (2009) 46:5-6 Urban Studies 1095; Lewis, supra note 219. 
665 See Appendix D. 
666 Toronto Entertainment District BIA Master Plan at 105, online: <http://www.torontoed.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/TED-MasterPlanUpdate-March4-2015.pdf>. Note other BIA Master Plans in 
Toronto, including: St. Lawrence Market Neighbourhood BIA Public Realm Master Plan (May 2015), 
online: < http://www.stlawrencemarketbia.ca/images/01_SLMNBIA-Final-
Report_full_Edited%20June%208%202015%20Optimized.pdf>; The Kennedy BIA Project Re-Kennedy 
(November 12, 2013), online: < http://www.oliviatruong.ca/workshop/img/design/projectrekennedy.pdf> 
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set process for councillor and staff review of the Master Plan in connection with proposed 
developments. The Master Plan further states that, “Where proposals are deemed to be 
fundamentally at odds with the spirit and intent of the Master Plan, the BIA reserves its 
right to voice its opposition to the application to the City and/or Ontario Municipal 
Board.”667 
 
Third, BIAs call into question inclusivity in their attempts to influence local governance 
more broadly, for example, to influence social policy. As one staff member I spoke with 
said, BIAs “ have, sometimes at their peril, weighed into the geopolitics of the area” 
because of their site-specific private interests.668 For example, in 2015, Toronto’s 
Chinatown BIA objected to the plan to introduce a youth homeless shelter within the 
boundaries of the BIA.669 The BIA noted a lack of consultation on the proposal and the 
negative impact on the area, stating: “the BIA had worked hard for a decade to ‘clean up’ 
the area, and business owners are worried the facility will turn Spadina into a ‘centre of 
homelessness’.”670 The protest culminated in placards within member businesses, as well 
as a demonstration of over 50 people at City Hall.671 The BIA suggests that it is 
sympathetic to the need for having soup kitchens and drop-in centres, but argues that they 
should not be located in tourist areas, even though numerous homeless and vulnerable 
people call such “tourist areas” home.672 In this case, as Schragger advances, BIAs affirm 
recognition of their members’ business interests in priority to others.673 
 
                                                
667 Ibid. Note, however, that under the Procedural Bylaw, BIAs – as City boards – may not oppose City 
policy, including by appearing against the City at OMB hearings. 
668 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
(18 May 2016) – author conducted. 
669 Kendra Mangione, “We don't need any more grit': Chinatown BIA on street youth centre” CTV News 
(December 30, 2015), online: <http://toronto.ctvnews.ca/we-don-t-need-any-more-grit-chinatown-bia-on-
street-youth-centre-1.2718615>. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Connie Wardle, “Toronto BIA Protests Street Mission’s Plans to Move into the Neighbourhood” 
Presbyterian Record (February 1, 2016), online: < http://presbyterianrecord.ca/2016/02/01/toronto-bia-
protests-street-missions-plans-to-move-into-the-neighbourhood/>. 
672 Desmond Cole, “Chinatown should welcome homeless youth with open heart: Cole” The Toronto Star 
(7 January 2016), online: <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/01/07/chinatown-should-
welcome-homeless-youth-with-open-heart-cole.html>. 
673 Schragger, supra note 193 at 426. 
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Likewise, researchers have observed that neighbourhood associations are positioned to 
exercise a tremendous amount of power within local decision-making as compared to 
other stakeholders, exemplified by their access to councillors to the exclusion of other 
local actors. As Logan & Rabrenovic note, while other kinds of civic organizations may 
play a role in representing resident interests, the neighbourhood association “is 
commonly the vehicle through which neighbors learn about problems, formulate 
opinions, and seek to intervene in the political process to protect their local interests.”674 
Such communities have a very strong identification with their neighbourhood, and the 
neighbourhood association representing their interests should be listened to and involved 
in the development process.675 This may be due, in part, to the presence of 
neighbourhood associations in predominately wealthy neighbourhoods, as individuals 
and households with higher incomes are more likely to be engaged in civic 
participation.676 Similarly, Toronto’s neighbourhood associations are seen as dominated 
by homeowners who are white and middle class, who do not reach out to other members 
of the communities, and focus largely on land use rather than social issues.677 Not all 
neighbourhood associations are created equal: organizations with expertise, institutional 
memory, and neighbourhood self-governance capacity are better able to achieve 
results.678  
 
The false dichotomy of “public” and “private”  
 
Neither BIAs nor neighbourhood associations are easily classified as “public” or 
“private” bodies, meaning the distinction between their role as representing their 
members and serving as a unit in a larger local governance system. The extent to which 
they may be characterized is informed by many factors, including the financial power of 
                                                
674 Logan & Rabrenovic, supra note 139 at 69. 
675 Ibid at 323. 
676 Oren M. Levin-Waldman, “Income, civic participation and achieving greater democracy” (2013) 43 The 
Journal of Socio-Economics 83. 
677 Amalia Alarcon De Morris & Paul Leistner, “From Neighborhood Association System to Participatory 
Democracy: Broadening and Deepening Public Involvement in Portland, Oregon” (2009) National Civic 
Review 47 at 48. 
678 Andre Sorensen & Lake Segaris, “From Participation to the Right to the City: Democratic Place 
Management at the Neighbourhood Scale in Comparative Perspective” (2010) 25:3 Planning Practice & 
Research 297.  
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the organization, their connection to city and business leaders as important players in 
local decision-making, and their transformation over time. 
 
Regarding BIAs, one councillor said, “They have a … board of directors, supported by 
city staff, who are at every one of these meetings, and an employee who can manage the 
back office stuff. You have this institutional stuff and a source of money, and that’s great. 
But, we have to be very careful to constrain them.”679 BIAs have a direct relationship 
with local governments. Their establishment is sanctioned through municipal law; they 
are partners in the delivery of some governmental services; the government has 
accountability mechanisms to oversee their conduct; and their fees. However, despite 
these formal connections with municipal governments, studies have shown that BIA staff 
do not believe they have any close identification with governmental institutions and see 
themselves as firmly part of the private sector rather than any form of government.680  
 
Randy Lippert and Mark Sleiman describe BIAs as “ambassadors,” serving as a 
“knowledge brokers within a broader urban governance assemblage.”681 Lippert and 
Sleiman suggest that BIAs are not simply private actors seeking additional power and 
they do not fit easily within particular descriptions as exclusionary or inequality-
enhancing. Instead, they are more complex organizations that defy easy categorization. 
Richard Briffault suggests that the “public” and the “private” spheres are interconnected 
in relation to BIAs.682 Briffault states, “... the public’s use and enjoyment of the streets, 
parks, squares and other public spaces that are at the heart of urban living, BIAs—
whatever their place on the public-private continuum—can enhance the public 
environment and contribute to an enrichment of the public life.”683 Similarly, Wolf 
emphatically states that BIAs are “a part of urban governance and public 
                                                
679 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
680 James F. Wolf, “Urban Governance and Business Improvement Districts: The Washington, DC BIDs” 
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administration.”684 He argues that BIAs must be placed within the public administration 
context, even if their objectives focus on the “private” concerns of their members.685  
 
In a comprehensive study of the nature of BIA governance, researchers Göktug Morçöl, 
Triparna Vasavada and Sohee Kim studied BIAs in Center City, Pennsylvania to evaluate 
the role of BIAs in urban governance, concluding involvement in the city’s governance 
became “deeper and wider” over the years.686 In particular, BIAs began to advocate on 
positions that went beyond the BIA to citywide matters like land-use planning, zoning, 
and intergovernmental funding for infrastructure repair.687 Similarly, a study of Toronto’s 
Downtown Young BIA, researchers observed that the objectives of BIAs tend to evolve 
from basic operational and tactical tasks to more strategic tasks. This requires improved 
data, cost-effective decision support, and increased coordination at the city, regional, 
provincial and national levels.688 Put another way, the longer they are in operation, the 
more they exert a role in local governance.  
 
It remains uncertain the extent to which BIAs cooperate with other neighbourhood 
organizations. For example, in his study of the development of the “creative city” in one 
of Toronto’s largest BIAs, the Entertainment District BIA, Sébastien Darchen observed 
the tension between the local planning process, whereby the BIA carried a far stronger 
voice in community deliberations and their interests were specific to the advantages for 
the member businesses.689 While council ultimately supported a mixed use 
neighbourhood which includes a diverse range of economic activities than those proposed 
by the BIA, including an environment where emerging artists can live and work in the 
neighbourhood, Darchen concluded that the promotion of arts and culture as imagined by 
the BIA will lead to revitalization of the area: “The creative city is used to legitimize a set 
of objectives — put forward by key stakeholders — to transform the space into an 
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appealing urban environment conducive specifically to investment for residential and 
business development.”690 The BIA articulated “already packaged regeneration 
processes,” whereby the creative city concept does not result in a neighbourhood balance 
or representation. Instead, only the particular interests of those with a vested stake are 
promoted.”691 Illustration 3.7 shows Toronto BIAs mapped alongside population density 
and their year of establishment, showing that amongst areas where these bodies exist, 
density is greater the earlier that the BIA was established.  
 
 
Illustration 3.7: Map of BIAs, neighbourhood associations and density 
 
Neighbourhood associations, too, have been described as having an “insider/outsider” 
status in local governance. Miller suggests that this characterization is greatly informed 
by whether the neighborhood council or association is officially sanctioned or “certified” 
by the city; if not, the neighborhood associations are simply private organizations 
comprised of neighborhood residents.692 Related questions include the degree of financial 
support, whether they have final decision-making powers or a predominantly advisory 
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 	 165 
role, and the extent to which the decisions of such bodies are respected.693 Chaskin and 
Greenberg believe that neighbourhood associations, regardless of affiliation with 
municipal governments, are central to local governance, through fostering collective 
decision-making and encouraging civic engagement.694 While they are not part of formal 
processes, they are embedded in governance mechanisms by leveraging relationships 
with allies and partners, and negotiating on behalf of their membership.695 In Chicago, 
they have been able to use this “interstitial” space to successfully shape policy and 
allocate resources in the public realm, ultimately playing a more direct roles in 
governance.696 Chaskin and Garg suggest viewing the neighbourhood association along a 
spectrum, where they serve as parallel institutions providing an alternative form of 
provision of public good; as separate but complementary institutions to local government, 
offering goods and services beyond the scope of local government; as incorporated into 
local government as formal methods of representation and action; or in opposition to 
local government, meant to advocate for change.697  
 
In Toronto, this “insider/outside” characterization has been influenced by amalgamation. 
As noted earlier, the number of neighbourhood associations has increased steadily over 
the years, with more than half of the city’s active neighbourhood associations having 
been created since amalgamation. This means that neighbourhood associations are 
asserting themselves in local governance to a greater degree than they did prior to 
amalgamation. Like BIAs, some neighbourhood associations seem to have taken on 
functions that would normally fall to the municipal government or to a BIA. Based on the 
data collected for this dissertation, post-amalgamation neighbourhood associations are 
more likely than those established prior to 1998 to assert a role in bringing the 
community together, protecting the environment, disseminating information, and 
addressing safety. For example, the Trefann Court Residents Association, established in 
2008, sidewalk and pothole repair, addressing graffiti removal, and working directly with 
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the police.698 The Swansea Area Ratepayer's Association offers public forums, ensuring 
the Town Hall is managed according to neighbourhood needs, and collaborating with the 
City of Toronto to ensure safe and well-designed pedestrian and cycle paths along the 
lakeshore and Humber River.699  
 
Neighbourhood associations exercise a range of authority and power in local areas. In 
their famous study of neighbourhood associations in five American cities, Berry, Portney 
and Thomson also observed that strong neighbourhood associations are chiefly focused 
on mobilizing civic participation, through demand from residents, legitimacy from local 
government.700 However, as Chaskin and Garg note, there is no clear system to determine 
how neighbourhood associations will be incorporated into the overall governance 
model.701 On one hand, they may be vehicles to enhance civic participation in local 
government and planning decisions, thus promoting democracy. On the other, they may 
help with service delivery or other tangible functions. Either way, “they are neither 
politically nor administratively independent.”702  
 
In summary, while BIAs are, as one councillor called them, bodies that “create their own 
little tiny tax base and they tax and spend on themselves, and they all act in self-
interest,”703 neighbourhood associations are more likely to react to local politics and 
determine their activities accordingly, rather than have stand-alone missions separate 
from what the city does. In turn, “city administrators and elected officials respect the 
neighbourhood associations … because of the authority they have within the structure of 
government.”704 Together, neighbourhood associations and BIAs have dual roles: on the 
one hand, they are created and reinforced by ward councillors, and privileged in their 
participatory role in local decision-making in order to mitigate opposition within the 
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ward. On the other hand, they are not representative of the diversity of residents. The 
local governance model includes the formal and informal sanctioning of neighbourhood 
associations and BIAs by elected officials and staff. The implications for local 
governance are discussed in the next section. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examines Toronto’s local boundaries and overlapping governance 
bodies to query the meaning of local governance, balancing representation and fairness in 
decision-making. Building on legal geography and legal pluralism, I assert that local legal 
spaces comprise state law and other norms, orders, rules and practices. Although state 
and non-state co-exist and, indeed can be thought of as mutually constitutive, the naming 
of norms, orders, rules and practices outside of state law helps to identify the dynamics of 
these interlegal spaces, including what state law has not included in its articulation of 
local governance.  
 
However, wards are not the only component of local governance. As Santos asserts, there 
are a multiplicity of laws, institutions, and boundaries operating formally and 
informally.705 This combination of laws creates literal and metaphorical boundaries, 
manifesting in Ford’s conclusion  that jurisdiction is left largely unquestioned. When 
applied to  Toronto, we see that the ward serves a central role. In interviews with staff 
and councillors, the councillor was informally referred to as the “ward boss,” with wards 
as the “fiefdom.” Beyond these characterizations, wards are the basis of representation in 
Toronto, with COTA setting out that all decisions are to be made by “City Council,” 
meaning (at present) the 44 councillors and mayor. Wards also serve as the chief 
intermediary between residents and local government. 
 
In Toronto, while wards serve a privileged role in the formal local governance model, 
community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations assert competing claims that 
may reinforce or contradict the boundaries and representation of wards. Some wards and 
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neighbourhood associations act as ongoing expressions of communities that predated 
confederation, yet which reinforce the ghosts of previous towns and villages. Community 
councils largely and symbolically reflect the pre-amalgamated municipalities. These 
boundaries reflect multiple conceptions of local legal spaces in the Toronto context, each 
created with their own independent objectives and claims to representation based on the 
asserted boundaries, working like an accordion to reorient the scale of interest and 
decision-making. They embody what Habermas observes as the ongoing negotiation 
between and within groups regarding the boundaries of “neighbourhood” or 
“community.”706  
 
Within this model, BIAs and neighbourhood associations have transformed since 
amalgamation. From a legal perspective, there are significant differences between these 
bodies. BIAs are “local boards” of municipal government, with delegated powers, city 
assistance, and direct involvement of councillors. While neighbourhood associations are 
informal bodies, they have transformed since amalgamation from largely focused on 
planning to taking on other functions, including stepping into local government provision 
of services. However, there are important similarities: both of these bodies have doubled 
in number since amalgamation, are unevenly scattered across the city, and are generally 
situated in the city’s most affluent areas. Their creation and involvement in local 
governance is perpetuated by the city councillor.  
 
Local legal spaces are thus comprised of geographic and participatory characteristics, 
both of which assert norms of inclusion and exclusion. Boundary lines have 
consequences.707 Participation in local governance is contingent on the legitimization of 
the geographic boundary, either because a councillor has determined their interests in 
considering a particular matter, or a BIA or neighbourhood association exists in a specific 
part of the city. The boundaries of the local legal spaces are plural and overlapping.  
 
In Toronto, local governance is dominated by the ward, with BIAs and neighbourhood 
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associations asserting significant influence. This model calls into question the degree to 
which Toronto’s local governance model is inclusive and participatory, as neighbourhood 
associations and BIAs represent economically privileged residents,708 with 
neighbourhood associations, in particular, dominated by homeowners who are white and 
middle class, who do not reach out to other members of the communities.709 Like the 
observations of Gerald Frug that neighbourhood-based governance can have significant 
implications on inclusivity, including the creation of the “other,” the data collected in this 
chapter shows that BIAs and neighbourhood associations perpetuate decision-making that 
is disproportionately focused on the interests of certain residents to the exclusion of other 
voices.710 
 
Like Young and Valverde, this dissertation focuses on scale and, in particular, the 
appropriate scale of local decision-making. This chapter concludes that community 
councils were intended to and could be designed to play a pivotal role in local 
governance, unsettling the power of the ward councillor and shifting the focus away from 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations to a broader public, which other scholars have 
suggested may be a positive contribution to the governance structures of amalgamated 
city governments.711 Chapter 1 presented three rationales for the establishment of 
delegated “local” bodies like community councils. First, as argued by Slack and Bird, 
local institutions like community councils may allow pre-amalgamated communities to 
maintain a sense of their earlier identities and to govern particular affairs independently. 
This has also been referred to as “stewardship,” whereby a community has autonomy to 
manage its own affairs and promote well-being while insulating itself from conflicting 
city-wide decisions.712 Second, community councils may fulfill the democratic ideal of 
representation that is closer to the community. Jane Jacobs passionately advocated the 
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importance of neighbourhoods in the built form and in the decision-making of urban 
areas.713 Her position was that local decision-making was more legitimately democratic 
and connected to the interests and desires of those within neighbourhoods. A third 
argument concerns the efficient operation of government committees through the use of 
delegation. The suggestion is that community councils should have responsibility for 
certain localized functions like minor planning, parking or zoning decisions in order to 
give City Council the time and mandate to focus on issues that affect the city as a 
whole.714  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 offer case studies to apply the claims made here. A reimagination of 
local governance within the context of the urban commons is explored in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 – The Local Claims and Competing Forums of Toronto’s Casino 
Decisions 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of two related case studies: the 2012-13 casino 
decision, which involved four potential options for casino placement in the City of 
Toronto; and the 2015 casino decision, where the expansion of the Woodbine casino in 
the northwest part of the city was considered.715 
These case studies query how local spaces in the City of Toronto are created, imagined 
and governed by law. In Chapter 3, I examined the governance of Toronto’s local legal 
spaces, including how their overlap impacts inclusive participation. This dissertation now 
turns to an application of the framework outlined in Chapter 1. The cases here and in the 
following chapter were chosen on the basis of four criteria: first, that Toronto’s local 
governance bodies, meaning wards (as represented by councillors), community councils, 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations, did or could have played a role in decision-
making. Second, the cases considered matters that were deemed under the City of 
Toronto’s procedural bylaw to be city-wide issues. Third, the cases tested the geographic 
boundaries of local, meaning that the spatial aspects were considered alongside 
governance. Fourth, each of these cases concerned distributive justice, in that the city-
wide issues to the decided would have localized implications for residents. 
 
This chapter makes two conclusions regarding the overlap of the four bodies that form 
Toronto’s local governance model and how they govern the smaller-than-city areas of the 
city. First, community councils were used as a forum for the consideration of “local” 
issues in the city-wide debate, with “local” referring to the matters of concern to the 
community where the casino would be located. In 2015, the matter proceeded through the 
existing process for “city-wide” deliberations, namely through Executive Committee and 
then City Council, with staff-led consultation, and the local councillor acting as the local 
gatekeeper. In the 2012-13 decision, the Toronto-East York Community Council 
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(“TEYCC”) was used as a forum for deliberation, whereby the local aspects of a city-
wide issue were directly considered by staff, formal procedures and greater opportunities 
for civic engagement. The use of the community council in the 2012-13 casino debate 
was a powerful tool to shift the debate of this city-wide issue to the local community. 
Second, these case studies demonstrated that the city’s distinction between local versus 
city-wide decisions, based exclusively on subject matter, does not necessarily correspond 
to what communities deem to be of concern. Instead, the city-wide matters of casino 
development, the job and the economy and tourism are also local matters. 
 
I. The 2012-2013 casino decision 
 
In 2012, the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG), a provincial corporation of 
the Province of Ontario, announced that it would expand gaming sites in the province. At 
the request of the City of Toronto’s Executive Committee, city staff spent months 
reviewing the pros and cons of having a casino in the City of Toronto, and the ideal 
location for such a casino.716 This review, which ultimately comprised more than a dozen 
staff reports and consideration by two committees and City Council, was articulated by 
city staff as a city-wide issue, with a focus on the city’s operating budget, jobs and 
tourism impacts. While city staff were conducting this official review, ward councillors 
and other parties, including BIAs and neighbourhood associations, played a role.717 As 
this section will show, these local entities negotiated their way into official processes - 
including the use of city staff, resources and governance entities - forcing consideration 
of the local effects of a casino.  
 
Ultimately, City Council decided not to permit the creation of a casino in Toronto’s 
downtown core. This case study examines the role that wards, community councils, 
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neighbourhood associations and BIAs played in the process, and what this reveals about 
the construction of the local and the meaningful, inclusive participation of people in local 
governance in this city-wide debate.718  
 
1. The legal context and history of gambling law in Toronto 
 
The history of gambling legislation in Canada assists in appreciating events related to the 
2012-13 casino debate. Until 1969, gambling was illegal across Canada under the 
Criminal Code of Canada.719 Gambling provisions, found in Part V of the Criminal Code 
(“Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting”), had origins in English Law, enacted in the 
14th-century720 in response to monarchs fearing that their archers “could be lost to ‘idle’ 
games of dice.”721 This legislation found its way into Canada’s first Criminal Code in 
1892 and prohibited the keeping common gaming houses, conducting lotteries, gambling 
at public conveyances and cheating at play.722 These “piecemeal” provisions more or less 
stayed the same until the striking of a joint committee of both houses of Parliament in 
1952, which noted that existing laws suffered from a lack of clarity making enforcement 
impossible, did not have the support of the public, and led to fraudulent activity that 
authorities were unable or unwilling to control.723 The committee ultimately 
recommended relaxing and clarifying criminal law provisions, but not without offering 
the following proviso regarding its moral concerns with gambling activity: 
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The Committee does not wish in any way to give countenance to or 
encourage widespread organized gambling through lotteries or other means. 
It recognizes that unrestrained gambling would produce grave moral, social 
and economic effects in the community and it is of the opinion that the duty 
of the state is to ensure that lotteries and other forms of gambling are kept 
within limited bounds. This desirable result has not been achieved and, in 
the Committee’s opinion, cannot be achieved within the framework of the 
present law.724 
 
In 1969 and 1985, considerable changes were made to gambling, in no small part related 
to the Committee’s conclusions. While there remain federal prohibitions against gaming 
and betting, section 207 of the Criminal Code carves out an important exception which 
permits provinces to conduct activities broadly defined as “lottery schemes”:725 
 
207. (1) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Part relating to gaming and 
betting, it is lawful 
  (a) for the government of a province, either alone or in conjunction with the 
government of another province, to conduct and manage a lottery scheme in that 
province, or in that and the other province, in accordance with any law enacted by the 
legislature of that province; 
 
Since these changes to the Criminal Code were introduced, the Province of Ontario has 
introduced sweeping reforms relating to gambling.726 As noted by scholars Colin 
Campbell and Gary Smith: “Legal gambling in Canada now operates on a scale that was 
unimagined thirty years ago.”727 From 1993 to 1997, the Province of Ontario provided 
licenses to charities to run temporary casinos as fundraisers. As a result of technical 
challenges associated with licensing, the Province then developed permanent charity 
gaming clubs. In 1997, the Province announced that it would develop a certain number of 
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permanent charity gaming clubs and introduce video lottery terminals, first at charity 
gaming clubs and racetracks and then in bars and restaurants. However, under the 
applicable legislation at the time, the host municipality was required to approve the 
operation of a casino following public consultation.728 In response, the former City of 
Toronto, along with each of the other former municipalities of Metro Toronto held a 
referendum in tandem with the 1997 municipal election, where 67% of citizens in each of 
the former municipalities voted against the establishment of permanent charity casinos.729 
As such, there are currently no charity casinos or video lottery terminals in the City of 
Toronto. 
 
In Ontario, gambling activities are subject to a complex regulatory regime.730 The OLG 
sits within this regulatory framework. The OLG is a Provincial Crown Corporation 
reporting to the Minister of Finance. Since 2000, OLG has been responsible for the 
province's lotteries, casinos, and slot facilities. OLG operates 24 gaming facilities within 
the Province, which include 14 slot facilities at racetracks, five casinos offering both 
table games and slot machines, one charity casino, four resort casinos, and dozens of 
retail ticket games. It has authority under section 207 of the Criminal Code to conduct 
and manage lottery schemes pursuant to its mandate under the Ontario Lottery and 
Gaming Corporation Act, 1999 (“OLGCA”), including the establishment of a “gaming 
site” in any municipality located in Ontario.731 The OLGCA regulation provides for a 
number of preconditions to OLG authorization, including a municipal council resolution 
supporting the establishment of a gaming site within the applicable municipal 
boundaries.732 The municipality must also seek “public input into the establishment of the 
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proposed gaming site and give the Corporation, in writing, a description of the steps it 
took to do so and a summary of the public input it received.” Two factors help to 
contextualize the presence of gambling sites and public consultation. First, legislation 
now repealed previously required that a municipality hold a referendum to ensure public 
approval of a casino within local government boundaries, as illustrated in the following 
section. Second, the OLG itself is not obligated to seek public opinion or demonstrate to 
any government entity the process it undertook on casino-related decisions. 
 
Leading up to the 2012-13 casino debate, there were three kinds of venues available for 
gambling in the City of Toronto: a racetrack and slot machines at the Woodbine 
Racetrack,733 a temporary casino held each summer at the two-week Canadian National 
Exhibition (CNE), and charity gaming venues licensed by OLG, such as bingo halls.  
 
2. Genesis of the debate 
 
In July 2010, the Government of Ontario directed OLG to raise its revenue in the areas of 
commercial and charitable gaming. On February 1, 2012, the Province of Ontario 
announced that it would be closing Ontario Place, a 96-acre public and family friendly 
space located in the City of Toronto’s waterfront, a destination for mainly Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) residents since 1971. The City of Toronto’s Executive Committee 
speculated at this time that Ontario Place would ultimately be used as a casino.734 Even 
without formal notice from OLG or the province, the City Manager was asked to report 
back on the pros and cons of hosting a commercial casino in Toronto.735 
 
In March 2012, OLG delivered a report to the Minister of Finance following a Strategic 
Business Review of its operations, which outlined a plan to “modernize” lottery and 
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gaming in Ontario.736 OLG identified 29 zones across Ontario for locating gaming 
facilities, of which 24 already housed an existing slot
 
or casino
 
gaming facility. OLG’s 
intention was to issue a request for proposal for a private sector provider to develop or 
operate a casino in each zone. OLG would regulate the types and number of games 
offered, betting limits, and responsible gambling policies. Two gaming zones were 
proposed within the City of Toronto’s boundaries.737 Illustration 4.1 shows the OLG’s 
preferred zones for a new casino, called “C1.” 
 
 
Illustration 4.1: Map of Preferred OLG Casino Zones738 
 
Before the development of any new gaming sites, OLG required under provincial 
legislation the explicit consent of a municipality, which in Toronto is the passing of a 
resolution by City Council.739 The City of Toronto’s procedural bylaw considered this to 
                                                
736 City Manager, Staff Report: New Casino & Convention Development in Toronto, City of Toronto (5 
April 2013), online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-57336.pdf>. 
737 Ibid. at 27. 
738 Ibid. at 27. 
739 Ibid. at 3. 
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be an issue of city-wide consequence, meaning that it affected the city as a whole, not a 
single community council area.740 As such, City Council approval was necessary to 
expand or construct gaming sites within the city’s boundaries.741 
 
3. Distinction between a “city-wide” and “local” process 
 
The 2012-13 casino debate took place over a single year and included three  overlapping 
events and actors: the formal process as set out by City Council; the steps taken by the 
ward councillors and the Toronto and East York Community Council (TEYCC); and the 
role played by BIAs, neighbourhood associations, and other groups.742 Key decisions 
were also made at the provincial level, which impacted OLG’s negotiations with the City 
of Toronto over the 12-month period.743  
 
The City of Toronto’s Executive Committee is made up of the Mayor and hand-picked 
members from amongst the city’s 44 councillors. The Executive Committee is required 
under COTA.744 The City’s procedural bylaw sets out the terms of reference for the 
Executive Committee.745 Its mandate is to “monitor and make recommendations on the 
priorities, plans, international and intergovernmental relations, and the financial integrity 
of the City” including “Council's strategic policy and priorities in setting the agenda.”746  
                                                
740 Ibid. at 1, explicitly stated: “Should Council consider new casino development, a citywide perspective 
should be taken to support the potential that exists in both the C1 and C2 zones 
741 Ibid. 
742 Note that this paper does not include ethnographic information – in particular interviews – with relevant 
municipal and provincial officials, nor with members of social movements, BIAs, neighbourhood 
associations and others. Data is drawn from reports on the public record and popular media.  
743 While it is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the role played by City of Toronto 
staff is complex and worthy of independent study. In the Final Report, distinct sections included the 
analysis of particular city departments, and the content of sections suggests that the departments had 
different perspectives on the value of a casino.  
744 Under the Act, “committee” means any advisory or other committee, subcommittee or similar entity of 
which at least 50 per cent of the members are also members of one or more municipal councils or local 
boards other than a police services board or public library board (City of Toronto Act, section 189 (1). 
745 City of Toronto Procedural Bylaw, Chapter 27, Appendix B-1. 
746 City of Toronto Procedural Bylaw, Chapter 27, Appendix B-1 at (I)(1) and (2)(A)(1). 
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Figure 4.1: Organizational Structure of the City of Toronto747 
 
The City’s organizational structure, shown in Figure 4.1, was introduced following the 
2005 governance review was outlined in Chapter 3. The governance structure was 
intended to reduce the number of days that councillors say in City Council meetings 
through enhanced delegation to committees. The new governance model introduced an 
Executive Committee; seven city-wide standing committees;748 six special committees, 
which are sub-committees of the Executive Committee;749 and four community 
councils.750 These bodies are set out and described in the Procedural Bylaw,751 which 
comprehensively sets out the rules for all Council and committee meetings and the 
                                                
747 City of Toronto, "City Council and its Committees", online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=762b6804e1f22410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD&vgnextchannel=9632acb640c21410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD>. 
748 The committees are: Economic Development Committee, Community Development and Recreation 
Committee, Public Works and Infrastructure Committee, Planning and Growth Management Committee, 
Licensing and Standards Committee, Parks and Environment Committee, Government Management 
Committee (§ 27-126). 
749 They are: Audit Committee, Striking Committee, Civic Appointments Committee, Budget Committee, 
Affordable Housing Committee, Employee and Labour Relations Committee (Appendix B (II)).  
750 Community council powers are described in detail in Part II of this Chapter. 
751 City of Toronto Municipal Code, Chapter 27, Council Procedures. 
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Council Committees.752 The provisions in the procedural bylaw are very detailed. They 
prescribe exactly how the meetings should be conducted, which committees there should 
be, and what may be delegated to community councils.753 City Council also delegated 
limited powers to the City’s four community councils, highlighted in yellow in Figure 
4.1, as outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
The City Manager is the city’s most senior staff member, appointed by City Council. 
COTA states that the City Manager (referred to as a “chief administrative officer” in the 
Act) is responsible for: “exercising general control and management of the affairs of the 
City for the purpose of ensuring the efficient and effective operation of the City; and 
performing such other duties as are assigned by the City.”754 The City Manager provides 
advice and information to the Executive Committee.755 
 
The changes in the city’s governance structure were in part a shift to make City Council 
more efficient, but another aim was to include in the model possibilities to look at the 
city-wide perspective, too. Amalgamation ultimately eroded the two-tier perspective, but 
integrating what was formally a metropolitan level with the municipal level. As a former 
senior staff member told that, in general, “there is something to be said for just 
coordinating better and putting in place mechanisms that make sure you were to cross 
boundaries that were kind of arbitrary to serve the people as a whole.”756 But the thing 
that is lost is that “the two-tier did give you the ability for different people to look at 
things differently. Either from a sort of citywide, or region-wide perspective and a local 
                                                
752 City of Toronto Municipal Code, Chapter 27 § 27-2.  
753 Council and Committee Meetings (Article V), Roles and Conduct (Article VI), Council Meeting's 
Agenda (Article VII), Adding New Business to Council Meetings (Article VIII), Motions (Article IX), 
Points of Order and Privilege and Chair's Rulings (Article X), Rules of Debate for Council (Article XI), 
Voting (Article XII ), Rules for Committee of the Whole (Article XIII), Minutes (Article XIV), Bills 
(Article XV), Committees of Council (Article XVI), Rules for Committees (Article XVII), Delegation to 
Council Committees (Article XVIII); Order of Business and Balloting (Appendix A); and Committees 
(Appendix B). 
754 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 140. 
755 City of Toronto, “City Manager’s Office” (last retrieved: April 1, 2017), online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=56f632d0b6d1e310VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD>. 
756 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
 	 181 
perspective.”757 The Executive Committee was meant to be a “kind of proxy for two-tier 
in a kind of way.”758  
 
In the process outlined by the City of Toronto’s Executive Committee, staff was asked to 
examine the “city-wide” effects of a casino, rather than the effects within the immediate 
area in which a potential casino would be located.759 In a report submitted to the 
Executive Committee and City Council summarizing the effects on communities and 
neighbourhoods, city staff did not report on the effects on neighbourhoods adjacent to 
one of the proposed casino sites: “To date, the City has not formally received a specific 
proposal for the establishment of a standalone casino gaming facility and/or integrated 
entertainment complex in Toronto. As such, City staff cannot provide a full analysis of 
the social impacts and opportunities a new casino gaming facility may have on the 
neighbourhood(s) adjacent to such a facility at this time.”760  
 
On May 14, 2012, the Executive Committee considered two other member motions 
referred by City Council related to casinos, in addition to the Ontario Place Motion that 
was introduced the previous month. The Executive Committee referred both items to the 
City Manager requesting that he consult with the OLG on the process for the selection of 
future casino locations in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). The City Manager was also 
asked to report back to Executive Committee at its October 9, 2012 meeting on the pros 
and cons of hosting a commercial casino in Toronto, “including projected job creation, 
revenue to the City, tourist attraction, and social impact”761 and the effects of casinos on 
neighbourhoods.762  
 
On November 5, 2012, the City Manager reported back to the Executive Committee with 
                                                
757 Ibid 
758 Ibid. 
759 City Manager, supra note 736. 
760 City of Toronto, Appendix E to the Final Report, Social Considerations of Establishing a New Casino in 
Toronto, City of Toronto (n.d.), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-57342.pdf>. 
761 Executive Committee, No Casino without a Referendum, (2015) EX 20.15, online: City of Toronto 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.EX20.15>. 
762 Member Motion, Ontario Place: A Place for Families and a Public Space, MM22.7 (City of Toronto, 
10 & 11 April 2012). 
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a preliminary report, “Considering a New Casino in Toronto,” and was directed to 
conduct a public consultation, provide further analysis, and report back with 
recommendations in Spring 2013. The Committee authorized the City Manager to 
conduct public consultations based on the staff report and technical report prepared by 
consultants. The direction was also given to report on a temporary casino, establishing a 
“social contract” (undefined in the motion) and developing recommendations on 
preferred locations, size, and type of facility and potential revenues from a hosting 
arrangement. No additional directions were provided on the effects of a potential casino 
on neighbourhoods. 
 
The City of Toronto identified three “study areas” as potential sites for a downtown 
casino, as well as analysis of the effects of an expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack.763 
As documented in its final report, the City undertook a “detailed review” of the study 
areas to provide advice on possible locations that “may or may not be appropriate for a 
new casino” and to give advice to City Council on the conditions it may wish to impose if 
Council proceeded with a casino in the C1 zone, which were OLG’s preferred areas for a 
casino development.764 The City identified the “opportunities and challenges” of a casino 
in this area based on five themes: the existing planning framework, urban fabric, place 
making/public realm, transportation, and infrastructure.  
 
The three areas chosen for closer study were the Ports Lands, Exhibition Place, and the 
downtown core. The proposed downtown locations were all within the boundaries of the 
TEYCC, which has representatives from 12 wards. The Port Lands were ultimately 
rejected as a suitable area for a casino, thus leaving Exhibition Place and the downtown 
core, which lie within Wards 19 and 20.765 Councillor Mike Layton was the Ward 19 
councillor and then-Councillor Adam Vaughan represented Ward 20. 
 
From a planning perspective, planning staff noted that “casino uses have significant city 
building implications which have to be understood both at a citywide level and an area 
                                                
763 Executive Committee, No Casino without a Referendum, (2015) EX 20.15, online: City of Toronto 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.EX20.15>. 
764 Ibid. 
765 Ibid. 
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specific basis” (emphasis added).766 Normally, city planners are given “a detailed 
proposal for a specific site accompanied by development applications submitted under 
the Planning Act with supporting documentation,” which is then assessed.767 This 
information helps staff in making recommendations to City Council on “the 
appropriateness of a proposal (proposed uses, scale, form, density, etc.) for a specific 
site.” Here, the casino was to be located within the zones identified in Illustration 4.2, 
with uncertain, unpolished details regarding the precise location and square footage, 
interfering with staff’s ability to assess the local implications of the casino, on top of the 
“complicated” and “significant” city-wide “economic, financial and social considerations 
around casino uses.”768 
 
 
Illustration 4.2: Map of Toronto’s Study of Casino Locations 769 
 
Within the city’s decision-making process, individual ward councillors and community 
councils did not have a formal role to play in the casino deliberations. The councillors 
                                                
766 City Manager, supra note 736 at 2. 
767 Ibid. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Executive Committee, No Casino without a Referendum, (2015) EX 20.15, online: City of Toronto 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.EX20.15>. 
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were meant to fulfill their role as local representatives on City Council. The casino was 
seen as a “city-wide” issue given the magnitude of the financial consideration and 
because it involved more than one community council area.   
 
The consultation process, mandated by the Executive Committee and overseen by the 
City Manager’s Office, was one of the ways that the local impacts were assessed. 
Throughout the month of January 2013, City of Toronto staff and consultants oversaw 
five public consultations throughout the city.770 Consultants also conducted a poll and 
stakeholder interviews to understand whether the public supported the introduction of a 
casino.771 The format of the public consultations changed throughout the process. The 
initial open house took place in the City Hall Rotunda on January 9, 2013, with a series 
of information boards setting out the decision process; revenue, financial and economic 
development information; social and health considerations; and planning and site area 
information. City staff was available to answer questions. A feedback form and two 
online terminals were available for participants to provide their input. Hundreds of people 
showed up for the consultation, demanding more than information. Councillor Gord 
Perks, who represented a ward in the Toronto-East York Community Council area, stood 
on a chair and invited participants to an upstairs committee room to “have an actual 
conversation.”772  
 
Following the first meeting, the format for the remaining Community Open House events 
held between January 12 and 19, 2013 was changed to include presentations by City staff, 
more formal facilitated discussion groups and the opportunity to make statements during 
an open microphone session.773 I spoke to a former city staff member about the civic 
engagement process during the 2012-13 casino debate. For this former staff member, the 
                                                
770 Glyn Bowerman, “Toronto When The Chips Are Down” (16 April 2013) YYZ Magazine, online: 
<http://humberjournalism.com/yyz2013/toronto-when-the-chips-are-down/>. 
771 The Environics poll was a telephone survey of 902 Torontonians, with representation from across the 
City of Toronto. See City Manager, Staff Report: New Casino & Convention Development in Toronto, City 
of Toronto (5 April 2013).  
772 Staff, “Anti-casino side hijacks first public consultation on Toronto casino plan” (9 January 2013) Metro 
News, online: <http://metronews.ca/news/toronto/503047/anti-casino-side-hijacks-first-public-consultation-
on-toronto-casino-plan/>. 
773 City Manager, supra note 736. 
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casino debate was “one of the most difficult kinds of topics and situations.”774 The staff 
member noted, “In the end, you know, we had a legislative requirement to do civic 
engagement, and so we had to have some kind of process. We didn’t want to have it seen 
to be just ticking a box, so we wanted to do it properly, as much as we could, given the 
topic. And the first one went badly, but the rest went reasonably smoothly.”775  
 
The prevailing position of members of the Toronto public who attended the Community 
Open House Discussions or completed a Feedback Form was opposition to a new casino 
in Toronto. Among the 17,780 completed Feedback Forms, 66.3% indicated they were 
“strongly opposed” to a casino in Toronto and another 5% “somewhat opposed.” Those 
“strongly in favour” or “somewhat in favour” of a casino represented 21.2% and 4.5% 
respectively. Another 3.1% indicated they were neutral or had mixed feelings.776 As the 
staff member interviews above noted, it was uncertain whether any of these public 
participation efforts “really had an impact on where it was going to go anyway.”777  
 
The councillors in the Toronto-East York Community Council area thought that the 
consultation process was inadequate for consideration of the local impacts.778 They 
advocated for a more formalized local consideration of the issue. The councillors used the 
authority of Toronto Municipal Code’s Chapter 27 to argue that, “community councils 
are entitled to hear from the public about local needs and neighborhood issues.”779 As 
noted in Chapter 3, all four of Toronto’s community councils have the authority to strike 
subcommittees under §27-131 of the Toronto Municipal Code. The TEYCC could, 
therefore, convene community meetings to “inform” (rather than consult) the public of 
the casino issue. Under Chapter 27, TEYCC could only make recommendations to 
                                                
774 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
775 Ibid. 
776 DPRA, City of Toronto Casino Consultation Report (22 February 2013), online: City of Toronto 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-57343.pdf. 
777 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
778 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
779 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
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Council on “local” official plan and zoning by-law amendments, or planning applications 
that “are not of city-wide interest,” neither of which applied in this case. Nor could 
TEYCC make recommendations at the committee level, as there was no planning report 
and no involvement for the committee.780 
 
On November 6, 2012, the TEYCC established the subcommittee to “undertake public 
consultation with BIAs and local business representatives in the casino zones identified 
by OLG in the Toronto and East York District regarding the impact of a casino on 
parking and other business infrastructure in the Toronto and East York District, with a 
request that the subcommittee report on the outcome of such consultation to the January 
22, 2013 meeting of the Toronto and East York Community Council.”781 The TEYCC 
could not use its authority under Appendix B-IV (5) to make recommendations on policy 
and research about local matters. In the case of the casino, the City Manager had 
identified that the decision was one of City-wide interest.782 As such, there was no 
capacity for the TEYCC to assume authority under that provision. However, under §§27-
131(A) and (D), community councils may create subcommittees that report directly to 
Council on public hearings or public presentations. The subcommittee must have terms of 
reference in accordance with § 27-130B, including details as to why an existing 
committee or public advisory body cannot do the work; and a Clerk's impact statement 
identifying the staff and other resources the committee or public advisory body needs for 
support and a statement that such resources are available.783 No information could be 
located on the terms of reference of the subcommittee or the details of the Clerk’s impact 
statement beyond what was in the motion, illustrating perhaps that this was a novel use of 
the TEYCC.  
                                                
780 Ibid. 
781 Toronto-East York Community Council Subcommittee, “Public Consultation with Business 
Improvement Areas and Local Business Representatives in the Casino Zones Identified in the Toronto and 
East York District” (2013) TZ1.2, online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.TZ1.2>; Toronto and East York 
Community Council, “Response to Various Motions Respecting Casinos in Toronto and East York 
District” (2012) TE20.47 at 2, online: City of Toronto 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.TE20.47>. 
782 See City Manager, supra note 736 at 1, where the City Manager states: “Should Council consider new 
casino development, a citywide perspective should be taken to support the potential that exists in both the 
C1 and C2 zones.” 
783 City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code s 27-130(b)(2)(e) & (f). 
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The use of TEYCC to deliberate on the local effects of a downtown casino impacted how 
the meanings of “local” and “city-wide” were constructed by different city actors. To 
some, the TEYCC legitimized the city’s decision-making process. A senior staff member 
explained the striking of the subcommittee as a means to “create a legitimate … political 
entity that would become a place of energy for the counter argument, the anti-casino 
voice.” To others, it was used as a forum for an oppositional process. As another staff 
member said, the Subcommitte became a “theatre.”784 Either way, the role of 
neighborhood associations and BIAs was to ensure that “traditional voices are a part of 
the process” and were part of a genuine, but strategic effort to hear from everybody, even 
those who might be strongly in favour of casino. The strategic element was to loop them 
in, as “they would be delegitimized if they didn’t come across as wanting to hear from 
everybody.”785  
 
I interviewed one of the City of Toronto staff members who helped to design the 
community council model. The staff argued that the community council as a “segregated 
out a body, a committee which is geographically ward based,” needs to have a clear 
function, “otherwise what is the point?”786  In this staff member’s view, the evolution of 
the community council from a body primarily focused on planning issues to one that 
considered the neighbourhood effects of city decisions, like the 2012-13 casino decision, 
indicates that the community council mandate “stood the test of time.”787 
 
There was a disconnect between the view of councillors in the TEYCC area and city staff 
working on the city-wide issue. To one of the main city staff members working on the 
matter, “we were really honest about trying our best… [I]t’s one of the most difficult 
kinds of topics.”788 However, to one of the local councillors involved in the decision to 
establish the subcommittee, the impetus for the TEYCC’s involvement was the lack of 
                                                
784 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
(18 May 2016) – author conducted. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid. 
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staff reports available on the local effects of the casino, which needed to be requested by 
elected officials: 
 
[W]e didn’t feel like we were getting enough of an opportunity to evaluate what the 
impacts were on a local level of a citywide decision. The decision was very 
specific, about two neighborhoods, but, with respect to the Toronto East York 
Community Council district, there was no member of the Community Council on 
executive where the item was being debated. And we wanted to get … down into 
what planning implications, what traffic implications, what social development 
impacts would have on it, would a casino have on a neighbourhood.789 
 
One of the local councillors involved in the issue describes the goals of the subcommittee 
as “specific to the planning and transportation impact, which are squarely within the 
purview of Toronto East York Community Council.” The main benefit of the 
subcommittee approach was that and it “allowed us to question staff in far greater detail 
and to scrutinize the assumptions that were being made by various actors and players.” 
Another councillor put it this way, “What we did have is the ability to create a forum for 
the casino exploration and use that forum to get the information we need, under sort of 
requirement to get staff in front of us and push them on things like parking requirements 
and cost of parking spaces, and vehicle studies and do all the stuff from the areas where 
community council had jurisdiction to deal with is as a land use issue.”790  
 
The TEYCC was thus able to leverage the subcommittee to engage with BIAs and 
resident associations, request staff reports on the impacts of a casino, and make 
recommendations directly to City Council. Numerous reports were requested from or 
submitted to the Subcommittee, all with a focus on planning, local transportation, local 
economic development, and health, as summarized in Table 4.1.  
 
TEYCC 
Subcommittee 
Meeting date 
City unit 
authoring the 
report 
Issues considered 
                                                
789 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
790 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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October 10, 
2012 
City Planning791 • Zoning regulations governing casinos, actions to 
prohibit casinos under the zoning by-laws, 
parking standards, parking capacity within the 
Front Street and John Street precinct 
 Transportation792 
 
• Traffic operation issues arising from large 
casino/resorts in downtown locations in similar-
sized cities  
• Traffic conditions, capacity constraints and 
other operational issues on the highways and 
arterial roads in the vicinity of the 
Exhibition/Ontario Place grounds  
November 6, 
2012 
City Planning793 • Land uses, transportation, and the Port Lands  
February 26, 
2013 
City Planning794 • Existing, approved and anticipated population 
densities and growth within 10 km of each of 
the proposed casino sites within the TEY 
district  
• Transportation and parking issues, character of 
the local neighbourhood, economic impacts on 
local businesses, local property assessment 
impacts and local safety and security impacts in 
the TEY district 
 City Solicitor795 • The use of the Exhibition Place lands for parks 
and industrial purposes 
 City Manager 
and City 
Solicitor796 
• Legal or other mechanisms for securing any 
conditions requested by the City 
 Economic • Economic and employment losses as a result of 
                                                
791 See Toronto-East York Community Council, Zoning Status of Casinos in Toronto and East York (11 
September 2012), online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.TE18.55>; 
Toronto-East York Community Council, Zoning Status of Casinos in Toronto and East York, (2012) 
TE19.19, online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.TE19.9>. 
792 Toronto-East York Community Council, Response to Various Motions Respecting Casinos in Toronto 
and East York District (2012), online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.TE20.47>. 
793 Toronto-East York Community Council, Response to Various Motions Respecting Casinos in Toronto 
and East York District (2013), online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.TE21.29>. 
794 Toronto-East York Community Council, Response to Various Motions Respecting Casinos in Toronto 
and East York District - Fifth Supplementary Report, Report from the Director, Community Planning, 
Toronto and East York District (14 February 2013), online: City of Toronto 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/te/bgrd/backgroundfile-56318.pdf>  
795 City Solicitor, Casino in Toronto and East York District - Exhibition Place, Report from the City 
Solicitor (6 February 2013), online: City of Toronto 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/te/bgrd/backgroundfile-55991.pdf>. 
796 City Manager and City Solicitor, Response to Motion Respecting a New Casino - Securing Conditions 
from OLG, City of Toronto (20 February 2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/te/bgrd/backgroundfile-56324.pdf>. 
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Development & 
Culture797 
the elimination of the exhibition place grounds 
as a public event space 
 Medical Officer 
of Health798  
Provided two reports to the Board of Health and 
then to the TEYCC, Executive Committee and City 
Council on the health impacts of gambling, 
focusing on social and community impacts.799  
 
Table 4.1: Reports requested by the TEYCC Subcommittee related to the 2012-13 
Casino Debate 
 
When asked how the Subcommittee was distinct from practices aimed at gathering public 
input, one of the local councillors described the forum as, “a more formal place to 
provide feedback and I think that’s where it helped with collecting information, but not 
giving out information.” In public consultations, by contrast, “nothing that you say is 
really on the record, you submit your comments on a little form, you stuff them in a box 
and there you go.” The councillor cited this as relevant in the 2012-13 case, as “the first 
set of public consultations [were] disappointing. [They were] held in City Hall, so not in 
the communities that would have been impacted. It was ‘here’s the pretty picture of what 
can happen, here’s the economic benefit’ [yet in fact] says nothing about the economic 
impact, [just] everything that the casino operators are promising.”800  
 
This novel use of the procedural bylaw to create the TEYCC subcommittee was perhaps 
anticipated. As affirmed by a senior city staff member, this provision of the Municipal 
                                                
797 General Manager, Economic Development & Culture, Use of Exhibition Place Grounds as a Public 
Event Space (25 February 2013), online: City of Toronto: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/te/bgrd/backgroundfile-56371.pdf>. 
798 Board of Health, The Health Impacts of Gambling Expansion in Toronto (7 November 2012), online: 
City of Toronto <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2012.HL18.1> and Board 
of Health, Community Health Impacts of a Casino in Toronto (28 January 2013), online: City of Toronto 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.HL19.4>. Note that The Medical 
Officer of Health does not have explicit authority to assess the health effects of planning decisions such as 
casinos. The involvement of the Medical Officer of Health in matters that tangentially relate to the health of 
Toronto residents is not new: previously, he has contributed to debates with arm’s length relevance to the 
Board of Health, such as the extension of the runway at Billy Bishop Centre Island Airport. 
799 Note that the Board of Health endorsed the Medical Officer of Health’s proposed Dr. McKeown’s 
proposed Toronto Public Health Position Statement on Gambling and Health, recommended against City 
Council expanding gambling in Toronto, urged Toronto Public Health's participation in the City Manager's 
public consultation process, and made recommendations to support research on problem gambling. 
800 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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Code was included in 2006, when the city’s committee system was restructured.801 As 
this staff person conceded: “We put a backdoor in that might support community councils 
developing more of that local council role. … We needed to have something in there that 
would support that, because the rest of the description of community councils is really a 
laundry list.”802  
 
Thus, the TEYCC was able to use the creation of the Subcommittee to engage squarely in 
local decision-making in the 2012-13 casino debate, using a little-known provision in the 
Toronto Municipal Code setting out community council authorities. A councillor 
described it as “a tool of extraordinary importance,” stating that the Subcommittee “gave 
us … space to think out loud” in contrast to City Council, which had become “a decision-
making body and not a debating and research body.”803 This was the first time the 
community council had been used for this purpose. Ultimately, the subcommittee was 
able to speak the language of local on a city-wide matter by considering specific matters 
of relevance to the TEYCC boundaries.  
 
4. BIAs, neighbourhood associations and other iterations of “local” 
 
The casino opposition was described in the Globe and Mail as follows: “Apart from the 
mayor, a union or two and the developers and casino operators who stood to benefit, the 
casino lacked powerful champions. Its opponents, by contrast, were articulate and well-
organized.”804 The main community group involved in the 2012-13 was “No Casino 
Toronto,” a grassroots group started in the spring of 2012 by three women in Etobicoke, 
one of Toronto’s suburbs.805 Maureen Lynett, Peggy Calvert, and Sheila Lynett headed 
No Casino Toronto. Maureen Lynett objected in particular to Ontario Finance Minister 
                                                
801 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
802 Ibid. 
803 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
804 Marcus Gee, “Toronto casino was always a long shot”, The Globe and Mail (17 May 2013), online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/toronto-casino-was-always-a-long-
shot/article11986713/>. 
805 Elizabeth Church, “Anti-casino lobby ramps up campaign”, The Globe and Mail (13 April 2013), 
online: <http://www.theglobean”dmail.com/news/toronto/anti-casino-lobby-ramps-up-
campaign/article11181058/>. 
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Dwight Duncan’s vision of a casino-anchored “golden mile on Toronto’s waterfront, 
stating: “Dwight Duncan’s idea of a jewel, a golden mile, to me was a nightmare,” that 
would ruin the waterfront, harm neighbourhoods and send a terrible international 
message about what Toronto considers “iconic.”806 It is interesting to note that No Casino 
Toronto was not in any way connected with BIAs or neighbourhood associations in the 
TEYCC area; instead, they comprised elite and well-connected people and organizations 
outside of these organizations.807 However, the involvement of No Casino Toronto was 
facilitated and enabled by the local councillors involved in the issue.808 This is consistent 
with the findings reached in Chapter 3, that councillors are the chief facilitators and 
enablers of BIAs and neighbourhood associations in local matters. 
 
Of key significance was the close working relationship between No Casino Toronto and 
councillors in the Toronto-East York district. The trio approached downtown councillors 
very early in the debate for advice, even before the OLG announced its expansion plan.809 
They were described as “relentless” at contacting the local councillor and mobilizing 
support against a casino anywhere along the waterfront.810 Their intention in reaching out 
to councillors was to understand the process for decision-making at City Hall and to 
coordinate their efforts outside of the formal institutions.811 
 
                                                
806 David Rider, “Grassroots campaign opposing a Toronto casino draws influential members”, The 
Toronto Star (16 November 2012), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/11/16/grassroots_campaign_opposing_a_toronto_casino_draws_in
fluential_members.html>. 
807 Interview with members of No Casino Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada  (11 May 2015) – author 
conducted. 
808 Ibid. 
809 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
810 Ibid. See also No Casino Toronto, “Don’t Gamble with our City” (8 April 2013), online: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaKMOF2-6UA>; Glyn Bowerman, “Toronto When The Chips Are 
Down” (16 April 2013) YYZ Magazine, online: <http://humberjournalism.com/yyz2013/toronto-when-the-
chips-are-down/>. 
811 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. See also City Council, “Petitions” (21 May 2013) RM35.3, online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.RM35.3>. 
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No Casino Toronto was effective at bringing together multiple voices, including other 
activists812 and high-profile members from the arts, business and academia like Ken 
Greenburg, Jack Diamond and Richard Florida who gathered weekly to discuss strategy 
in an unnamed downtown office. This suggests that No Casino Toronto, rather than 
acting as a “grassroots” organization as characterized in the news, was instead a highly 
mobilized, elite organization.813 They collaborated with the Martin Institute, a think-tank 
affiliated with the University of Toronto, who opposed the casino on business and 
economic grounds.814 No Casino Toronto had a steering committee who met regularly to 
discuss their strategy and included an emphasis on messaging and social media.815 They 
also used a range of canvassing and media techniques, including Facebook,816 building a 
website, attending meetings and debates, contacting other organizations, handing out 
buttons, creating an online petition, actively using a twitter account to report the news 
and to live-tweet key City of Toronto meetings), and helped distribute lawn signs.817 
They used innovative approaches like setting out exactly how residents could sign up to 
depute at Executive Committee and what individuals could say818 and distributing a 
youtube video explicitly for sharing on social media.819 The result was over 250 
                                                
812 Glyn Bowerman, “Toronto When The Chips Are Down” (16 April 2013) YYZ Magazine, online: 
<http://humberjournalism.com/yyz2013/toronto-when-the-chips-are-down/>. 
813 David Rider, “Grassroots campaign opposing a Toronto casino draws influential members”, The 
Toronto Star (16 November 2012), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/11/16/grassroots_campaign_opposing_a_toronto_casino_draws_in
fluential_members.html>. See also Richard Florida, “Casinos Ruin Cities”, Huffington Post (17 April 
2013), online: <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/richard-florida/toronto-casino-rob-ford_b_2164882.html>. 
814 David Olive, “In Toronto casino debate, it’s time to walk away from the table”, The Toronto Star (29 
March 2013), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/business/2013/03/29/in_toronto_casino_debate_its_time_to_walk_away_from_th
e_table_olive.html>. 
815 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
816 No Casino Toronto Facebook Page, online: <https://www.facebook.com/NoCasinoToronto?fref=ts>. 
The Facebook page had 15,326 likes. The Twitter feed had 1,189 followers. 
817 Those who believe a casino could be great thing for the city have noticed the building opposition visible 
in the city’s east end, thanks to more than 100 “No casino” lawn signs distributed by Toronto-Danforth 
MPP Peter Tabuns. 
818 No Casino Toronto, “Why is MGM Betting on You Sleeping on Monday?” (n.d.), online: 
<http://us6.campaign-archive2.com/?u=8b04c2e2b0af73d1226a1c173&id=89b6463dd3>. 
819 Ibid. 
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deputants at Executive Committee, and 20 out of 22 petitions at the final City Council 
meeting where the casino issue was heard.820  
 
Religious leaders also played an important role, with 268 faith leaders signing a petition 
on April 5, 2013 that they could not support a casino.821 This group did not appear to 
have a direct relationship with No Casino Toronto.822 According to one councillor, 
getting the faith community on board was a strategic decision: “We knew that to win the 
casino fight, we had to win the vote of council. We knew that we had to get to those 
communities somehow, we were not going to get to them through neighborhood 
associations very easily, so we went through different organizations. … one of the critical 
ones is getting to the Baptist churches.”823 John Sewell, former mayor of Toronto, found 
few civic leaders who would speak publicly in favour of a casino. He wrote: “[F]ew 
community leaders favour a large casino in downtown Toronto. As one can see from the 
ads placed in the daily papers by No Casino Toronto, virtually everyone who cares about 
the city and participates in its public life is opposed. They come from every sector. When 
faith leaders made their public announcement of opposition, they proved a lively crew in 
their different religious outfits and said this was one of the first times they had spoken out 
as a group.”824  
 
In contrast to these other key advocates, BIAs and neighbourhood associations played a 
less obvious role in the debate. As noted earlier, the TEYCC established the 
subcommittee to “undertake public consultation with BIAs and local business 
representatives in the casino zones identified by OLG. The motive behind the explicit 
naming of BIAs over other local interests was unclear. A former staff member ruminated 
                                                
820 City Council, Petitions (RM35.3) (21 May 2013), online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.RM35.3>. 
821 Margaret Wente, “Dead man’s hand: Just say no to casinos”, The Globe and Mail (11 April 2013), 
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/dead-mans-hand-just-say-no-to-
casinos/article11017537/>. 
822 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
823 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
824 John Sewell, “Sewell: casino divides city, fight takes flight”, Post City Toronto (6 May 2013), online: 
<http://www.postcity.com/Eat-Shop-Do/Do/May-2013/Civic-war-Casino-divides-city-fight-takes-flight/>. 
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that, “I guess they were getting lots of pressure from [BIAs]… This was … about the 
Metro Convention Centre site mostly, right? That whole area and the Entertainment 
district… [S]o I guess that’s why … because there would have been an impact on 
them.”825 
 
One of the councillors who initiated the subcommittee thought that it might have had to 
do with the impacts on local businesses in favour of “large multinationals” who were 
concerned that “a lot of money would be coming out of that very local community and 
what impact that would have on local businesses.”826 When asked why other parties 
weren’t named specifically as bodies to consult, the councillor said, “I can’t remember 
why, but it may have been that at that point in time was the most pressing, seemed the 
most pressing of issues. And because of how quickly [the debate] was going, we didn’t 
really sit down amongst the colleagues to say let’s draft out this long list, laundry list of 
groups to consult. It was, who’s missing at the table?”827 
 
Although BIAs and NAs didn’t lead the charge in the casino opposition, they contributed 
to the debate, mainly via the city’s formal committee process. Toronto’s BIAs and NAs 
were among the hundreds of submissions and deputations to the Executive Committee in 
April 2013.828 Some of their concerns centred on neighbourhoods, like the impact on 
traffic and local planning. For example, the York Quay Neighbourhood Association was 
very active, submitting letters,829 deputing at meetings830 and appearing in media 
including Metro Morning.831 They state that they are a, “RESIDENTIAL community 
                                                
825 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
826 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Executive Committee Meeting, New Casino and Convention Development in Toronto (15 April 2013) 
EX30.1 [hereinafter “Executive Committee meeting”], online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.EX30.1>. 
829 Braz Menezes, Correspondence to Toronto City Council (15 January 2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/comm/communicationfile-35545.pdf>. 
830 Executive Committee Meeting, New Casino and Convention Development in Toronto (15 April 2013) 
EX30.1 [hereinafter “Executive Committee meeting”], online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.EX30.1>. 
831 Metro Morning (April 15, 2013). 
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organization,” representing a population “expected to top 120,000 by 2015.”832 The York 
Quay Neighbourhood Association emphasized that “a mega-casino anywhere downtown 
that increases congestion and threatens the city’s economic and social fabric,” and had 
issues with the consultation process adopted by city staff. The Wellington Place 
Neighbourhood Association stated, “WPNA represents the area bounded by King, 
Spadina, Front and Bathurst Streets and is most concerned with the negative economic 
and urban planning effects that this proposal presents... In the case of downtown Toronto, 
the King-Spadina area is already overwhelmed by the impact of nightclubs on the 
residential community.”833 
 
However, many did not expressly reference local concerns, instead emphasizing the city-
wide effects of a casino. For example, the Federation of North Toronto Residents 
Association (FoNTRA), an important umbrella organization of resident associations in 
northern Toronto, stated: “casinos do not contribute positively to city-building and their 
social impact affects the quality of place. By their nature, casinos are inward-facing, 
aiming to keep the client contently in one place, depleting the life of the street, and giving 
little or nothing back to the public realm.”834 FoNTRA’s rejection of the downtown 
casino was considered to be a very important catalyst in mobilizing North York 
councillors to the “no” side.835 
 
While the “no” side was engaged in a fulsome campaign and bringing together BIAs, 
NAs and other parties, pro casino advocates did not appear to have such a unified voice 
outside of City Hall, nor did they have BIAs and NAs on side. Early in the debate, 
lobbyists formed a critical part of the “yes” side campaign. Even before the decision was 
made by the Executive Committee to study the issue, lobbyists began approaching city 
councillors to garner their support for a casino in the city’s downtown or waterfront 
areas. These practices resulted in a review by the Lobbyist Registrar, who found that 
                                                
832 Menezes, supra note 836. 
833 Scott James, Correspondence to Mayor Rob Ford and City Councillors (5 February 2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/comm/communicationfile-35551.pdf>. 
834 Peter Baker & Geoff Kettel, Correspondence to Executive Committee (13 April 2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/comm/communicationfile-35949.pdf>.  
835 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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MGM had breached the Lobbying By-law836 by failing to register in the Lobbyist 
Registry before lobbying public office holders at the City. The “yes” side also had a 
public campaign, which began on April 26, 2013, less than a month before the crucial 
City Council vote.837 Other proponents included downtown restaurant owners, real estate 
developers, and brokerage companies, and all focused on the development of jobs and 
revenue opportunities for the city.838 They did not have BIAs or NAs on side. 
 
5. The Final Report and Executive Committee’s Decision 
 
The City Manager’s final report was first delivered to a special meeting of the Executive 
Committee held on April 15-16, 2013, with options on how City Council could 
proceed.839 The meeting included hundreds of deputations and submissions, including 
from BIAs and NAs. City staff reviewed the issue of a new downtown casino and 
expanded gaming at the Woodbine site by evaluating key economic, city building, social, 
health, and fiscal criteria. The 84-page report (not including attachments) provided a 
detailed analysis of specific study areas in the Port Lands, Exhibition Place, downtown 
core, and Woodbine. In the report, the City Manager provided two options: first, not grant 
approval for a casino. And, second, that City Council grant approval for the City 
Manager to continue discussions with OLG, with a recommendation that City Council 
select a mixed-use site in the downtown core for a casino, rather than selecting a site in 
the Port Lands, Exhibition Place and Woodbine.840 Although then-Mayor Rob Ford’s 
Executive Committee struggled to approve a casino without assurances that the hosting 
fee, the annual amount to be paid to the City of Toronto by OLG in return for having a 
casino without its boundaries, would be at least $100 million, which city staff were 
                                                
836 City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code, ch. 140, s. 10. 
837 See tweet dated 26 April 2013 noting the start of the 10,000 Jos Now Coalition, online: < 
https://twitter.com/10000jobsnow>. 
838 See esp Toronto Life, “The definitive guide to the supporters and opponents of a Toronto casino”, 
Toronto Life (10 April 2013), online: <http://www.torontolife.com/informer/toronto-
politics/2013/04/10/toronto-casino-yes-versus-no/>. 
839 City Manager, supra note 736 at 1. 
840 The City Manager also provided City Council with several options in respect of a new gaming facility in 
the C2 zone: Maintain the current gaming use at Woodbine (no Council approval needed); expand the 
Woodbine gaming facility into a casino by adding live dealer table games; and attach conditions to a 
resolution supporting the establishment of a gaming site. 
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unable to secure from OLG,841 the Executive Committee voted overwhelmingly in favour 
of a downtown casino, conditional on 47 requirements including a minimum annual 
hosting fee of $100 million.842 The hosting fee was consistent with the Executive 
Committee’s construction of the casino as a city-wide issue, one meant to address the 
city’s operating revenue. 
 
The casino issue was scheduled for a City Council deliberation on May 21, 2013. 
However, in between the Executive Committee and Council meetings, a significant 
change in OLG’s position took place in respect of hosting fees.843 At the initial stages of 
the negotiation between the City of Toronto and OLG, it was suggested that the City 
would obtain a special hosting fee of between $50-million to $100-million, as estimated 
by OLCG, “in recognition of the size and scale and job opportunities promised by casino 
operators fighting for the opportunity to build casino-anchored complexes worth $2 
billion to $3 billion.” The City of Toronto-commissioned report forecasted annual hosting 
fees of up to $168 million in addition to property taxes.844 However, following her win of 
the Liberal leadership race, Premier Kathleen Wynne advised Ontario’s gambling agency 
that it would not give the city any extra fees for hosting a downtown casino. The Globe 
and Mail reported that Premier Wynne was “no fan of the proposal to build a downtown 
Toronto casino” and that she had “raised concerns about several key OLG decisions and 
ordered the Crown agency to nix plans to cut Toronto a special financial deal, if city 
councillors voted for a casino.”845 OLG Chief Executive Officer Paul Godfrey was fired 
                                                
841 Elizabeth Church, “Casino Approval Becoming a Long Shot”, The Globe and Mail (10 April 2013), 
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/casino-approval-becoming-a-long-
shot/article11044013/>. 
842 City Manager, supra note 736. 
843 Elizabeth Church, “Anti-casino lobby ramps up campaign”, The Globe and Mail (13 April 2013), 
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/anti-casino-lobby-ramps-up-
campaign/article11181058/> 
844 Editor, “Toronto casino: No special deal, OLG chair says”, Toronto Star (20 March 2013), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2013/03/20/toronto_casino_no_special_deal_olg_chair_says.html>. But 
see John Lorinc, “The Casino Debate and Non-Fiction Numbers”, Spacing Magazine (16 January 2013), 
online: <http://spacing.ca/toronto/2013/01/16/lorinc-the-casino-debate-and-non-fiction-numbers/>, who 
noted that the consultant report used as the basis for economic analysis suggested a range of possible 
revenues from hosted fees, some as low as $18 million. 
845 Karen Howlett et al, “Wynne seeks successor for OLG chair Godfrey amid questions over strategy”, The 
Globe and Mail (13 May 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/wynne-seeks-
successor-for-olg-chair-godfrey-amid-questions-over-strategy/article11882130/>. 
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by Premier Wynne on May 16, 2013.846  
 
Mayor Ford delayed and then cancelled the special City Council meeting scheduled for 
May 21, 2013, declaring the proposals to build a casino in downtown Toronto “dead” 
unless OLG could guarantee $100 million annually in hosting fees.847 Councillor Mike 
Layton, one of the councillors within the TEYCC area, pursued a petition to hold the 
meeting on May 21, 2013, gathering 24 signatures pursuant to Section 27-30 of the 
Council Procedures, driving throughout the city over the weekend and reaching the 
Clerk’s Office as the bells at Old City Hall rang in order to obtain the signatures in 
time.848 At the meeting, City Council rejected the option to have a casino in the 
downtown core by an overwhelming majority.849  
 
In summary, the 2012-13 casino decision reflected what Santos observed as the tension 
between rational bureaucracy and messier forms of political action. He notes that the 
relationship between representative and participatory democracy often forget that these 
two concepts must work together and that participatory democracy in complex political 
environments always presupposes opportunities for delegation and representation. 
Indeed, the model for this public engagement and involvement should be complex and 
sophisticated to reflect the importance of an overlapping, multifaceted, multiplayer 
decision-making at the municipal level. Here, the “rational” system of decision-making, 
meaning the city-wide characterization of the casino decision and the Executive 
Committee forum, misrepresented the messy local reality of the issue, which was 
                                                
846 Robert Benzie & Richard J. Brennan, “Paul Godfrey fired as head of OLG, board of directors resign”, 
The Toronto Star (16 May 2013), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2013/05/16/paul_godfrey_fired_as_head_of_olg.html>. 
847 Hamutal Dotan, “Rob Ford Proclaims Toronto Casino ‘Dead’”, The Torontoist (16 May 2013), online: 
<http://torontoist.com/2013/05/rob-ford-proclaims-toronto-casino-dead/>. See also, Elizabeth Church, 
“Special meeting for Toronto casino debate scheduled for May 21”, The Globe and Mail (1 May 2013), 
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/special-meeting-for-toronto-casino-debate-
scheduled-for-may-21/article11650673/>. 
848 City Council, Petition (19 May 2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/rm/bgrd/backgroundfile-58463.pdf>. See also Interview with 
Councillor, supra note 57. 
849 City Manager, supra note 743. Ultimately, the final presentation by the City Manager suggested that the 
new hosting fee formula proposed by OLG would result in between $55 and $61 million in annual revenue: 
see City Manager, Presentation to City Council: New Casino and Convention Development in Toronto, 
City of Toronto (21 May 2013) at 16, online:  
 <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/cc/bgrd/backgroundfile-58464.pdf>. 
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interconnected with tugs and pulls of representation and delegation. In the end, the 
councillors in the TEYCC were able to mobilize the casino opposition with a city 
committee that could serve as a legitimized forum to receive information on the local 
effects of the issue. 
 
However, amidst this final decision to disallow a casino in the city’s downtown core, 
another matter was being considered, too. As part of this motion, City Council also 
rejected the expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack to a casino. In addition to prohibiting a 
new casino in the downtown core, the Port Lands or Exhibition Place in 2013, City 
Council also opposed the expansion of existing gaming sites in the C2 Zone, where the 
Woodbine casino was located.850 This meant that an expansion of the Woodbine 
Racetrack was not permitted. However, while City Council narrowly voted against a 
Woodbine expansion, all 11 councillors in the Etobicoke York Community Council area 
voted against the motion disallowing a Woodbine gaming expansion to create a casino, as 
noted in the chart below.851 During the 2012 debate, Councillor Crisanti noted the 
importance of considering the local voice in any casino deliberations.852 As can be seen 
in Table 4.2, where green marks support of a casino and red marks opposition, the 
councillors within the Woodbine area were unequivocal in their desire to expand 
Woodbine to create a casino, even though they opposed the creation of a new casino in 
downtown Toronto. The reorientation of the 2012-13 casino debate as a local issue by the 
councillors in the TEYCC area did not negate the desire of councillors in the Etobicoke-
York area of the city to frame a Woodbine expansion as a local issue, too. Thus, 
councillor support for a casino was contingent on the local area of the city, not a 
principled decision about casinos.  
 
 
                                                
850 Toronto City Council, "New Casino and Convention Development in Toronto" (2013) City Council 
Decision, online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.EX30.1> at 
resolution 2. 
851 Ibid. 
852 Councilor Vincent Crisanti, "Casinos in Toronto" (2012) Marilyn Toft - Casinos in Toronto 1, online: < 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2012/ex/comm/communicationfile-29803.pdf>. 
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 2013 Council motion to 
expand Woodbine853 
2013 Council motion to 
create new casino854 
Ward 1 (Vincent 
Crisanti) 
In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
In favour of downtown casino 
Ward 2 (Doug Ford) In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 3 (Doug Holyday) In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 4 (Gloria Lindsay 
Luby) 
In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 5 (Peter Milczyn) In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 6 (Mark Grimes) In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 7 (Giorgio 
Mammoliti) 
In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
In favour of downtown casino 
Ward 11 (Frances 
Nunziata) 
In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 12 (Frank Di 
Giorgio) 
In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 13 (Sarah 
Doucette) 
In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
Ward 17 (Cesar Palacio) In favour of Woodbine 
expansion 
Against downtown casino 
 
Table 4.2: Etobicoke councillor votes in 2012-13 casino decision 
 
The decision to reject the expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack would come to City 
Council a short time later, as we will see in the next section. 
                                                
853 Toronto City Council, supra note 850. 
854 Ibid at 1. 
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II. The 2015 Casino decision 
 
The 2015 casino decision concerned only one site in the City - the Woodbine Racetrack, 
located in Rexdale, one of the City’s most economically vulnerable areas.855 More than 
half of Rexdale residents are first-generation Canadians.856 About a quarter of families 
are poor and nearly 40 percent of working adults have low-wage, part-time jobs without 
benefits or security. High school dropout rates are 50%, double the Toronto average.857 
At the time that the decision was made, the Woodbine Racetrack was responsible for the 
employment of more than 7,500 people in Toronto, with approximately 5,000 of jobs 
located in Rexdale. The Woodbine Racetrack stated that this represented 10% of the 
workforce in a community that had seen a 26% decline in jobs over the last 10 years.858 
 
During the 2015 debate, community advocates located in Rexdale suggested that the 
community should have the final say on an issue that has many pros and cons.859 
However, in the end, community advocates played a limited role and the decision-making 
process proceeded through the Executive Committee to City Council without the 
involvement of the Etobicoke York Community Council (EYCC) as a forum for 
consideration of local effects. All of the adjacent councillors and the polling data 
affirming support for an expanded casino. BIAs and neighbourhood associations were 
absent from decision-making, as few such bodies exist in the Etobicoke-York 
Community Council area and none in Rexdale. However, in contrast to the 2012-13 
                                                
855 Christopher Hume, "Casino suddenly seems respectable — in Rexdale: Hume" (28 June 2015) The 
Toronto Star, online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/06/28/casino-suddenly-seems-respectable-
in-rexdale-hume.html>. 
856 City of Toronto, Rexdale-Kipling, Social Profile #4 - NHS Languages, Immigration, Income (2011), 
online: 
<https://www1.toronto.ca/City%20Of%20Toronto/Social%20Development,%20Finance%20&%20Admini
stration/Neighbourhood%20Profiles/pdf/2011/pdf4/cpa04.pdf>. 
857 Bob Hepburn, “Rexdale hub a beacon for area hurt by poverty and crime,” Toronto Star (27 June 2012), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/06/27/rexdale_hub_a_beacon_for_area_hurt_by_poverty_
and_crime.html>. 
858Nick Eaves, "Re: Woodbine Racetrack", (2015) Woodbine Entertainment 1 at 2, online: 
<www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-77988.pdf>.  
859 Laura Armstrong, "Is the third time a charm for Rexdale revitalization?" (15 March 2015) The Toronto 
Star, online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/03/15/is-the-third-time-a-charm-for-rexdale-
revitalization.html>. 
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casino decision where the focus of advocacy organizations, BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations was on traffic, local planning and the impact of addiction on nearby 
residents, the local considerations in the 2015 debate were jobs and the economy, 
typically framed as city-wide considerations. 
 
This section provides an overview of process and the roles of the ward, community 
councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations. It concludes that “local” in the 2015 
casino debate concerned a singular issue – jobs– with a lack of tension between this issue 
and the city-wide agenda. While the City’s consultation processes did not reveal 
overwhelmingly different results in 2015 than during the 2012-13 casino debate, the data 
was used to reinforce the ward councillor perspectives, without more nuanced 
intervention of other participants in the decision-making process. 
 
1. Resurgence of the debate 
 
The municipal election was held on October 25, 2014, a little over one year after the 
2012-13 casino decision. The election brought in a few changes. First, Mayor John Tory 
replaced Mayor Rob Ford, promising a more economically stable, professional and 
transparent government.860 Second, Rob Ford replaced his brother, Doug Ford, as 
councillor for Ward 2. Third, three new councillors were elected: John Campbell replaced 
Gloria Lindsay Luby, who had decided not to run again; and both Doug Holyday and 
Peter Milcyn ran for provincial office, resulting in new councillors, Stephen Holyday and 
Justin Di Ciano. 
 
On March 18, 2015, Councillor Cristanti, whose ward is adjacent to the Woodbine area, 
and who sits on the Etobicoke York Community Council, re-opened the expansion 
debate.861 Councillor Crisanti had been named as deputy mayor, with the task of 
                                                
860 Hamutal Dotan, “Toronto Election 2014: John Tory on Seven Key Issues,” Torontoist (22 October 
2014), online: < http://torontoist.com/2014/10/toronto-election-2014-john-tory-on-seven-key-issues/>. 
861 Natalie Alcoba, "Deputy mayor wants Toronto to reopen casino debate with report on Woodbine 
Racetrack expansion", National Post (18 March, 2015), online: < 
http://news.nationalpost.com/toronto/deputy-mayor-wants-toronto-to-reopen-casino-debate-with-report-on-
woodbine-racetrack-expansion>. 
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increasing economic growth in Etobicoke-York area of the city.862 Mayor John Tory 
affirmed Councillor Crisanti’s proposal, saying, “I have said all the way along that I 
support us taking a second look at casino gambling at Woodbine provided it is part of a 
much larger vision, that we’re not doing it just for sake of allowing a casino out there 
where there are already slot machines and horse racing. It’s all about jobs for me. It’s all 
about jobs and economic development, not gambling.”863 
 
Councillor Crisanti distinguished the 2015 Woodbine proposal from the earlier debate. 
He suggested that the May 2013 vote against the Woodbine expansion occurred at the 
same time as the controversial proposal to build a casino in the city’s downtown core and, 
therefore, the Woodbine casino idea did not get the full attention it deserved.864 “In 
essence, what we’re doing now is dusting off that information we had two years ago,” 
Deputy Mayor Vincent Crisanti later stated at a Woodbine public consultation meeting.865 
“Unfortunately that [2013] vote for Woodbine was a very, very tight vote. I think it just 
got convoluted and mixed up in the major fight, which was the downtown issue. But now 
we’re focused on Woodbine and Woodbine only. And I can tell you that Woodbine has 
been a great community partner, they do a wonderful job, and they employ about 7,500 
people – and this is also about protecting the jobs that are currently there.”866    
 
The Woodbine proposal was re-opened in 2015 without the controversy of a suggested 
downtown casino, and with a new scandal-free mayor committed to economic 
development. However, many councillors objected to reopening the debate. Councillor 
Josh Matlow stated, “I am surprised that we would want to reopen such a divisive and 
                                                
862 Staff, “Toronto casino debate could focus on expanded gaming at Woodbine racetrack”, Toronto Metro 
(11 March 2015), online: < http://www.metronews.ca/news/toronto/2015/03/11/toronto-casino-debate-
could-focus-on-expanded-gaming-at-woodbine-racetrack.html>.  
863 Chris Fox, "Ford says expanded gaming at Woodbine would benefit Toronto as a whole", CP24.com (24 
June, 2015), online: <http://www.cp24.com/news/ford-says-expanded-gaming-at-woodbine-would-benefit-
toronto-as-a-whole-1.2437623>. 
864 Chris Fox, "Tory open to restarting debate on expanded gaming at Woodbine", CP24.com (11 March, 
2015), online: <www.cp24.com/news/tory-open-to-restarting-debate-on-expanded-gaming-at-woodbine-
1.2273986>. 
865 Cynthia Reason, "Woodbine Racetrack employees say ‘get the shovel in the ground’ on casino 
expansion", Etobicoke Guardian (12 May 2015), online: < http://www.insidetoronto.com/news-
story/5614095-woodbine-racetrack-employees-say-get-the-shovel-in-the-ground-on-casino-expansion>. 
866 Ibid. 
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difficult debate that we just had.”867 
 
2. The “local” in a “city-wide” decision  
 
In early 2015, the Executive Committee requested that the City Manager study the 
planning implications of a casino, the economic impact, employment issues, social costs, 
incremental costs associated with expanded gaming, like police, fire and emergency 
medical services costs. The local effects that had dominated the 2012-13 debate, namely 
traffic – were not included in the laundry list of public input items that the Executive 
Committee asked the City Manager’s Office to obtain in its public consultation 
process.868 Council also asked that consultation efforts include a public meeting in 
Etobicoke, an online questionnaire promoted on the City's website and via social media, a 
city-wide public opinion poll, and a presentation at Executive Committee.869 Council 
allocated $75,000 from the City Manager’s budget for this review. 
 
The 2013 review had included an analysis of the economic benefits, planning 
implications, social costs, and other aspects of an expanded casino. In regard to economic 
gains, the Final Report suggested that a standalone casino would generate $32 million to 
$95 million in hosting fees at Woodbine and up to $10 million in increased property 
taxes.870 In 2015, this figure was changed to an increase of $14 million (a total of $29.5 
million) in hosting fees and up to $5.5 million in property taxes, an increase from the 
existing $1.7 million received at the Woodbine Racetrack.871  
 
As with the previous casino debate, an external firm was hired for part of the consultation 
process, although unlike the 2013 decision, a consulting company, Ipsos, managed all 
                                                
867 Chris Fox, "Tory open to restarting debate on expanded gaming at Woodbine", CP24.com (11 March, 
2015), online: <www.cp24.com/news/tory-open-to-restarting-debate-on-expanded-gaming-at-woodbine-
1.2273986>. 
868 City of Toronto, “Backgrounder: Woodbine Racetrack Casino Consultation” (n.d.), online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/City%20Of%20Toronto/City%20Managers%20Office/Civic%20Engagement/Wo
odbine%20Casino%20Consultation/Woodbine%20Casino%20Consultation%20Backgrounder.pdf>. 
869 Ibid. 
870 Joseph P. Pennachetti, "Considering a New Casino in Toronto" (2012) Staff Report Action Required 1, 
online: <www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2012/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-51514.pdf>. 
871 "Municipal Contribution Agreement" (2015) Appendix B – Financial Considerations 1, online: 
<www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81785.pdf>. 
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aspects of the consultation process.872 This meant that detailed notes were available on 
the process followed and the information gathered. The results of the public consultation 
showed substantially different results based on the form of engagement. In respect of the 
telephone poll, Ipsos conducted 701 interviews, including 200 with residents who live in 
North Etobicoke in order to boost the sample size of local residents.873 Initially, 34% of 
individuals supported the expansion and 25%, opposed, with the remaining (42%) having 
mixed feelings. Support was significantly higher among North Etobicoke residents (50% 
support, 34% mixed feelings and 16% oppose).874 Once residents are told the estimated 
possible number of additional slots and video tables and new live tables that could be 
added with the expansion, support remains steady, but many of those who initially have 
mixed feelings shift to opposition.875  
 
The most compelling reasons that responders supported casino expansion were the 
creation of 2,600 new jobs and the promise of a community benefits agreement with the 
City of Toronto.876 Indeed, support increased to 72% when it was suggested that 
expansion would bring new commercial development such as hotels, restaurants or 
entertainment venues (21% support regardless, 51% support on the condition of new 
commercial development).877 However, 70% of responders were dubious that expansion 
would lead to full-time, permanent jobs, and worried that expansion would contribute to 
an increase in problem gambling.878  
 
The results from the telephone poll were not hugely different than in 2013, when 55% of 
Torontonians supported an expansion of the Woodbine casino.879 No data was available 
as to the breakdown of residents by community council area, therefore, we do not know 
                                                
872 City of Toronto, "Woodbine Racetrack Casino Public Consultation" (2016) Page Menu, online: < 
http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=4ae8359fa7e9c410VgnVCM10000071d60f89R
CRD>. 
873 Frances Nunziata, "Expanded Gaming at Woodbine Racetrack" (2015) City Council Decision 1 at 3, 
online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81786.pdf>.  
874 Ibid at 5. 
875 Ibid at 5. 
876 Ibid at 6. 
877 Ibid at 6. 
878 Ibid at 5. 
879 Environics Research Group, "Toronto Resident Casino Survey" (2013) Summary 1 at 26, online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-57344.pdf>. 
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the geographic distribution of this support. This same study found that 45% of residents 
in Etobicoke strongly or somewhat supported “the possibility of a new casino in 
Toronto.”880 Over one-third of respondents (38.5%) indicated that expanded gaming at 
Woodbine Racetrack was strongly unsuitable, compared to 21.2% who felt it was highly 
suitable.881 Those with neutral or mixed feelings indicated a preference for leaving the 
facility as is (28.1) compared to expanding the gaming opportunities (18.2%). Overall, 
there was more support for an expanded gaming facility at the Woodbine Racetrack than 
for the introduction of a new casino in Toronto’s downtown core.882 It is difficult to 
arrive at concrete numbers related to support for a Woodbine expansion, as a total of 
55.4% or 9,852 respondents checked the box “I do not support a new casino under any 
conditions.”883  
 
Ipsos also conduced an online survey and hosted a public consultation meeting, both of 
which suggested overwhelming support for an expanded casino. Almost five hundred 
people completed the survey.884 Overall, 65% indicated support for the expansion, 24% 
opposed it and the remainder had mixed feelings or didn’t know (11%).885 The strongest 
levels of support came from non-Toronto residents (85%), Etobicoke/York residents 
(74%), Scarborough residents (65%) and North York residents (61%).886 The reasons for 
support were: an increase in the number of employment opportunities (38%), economic 
activity (17%), tourism (17%) and entertainment in the area (15%). Several (18%) also 
felt that it was a good location for expanded gaming.887  
 
                                                
880 Ibid at 8. 
881 DPRA, "City of Toronto Casino Consultation Final Consultation Report" (2013) Toronto Casino 
Consultation 1 at 52, online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-
57343.pdf>. 
882 Ibid at 6. 
883 Ibid at 54. 
884 Ipsos, "Public Consultation on the Woodbine Racetrack Casino" (2015) City-Wide Telephone Poll 1 at 
3, online: <www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81786.pdf>. Ispos noted that, “the 
survey was open to anybody who chose to complete it and therefore, the sample of those who completed it 
and their opinions should be not be viewed as statistically representative of the residents of Toronto. This 
information is collected to assist the City to better understand the positions and interest of Torontonians”. 
885 Ibid at 6. 
886 Ibid at 10. 
887 Ibid at 11. 
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Likewise, the public consultation meeting hosted by Ipsos suggested overwhelming 
support.888 Approximately 80 people attended the community meeting,889 although 
newspaper reports suggested 100.890 The notes of the Woodbine casino consultation 
meeting state that the public meeting included an open microphone, where approximately 
20 community members spoke; that Ipsos researchers spoke with attendees one-on-one to 
gather reactions, whereby 19 people provided feedback; and anonymous feedback was 
immediately uploaded and projected in the room via a live feed.891 In addition, 51 
community members provided feedback via a distributed form.  
 
Of the 51 community members who completed feedback forms, 48 either somewhat or 
strongly supported the possible expansion. Only one had mixed feelings, and one person 
was somewhat opposed. 892 No one who completed the feedback form expressed strong 
opposition to the expansion. Support for the expansion was based largely on the creation 
of new jobs, securing existing jobs, and generating revenue for the City. Residents 
expressed concern over increased traffic congestion, revenue coming from a source some 
don’t agree with, and concerns about gambling addiction, but overall, those attending 
expressed that a casino would bring greater benefits than problems for the community.893  
 
The support is the potential increase in jobs and the promise – however dubious residents 
are – of economic development in an area of the city that badly needs it.894 As a former 
city staff member noted, “nobody really cared, because for them out there it was about 
jobs, it wasn’t about quality of life next door and all these things that come into play 
                                                
888 Ibid at 8. The meeting was open to anyone who wished to attend. There were no requirements for 
registering in advance or on arrival. Attendees could enter or leave the meeting as desired over the 3 hour 
session.  
889 City of Toronto, "Woodbine Racetrack Casino Public Consultation" (2016) Page Menu, online: < 
http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=4ae8359fa7e9c410VgnVCM10000071d60f89R
CRD>. 
890 Cynthia Reason, "Woodbine Racetrack employees say ‘get the shovel in the ground’ on casino 
expansion", Etobicoke Guardian (12 May 2015), online: < http://www.insidetoronto.com/news-
story/5614095-woodbine-racetrack-employees-say-get-the-shovel-in-the-ground-on-casino-expansion>. 
891 City of Toronto, supra note 896. 
892 Ibid at 10. 
893 Ibid at 11. 
894 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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down here, or at Exhibition [Place].”895  A councillor described it differently, that 
ultimately this was the decision that the local community wanted: “if the folks in Rexdale 
want a casino, let them have it.”896 
 
Ultimately, City Council voted in favour of expanded gambling with limited opposition 
or fanfare. The small dissent came largely from the Toronto-East York and North York 
councillors.897 As part of this decision, City Council sought mechanisms to improve the 
economic circumstances in Rexdale, including a further review of whether additional 
revenues from expanded gaming at Woodbine could form part of a “City of Toronto 
Community Benefits Fund,” where funds would be allocated to Neighbourhood 
Improvement Areas and other lower income communities for capital or operating projects 
aimed at improving the quality of life for local community members.898 
 
3. BIAs and neighbourhood associations 
 
A key difference between the 2012-13 and 2015 casino case studies was the lack of 
involvement from local BIAs or neighbourhood associations in the 2015 debate. In the 
former the BIAs and the neighbourhood associations were important participants, 
including such bodies from outside the TEYCC. In the latter, there was no mention at all 
of these informal governance bodies, either through a newspaper search of key terms 
during the six-month period of the debate, nor in listings of deputants on City of Toronto 
decision documents. The reason is simple: Rexdale does not have any BIAs or 
neighbourhood associations. Nor are there BIAs or neighbourhood associations in all of 
North Etobicoke. Illustration 4.3 shows the locations of BIAs and NAs in comparison 
with the proposed casino sites. 
 
                                                
895 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
896 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
897 City of Toronto, "Health Impacts of Expanded Gambling at Woodbine Racetrack" (2015) City Council 
Consideration, online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2015.HL4.2>. 
898 City of Toronto, "Expanded Gaming at Woodbine Racetrack" (2015) Executive Committee 
Consideration, online: http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2015.EX7.4. 
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Illustration 4.3: Map of proposed casino sites, with BIAs and NAs 
 
The difference in consultation practices in the 2012-13 and 2015 casino processes was 
stark, particularly in regard to the role of BIAs and community councils. In the 2012-13 
debate, the purported reason for the creation of the TEYCC subcommittee was to consult 
with BIAs. Thus, the subcommittee institutionalized the importance of further 
consultation with key stakeholders in the governance model – the local businesses.  
 
Without neighbourhood association or BIA involvement, it is difficult to know what 
residents in the area thought about an expanded casino. In the 2012-13 debate, the 
neighbourhood associations and BIAs brought added information to residents and another 
opportunity to learn about the effects of a casino and were a catalyst for the creation of 
the Subcommittee. This contribution was even more crucial in the 2015 debate, as far 
fewer residents were aware that the issue was before City Council. The lack of 
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neighbourhood association involvement may also mean that a broader range of resident 
perspectives were not included in the debate. While the information is incomplete and 
anecdotal, popular media accounts noted discord with the proposal to expand Woodbine 
from those who lived nearby.899 As one resident noted, “If you get on building the LRT, 
we can bring condo development; we can bring retail development, all sorts of 
development. I don’t think we need a casino to be the catalyst for that.”900  
 
Community advocates in Etobicoke, suggested that the community should have the final 
say on the expansion of Woodbine, given the many different benefits and drawbacks that 
require consideration.901 It is impossible to know whether the presence of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations would have led to a different result. As one columnist said, 
“Rexdale had two options in the casino debate: Take it or leave it. It’s easy for a 
councillor to say a casino will bring the wrong kinds of jobs when the neighbourhood that 
councillor represents is chock full of them. In Rexdale, almost any job is better than 
none.”902 Likewise, another writer stated, “Gambling is a rotten way for governments to 
make money, if you ask me. But that’s the province we live in. As such it would take 
some balls to look Woodbine, and its employees, both extant and potential, in the eye and 
tell them they can’t partner with Queen’s Park to provide a perfectly legal product on 
private land.”903  
 
However, without any formal organizing by neighbourhood associations and BIAs, it is 
harder to know what members of the residential and business community believed. As 
noted in Illustration 4.4, although there are no BIAs in Rexdale, there are numerous local 
                                                
899 Natalie Alcoba, "Deputy mayor wants Toronto to reopen casino debate with report on Woodbine 
Racetrack expansion", National Post (18 March, 2015), online: < 
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900 Laura Armstrong, "Is the third time a charm for Rexdale revitalization?" (15 March 2015) The Toronto 
Star, online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/03/15/is-the-third-time-a-charm-for-rexdale-
revitalization.html>. 
901 Ibid. 
902 Andray Domise, “Woodbine casino would be good for Rexdale”, Toronto Sun (9 July 2015), online: 
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businesses. Unlike in the 2012-13 casino debate, the views of these local entities were 
entirely absent, with no challenge made of Woodbine’s information on local jobs and the 
economy. 
 
 
Illustration 4.4: Map of BIAs and local businesses904 
 
But what can be done if the organizations don’t exist? One councillor said, “If you don’t 
build the association, if you don’t build the activity, if you don’t engage in that front, you 
get what you deserve. So if you’re complacent about it, or apathetic, or disengaged, or 
marginalized, there’s a price to pay for that.”905 To this councillor, it is up to the local 
community and its councillors to “make its own mistakes.” There is no point in having 
outside voices help them to organize or “colonize” the area: “I’m not going to have time 
to go up there and orchestrate the neighbourhood for them. But I have seen people try and 
                                                
904 Original research (Alexandra Flynn). 
905 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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do that, it’s sort of like they’re missionaries going into the suburbs to try and urbanize 
somebody. [They have] to make their own mistakes.” The councillor said, “They will 
build a casino and realize it’s wrecked their city and there will be nothing they can do 
about it.”906 
 
There are few jobs in Rexdale, very high unemployment rates, and bleak signs of 
economic development initiatives coming from either the City or the Province of Ontario. 
It may well be that the ward councillors and the Etobicoke York Community Council 
fully represented the views of their residents in opting to the promise of new employment 
to the area. However, it may also be that the absence of these voices diminished the 
nature, amount and depth of engagement opportunities, representation, and contribution 
to decision-making for Rexdale residents and businesses.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
These very different outcomes on a similar issue tell us that the governance of different 
local legal spaces is spatially and substantively different acrossToronto, without strict 
categories of participants, uniform forums of deliberation, and with meanings of “local” 
that comply with the categories of “city-wide” and “local” advanced in the City of 
Toronto’s bylaws.   These case studies affirm the pluralistic nature of local governance, 
both geographically and based on representation, with bodies articulated in provincial law 
(community councils) and bylaws (BIAs) interacting with those operating through 
custom (wards) and outside formal law (neighbourhood associations). The 2012-13 and 
2015 casino decisions also provided crucial insight into the use of community councils as 
an appropriate forum to consider the nuance of “local” versus “city-wide” and the 
privileging of BIAs as consultative participants in the City of Toronto’s governance 
model.  
 
First, the case studies tell us that the landscape of local governance looks different across 
the city. This is in part due to very different levels of involvement of BIAs and 
                                                
906 Ibid. 
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neighbourhood associations. In the 2012-13, the creation of the TEYCC was motivated in 
part by having appropriate consultation with BIAs. BIAs and neighbourhood associations 
from across the city ended up playing an important role in the decision-making process, 
beginning initially with those located within the area of the casino development and 
concluding with FoNTRA, which strongly opposed the creation of new casino.907 Their 
involvement – together with that of other advocates – augmented the controversy of the 
issue. In the 2015 debate, there were no BIAs or neighbourhood associations involved in 
casino decision-making in either Toronto-East York or in Etobicoke-York. In the latter, 
the reason was simple: there are no such bodies located in the area, despite there being 
many residents and businesses. The former is a more confusing phenomenon, given the 
depth and intensity of the involvement just two years before. While there continued to be 
some ward councillor opposition in the 2015 decision on the same grounds as the 2012-
13 debate, in general the expansion passed with little fanfare or opposition, and with no 
involvement of any BIAs or neighbourhood associations, nor any other advocacy groups. 
 
Santos remarked that there is a multiplicity of laws, institutions and boundaries operating 
formally and informally, and that formal law may be rejected if it differs too dramatically 
from informal notions of representation and space. In the 2015 casino decision, the local 
formal forum was not the community council, it was exclusively the ward, not the 
broader, multi-party scale of local governance that we saw in the 2012-13 decision. 
Notwithstanding the presence of some neighbourhood associations in neighbourhood 
improvement areas (as Rexdale is), the absence of such bodies in the 2015 decision 
reinforces the extent to which neighbourhood associations, in particular, are dominated 
by privileged homeowners.908 The articulation of local legal spaces includes insiders and 
outsiders, including who is eligible to participate, in what manner, and with what power, 
but the context for these spaces is not geographically uniform across the city. Moreover, 
if we believe, as Dahl, Stone, Leo, Cobban and Good, among others, do, that non-state 
                                                
907 Peter Baker & Geoff Kettel, "EX 30.1 New Casino and Convention Development in Toronto" (2013) 
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908 Amalia Alarcon De Morris & Paul Leistner, “From Neighborhood Association System to Participatory 
Democracy: Broadening and Deepening Public Involvement in Portland, Oregon” (2009) National Civic 
Review 47 at 48. 
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actors are involved in municipal decision-making, the question is how non-state bodies 
are reflected at the local level outside of BIAs and neighbourhood associations.909  
 
Second, the advocates who rallied in opposition to a downtown casino did not object to 
the Woodbine expansion. One of the local councillors involved in the 2012-13 decisions 
did speak in opposition in the 2015 debate, but this activity did not manifest in the 
mobilization of BIAs or NAs outside the area of the applicable ward or faith 
communities, as had occurred in the 2012-13 debate. An explanation from NIMBY 
literature is that a downtown casino would negatively colour the “playground” of the 
more privileged residents of the city, who may not go to or care about Rexdale. This 
explanation has merit: as the Toronto Star reported in regard to the Woodbine expansion, 
“most Torontonians couldn’t care less. Unaware and indifferent, we are happy with it as 
long as it won’t be in our backyard. Let Rexdale enjoy what the rest of us don’t want.910  
 
Adding to this inequality, I argue, is the absence of any bodies speaking for the residents 
of Rexdale. This further exacerbates the powerful role played by the local councillor 
who, in the 2015 debate, did not object to the Woodbine expansion. In the 2012-13 
debate, the downtown elite were able to take control of the formal local governance 
model in a manner that Rexdale residents were not – by using community councils to 
consult with BIAs, mobilizing residents beyond the usual engagement processes, and 
using staff resources to examine the local effects of this city-wide decision. This affirms 
the data from Chapter 3 that local governance is dominated by the ward councillor 
without a local governance model to challenge the councillor’s position. 
 
The third conclusion to be drawn concerns the potential for a greater role for community 
councils in the decision-making process. Although the casino results were markedly 
different from one another, despite their having taken place less than two years apart, 
                                                
909 Robert A. Dahl, Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (Yale University 
Press, 1963); and Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946- 1988 (University Press of 
Kansas, 1989). 
910 Christopher Hume, “Casino suddenly seems respectable — in Rexdale,” Toronto Star (28 June 2015), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/06/28/casino-suddenly-seems-respectable-in-rexdale-hume.html>. 
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both illustrate the community council as an important site for local decision-making. 
While each of the Toronto-East York and Etobicoke-York community councils 
approached their role and the issue differently, both made a decision to include this body 
in the decision-making process. During the 2012-13 debate, the TEYCC was able to 
assume jurisdiction of the matter under the procedural bylaw. For the first time since the 
creation of these bodies, it struck a subcommittee to engage directly with BIAs and to 
solicit eight detailed staff reports on local matters that it considered important. 
Ultimately, the community council became a forum to contemplate the issues deemed 
crucial from a local perspective that had been sidelined in the city-wide debate. During 
the same debate, in Etobicoke-York, the community council voted to endorse a report 
entitled “Support for a Casino at Woodbine Racetrack.” This action from the 2012-13 
debate carried over to the 2015 decision, where each one of the ward councillors again 
endorsed the expansion of the Woodbine racetrack. The councillors in the TEYCC, but 
not EYCC, shifted the community council mandate towards local consideration of city-
wide issues.  
 
Thus, consideration of local legal spaces means questioning the extent to which they 
intersect with formal bodies. We see here that community councils as formal bodies have 
broad mandates that can be exercised differently, depending on the will of the councillors 
that serve on them. In the 2015 casino debate, we see the standard expression of the local 
voice in city-wide issues, whereby the councillor represents the voices of those in the 
area where the development will take place, the community council backs up or 
reinforces this councillor position, and City Council votes on the proposal as a whole. By 
contrast, in the 2012-13 debate, councillors used the TEYCC to create a local forum to 
consider the local effects of a city-wide decision. The effect was a shift away from the 
power of the ward councillor to a more participatory and visible forum, which included 
opportunities for staff support, city reports and public meetings. Community councils 
could be used more broadly to serve this function under their existing legal framework. 
 
Fourth, the decisions demonstrate the relevance of the local lens on city-wide issues. In 
both the 2012-13 and 2015 decisions, all of the ward councillors in the Toronto-East 
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York and Etobicoke-York areas supported the decisions. Ward councillors, BIAs, and 
NAs raised and engaged in these local issues, with differing levels of involvement among 
the two different community council areas. In the case of the 2012-13 decision, the 
factors were traffic, threats to local businesses, quality of life for nearby residents, and 
the health effects on nearby vulnerable populations. In the 2015 decision, the major 
consideration was the employment of local residents. It was these local issues that framed 
the debates and the eventual decisions, with the content of local meaning the economic, 
logistical and social needs of the geographically-proximate community. 
 
These case studies also challenge the distinction made by the City of Toronto between 
what are considered to be local versus city-wide issues. Those issues considered to be 
“local” may be considered by community councils, but otherwise they are to be decided 
by City Council and its standing committees only. This distinction brings to mind Santos’ 
notion of scale, where a large-scale map shows a smaller area but with far more detail (a 
zooming in or “miniaturized version of reality”), whereas a small-scale map shows a 
larger area, but less detail.911 Under Santos’ conception of scale, a community council 
could be thought of as a zooming in on a smaller area to study the localized effects, as 
occurred in the 2012-13 casino debate. This framing instead suggests that smaller-than-
city bodies can examine the localized effects of city-wide issues, as city-wide issues are 
relevant to local communities, too. A casino, labelled “city-wide,” cannot be set aside 
from other scales, including local.912   
 
To further evaluate the conclusions drawn regarding the nature of local governance in 
Toronto, the next chapter examines another case study: the ward boundary review. 
                                                
911 Santos, supra note 12. 
912 Blomley, supra note 56 at xix (the artificial distinction between “local” and “city-wide” highlights 
Blomley’s notion of a “Russian doll-like conception of spatial order,” whereby scale nest within another).  
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Chapter 5 – The Spaces of Local in Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review 
 
In 2013, the City of Toronto embarked on its first post-amalgamation ward boundary 
review under the authority of yet-unused COTA provisions. The review began amidst a 
body of case law that required a process meant to achieve “effective representation” for 
Toronto residents.913  
 
A ward boundary review triggers many legal questions, including administrative law 
requirements, compliance with applicable legislation, and provincial-municipal division 
of powers. At the same time, the review raises questions regarding the “social orders” or 
rules and norms outside of state law that contribute to a plurality of ideas regarding 
boundaries and notions of “community,” all of which came into play in Toronto’s ward 
boundary review. 914 The review attempted to frame the local legal spaces that would 
subsequently determine the prime determinant of local governance: the ward councillor.  
 
This chapter sets out the context for the review, including the interplay of Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) and OMB requirements. Second, this chapter outlines the process used 
in the City of Toronto ward boundary review (WBR), including the use of consultants 
meant to emulate the arm’s length review process used by the federal government in its 
decennial electoral boundary reconfiguration. The meaning of “local” alongside the 
concept, “communities of interest,” a feature of the WBR, is examined in the third 
section.  
 
This case study makes three conclusions regarding local governance. First, ward 
councillors were the predominant participants in the review process, interviewed 
individually by the consultants on numerous occasions and were decision-makers in the 
ultimate results, partly due to COTA provisions, but also because of the power retained 
by councillors over the process. Second, BIAs and neighbourhood associations were 
                                                
913 See e.g. Ron Levy, "Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena" 
(2008) 53 R.D. McGill 1, online: <http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/8981234-Levy.pdf>. (arguing 
that administrative design of electoral boundary reviewers can be redesigned to address the perception of 
impartiality). 
914 Moore, supra note 72 at 357.  
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given favourable consideration in the review as “communities of interest.” The results 
triggered questions about other boundaries and conceptions of community, in particular 
those local legal spaces not represented by BIAs or neighbourhood associations. Third, 
the WBR led to the creation of wards aligned with existing notions of power. As set out 
in Chapter 1, local governance comprises an overlapping set of formal and informal 
bodies. Ultimately, the WBR reinforced and privileged councillor-led perceptions of 
“local” in the creation of new boundaries.915   
 
I. Context for the ward boundary review  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, Toronto has had geographically-based electoral districts called 
wards since its inception as a municipality in 1834. As detailed in Chapter 3, the wards 
have endured as the City’s boundaries shifted and changed over the years owing to 
annexations and amalgamations, and despite other Canadian provinces having rejected 
their use. Some former municipal entities continue to have defined identities in Toronto, 
as reflected in the city’s wards. The current ward structure has been in place since 2000, 
shortly after amalgamation, and is based on the 22 federal ridings or electoral districts 
that covered Toronto at the time. Each riding was split to create the current system of 44 
wards. Wards are a crucial element of Toronto’s governance model, described in this 
dissertation and elsewhere as “fiefdoms.”916  
 
1. Disparity in ward population size across Toronto 
 
In 2010, the City Clerk’s Office reported to City Council on the discrepancy among ward 
populations, noting: “The inequities in ward population and number of households place 
some Ward Councillors at a disadvantage in communicating with and representing a 
larger number of residents when compared to other Councillors. This could potentially 
raise the issue of whether certain constituents are fairly and adequately represented 
                                                
915 Zumbansen, supra note 74 at 326. 
916 Moore, supra note 202 at 154. 
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among all wards.”917 City Council decided to allocate an additional staff member to the 
councillor in question, in which the population and typical household size were more than 
50 percent higher than the average.918 The city announced that any other ward in similar 
circumstances would also be entitled to an additional staff member, too.919  
 
By 2013, when the City’s WBR process began, the populations of Toronto’s wards were 
widely unequal, with some wards having twice the population of others.920 For example, 
ward 18 (located in the former City of Toronto) and ward 29 (in the former Borough of 
East York) each contained fewer than 45,000 residents, about half of the population of 
ward 23 (in the former City of North York), which had almost 90,000 residents. 
Illustration 5.1 1 shows the discrepancy in population amongst the City of Toronto’s 
wards. 
 
 
Illustration 5.1: Map of 2011 Population Differences Among Wards921 
                                                
917 City Manager and City Clerk, Staff Report to City Council: Equalizing constituency support issues 
arising out of uneven population growth in some city wards, City of Toronto (2010), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2010/cc/bgrd/backgroundfile-29379.pdf>. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Ibid. 
920 Zack Taylor, Analysis and Commentary: City of Toronto Ward Boundary Review (2012). 
921 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding the SCC’s requirements that electoral districts consider “communities of 
interest,” the OMB’s trigger for a review of ward boundaries is based exclusively on 
voter disparity. These inequalities have legal consequences for Toronto’s decision-
making authority. Under COTA, 500 electors could petition the OMB for new, more 
equitable ward boundaries in exactly these circumstances. As described next, this 
approach to a review of electoral boundaries differs significantly from the federal 
approach, where the number of electoral boundaries is predetermined and reviews take 
place every ten years.  
 
2. Federal and provincial electoral reviews 
 
The process of electoral boundary review differs among governments. At the federal 
level, federal commissions are established in each of Canada’s ten provinces every ten 
years to recommend changes to electoral boundaries. The commissions are independent 
bodies and make all final decisions as to the federal electoral boundaries following a 
robust public participation process.922 The province’s chief justice appoints a judge to 
chair the commission, and the Speaker of the House of Commons appoints the other two 
members from among the province’s residents.923 The commissions are “radically” 
decentralized, with each of the 10 commissions operating independently.924 
 
After engaging in a public consultation process, each commission submits a report on 
what it considered in revising the boundaries and proposes an electoral map to the House 
of Commons. Each commission then considers any objections and recommendations 
received from Members of Parliament and prepares a final report, which outlines the final 
electoral boundaries for the respective province. The process is set out in the Electoral 
Boundaries Readjustment Act,925 which was introduced to address problems associated 
with electoral redistribution in Canada, including “the tendency for the exercise to be 
                                                
922 City Clerk and City Solicitor, Staff Report to City Council: Petition to redivide ward boundaries, City of 
Toronto (2013), online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/cc/bgrd/backgroundfile-60165.pdf>. 
923 Levy, supra note 913 at 10. 
924 Ibid. at 54. 
925 Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, ss. 4-6. 
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overly partisan and the frequent discrepancies in the geographic size and population of 
constituencies at the federal level.”926  
 
The provincial review process differs from that of the federal government. The Province 
of Ontario had previously aligned its electoral districts with those of the federal 
government and required that a provincial electoral district review follow a federal 
review. The Province of Ontario has not yet announced its intentions for its next review, 
although 10 years have passed since the last one, so it may happen soon.927 There are 
indications that the Province will adopt the new federal riding boundaries within the 
Toronto area before the next provincial election.928 
 
Just as Toronto’s WBR process was beginning, federal electoral districts across the 
country were realigned. In 2013, the Federal Electoral Boundaries Commission for 
Ontario held two days of public hearings in Toronto, where it received more than 100 
submissions each day.929 The principal focus of the submissions was the location and 
boundaries of the applicable “communities of interest.”930 The Federal Electoral 
Boundaries Commission for Ontario increased the number of electoral districts within the 
City of Toronto’s boundaries from 22 to 25. As a result, federal boundaries and Toronto’s 
wards no longer overlap, as shown in Illustration 5.2. 
 
                                                
926 Canadian Urban Institute, et al. supra note 414 at 3. 
927 Ibid. at 3. 
928 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., & Thomas Ostler, 
Why is Toronto drawing new ward boundaries? - Ward population background brief (2016c), online: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/56215fb0e4b06680fc6a6dcf/144502
7760330/TorontoWardBoundaryReview.OptionsReport.Aug11-RevOct16.pdf> at 4. 
929 Canadian Urban Institute at al, supra note 414 at 36. 
930 J. Preston, J., Report of the federal electoral boundaries commission for Ontario 2012 (Standing 
Committee on Procedure and House Affairs No. 61 (2013), online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6223962&Lang>. 
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Illustration 5.2: Map of Federal Electoral Districts and Toronto Ward 
Boundaries931 
 
Toronto’s WBR was the first undertaken without the provincial government dictating any 
required geographical boundaries. Even so, the WBR included legislative and judicial 
constraints, as we will see next.   
 
3. A complex legal arena 
 
Ontario municipalities have broad discretion to determine the number of electoral 
districts they wish to have within their municipal boundaries. Since COTA’s 
introduction, Toronto can exercise its powers with respect to “establishing, changing or 
dissolving wards.” The Act clarifies this power in section 128(1), where it states: 
“Without limiting sections 7 and 8, those sections authorize the City to divide or redivide 
the City into wards or to dissolve the existing wards” and are able to eliminate wards 
altogether. The city – like other Ontario municipalities – is empowered to determine its 
manner of representation, whether through the election of councillors based on ward, 
elected at-large, or some combination of the two. Examined under the lens of 
subsidiarity, Ontario municipalities have been given the ability to regulate this aspect of 
                                                
931 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 414 at 37. 
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their affairs freely. However, a closer look reveals constraints and impediments amidst 
this power. 
a) Legislative constraints  
 
The city’s authority over its system of representation is not absolute. As noted earlier, 
COTA empowers 500 electors in the City of Toronto to petition City Council to pass a 
bylaw dividing or redividing the City into wards or dissolving existing wards.932 If the 
City does not pass a bylaw within 90 days after receiving the petition, any of the electors 
may apply to the OMB to divide, redivide, or dissolve the wards, upon which the OMB 
may hear the application and make an order. Ironically, city staff estimate that the 
timeline required for the introduction of new ward boundaries is at least two years, far 
more than the 90 days prescribed in the Act.933 This means that while the process for 
conducting a ward boundary review is long and complex, with numerous required rounds 
of public consultation, it may in turn be appealed to and annulled by the OMB.934 
 
While COTA does not set out the process that must be followed to designate new ward 
boundaries, nor does the city’s procedural bylaw, the legislation does require that the 
powers of the City be exercised by City Council.935 This suggests that an independent 
body like the federal commission would not be able to make the final decision on the 
placement of ward boundaries, although the City has never tried nor tested this approach.  
 
b) Judicial constraints 
 
As Sancton notes, there are no SCC decisions that apply to the drawing of municipal 
boundaries.936 In practice, however, Ontario municipalities observe the common-law 
requirements related to electoral districts set out in the landmark Supreme Court of 
                                                
932 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 129(3) defines “elector” as “a person whose name appears on the voters’ list, 
as amended up until the close of voting on voting day, for the last regular election preceding a petition 
being presented to council under subsection (1).” 
933 City Manager, supra note 438 at 4. 
934 Ibid. at 3. 
935 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 132. 
936 Andrew Sancton, “Commentary” in J. Courtney, P. MacKinnon, and D. E. Smith (Eds.), Drawing 
Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral Boundaries (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1992). 
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Canada case, Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), known colloquially 
as the “Carter decision.”937 This case considered the meaning of the “right to vote” in 
section 3 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 3 grants every citizen the 
right to “vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or a legislative 
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.” The case was brought by lawyer 
and resident, Rogers Carter, who observed that the electoral boundaries (or ridings) 
approved in the Province of Saskatchewan led to significant deviations in population 
across the province. The result was that, “a single vote in the smaller riding carried 63.5% 
more electoral weight than a single vote in the larger riding.”938 
 
In affirming that there may be population differences across ridings, the SCC clarified 
that voter parity was only measure to assess effective representation, but not the only 
criterion by which boundaries should be evaluated. In considering electoral boundaries, 
the first criterion is that approximately the same numbers of voters are represented in 
each electoral area, a criterion known as “voter parity.” However, to achieve “effective 
representation,” other criteria are also important, namely geography, community history, 
community interests, minority representation, and other factors.939 These other criteria 
justify a departure from strict voter parity; however, the courts have said that the 
population of each electoral district should not deviate by more than 25 percent.  
 
The SCC explicitly rejected the “one person, one vote” principle which guides electoral 
district decisions in the United States. In Baker v Carr, the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether electoral redistricting should be subject to judicial review and coined 
the term “one person, one vote,” meaning that the sizes of wards or ridings should be 
equal, and roughly equivalent to the principle of voter parity.940 The equal population 
                                                
937 Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra note 48. 
938 David Johnson, “Canadian Electoral Boundaries and Courts: Practices, Principles and Problems” (1994) 
39 McGill L.J. 224 at 227. 
939 Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra note 48. 
940 Ibid. 
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requirement has been strictly interpreted in subsequent cases “as requiring that districts 
be as close to exactly equal in population as possible.”941  
 
The SCC characterized effective representation as “the less radical, more pragmatic 
approach which had developed in England,” in contrast to the U.S. approach. The SCC’s 
consideration of voter parity largely focused on the legislative intent of section 3 of the 
Charter: “In the absence of any supportive evidence to the contrary … it would be wrong 
to infer that in enshrining the right to vote in our written constitution the intention was to 
adopt the American model. On the contrary, we should assume that the goal was to 
recognize the right affirmed in this country since the time of our first Prime Minister, Sir 
John A. Macdonald, to effective representation in a system which gives due weight to 
voter parity but admits other considerations where necessary.”942 
 
c) Previous Ontario Municipal Board decisions 
 
Unlike the courts, the OMB’s decisions do not follow stare decisis, meaning that 
adjudicators are not bound by previous OMB decisions. Therefore, for any municipality 
undertaking a ward boundary review, it is important to understand how the OMB has 
decided past cases. The OMB has applied the Carter decision to evaluate the 
effectiveness of representation based on the following factors, referred to as the Carter 
criteria:943 
 
• Does it equitably distribute the population and the electors?  
• Does it respect identifiable communities of interest?  
• Does it utilize natural, physical boundaries that are locally recognized?  
• Does it serve the larger public interest of all electors of the municipality in contrast to 
the interest of a small group? 
 
                                                
941 See United States Constitution, Art. I, §2. See also Jeffrey D. Colman and Julie L. Bentz, “Redistricting 
and Reapportionment” (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 2002). 
942 Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra note 48. 
943 Teno v Lakeshore (Town), 51 OMBR 473, 2005 CarswellOnt 6386. 
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Because OMB decisions are not binding on subsequent hearings, there is no single set of 
prescribed rules that municipalities must follow to prevent the OMB from overturning a 
ward boundary review. The OMB has stated that ward boundary decisions are amended 
or repealed only if there is a compelling reason to do so.944 That said, certain guidelines 
may help insulate a municipality from challenge. 
 
First, the OMB has overturned ward boundary reviews in which the outcome was 
predetermined. This includes ones for which a City Council had specified the final 
number of wards before the review process began or had mandated that the number of 
wards could not increase from the existing number.945 The OMB has also determined that 
a WBR process must be approached from an unbiased perspective and must include 
public consultation.946 For example, Ottawa’s 2001 ward boundary review prescribed the 
number of new wards in advance. The review was overturned by the OMB in 2003 on the 
basis that “Council did not give sufficient weight to communities of interest and, in 
particular, rural communities of interest.”947 Ottawa was required to conduct a second 
ward boundary review.  
 
Second, the meaning of the term “communities of interest” is contested. In the City of 
Toronto’s WBR, the term “communities of interest” was linked to the idea of 
“neighbourhoods,” suggesting that the neighbourhood is a crucially important and 
identifiable geographic point in most people’s lives and frames how people experience 
their city.948 The alignment of the term “communities of interest” with that of 
“neighbourhood” also underscored a belief that the role and responsibilities of a 
municipality are closely linked to neighbourhoods, including how people get around; the 
social, cultural, and recreational services that are available; and the provision of utilities 
and public spaces.  
 
                                                
944 Hambly, Re, 64 OMBR 36, 2009 CarswellOnt 7748. 
945 Ottawa (City) v Osgoode Rural Community Assn, 39 MPLR (3d), 2003 CarswellOnt. 
946 Hambly, supra note 944. 
947 Ottawa (City) v Osgoode Rural Community Assn, supra note 945. 
948 Canadian Urban Institute, et al. supra note 414 at 16. 
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In the City of Kingston’s 2013 ward boundary review process, City Council’s ward 
boundary decision was appealed to the OMB on the basis that it did not provide effective 
representation, in part because the bylaw failed to recognize communities of interest, by 
splitting up an area represented by a single neighbourhood association.949 The OMB 
sided with the appellant (although the decision rested largely on the lack of inclusion of 
postsecondary students and the inclusion of non-voters in population counts when 
determining electoral districts), and amended the bylaw to account for the Syndenham 
Neighbourhood Association.950 In Kitchener, the city’s 34 neighbourhood associations 
were the “communities of interest” used to inform its ward boundaries.951 
 
Third, even though public consultation is not set out as a requirement under applicable 
legislation, the OMB has made it clear that it expects municipalities to include public 
consultation in the review process.952 In the Town of Innisfil v Hambly, 2009, the OMB 
stated: “[T]he common practice of holding public meetings on a variety of matters that 
come before a municipal council creates an environment and reasonable expectation that 
the municipality will hold a public meeting to hear from residents on a ward boundary 
proposal.”953 
 
In the City of Ottawa’s 2001 WBR, the OMB held that the public was not sufficiently 
engaged. It also noted that the public process had been too limited and that, in particular, 
there had been no opportunity for the public to discuss options for specific ward 
boundary proposals.954 
 
Fourth, the OMB has stated that population deviations in rural and urban areas may 
differ.955 In rural regions, the OMB has determined that up to 33 percent of a deviation in 
voter parity may be allowed, if based on the Carter criteria.956 This means that the 
                                                
949 Ibid. at 24. 
950 Ibid. at 25. 
951 Ibid. at 16. 
952 Ibid. at 21. 
953 Hambly, supra note 944. 
954 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 414 at 28. 
955 Ibid. at 11. 
956 Ibid. at 28. 
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populations of wards may vary by up to 33 percent if the boundaries were drawn with the 
intention of keeping communities of interest together, respecting relevant geographic 
boundaries, or otherwise upholding the principles set out in the Carter decision. 
 
Other municipal approaches 
 
Appendix E compares nine municipalities from Ontario, elsewhere in Canada, and the 
United States. The data show that there are no firm rules when it comes to ward-based 
representation. Cities vary widely in the number of wards, the populations represented by 
councillors, and the approach to ward boundary reviews. For example, Halifax and 
London (Ontario) councillors represent approximately 25,000 people each, while Calgary 
and Edmonton’s numbers are about 70,000. New York, which has a City Council close in 
size to that of Toronto (51 members), has more than 160,000 residents per electoral 
district, although it also has five borough presidents and 59 community boards.957 James 
Lightbody has noted, in reference to Winnipeg’s preference for ward sizes of 
approximately 50,000 residents that, “Their purposely artificial construction transcended 
any bounds of neighbourhood or community.”958  
 
The approaches to ward boundary reviews also differ from city to city. Canada does not 
have a country-wide approach to the timing of electoral boundary reviews at the 
municipal level, although mandatory federal electoral district reviews take place every 10 
years following the decennial census. As such, the rules differ by jurisdiction. For 
example, in London (Ontario), staff are required to review ward populations each term, 
while in Halifax, Nova Scotia, wards are considered every eight years. In the United 
States, the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires that local governments remap their 
wards following the decennial census to meet federal “one person one vote” 
guidelines.959 Deviations may be acceptable to respect established communities of 
                                                
957 City of New York. “About Community Boards” (17 January 2017), online: 
<http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/cb/about.shtml>. 
958 James Lightbody, “Electoral reform in local government: the case of Winnipeg” (1978) 11:2 Canadian 
Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 307. 
959 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), online: 
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/372/368/case.html>. Note also relevant state laws, e.g. Article 
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interest or to achieve other legally valid and permissible objectives.960  
 
Two other differences related to accountability are noteworthy. First, independent 
consultants and commissions are sometimes, but not always, retained or appointed to 
carry out the review. Second, City Council is not always the final decision-maker on 
boundaries. In New York, the United States Department of Justice must endorse the 
Council’s decision. In Halifax, final approval rests with the Nova Scotia Utility and 
Review Board. 
 
With the threat of a resident petition and, at worst, an OMB order that would impose new 
ward boundaries, the city embarked on its review. With the legal background in mind, we 
examine the details of Toronto’s multi-year WBR process. 
 
II. The City of Toronto’s ward boundary review process 
 
The 2013 ward boundary review was Toronto’s first municipal-led ward boundary review 
since amalgamation. Any WBR process is a legal minefield, with broad principles but no 
clear rules, the potential for residents to appeal proposed boundaries to the OMB, and a 
lack of precedent in OMB decisions. This results in considerable difficulty in setting out 
a process that will withstand quasi-judicial scrutiny.  
 
1. Design of the WBR process 
 
In June 2013, City Council approved a WBR process.961 City staff recommended that 
consultants be retained to conduct the review, independent from staff and councillors. 
The objective was to keep the process at arm’s-length from the City Manager’s Office, 
who would oversee the WBR, as the consultants would make the final recommendations. 
                                                                                                                                            
21 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act of 1941, 65 ILCS 20/21-0.01, et seq., which require the City of 
Chicago to be divided into 50 wards of “nearly equal” populations. 65 ILCS 20/21-36.  
960 Office of the City Clerk, Special meeting - redistricting of city wards, City of Chicago (2012), online: 
<https://chicago.legistar.com/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=182369&GUID=64006609-9A98-4137-86CF-
8A00FE2C1539&Search>. 
961 City Clerk, Executive Committee Decision: Committee decision on final report - Toronto ward 
boundary review, City of Toronto (2016), online: 
<http://app.Toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
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Careful attention was placed on avoiding language that would limit the consultants’ 
options, in particular by setting out in advance the number of wards.  
 
Staff also required two rounds of public and stakeholder consultation. The first set would 
allow the public and select groups (including councillors) to give general input; the 
second would allow the public to comment on the options identified by the consultants. 
This requirement was rooted in applicable law.962  
 
The timeline was set on the assumption that the results would likely be appealed to the 
OMB, but the timing would allow the Clerk’s Office at least a year from the end of all 
appeals to prepare for the 2018 municipal election. Staff designed the process to conclude 
in fall 2017, OMB appeals included, to give the Clerk’s Office the time needed to 
implement the results.963 This three-year process meant that the consultants could carry 
out extensive background research and analysis, making it one of the longer processes 
followed in Ontario. 
 
On June 27, 2013, shortly after City Council approved the ward boundary review process, 
a petition under COTA section 129 was filed with the City Clerk’s Office by the Toronto 
Taxpayers Coalition. The petition asked City Council to pass a bylaw redividing the City 
of Toronto into wards, and that such wards “be based on the new boundaries for the 
federal electoral districts located in Toronto proposed by the 2012 Federal Electoral 
Boundaries Commission for Ontario in its Report in either its current form or as amended 
after receiving objections from the House of Commons. We further request that these 
new wards be in place for the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election.”964 The appeal was 
withdrawn, pending the conclusion of the WBR.965  
 
                                                
962 City Clerk, City Council Decision: Consideration of a ward boundary review for Toronto, City of 
Toronto (2013), online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.EX32.2>. 
963 City Manager, supra note 438 at 4. 
964 City Clerk, Staff Report to City Council: Petition received under section 129 of the City of Toronto Act, 
2006 – request for ward boundary changes, City of Toronto (2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/cc/bgrd/backgroundfile-60118.pdf>. 
965 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 933 at 41. 
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The WBR process was approved by City Council in June 2013.966 The process taken by 
the consultants followed the requirements approved by City Council. Figure 5.1 depicts 
the process. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Toronto Ward Boundary Review Steps967 
 
The consultants conducted two rounds of consultations, first on wards generally, and the 
next on five proposed options. They included “web-based activities (including social 
media platforms), communication and outreach to educate the public about the purpose of 
the ward boundary review, keep the public informed about the process and provide a 
range of opportunities for the public to get involved, including two online surveys.”968 
The consultant team also solicited input from Members of Council, school board 
representatives, neighbourhood associations, other stakeholder groups and members of 
the public.969  
 
                                                
966 City Clerk, Executive Committee Decision: Committee decision on final report - Toronto ward 
boundary review, City of Toronto (24 May 2016), online: 
<http://app.Toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
967 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., & Thomas Ostler, 
“Toronto ward boundary review: final report” (2016), online: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/5739fe5022482e97a8591392/146341
8450864/TWBRFinalReportMay2016.pdf> at 6. 
968 City Clerk, “Committee decision on final report - Toronto ward boundary review, Executive Committee 
Decision (2016), online: <http://app.Toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
969 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 967. 
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The consultants explicitly set the target year for voter parity at 2026, so that the new ward 
structure would last for the next four municipal elections.970 This meant that the proposed 
wards would be based on projections for the vast growth anticipated in the downtown and 
other growth centres designated in the Official Plan, and data suggesting that most of 
Toronto’s other communities would remain stable. The use of projected figures meant a 
continued discrepancy in ward populations, with six wards having variances of over 20 
percent in 2018, and one having a variance of over 37 percent.971  Finally. the proposed 
ward populations were to be based on the number of residents, not simply the number of 
electors, a point that had been raised in a previous OMB decision, but perhaps drew 
inspiration from the City of Toronto’s recent decision to ask the provincial to extend 
voting rights in municipal elections to permanent residents.972 
 
Based on these principles, five options were offered, ranging in size, geography, and 
historical connection (see Table 5.1).973 Each option sought to balance all the components 
of effective representation.974  
 
Option Name Avg Ward 
Population 
Ward Population 
Range 
No. of 
Wards 
 Current 60,000 45,000–90,000 44 
1 Minimal Change 61,000 51,850–70,150 47 
2 44 Wards 70,000 63,000–77,000 44 
3 Small Wards 50,000 45,000–55,000 58 
4 Large Wards 75,000 67,500–82,500 38 
5 Natural or Physical 
Boundaries 
70,000 63,000–77,000 41 
 
Table 5.1: Ward Boundary Review Options Presented in the Final Report975  
                                                
970 2018, 2022, 2026 and 2030. 
971 Canadian Urban Institute, supra note 935. 
972 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., & Thomas Ostler, 
“Supplementary report: Toronto ward boundary review - New wards for Toronto” (2016), online: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/5807a5ef20099ecb24249b07/147689
6247228/TWBR.SupplementaryReport.161014.pdf>. “Electors” refers to those entitled to vote, while 
“residents” are those who reside in the area in question.  
973 For further detail on each of the five options, please see Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron 
Etcetera, The Davidson Group, and Thomas Osler, Toronto Ward Boundary Review: Options Report, 
August 11, 2015. 
974 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 972. 
 	 234 
 
The consultants solicited feedback on the five options and opted for an innovative way to 
assess the feedback. They asked Councillors and the public to rank the options by 
selecting their first, second, third, fourth, and fifth choices. Four dimensions were then 
assessed: first-place choices, ranked scores, last-place choices, and a comparison of first 
and last choices. The rationale was that: “a new ward structure is not just about which 
option places first but just as much about which option a consensus can be built around. 
That is why it is important to know which option placed last and can be considered a “no 
way” option. Also, a comparison between first and last can assist in revealing options 
around which a consensus may be difficult to achieve.”976  
 
For example, Option 3 (Small Wards), saw a high degree of first and last choices from 
the public and Members of Council. Option 3 is the “love-it-or-hate-it” option. The 
consultants assess that, “It would be the option that would be the most difficult to form a 
consensus around, because of the strong positive and negative reactions to it.”977  
 
Ultimately, the consultants recommended the Minimal Change – 47 Ward option with 
refinements. The refinements, drawn from public and councillor input, were meant to 
improve the recommended ward structure with regard to communities of interest, ward 
history, and other factors. The result was an increase in the number of wards to 47 from 
44 while maintaining the current average ward population size of approximately 
61,000.978 Of the 44 existing wards, 38 would experience some changes in their 
boundaries; only six existing wards would stay the same. Also, three new wards were 
recommended for the Toronto–East York community council area and an additional ward 
for North York. The Etobicoke-York Community Council area lost one ward. 
 
2. Role of the Executive Committee and City Council in WBR Design 
 
                                                                                                                                            
975 Ibid. 
976 Ibid. 
977 Ibid. 
978 Ibid. 
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Toronto’s Executive Committee considered the ward boundaries on two occasions. First, 
the Final Report, together with a cover staff report, was delivered to the Executive 
Committee for discussion and debate on May 24, 2016. The item was the second on a 
very full agenda and was heard at 8 p.m.979 After a brief period of questions and answers, 
a motion was introduced, asking the consultants to review Option 1 (47 wards) by 
focusing only on wards with the highest population discrepancies and leaving the other 
wards intact; and to examine the possibility of having only 46 wards, 44 wards, or wards 
that aligned with federal and provincial electoral boundaries, all while achieving the 
objective of effective representation.980 Mayor Tory cautioned the councillors about 
“getting into the weeds” for fear of “tainting the process.”981  
 
The Final Report, written together with a cover staff report endorsing the 
recommendations, was delivered to the Executive Committee for discussion and debate 
on May 24, 2016. The item was the second on the agenda, right after another contentious 
matter.982 I watched the meeting online from 9:30 am, waiting for the item to be heard, 
which finally occurred just after 8 pm. The Executive Committee members decided to 
forego the presentation of the consultants and to limit all speaking times to three minutes. 
By this point, all but one of the eight listed deputants had left the meeting, meaning that 
this form of civic engagement was therefore not utilized.  
 
At the meeting, various councillors weighed in, suggesting new boundaries on the 
grounds that communities could be divided and noting the difficulty in dealing only with 
boundaries, rather than other relevant governance issues. A councillor noted other 
objection to any changes to his ward on the grounds that it split a “community of interest” 
– a BIA. Another speaker, a councillor from the Scarborough area, wondered why the 
review had only focused on boundaries and not on other aspects of representation. 
“Unfortunately,” the consultants stated, “those questions were not part of our terms of 
reference.” Another councillor came up to the screen with a map in hand, pointing to 
                                                
979 Personal observation (Alexandra Flynn). 
980 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 972. 
981 Personal observation (Alexandra Flynn). 
982 City of Toronto Council, "The City of Toronto's Long-term Financial Direction" (2016) City Council 
Decision, online: <app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.1>. 
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non-arterial roads and mapping how they could be changed to accommodate “a 
community now broken in half.” At this May meeting, the Executive Committee sent the 
Final Report back to the consultants to consider a recommendation with fewer wards. 
 
Second, the Executive Committee met on October 26, 2016, to consider the consultants’ 
further review. In their Supplementary Report, the consultants concluded in part that a 
44-ward option achieves excellent voter parity among the 44 wards, but has significant 
challenges for maintaining existing geographic communities of interest and, in particular, 
keeping the boundaries of Scarborough intact; and using federal riding boundaries as a 
basis for ward boundaries raises significant concerns for voter parity, a prime component 
of effective representation, and would require altering “natural and historical” ward 
boundaries.983  
 
The consultants recommended proceeding with the 47 wards option previously 
recommended, as depicted in Illustration 5.3, but with minor changes.984  
 
 
                                                
983 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 972. 
984 Ibid. 
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Illustration 5.3: Map of Recommended Wards With Refinements (47 Wards)985 
 
The proposal was debated for close to four hours. Many issues were raised, including the 
appetite of Toronto residents to have more councillors; whether the WBR should be 
connected to a more comprehensive governance review; and if the options satisfied the 
goal of keeping “communities of interest” together.986 After a number of failed motions, 
the Executive Meeting vote 7–6 to forward the “Recommended Wards with Refinements 
– 47 Ward Option” to City Council for approval at its November 2016 meeting.987 
 
Two weeks later, on November 8, 2016, the 47-ward option was approved by a 28–13 
vote of City Council; the Mayor voted against the proposal.988 A proposed amendment – 
to consider the impacts to governance and structure changes to the authority, duties, and 
function of community councils, as well as the establishment of new committees and a 
board of control to focus on citywide issues – failed.989 
 
The next section uses the analogy of Santos’ lens of scale to focus more specifically on 
the notion of local governance raised in the WBR. It concludes that the judicial 
requirement of consideration of “communities of interest” reflect the conflict between 
how state-based law, and the norms and rules of other actors or bodies regarding the 
meaning of local governance in Toronto. 
 
3. The meaning of “local” in the ward boundary review process 
 
This section brings together the WBR details presented earlier to analyze the implications 
for local governance. First, I examine the meaning of “communities of interest,” one of 
the chief criteria of the Carter test, alongside Toronto’s WBR. Next, this section explores 
                                                
985 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 972.  
986 Personal observation (Alexandra Flynn). 
987 Ibid. 
988 City Clerk, Committee decision on final report - Toronto ward boundary review, Executive Committee 
Decision (24 May 2016), online: 
<http://app.Toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
989 City Clerk, “Motion to amend item moved by Councillor Stephen Holyday - Toronto ward boundary 
review” (24 May 2016), online: 
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
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the involvement of ward councillors, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood 
association. This section concludes that councillors were the principal determinants of 
local boundaries, with BIAs and neighbourhood associations playing a central role. The 
WBR also raised the need for a governance review to address the lack of local forum 
beyond the ward. 
 
a) Definitions and applications of the “communities of interest" criterion 
 
This section provides background on this criterion and a description of how the concept, 
“communities of interest” was engaged in the WBR. 
 
The focus on “communities of interest” was profoundly important in the Carter decision 
and in the Toronto WBR. One of the underlying tenets in the Carter decision ensuring the 
representation of minorities in the electoral model.990 In applying the Carter principle to 
the WBR, the consultants state, “As a rule, lines are drawn around communities, not 
through them. Wards should group together communities with common interests, where 
there is some identifiable similarity such as age, assessed value and configuration of 
housing, the life-stage and demographics of the residents, and municipal service 
provisions and amenities.”991 Put another way, this WBR should ensure that communities 
of interest are not be divided into separate wards.  
 
Providing some forum for “communities of interest” when drawing ward boundaries is a 
common standard in Canada and other commonwealth cities in the UK and Australia.992 
The view is that it is both fair and logical to group communities together, and can also 
encourage participation in civic life. This sentiment was echoed in Toronto’s ward 
boundary review where the consultants wrote: 
 
                                                
990 John C., Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (McGill – Queen’s 
University Press: 2001) at 167-169. 
991 Ibid. at 225. 
992 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 972. 
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A great number of individuals identify with geographically defined communities of 
some sort. It is natural to want to extend that sense of being part of a community to 
ensuring that that community becomes a part of a larger electoral district with 
which there is also some affinity. A community of interest can enhance citizen 
involvement in politics. It has been demonstrated that voter turnout is positively 
affected when boundaries are redrawn in such a way as to place voters in a riding 
with they share a strong community of interest.993  
 
However, “communities of interest” leaves considerable room for interpretation, largely 
in terms of which communities of interest to consider. “Communities of interest” has no 
rigorous definition, is vague, and is applied inconsistently.994 The practice of identifying 
such communities is that it biases “the very system of representation from the outset by 
providing special status to particular communities over others.”995 
 
In practice, there are contested meanings for the term “communities of interest.” In the 
City of Barrie’s Ward Boundary Review Final Report, the term “communities of interest” 
was linked to the idea of “neighbourhoods,” suggesting that the neighbourhood is a 
crucially important and identifiable geographic point in most people’s lives and 
substantially frames how people experience their city. The alignment of the term 
“communities of interest” with that of “neighbourhood” also underscored a belief that the 
role and responsibilities of a municipality are closely linked to neighbourhoods, including 
how people get around; the social, cultural, and recreational services that are available; 
and the provision of utilities and public spaces.  
 
Another potential issue in regard to “communities of interest” is the difficulty in locating 
them geographically through a ward system. Like-communities are not neatly divided 
into the wards of the City of Toronto. There can be overlaps amongst communities, 
communities may be larger than a single ward, or the placement of a single community 
within a ward may conflict with other ward boundary review principles.  
 
                                                
993 Courtney, supra note 990. 
994 David Johnson, “Canadian Electoral Boundaries and Courts: Practices, Principles and Problems” (1994) 
39 McGill L.J. 224 at 237 
995 Ibid. at 244. 
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As noted earlier in this chapter, the connection between neighbourhood associations and 
“communities of interest” has arisen in other ward boundary reviews. In the City of 
Kingston’s 2013 ward boundary review process, City Council’s ward boundary decision 
was appealed to the OMB on the basis that it did not provide effective representation, in 
part because the by-law failed to recognize communities of interest by splitting a 
neighbourhood association area.996 The OMB sided with the appellant, amending the 
bylaw so that the Syndenham Neighbourhood Association was not divided.997 In 
Kitchener, the city’s 34 neighbourhood associations that operate across the city were the 
“communities of interest” used to inform its ward boundaries.998 
 
The consultants in Toronto’s WBR were broad in their depiction of “communities of 
interest.” The consultants stated that they are “difficult to define precisely.”999 They note 
of the term: “Sometimes it refers to ethno-cultural commercial areas such as Chinatown, 
Little Italy or Little India. The term is also used to define neighbourhoods such as The 
Annex, Rexdale, Malvern, Mimico, Mount Dennis or St. Lawrence…”1000 They also 
noted that “there is no comprehensive list or map of Toronto’s communities of interest or 
neighbourhoods with precise boundaries. Some areas of the city have strong 
neighbourhood groups and residents associations with well-defined boundaries, while 
other areas do not”1001  
 
The consultants offered their guidelines to capture as many “communities of interest” as 
possible in the new ward boundary configuration: first, communities of interest must be 
geographically contiguous, meaning that there must not be a gap in their physical 
location. Second, communities of interest should not be divided, although this may be 
                                                
996 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 928 at 24. 
997 Ibid. 
998 Williams, Dr. Robert J., “City of Kitchener Ward Boundary Review Final Report” (2008) 1, online: 
<http://imis.amcto.com/imis15/CMDownload.aspx?ContentKey=dc05f78a-6402-427c-ae31-
47207091054c&ContentItemKey=97e9cfd4- 472e-4ca5-8bec-a178f1727485>. 
999 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., & Thomas Ostler, 
“Toronto ward boundary review: final report” (2016), online: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/5739fe5022482e97a8591392/146341
8450864/TWBRFinalReportMay2016.pdf>. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 Ibid. 
 	 241 
unavoidable, such as the Jane/Finch area or Malvern, due to the size of these 
communities and the location of natural boundaries. The consultants did not identify 
communities of interest in advance, nor did they solicit specific feedback from 
neighbourhood associations, although they did reach out specifically to BIAs. The next 
section details how local participants were engaged in the WBR and what this 
involvement tells us about “communities of interest.” 
 
b) “Local” participants in the WBR process 
 
The ward councillor played a crucial role in the WBR, together with input from BIAs and 
certain neighbourhood associations. First, councillors had multiple entryways into the 
review process: one-on-one consultations with the WBR consultants, involvement in the 
public consultation sessions, and decision-making at the Executive Committee and City 
Council. Second, unlike neighbourhood associations, BIAs had direct involvement as 
stakeholders, perhaps due to the existence of a BIA umbrella organization representing 
all BIAs in the city. Third, community councils were not involved in the process, in part 
because of city staff concern that their input could ultimately weaken the city’s position 
in the event of an OMB appeal. Notwithstanding their formal role in the process, the 
boundaries of the community council areas formed part of the ward boundary review, as 
a proxy for the identities of the formal municipalities.  
 
Table 5.2 illustrates the involvement that ward councillors, community councils, BIAs 
and neighbourhood associations played in WBR design, consultation and decision-
making, further explained below.  
 
 Design Specifically 
consulted 
Part of public 
consultation 
Decision-
making role 
Ward 
councillors 
Yes  
 
Yes No Yes 
Community 
councils 
No No No No 
Business 
improvement 
areas 
No Yes Yes No 
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Neighbourhood 
associations 
No No Yes No 
 
Table 5.2: Involvement of local actors in the WBR process 
 
Ward councillor 
 
The ward was of acute importance in the WBR. Not only was the subject matter of the 
review the meaning and boundaries of the ward, but the ward councillors as prime 
stewards of the ward were disproportionately engaged compared to other local actors. In 
the first consultation stage, the consultants individually interviewed all 44 members of 
the 2010-2014 City Council and seven new 2014-2018 Members of Council to solicit 
their perspective on the issues related to the current Toronto ward configuration.1002 In 
stage 2, the consultants had meetings with 42 members of Council and three members of 
the Mayor’s staff.  
 
The privileging of the councillor voice revealed itself in the review of the options, as 
explained in the Final Report, which specifically set out the ranked order of each of the 
public, the councillors, and the results of surveys.1003 The consultants recommended the 
“minimal change” option preferred by the councillors, even though this option ranked 
fourth (of five options) in a public survey.1004  
 
Councillors also had decision-making power at the Executive Committee and City 
Council, which enabled them to advance their views on the proper boundaries of the 
ward. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the WBR process was designed by staff and 
approved by the Executive Committee and City Council based on a model that would try 
to emulate the federal government’s electoral boundary review approach given legislative 
constraints. Neither city staff nor councillors attempted to introduce a model like the one 
used at the federal level. Instead, staff recommended an arm’s length process that 
involved hiring external consultants to develop a set of recommendations, following 
                                                
1002 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 928 at 7. 
1003 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 999. 
1004 Ibid. 
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extensive public and stakeholder consultations, which would then go to Executive 
Committee and City Council for approval.1005 Staff advised councillors many times that 
an OMB review could be successful if the review were overly limited or prescribed, so 
the hope was that this fear would further protect the process from undue political 
influence.1006 Councillors were given many opportunities to advance their own 
perceptions of the appropriate ward boundaries. Their role embodied what a City staff 
member whom I interviewed told me, “in the end, [councillors] decide where the 
boundaries are.”1007  
 
Community Councils 
 
Community councils did not assume a formal role in the ward boundary review. A senior 
City of Toronto staff member told me, in regard to the Etobicoke-York Community 
Council, “[A]t their last meeting, they decided they wanted to have this  briefing on the 
ward boundary review and my staff gave advice: this is within executive committee’s 
mandate, not community council.”1008 When I asked why, my contact told me, “I think 
we kind of realized that there would end up being motions attached and that had the 
potential to contaminate the process, in terms of future appeals and all that kind of stuff, 
so that’s why we were trying to influence in that case.”1009 As we know from Chapter 3, a 
community council can proceed with an issue even where city staff disagree. I heard from 
this staff member that, “there are lots of examples where we’ve given advice that we 
think something is a city-wide matter, that community council has considered 
anyway.”1010 However, in this case, perhaps due to the emphasis on mitigating an OMB 
appeal, the community councils backed off from involvement.  
 
                                                
1005 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
1006 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
1007 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
1008 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Ibid. 
 	 244 
The politicking related to community council boundaries plays out on the floor of City 
Council. This issue came up at the ward boundary review, where many comments were 
made as to the groupings of wards and affiliations with former municipalities as relevant 
to ward boundaries generally. The groupings of wards to form community councils is not 
new. As my former City staff colleague told me, “[W]hen we went from six to four, you 
know we had to break the boundaries of the old municipalities and so Etobicoke and 
York community council is an interesting one, because it’s really got some of North 
York, York and Toronto attached to it.” I learned that the Etobicoke-York community 
council area was created as a result of a trade. When staff originally designed that 
boundary, “we basically said we’ll take all the wards on the other side of the Humber and 
join them up.” One councillor didn’t want to sit on the Etobicoke York Community 
Council, so engineered a trade with another councillor, originally in the Toronto-East 
York Community Council area. The trade was engineered on the floor even though, to 
my contact, “that makes no sense to me, geographically.”1011 The community councils 
still serve as a proxy for the pre-amalgamated municipalities. As my contact said, “I 
mean this to me seems like the issue, not just for this representation, but also the identity 
of the old municipalities. Which, even if we don’t want them to exist and we don’t want 
it to be true, is still percolating under the surface, so it’s there if we want it or not.”1012  
 
In my own observation, while attending the public consultation sessions, the location of 
wards was not neatly separated from the location of community councils. At the public 
meetings, many participants were frustrated that governance, electoral reform or the 
operations of community councils were outside the scope of the review.1013 Thirteen 
comments were raised as to a New York-style community board system with appointed 
volunteers, specified responsibilities and separate staff and budget. Eight participants 
were in favour of stronger community councils with greater delegated authority and 
propose the creation of a Midtown community council. And, there was widespread 
concern in regard to Option 5, whereby the old Scarborough boundary would be shifted. 
                                                
1011 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
1012 Ibid. 
1013 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 928 at 36. 
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Even though the WBR did not concern itself with community councils, they were 
relevant to notions of “communities of interest.” 
 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations 
 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations were identified as important stakeholders by the 
consultants. BIAs – but not neighbourhood associations – were one of the stakeholder 
groups singled out for direct consultation via the umbrella organization, Toronto 
Association of Business Improvement Areas (TABIA).1014 In regard to “BIAs and 
Resident Associations,” the consultants stated, “In partnership with Toronto City 
Council, local commercial property owners and tenants can work together to form a 
Business Improvement Area (BIA) to enhance the safety, look and feel of their 
neighbourhoods to attract more visitors to shop and dine, as well as to draw new 
businesses to their area.”1015 The statement did not mention why this description was 
relevant to the WBR, nor why BIAs were to be consulted, but not neighbourhood 
associations. No other mention was made of neighbourhood associations, or how they 
would be consulted.1016  
 
Neighbourhood associations were actively involved in other aspects of the review, 
namely the public consultation sessions. The Final Report states that the involvement of 
BIAs and NAs made a difference in how the ward boundaries were crafted.1017 For 
example, the Finch-Bathurst BIA, located in North York, is a large, influential BIA and, 
as a result of their input, the consultants tried to keep it within a single ward. Likewise, 
the boundaries of the Junction and the Waterfront were influenced by the involvement of 
these organizations.1018 In the Scarborough consultation meeting that I observed, a 
neighbourhood association suggested revisions to proposed boundaries so that their 
                                                
1014 The other individual meetings were held with Civic Action (Emerging Leaders Network); Ontario 
Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants; Social Planning Toronto; and United Way at 7, online: 
<http://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/552e670ce4b01067ad03cbac/1429104
396257/RoundOneReport.TWBR.150402.pdf>.  
1015  Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 928. 
1016 Ibid. 
1017 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 999. 
1018 Ibid. 
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community would have a single councillor, making it easier for their interests to be heard. 
This recommendation ultimately found its way into the final report.1019 
 
In addition to influencing the location of specific boundaries, the involvement of these 
bodies raised important information about the meaning of “communities of interest.” 
First, BIAs and neighbourhood associations include boundaries that they argue delineate 
a community of interest. These boundaries may be larger or smaller than, and may 
conflict with, those of wards. Thus, wards are not meant to accurately map communities 
of interest – one goal of the ward boundary review is to minimize, as much as possible, 
their separation. Second, these bodies help facilitate the process by providing necessary 
input. The consultants did not create wards based on other notions of communities of 
interest like neighbourhood improvement areas or demographic information. Instead, 
they relied on the feedback of these stakeholders. Third, the involvement of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations was uneven across the City. Certain areas, particularly those 
without such organizations, did not give input. 
 
Thus, BIAs and neighbourhood associations reveal themselves as key participants in the 
WBR process. Chapter 1 described the debate as to whether BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations are important actors in local decision-making. Asserting that some of these 
bodies were able to influence the design and location of ward boundaries, the next section 
examines more deeply the way in which these bodies, as Toronto’s version of 
communities of interest, were specifically engaged. 
 
4. Engaging communities of interest 
 
The engagement of communities of interest was built into the WBR in five ways.1020 
First, the consultants specifically engaged seven Toronto “stakeholder groups,” which 
included the Toronto Association for Business Improvement Areas (TABIA), the 
umbrella organization for Toronto’s BIAs. Second, the consultants held face-to-face 
discussions with councillors on two occasions. Third, opportunities were provided to any 
                                                
1019 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 999. 
1020 Ibid at 21. 
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interested person or organization to participant to engage in the review by attending one 
of the 24 consultations, with six held in each of the four community council areas. These 
consultations were held in two stages – the first to obtain feedback from residents prior to 
the drafting of proposed boundaries and the second following the identification of five 
options. Fourth, the consultants provided a survey for any person to complete and 
forward to the consultants. Fifth, individuals were able to attend the Executive 
Committee meeting and give a five-minute deputation with their thoughts on the review.  
 
Interestingly, while TABIA (the umbrella organization for the city’s BIAs) was consulted 
directly as a “key stakeholder,” neighbourhood associations were not. This may be due to 
the absence of comprehensive contact information, as detailed in Chapter 3. In addition, 
unlike TABIA, there is no single umbrella organization that represents the 180+ 
neighbourhood organizations. However, the consultation sessions provided a forum for 
neighbourhood associations to comment on the review process and proposed boundaries.  
 
Table 5.3 sets out the number of people who participated in each of these engagement 
exercises.  
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 Public engagement exercise Number of Participants 
1. Stakeholder groups 59 (Round 1)1021 
 
2. Councillor meetings and meetings with 
Mayor’s staff 
51 (Round 1, includes existing and 
new councillors),1022 45 (Round 2)1023 
 
3. Public meetings, information sessions and 
webinar 
 
192 (Round 1),1024 115 (Round 2)1025 
 
4. Website survey and general submissions 608 (Round 1),1026 732 (Round 2)1027 
 
5. Deputations at Executive Committee 
 
11028 
 
Table 5.3: Public engagement in the ward boundary review 
 
To better understand the degree of engagement provided in the sessions, I attended 
consultation sessions at Metro Hall and in Scarborough, using the method of participatory 
observation, as explained in Chapter 2.  
 
a) Observation of downtown WBR consultations 
 
I arrived for a ward boundary review consultation at Metro Hall on October 7, 2015. It 
was a brisk fall day. I arrived about ten minutes early and found the room already filled 
with about 30 mostly white men and women in their 50s. The entrance way boasted a 
table with a calm, unsmiling consultant sitting behind it. On the table was a sign-in sheet, 
a survey, pens, and WBR buttons. 
 
                                                
1021 Ibid at 24. 
1022 Ibid at 24. 
1023 Ibid at 28. 
1024 Ibid at 24. 
1025 Ibid at 28. 
1026 Ibid at 24. 
1027 Ibid at 28. 
1028 City Clerk, Executive Committee Decision: Committee decision on final report - Toronto ward 
boundary review, City of Toronto (24 May 2016), online: 
<http://app.Toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
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In the room, people were speaking to one another enthusiastically. I chose a table near the 
middle, where a gentleman in his sixties was looking in detail at the six maps on the 
table. One map was of the existing ward structure; the other five each presented a 
different ward configuration option. We smiled at each other as I got out my computer to 
type. A few minutes later he passed the maps over to me. A man in his late 20s sat down 
next to me just before the meeting started. Several other people trickled in around this 
time. One could hear a low hum of talking, including some animated discussion at the 
table to my right.  
 
The room was very bright, with halogen lights in the ceiling. There were posters in the 
back of the ward boundary options, overlaid with the current ward boundaries. The room 
felt crowded with many tables and chairs, but not too full or empty for the number of 
people who ultimately came, which was 21. The meeting started about ten minutes late. 
The consultants introduced themselves. They noted that this was the fifth of twelve public 
meetings and that this was the second of two rounds of consultations that would take 
place on the WBR. They had a dry, clear tone as they described the scope of their 
mandate. The presentation was very succinct, setting out the reason for the review and the 
process they had followed to date, together with a timeline for the future. Half way 
through, the presenter switched with another member of the team. They laid out the five 
options. They articulated that the fifth option – which was to abandon historical boundary 
lines and draw new ones according to the city’s environmental geography – would be a 
fresh start. 
 
They then opened the room to questions. There were about fifteen questions from the 
floor. The main focus of questions was on the scope of the review – that is, whether other 
issues beyond the boundaries would be considered, like the role and function of 
community councils, and with having councillors ultimately approve the option, given 
the concern that there would be a conflict of interest in them doing so. The consultants 
were firm about their mandate as not including anything beyond “drawing lines on a 
paper.” 
 
 	 250 
Next, the consultants asked everyone at each table to discuss the options and to comment 
on them. Some participants raised concerns that there were people at each table who were 
not from the same sections of the city. The consultants responded that this was the task at 
hand and that participants were free to give any comments that they wanted. Our table, 
which was a group of three, started talking. The first comments came from the younger 
person, who was wearing a suit and was a very articulate a member of a racialized 
minority (which stood out given the backgrounds of those in the room), said that he lived 
in East York. He expressed that he did not feel at all attached to the historical connections 
some felt to their neighbourhood, although noted that he knew that many people in his 
ward did. He felt that the best option was the fifth, arguing that there was no need to cling 
to historical boundaries. The middle-aged man at the table disagreed, stating that “social 
geography” mattered as much as physical geography. He revealed that his interest in the 
ward boundaries was due to his involvement in the ranked ballot initiative. He noted that 
he lived in Cabbagetown and felt that some of the options would cut through his 
neighbourhood. We all looked at the maps in detail and noticed that the fifth option kept 
what he understood as his community intact. He seemed to like the fifth option more after 
his realization. We continued to have a lively discussion about the review process. 
 
We were given a five-minute warning and then a two-minute warning. Then each table 
announced their views. Most of the comments focused in detail on how the proposed 
boundaries supported or conflicted with those of neighbourhood associations. Five 
speakers focused on the Yonge/Eglinton boundaries and the explosive condo 
development over the last decades. They spoke of the three councillors and three planners 
involved in local decisions. The preference of the speakers was to have this area located 
within a single ward. The St. Lawrence area and Merton Street were also singled out as 
areas with strong neighbourhood associations and BIAs, with residents asking that the 
boundaries of such organizations be considered when crafting the new wards. Residents 
also noted that some areas should be located within multiple wards, for example: “The 
waterfront affects everyone in the city. It belongs to Torontonians and all people in 
Ontario.”  
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The consultants were clear and firm, again, in what feedback they were looking for, 
which was essentially comments on the suggested lines themselves, not on the process or 
on anything unrelated to the project. It felt a little like it was “business as usual” for the 
consultants, that there wasn’t a lot of passion for the exercise. The meeting ended 10 
minutes late at 9:10. The participants trickled out slowly, saying goodbye to one another. 
I had the impression that many of them would have liked to have continued talking about 
the issue.  
 
b) Observation of Scarborough WBR consultations 
 
By contrast, the consultation held in Scarborough about a week later had a very different 
feel. The meeting took place in the basement of a local church, in a space that felt 
considerably smaller than Metro Hall. The same three consultants were present. I walked 
down several stairs into the room. I signed in with my name, address, phone number and 
email address. Several round tables were set up with the option maps placed on them and 
large versions of the maps were at the back of the room. Two of the tables had other 
participants and I joined three of them at the farthest table on the left front side. The 
session started very shortly after I got there. 
 
The consultants introduced themselves and gave a presentation exactly like the one that 
had taken place at Metro Hall. Afterwards, the consultants opened the floor to questions, 
but there were none from the crowd. The consultants asked where everyone was from. 
The other two or three participants at the adjacent table noted that they were university 
researchers and I acknowledged the same. At the table where I was sitting, one of the 
people introduced herself as a member of the consultant team, while the other two people 
said they were members of a resident association in southern Scarborough and looked to 
be in their late 20s or early 30s and were members of a racialized group. Their ethnicity 
stood out because everyone else in the room was white. Otherwise, there were no other 
people attending the session.  
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The consultants asked if there was any feedback on the boundaries. The other researchers 
and I didn’t have anything to say about the Scarborough options or how the lines had 
been drawn in the five different maps. However, the members of the resident association 
were there to help craft new boundaries for their community, which was split into at least 
two wards in each of the five options. These participants stated that their community did 
not have many resources and having the voice of the ward councillor really mattered. 
That is why they were there. The consultants seemed very eager to hear more and came 
close to the table to get a look at precisely where the community was and where the 
boundaries should be. They were patient as the two residents drew on the maps and asked 
specific questions to ensure that they understood exactly which streets were important, as 
the maps did not provide enough detail to show them.  
 
Afterwards, the consultants asked again if there was any more feedback or comments. No 
one had any, so the meeting ended. The consultants thanked everyone for coming and the 
four other participants gathered their things. The two members of the resident group left 
quickly, but the other researchers chatted with the consultants and it seemed that they 
knew each other. I also lingered and asked the consultants how the sessions had been 
going. The consultants said that the meeting at Metro Hall had been very well attended, 
but not so much the others. However, they were happy to have received many completed 
surveys. I asked how much other governance issues (like community councils) had come 
up during the consultations, and the consultants acknowledged that they had many times, 
but that it was not their role to consider the structure or role of these bodies.  
 
My observations of the two open sessions revealed vastly differently kinds of community 
involvement. Those at Metro Hall were seemingly middle class and white, generally 
representing an association of some kind, within a vibrant meeting that extended beyond 
the appointed hour. Scarborough, by contrast, suggested a scantily attended meeting, with 
just two participants who were not researchers. The attendees were also representing an 
organization that did not fit the typical profile of neighbourhood associations.  
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The consultations highlighted ongoing negotiation between and among groups regarding 
the boundaries of “community.”1029 In the consultation sessions, I witnessed how the 
proposed wards came into conflict with neighbourhood and community level bodies who 
had crafted their own boundary lines around particular geographies, forming associations 
to reflect their interests. In both situations, neighbourhood associations wanted the 
legitimacy and security of ward boundaries to reinforce their own iterations of belonging. 
These sessions reinforced, as Schragger and Martin state, that communities are the 
products of contested political norms dependent on borders to define them, and the 
political actions of those that define where those boundaries should lie.1030  
 
The next section further explores more broadly how neighbourhood boundaries did – and 
did not – conform to the geographic framing of proposed wards and what these 
contestations meant for representation. 
 
5. Contested “Local” Boundaries 
 
In the consultants’ Options Report and the Final Report, the consultants detailed the 
feedback they had received on the contested boundaries raised during the ward boundary 
review. By “contested boundaries,” I mean the way in which boundary lines were crafted 
in relation to disputed locations of the applicable communities of interest. Unlike some 
reviews, the City of Toronto did not independently identify the locations of communities 
of interest based on any demographic data. Instead, the process assumed that residents 
and others would inform the consultants using or more of the public engagement 
exercises that were conducted. The reports did not identify whether the contested 
boundaries were raised at the stakeholder meetings, consultation sessions, surveys or 
other means.  
 
The contested boundaries can be roughly grouped into three categories. First, there are 
those communities of interest which are divided amongst two or more wards. Second, 
there were disputes over how communities of interest should be grouped with others. 
                                                
1029 See also Jurgen Habermas,. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). 
1030 Schragger, supra note 193; Martin, supra note 128 at 362. 
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Third, there were strong sentiments regarding the groupings of wards and their 
corresponding boundaries. 
 
a) Communities of interest in a single ward 
 
The WBR reports included many comments as to communities of interest that were 
purportedly small enough to be placed in a single ward, which were currently divided 
amongst two or three wards. The communities mentioned in the reports included the 
Yonge/Eglinton area, the High Park community (Runnymede, Annette, Bloor West 
Village, Swansea, High Park and Parkdale are said to have “great affinity with each 
other” but are currently divided, Liberty Village, Toronto’s Waterfront, the Junction, 
Victoria Park, and the Kingston-Galloway/Orton Park). In each, the existing boundary 
lines were said to divide well-established communities of interest.1031  
 
At the consultation session that I attended, there was substantial commentary on the 
Yonge-Eglinton area, which is currently split among three councillors, two community 
council areas, and two sets of planning staff.1032 Participants noted that there are issues 
with the Yonge and Eglinton street boundaries, which currently divide wards, because of 
all the development, and that both sides of Yonge are affected.1033 That the Yonge and 
Eglinton area is a growth centre exacerbates the difficulty in coordinating amongst 
different planning and political actors, thus the ward placement matters. Yonge Street 
also divides a strong retail strip and the local BIA. Other residents spoke about the 
appropriateness of Yonge as a separation. For example, the Yonge Street boundary fits 
with school boundaries, and “nobody” east of Yonge goes to school west of Yonge.  
 
When the last ward boundary review took place in 2000, some of Toronto’s 
neighbourhoods did not exist. The consultant reports note concerns from respondents 
                                                
1031 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 999 at 45. 
1032 Note that the City of Toronto’s Division of Planning groups services along the same lines as the 
community council boundaries. 
1033 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 999 at 46. 
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regarding new built areas like Liberty Village, Fort York and City Place.1034 The reports 
also cite ward divisions in the Waterfront and Entertainment District areas, and the desire 
to shift ward divisions so that the BIA community would not be split.1035 Residents also 
noted communities of interest that are too large to fit within a single ward and, therefore, 
a dispute over how the boundary lines should be drawn to divide them. They include the 
Jane-Finch area; the University of Toronto and York University; the Danforth and the 
Beaches. Malvern in Scarborough has a small enough population to fit into a single ward, 
but is divided by a natural boundary. 
 
b) Multiple communities of interest in a single ward 
 
Second, the consultant reports noted contested boundaries regarding the groupings of 
communities of interest. For example, Ward 32 currently includes Thorncliffe and 
Flemingdon Park, which are racially diverse and two of the least wealthy communities in 
the city, together with the affluent neighbourhood of Leaside. The Options Report noted 
resident feedback that, “Leaside, Bennington Heights and Wynford Heights [the latter 
two of which are affluent like Leaside] and the severely disadvantaged, more populous 
and [ethnically diverse and racialized] neighbourhoods of Thorncliffe Park and 
Flemingdon Park. Demographically, they are very different – can create issues for 
representation and equitable distribution of recreation and cultural facilities in the 
ward.”1036 
 
Multiple comments focused on the placement of the Leaside community alongside other 
communities. For example, that Leaside could be added to Ward 29 as “historically they 
were one community,” and that Leaside and Bennington Heights belong in a ward that 
includes some, or all, of Davisville Village, Moore Park and North Toronto, which are 
amongst Toronto’s more affluent communities. There was great objection to dividing 
Leaside boundaries in any way, as “it is a community.”1037  
                                                
1034 Ibid. at 49. 
1035 Ibid. at 50. 
1036 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 928 at 57. 
1037 Ibid. at 37. 
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The grouping of Leaside, Flemington Park and Thorncliffe Park were mentioned by 
multiple commentators. Some said that these three communities of interest “need to stay 
together.” Others thought that Flemington Park and Thorncliffe were areas that “have 
many issues that would benefit from a smaller ward and personalized treatment.”  There 
were also many comments that Flemington Park and Thorncliffe Park should be set 
within a single ward and noting that the new federal riding had inappropriately divided 
them. Another contested set of boundaries which fall into this category is a downtown 
ward that combines the “very disparate socio-economic status between neighbourhoods” 
like Rosedale, Yorkdale, Moss Park and St. Jamestown that “would be better served if 
separated.”1038 This claim of being “better served” is unsubstantiated by those who made 
the claim.1039 
 
The desire to separate communities of interest along economic lines could be seen as its 
own brand of NIMBY by trying to reframe whose “backyards” should be invited to stay 
in the new ward. Cheryl Teelucksingh writes of the divided community of Parkdale, 
where spatial and environmental justice are evident in micro-spaces of a single ward.1040 
Teelucksingh observed the separation of the ward into North and South, whereby the 
North was characterized as safe, clean and more European, while the South had greater 
numbers of visible minorities and new immigrants; lower incomes, crime and poorer 
housing stock.1041 These perceived differences were replicated by the City of Toronto’s 
planning processes, which divided North and South Parkdale for planning purposes, 
including different policies or one-way streets in the more affluent North Parkdale despite 
the closer siting to highways in the south.1042 The social and spatial distinctions in 
Parkdale were also noted by the location of “locally undesirable land uses” in the 
south.1043 Similarly, the cases of contested claims over whether affluent and poorer, 
                                                
1038 Ibid. at 59. 
1039 One potential loss to the less affluent areas within the ward would be section 37 funding, which the 
councillor is able to allocate within the ward. 
1040 Cheryl Teelucksingh, “Spatiality and Environmental Justice In Parkdale (Toronto)” (2002) 24:1 
Ethnologies 119. 
1041 Ibid. at 131. 
1042 Ibid. at 132. 
1043 Ibid. at 135. 
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racialized communities should remain in a single ward clarified that such distinctions and 
borders existed and continued to separate ward residents. Despite almost twenty years of 
co-existence in a ward, Thorncliffe Park, Flemingdon Park and Leaside remain distinct 
communities, with Leaside’s long-ago “ghost” status as its own independent municipality 
given dominating the dialogue on its “community of interest” boundaries.  
 
The divisions within the ward also point to the representation of more affluent or middle 
class residents. Teelucksingh states: “[T]he interests of residents who are able to exercise 
power become packaged as collective interests, whereas the interests of the marginalized 
residents are localized to their own homes and limited spheres of interest. Marginalized 
residents, who represent the majority stakeholder in Parkdale, often do not have the 
resources or opportunity to participate in advocating their interests.”1044 Maps of residents 
associations show one in Leaside, but not Flemingdon Park or Thorncliffe Park. The 
“many issues” of Flemingdon Park or Thorncliffe Park by neighbourhood associations 
who participated in the WBR were not characterized as issues of concern across the ward, 
but of only those residents in the applicable communities.  
 
This raises a deeper question of how we characterize the participation of those who 
belong to neighbourhood associations. As McClymont and P. O’Hare write, assertions of 
NIMBYism mean that there are “good” and “bad”, “welcome” and “unwelcome” forms 
of democratic participation. To dismiss groups as NIMBY, or to critique their rationality 
as being entirely self-interested or even malevolent, may, therefore, be misplaced or 
misleading.1045 These comments point not simply to some residents wishing to displace 
other, more vulnerable people within their ward, but also to spatial inequalities in 
representation generally. In other words, understanding the role of neighbourhood 
associations in representing the interests of a narrow set of residents, how can a more 
inclusive “local governance” model be crafted?  
 
                                                
1044 Ibid. at 133. 
1045 K. McClymont and P. O’Hare, supra note 184 at 135. 
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c) Communities of interest as groupings of wards 
 
A third focus were the groupings of wards and their corresponding boundaries. At the 
consultation session that I attended at Metro Hall, a suggestion was made that downtown 
councillors should represent the Downtown as designated in the Official Plan. In 
addition, there were strong sentiments about Option 5, which attempted to redraw the 
wards based on natural boundaries; as the consultants put it, “as though we were drawing 
the wards for the first time.” Residents suggested that, instead, Scarborough should be 
“kept intact,” noting its distinct pre-amalgamation identity. Participants also spoke about 
the locations of wards within community council boundaries. Members from a North 
York neighbourhood association noted that the community near Lawrence and Yonge 
identifies more with the Toronto-East York Community Council area. The Southeast 
Asian (Filipino, Vietnamese) and Black (Jamaican, West African) community at the 
south-east corner of Ward 7, the southwest corner of Ward 8, the northwest corner of 
Ward 12 and the northeast corner of Ward 11 were noted as having been divided in the 
existing wards.1046 
 
Two of the options split the University of Toronto’s campus in a way that residents 
objected to. In particular, there was concern about separating St. Michael’s and Victoria 
College, which were said to be “cohesive communities” and that it is “important for 
political activity, community organizing, etc. to keep these communities together.”1047 
Other suggestions included coming up with a way for the university to remain in one 
ward and shifting the ward locations of university residences.1048 
 
These categories of communities of interest reflect the conflict between how state-based 
law, and the norms and rules of other actors or bodies. The creation of local legal spaces 
includes insiders and outsiders, a set of norms that determines who is eligible to 
participate, in what manner, and with what power. The WBR process was defined 
narrowly, without considering whether the ward model should be maintained or the 
                                                
1046 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 928 at 42. 
1047 Ibid at 42. 
1048 Ibid. at 58. 
 	 259 
system of governance more broadly. This meant that some communities of interest were 
able to able to conform their version of boundaries within those of wards, due to their 
size or locations, and based on their ability to access city processes to assert their 
interests.  
 
The ward as the prime local legal space in law was not fundamentally challenged in the 
WBR, although tensions were raised. A summary of the overlapping role of wards, 
community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations in the process, and how this 
overlap informs the meaning of local governance in Toronto is described next. 
 
III. Conclusion  
 
The WBR case study was an opportunity to study the boundaries and governance of 
Toronto’s “local legal spaces.” It illustrated the scholarship of Frug and Young, who 
argue that legal boundaries are borne of political decision-making that ultimately creates 
boundary lines that exclude and embrace particular communities. It also affirmed the 
conception of “legal ghosts,” drawn from Valverde’s contribution of time within 
governance, that remain components of the boundaries and governance of local legal 
spaces regardless of formal law. The WBR highlighted the challenges of decision-
making, affirming the primacy of the ward councillor and the privileged role of BIAs and 
NAs. The review neither questioned the primacy of the ward as the dominant 
representational unit of local governance, nor challenged the dilemma of fitting 
communities of interest within the ward, notwithstanding their differences in size. In this 
case study, the pluralistic nature of local governance is revealed through the many 
representations of local both within and outside of formal law, but which may not have 
recognition in the formal local governance model. In particular, the WBR highlighted the 
privileged role of BIAs and NAs whose communities of interests are of the right size and 
location to rest within the ward, as well as the primacy of the ward councillor as decision-
maker.  
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In the WBR, the City of Toronto queried the boundaries and representation of its local 
government, and was empowered under COTA to significantly alter its local spaces with 
latitude to design an inclusive, participatory approach to decision-making. The study 
leads to two important conclusions: In regard to decision-making, the WBR case study 
demonstrates that the ward councillor played the most important role in decision-making. 
The centrality of the councillor role is enabled by the terms of the City of Toronto Act, 
2006, which requires that all decisions be made by City Council, meaning the 44 
councillors and mayor who comprise the body. However, councillor importance was also 
facilitated by the design of the WBR, crafted and approved by councillors so as to require 
that the final decision come back to them. While BIAs and neighbourhood associations 
both engaged in the review, those areas without BIAs and neighbourhood associations are 
reliant on individual community members or existing ward councillors to advance their 
interests.  
 
Ward councillors held many roles in the review (designing the process, providing input 
through direct consultations, final decision-makers) and did not engage in a broader 
review of the city’s local governance model. As a representational unit, the ward 
councillor was given a significant role during consultation, recommendation and 
decision-making. As a geographic concept, the ward is meant to enable but not contradict 
the communities of interest, which includes the BIAs and neighbourhood associations to 
the extent that such boundaries fit neatly within ward boundaries.  
 
Second, the meaning of “communities of interest” was a crucial component of the WBR. 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations – but not community councils – were recognized 
as proxy communities of interest in the WBR and in the final outcome of ward design. 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations include boundaries that they argue delineate a 
community of interest. These boundaries may be larger or smaller than, and may conflict 
with, those of wards. Thus, wards are not meant to accurately map communities of 
interest although a goal of the ward boundary review is to minimize, as much as possible, 
their fracture and separation. These bodies help to facilitate the process by providing 
necessary input. The consultants did not create wards based on other notions of 
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communities of interest like neighbourhood improvement areas or demographic 
information, even though such data was available. Instead, they relied on the feedback of 
these stakeholders. The involvement of BIAs and neighbourhood associations is uneven 
across the City, which impacts the degree to which all communities of interest are able to 
give input and engage in existing and proposed ward boundaries. Other communities of 
interest may not be identified because of the absence of neighbourhood associations and 
BIAs in all parts of the City, and because neighbourhood associations in particular may 
not have the capacity to gather all information on such communities. 
 
The sum of these conclusions reinforces that local legal spaces are defined and defended 
in relation to the ward, with BIAs and neighbourhood associations generally 
accommodated where their boundaries did not contradict or challenge the existing ward 
model. In addition to influencing the location of specific boundaries, the involvement of 
these bodies raised important information about the meaning of “communities of interest” 
and other boundaries and decision-making bodies in the city, in particular community 
councils, although such examinations were deemed outside of the WBR scope. The next 
chapter builds on these case studies to ask how a local governance model could be 
conceived if crafted within the theoretical lens of the urban commons. 
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Chapter 6 – Road-mapping the new theoretical territory of local governance  
 
The central question that the dissertation seeks to answer is what “local governance” 
means within the City of Toronto as a result of the overlap of various governance bodies, 
each with their own set of geographic boundaries and assertions of representation. In 
Toronto, these overlapping bodies are wards (as represented by councillors), community 
councils, business improvement areas and neighbourhood associations, each of which 
claim geographical boundaries as justification for the representation of locally-based 
populations, play a role in local governance and claim to be open to participation to some 
degree. This research asks whether the overlap of these bodies has unrecognized 
consequences and how these consequences affect marginalized peoples.  
 
In Chapter 1, I justified a conception of local governance grounded in legal pluralism, 
property law and legal geography. I referenced the scholarship of Frug and Young, who 
argue that local boundaries are the products of political decision-making and may 
privilege certain communities over others.1049 These scholars acknowledge that room 
must be made for a broader range of communities to participate in decision-making 
through the use of planning charettes and other engagement practices.1050 Building on the 
work of Valverde, Santos and Blomley, who have studied the overlapping nature of 
boundaries and governance, I focus specifically on the vertical tensions and interlegalities 
about the smaller-than-city scale itself. I argue that this scholarship has framed the central 
tension of local governance as between the city and region or province, rather than 
centred on the smaller-than-city bodies that are unequally embedded and privileged 
within the governance model.  
 
The early part of this dissertation outlined the legal basis for decision-making under 
applicable provincial legislation and municipal bylaws. Against these formal rules, the 
dissertation next examined the history, roles and interplay of wards, community councils, 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations as bodies that purport to represent the local 
                                                
1049 Frug, supra note 7; Young, supra note 141.  
1050 Ibid. 
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interests of those located within overlapping smaller-than-city geographical spaces in 
Toronto. Through this study, wards constitute a historical relic dating back to the 
establishment of the City of Toronto in 1834 as part of a representative model inherited 
from the United Kingdom without serious reflection.  
 
In the current model, wards emerge as the dominant actor in local governance, with 
councillors asserting a representative role for residents and an oversight role for planning 
and other decisions within their boundaries. Toronto’s four community councils are a 
post-amalgamation phenomenon, a collective of 10-12 councillors tasked with a role as 
local planning committees, rather than exercising the broader mandate outlined in the 
procedural bylaw. BIAs and neighbourhood associations also claim to represent interests 
within bounded communities. While BIAs are local bodies of the city, with bylaws that 
clarify their boundaries and permit the collection of a levy from members, a dedicated 
city staff office assisting them with their affairs, and requirements that they follow 
accountability requirements, neighbourhood associations are not integrated in the city’s 
operations. The city’s 184 neighbourhood associations have a variety of forms, levels of 
activity, and purposes.  
 
What emerges from these early sections is a clearer picture of local decision-making than 
the “law in the books” might suggest. Toronto’s governance model focuses largely on 
ward-based planning processes rather than mechanisms for inclusive participation in city-
wide decisions, with only a few mandated engagement processes. In some areas of the 
city, councillors and staff rely on BIAs and neighbourhood associations to encourage 
community acceptance for proposed developments. However, while wards and 
community councils are present in all areas of the city, BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations are not, leaving many areas unrepresented by such bodies. Even where they 
do exist, generally in the city’s more affluent areas, they do not represent a broad range of 
identities and interests. While initially conceived as deliberative spaces akin to New 
York’s community boards, community councils largely serve as forums for rubber-
stamping local planning decisions made by ward councillors.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 set out case studies examining the boundaries of overlapping local legal 
spaces, the bodies and contestations of local governance, and the localized effects of 
“city-wide” decisions. Chapter 4 analyzes the 2012-13 decision regarding the 
introduction of a casino in four parts of the city, including the downtown core. After a 
contentious, year-long debate, City Council voted against the proposal by a vote of 40-4, 
together with a motion to restrict the expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack, located in an 
economically struggling areas in Rexdale, located in Toronto’s northwest. In 2015, this 
latter decision was revisited with little opposition and the expansion was permitted. These 
cases reflect three different conceptions of local governance. First, while the downtown 
casino debate encompassed a more expansive geography with several sites across 
Toronto, both decisions ultimately focused on “local” concerns. In the 2012-13, these 
concerns were expansive and included traffic, health, parks and planning, while in 
Rexdale the decision focused exclusively on jobs and economic impacts. Second, the 
councillors in the downtown casino debate were able to mobilize little-known procedural 
bylaw provisions to have the matter debated at the community council level. This 
permitted downtown councillors, who were not part of the Executive Committee and 
therefore did not have a voice in the “city-wide” process other than via City Council, to 
seize control of the debate. In contrast, the Woodbine expansion became a pro forma 
agenda item with little consideration outside the walls of the Executive Committee and 
City Council. In both cases the ward councillors exercised considerable control over the 
process and the outcome, affirming the central role played by these “local” actors. Third, 
the two casino debates suggest very different engagement roles for BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations, with organizations from across the city heavily involved in 
the downtown debate and not at all involved in Woodbine. 
 
Chapter 5 detailed the city’s ward boundary review, which sought to review the number 
and boundaries of electoral districts, the first review full review since amalgamation. The 
case studies set out the overlapping roles of wards, community councils, BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations in these debates and the ways in which these bodies 
purported to represent local interests. The ward emerges as the critical feature of local 
governance, both in its representational and geographic form. First, the review did not 
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question whether the ward should remain the representational unit of the city. Second, 
councillors were given a privileged role during all of the consultation, recommendation 
and decision-making phases of the review, far more than riding representatives would 
have in provincial or federal electoral redistricting. Third, as a geographic concept, the 
WBR was meant to legitimize as many communities of interest (ostensibly BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations) as possible within the constraints of the existing ward model 
and judicial parameters, but was not designed for other notions of local governance. BIAs 
and neighbourhood associations, disproportionately located across the city, were heavily 
invested in the process highlighting the degree to which these organizations can play an 
important role in local governance.  
 
This last chapter now seeks to synthesize this data. I first apply the conception of local 
governance developed in Chapter 1 as a framework to explore the themes raised 
throughout this dissertation by situating the theoretical boundaries of local governance. 
The final section of this chapter offers an ambitious agenda for conceptualizing local 
governance in Toronto, together with concrete recommendations for legal and policy 
changes within the normative framework of the urban commons, allowing for a more 
inclusive and participatory model. I conclude with a proposed set of questions for future 
research.  
 
I. Conceptualizing local governance: lessons learned 
 
Chapter 1 sets out a conception of local governance grounded in legal pluralism and legal 
geography. I set out a two-part conceptualization of local governance in Chapter 1 that 
first, recognizes the pluralistic and interlegal nature of local legal spaces and, second, is 
framed by the state in political and spatial terms without necessarily incorporating other 
norms, orders, rules and practices, and may ultimately include and exclude certain people 
and communities through the setting of boundaries and participation rules. In Chapter 1, I 
argue that a normative reimagining of local governance based on the framework of Foster 
and Iaione’s urban commons would lead to a more inclusive, participatory local 
governance model in Toronto. This first section integrates the findings made earlier in 
 	 266 
this dissertation with both the conceptualization of local governance and the normative 
reimagination. 
 
1. Understanding local governance in the Toronto context 
 
I locate local governance foremost as a pluralist concept. This means that local 
governance cannot be understood as self-contained and autonomous. Conceptions of 
local governance can be singular or multiple, and may even compete with one other. 
Plural notions of local may be articulated with legal language, yet may also be created 
informally, thus requiring an examination that looks outside the strict contours of law to 
understand the boundaries and governance of local legal spaces.  
 
Chapters 3 set out the tensions of how local governance is situated within the city’s 
broader governance model, as comprised of community councils, wards and smaller-
than-ward boundaries and representatives, BIAs and neighbourhood associations. These 
entities, while each claiming governance roles, may be legally reflected in different 
sections of provincial acts (initially, wards and communities) and municipal bylaws 
(community councils and BIAs), or may not be recognized in law at all (neighbourhood 
associations). Even where these bodies are individually set out in law, their relationships 
with other local governance bodies may be unclear. 
 
The law provides a seemingly coherent structure for municipal government generally. 
The Constitution Act articulates that municipalities are within the provincial domain, 
which the Province of Ontario in turn executes through COTA and other pieces of 
legislation and regulations. The law thus sets out a ladder or hierarchy of power, with the 
federal government on top, leading downwards towards the municipality, which in strict 
constitutional terms may not even be considered a government.1051 But, the reality of 
law’s relations, the “law on the street,” tells a different story. First, this hierarchical 
notion of municipal authority is in tension with the shifting intergovernmental relations, 
whereby cities and their mayors are increasingly important players within the country. 
                                                
1051 Blomley, supra note 54. 
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This is reflected in funding decisions, whereby the federal government transferred 
billions to municipalities to make final spending decisions;1052 political agency, whereby 
the provincial government refused to step in to remove Toronto’s mayor;1053 and the 
accountability model, whereby the City successfully argued that more expansive 
provincial ombudsman powers should not apply to Toronto’s affairs.1054 The courts, too, 
have stepped in to recognize the principle of subsidiarity as underpinning municipal 
power, meaning that cities should be given wider latitude to make decisions in the best 
interests of their residents. Scholars including Levi and Valverde have noted that this 
increasing recognition by senior governments and the courts speaks to the power of local 
residents, in that municipalities have the ears, perhaps better than any other government, 
of the many people that reside within their boundaries.1055 Thus, local governance (in this 
case, local meaning municipal) has shifted from a non-governmental, prescriptively 
managed entity to a government that is not entirely explained by the legal codes that 
profess to govern. 
 
Second, while the law doesn’t accurately speak to the municipal role in the overall 
governmental hierarchy and is silent on key areas of governance,1056 it is clear that 
Toronto has a general capacity to decide the structure and operation of its governance 
model.1057 The ward is in one sense an organizational unit, sectioning the city into neatly 
divided groups. These carved sections serve to install councillors who oversee the affairs 
within the ward and speak for their constituents in the larger context of City Council. 
                                                
1052 See e.g. the Federal Gas Tax Fund, a now-permanent federal infrastructure funding program that gives 
funding directly to municipalities, including $152 million per year to the City of Toronto (Government of 
Canada, “The Federal Gas Tax Fund: Permanent and Predictable Funding for Municipalities” (12 April 
2017), online: <http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/plan/gtf-fte-eng.html>.  
1053 Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Minister says stripping Ford of mayoralty powers was legal, appropriate” The Globe 
and Mail (19 November 2013). 
1054 In 2014, the Ontario Ombudsman proposed an expansion of their scope of powers to include oversight 
over municipal actions. Initially, this included the power to investigate Toronto decisions, but following 
this proposal was dropped following objections from the City of Toronto (see Adrian Morrow, “Ontario set 
to strengthen Ombudsman’s powers” Globe and Mail (6 March 2014), online: < 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ontario-set-to-strengthen-watchdogs-powers/article17339860/> and 
Ontario Ombudsman, “Who we oversee: Municipalities” (17 April 2017), online: < 
https://www.ombudsman.on.ca/About-Us/Who-We-Oversee/Municipalities.aspx>. 
1055 Valverde, supra note 189. 
1056 COTA, supra note 11 at s. 8. 
1057 I say “general capacity,” as there are some limits as to which powers may be delegated. See e.g. 
restrictions on delegation (COTA, supra note 11 at s. 21). 
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This local role of ward councillors is largely unwritten and historical, a set of relations 
left over from centuries of governance evolution. Thus, the law acts as an unwritten set of 
norms. Wards ensure that each part of the city has a representative at City Council and 
that residents have a point of contact. While the law does not explicitly define how local 
governance functions in Toronto, the ward and its councillor emerge as profoundly 
important in their organizational, representative and coercive capacities. The ward is the 
basis upon which local governance is negotiated in formal and informal law, by enabling 
institutional voices to be heard and acting as a gateway into the City’s governance 
structure.  
 
Wards emerge as a formal mechanism to geographically carve sections in the city, even 
though COTA does not require this manner of city organization. The historical legacy of 
the ward and, until recently, the provincial power to determine city boundaries, has 
arguably contributed to the City’s persistent emphasis on wards as the spokespersons of 
“local” since amalgamation. The ward need not embody this role. The relationship 
between wards and community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations are 
entirely within the City’s authority. Despite the challenges that this relationship poses for 
representation, the ward has remained at the centre of governance as a result of political 
choices, incremental decision-making, and the absence of a holistic governance review. 
 
Community councils have not challenged the power of the councillor. Their genesis was 
a provincial commandment meant to soften the blow of a forced amalgamation. They 
were initially conceived as bodies to emulate the former functions of the local 
municipalities, as forums to gather community input on matters of neighbourhood 
concern. While committee councils are largely used as a committee to make routine 
planning decisions, the procedural bylaw also sets out a back door for them to provide a 
forum for neighbourhood affairs, a largely unused and little discussed provision that 
remained dormant until the 2012-13 casino debate. Efforts to use community councils in 
a similar manner during the WBR process were discouraged. While no longer part of 
provincial legislation, community councils ostensibly serve as an efficient means to 
handle mundane city business and reduce the burden at City Council, and to keep 
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meddling councillors busy, rather than fulfilling this originally-conceived governance 
function until commanded by councillors aware of their existence.  
 
Both wards and community councils embody the notion of “law on the books” versus 
“law in action.” Wards are not legally required under provincial legislation, yet no 
reviews during or following amalgamation have questioned their use. The ward 
councillor role exists via custom, but any effort to change their function or activities 
would need to be approved by organs empowered under the existing system. Similarly, 
community councils may serve a deliberative role in local decisions beyond planning, but 
this function rarely takes place. In this way, community councils do not marry their actual 
affairs, which for the most part are local planning functions that could either be delegated 
to staff or that must be sent to City Council for approval, to those laid out in legal 
codes.1058  
 
In regard to other local bodies, the ward’s relationship with community councils is the 
most explicit, in that 10-12 wards are grouped together to form the community council 
area, with only councillors serving as representatives. The will of the ward councillor, in 
tandem with others within the same community council area, determines whether the 
community council may be used as a forum to bring neighbourhood actors together, as 
occurred in the 2012-13 casino decision.  
 
Wards can also act as a focal point or enabler for BIAs and neighbourhood associations. 
Some ward councillors help create these smaller-than-city bodies, consult them as 
sounding boards for policy decisions, or use them to further their individual and 
collective agendas. The councillor may be seen to represent their residents by responding 
to BIA and neighbourhood association concerns. Without any clear entryway into the 
city’s local governance model, the ward can be a door to BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations, letting them in when it serves a councillor’s interest (for example the 
promotion of certain ward boundaries in North York in the ward boundary review).  
                                                
1058 Enid Slack, “A Preliminary Assessment of the New City of Toronto” (2000) XX111(1) Can J of Reg Sc 
13. 
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From a local planning perspective, this messy, plural model has an internal coherence, 
albeit with notable socio-economic exclusion. The “local” includes varying legal and 
non-legal claims by many entities, with contested meanings of local governance 
presented by the ward, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations, each 
with their own set of boundaries and members. Wards and community councils have 
clear lines of authority and involvement in relation to the planning process. As noted in 
Chapter 3, BIAs and neighbourhood associations, although they play out differently in 
various parts of the city, feed into local planning by way of their involvement with ward 
councillors. The procedural bylaw also sets out a series of consultation requirements, 
which include the power of BIAs and neighbourhood associations (and any other member 
of the public) to depute at community councils and committees of adjustment 
meetings.1059 The mandates of community councils are thus understood within this model 
as forums for deliberation. This geographically overlapping set of bodies, each with their 
own iteration of local governance, has a messy but coherent framework in the planning 
context. 
 
However, when looking at the model from a city-wide perspective, the meaning and 
facilitation of local governance is less clear. As defined, a city-wide issue concerns more 
than one community council area and therefore applies to the city as a whole. This means 
that the Executive Committee and then City Council will consider the issue. However, in 
some city-wide decisions, like the 2012-13 casino decision, “local” may be negotiated by 
one or more ward councillors. In this issue, they were able to shift the theatre of decision-
making to the community council area using a little-known provision of the procedural 
bylaw.1060 This “local” included the proposed areas of possible casinos, but more broadly 
it meant the spaces where the casino would be felt. It meant the spaces of businesses and 
residents throughout the downtown core and down to the waterfront, but also the areas of 
addiction, which extended to vulnerable neighbourhoods nearby. A city-wide issue may 
also focus on smaller geographic units, for example the ward boundary review decision, 
                                                
1059 Toronto Municipal Code Chapter § 27-12  
1060 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
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where BIAs and neighbourhood associations played a crucial role in defining the 
“communities of interest” meant to reflect the wards. 
 
Thus, Toronto’s governance model operates within the law (wards) and outside it 
(neighbourhood associations), or as bodies that have competing conceptions depending 
on how they are used by stakeholders (community councils, BIAs). The next section 
explores how these notions of local include and exclude particular communities. 
 
2. The implications of local exclusion 
  
The following section analyzes how the construction of “local” excludes, though 
geography and in representation, and the resulting implications. 
 
a) How law excludes 
 
The overlap of local governance in Toronto reveals two ways in which the model 
excludes: geography and representation. 
 
Based on geography 
 
Creating local legal spaces necessarily means the creation of boundary lines.1061 These 
lines may be created formally through a municipality’s establishment of electoral districts 
or wards, and by the creation of other representational units, for example New York’s 
community committees or Toronto’s BIAs. Such bodies may co-exist as what Moore 
calls semiautonomous social fields, rather than being meant to fit into a coherent 
governance structure.1062 Other organizations may also create versions of local that have 
boundary lines, without such bodies being in any way related to a municipal government 
and therefore subject to oversight. Boundaries also have the effect of classifying 
                                                
1061 Frug, supra note 7. 
1062 Merry, supra note 73. 
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particular members of the community into one area or another.1063 This means that all of 
these lines necessarily create an “inside” and an “outside.”1064  
 
Some scholars believe that residents often create boundaries based on notions of 
community that exclude people along racial lines and ultimately exacerbate a “who is in 
and who is out” notion of belonging.1065 This is evidenced in Toronto by the signifant 
differences in spatial poverty and race across the city.1066 Neighbourhood associations, in 
particular, are said to exacerbate exclusionary notions of community in order to maintain 
a narrow understanding of who is included. As presented in Chapter 1, Alexander and 
Peñalver believe that neighbourhood associations are the new “community” and base 
their commonality on factors like housing values.1067 Frug argues that local should be 
formed as a “togetherness of strangers” without regard for demographics, where people 
regardless of their backgrounds would be brought together through the use of charettes 
and other community building exercises.1068  
 
Three geographic exclusions are evident. First, neighbourhood associations and BIAs do 
not have objective measures in how they draw the lines around their communities. It is 
impossible to definitively find that a community exists “here” rather than “there.” 
Boundaries may be arbitrary or imposed in law without recognition of who resides within 
them. In the case of neighbourhood associations, they are largely drawn in a box or 
rectangle for simplicity, not because those specific lines are the exact markers of who 
belongs and who doesn’t. Some associations permit residents from outside the boundaries 
to become members, as if to understand that strict geographic lines may leave relevant 
people out. Neighbourhood associations may also reflect the “ghost” villages of legal 
boundaries that existed in the past. In the case of BIAs, the lines that are drawn have 
political ends as well, in that they need to be endorsed by local councillors, and therefore 
should not exist outside of the applicable ward, and because the levy is contingent on the 
                                                
1063 Ford, supra note 187 at 1859 and 1873. 
1064 David Delaney, Territory: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2005) at 14. 
1065 Ford, supra note 187. 
1066 See Introduction. 
1067 Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 144. 
1068 Frug, supra note 7. 
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approval of the applicable property owners and businesses. Therefore, the drawing of 
lines is not an objective statement of which businesses “belong,” but on political, social 
or historical placement. 
 
Second, the drawing of lines is supported by Toronto’s decision-making context. In the 
WBR, councillors had their own views on where the boundary lines of wards should be 
located. When councillors on the Executive Committee sent the recommendations back to 
the WBR consultants for consideration, some councillors did so on the basis that the 
drawing of the lines did not incorporate their own views of where “communities” should 
be, whereby communities were a proxy for maintaining the boundaries as they were. 
These political aims of councillors ultimately shaped notions of community that differed 
in some cases from the perspectives of BIAs and neighbourhood associations.  
 
Third, the lines setting community councils are perhaps the best reflection of how 
boundary lines are politically motivated. Toronto’s community councils were created in 
1998 to mirror the boundaries of the former municipalities and were a political reaction to 
the forced amalgamation. As a senior staff member advised, “community councils were 
kind of a last minute addition, they were thrown in as a softening blow to 
amalgamation.”1069 In 2000, Toronto staff introduced an initiative to reduce the number 
of community councils from six to four in order to keep the councils approximately the 
same size and to align service district areas. As noted in Chapter 5, the location of the 
Etobicoke-York Community Council boundary was politically driven, with councillors 
making a trade on the floor of City Council.1070 
 
Community council boundaries were a factor in the WBR. One of the options presented 
by the consultants disrupted the conception of Toronto’s wards by redrawing them as if 
they had never been drawn before, based on the city’s physical geography. The result of 
this exercise was a disruption of the Scarborough boundary, which was represented as a 
community council boundary following amalgamation. This was deemed to be a highly 
                                                
1069 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
1070 Ibid. 
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contentious proposal, one that the public seemed to “love or hate.” Those that hated it did 
so on the grounds that it interfered with the “ghost” of the former Scarborough. The 
Executive Committee requested that “in conducting the review the consultants consider 
the Committee’s preference for maintaining the Community Council boundaries given 
their historical significance reflecting communities of interest.”1071 The “historical 
significance” meant at least one of the boundary lines of the pre-amalgamated 
municipalities.  
 
In summary, local legal spaces, which form the foundation of my conception of local 
governance, exclude based on geography. Boundary lines themselves represent particular 
versions of community. Councillors, with the input of BIAs and neighbourhood 
asssociations, play a dominant role in crafting how boundary lines in the formal 
governance model are drawn. In addition, the “ghosts” of previous municipalities factor 
into their placement. The result is local legal spaces with particular perspectives of 
belonging.  
 
Based on representation 
 
In addition to geographic boundary lines, local legal spaces include and exclude based on 
representation. The ward system is based on the idea that geographic representation is the 
best way by which the interests of residents will be served. There is no consensus that an 
electoral boundary-based model is the only means by which representation can be 
achieved; there are examples of other municipal governments where councillors are 
elected at large, not based on wards.1072 Still, in Toronto, this is the fundamental premise 
of the ward system: that the ward councillor represents their residents within its 
respective boundaries. And, in practice, this representation may mean that only particular 
perspectives are given weight. The exclusion is thus two-fold: the exclusion of voices or 
interests considered important by the ward councillor, and the exclusion of other 
representations of local.   
                                                
1071 City of Toronto Executive Committee, Final Report - Toronto Ward Boundary Review (May 24, 2016), 
online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2>. 
1072 See e.g. “Vancouver City Council,” The City of Vancouver (12 May 2017), online: < 
http://vancouver.ca/your-government/vancouver-city-council.aspx>. 
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A councillor may understand the interests of the residents and businesses within his or 
her ward based on the interests articulated by smaller-than-city bodies located within the 
ward. BIAs and neighbourhood associations can have a big impact on local debates, as is 
well documented in major decisions in Toronto, particularly in the planning context.1073 
This was also demonstrated in my case studies. The 2012-13 and 2015 casino decisions 
point to the differences where wards include BIAs and neighbourhood associations. In 
the 2012-13 decision, councillors in wards that could have had a downtown casino had 
frequent meetings with BIAs and neighbourhood associations, even creating a 
subcommittee to ensure adequate consultation with BIAs. This contrasts with the 2015 
casino decision, where there were no BIAs or neighbourhood associations located in the 
ward where the Woodbine Racetrack would be expanded. In the 2012-13 casino decision, 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations helped in shaping a new use of the Toronto-East 
York Community Council in city-wide decisions. For the first time, the community 
council used a subcommittee to permit greater consultation of BIAs and to allow for 
deeper consideration of community impacts. In the WBR, neighbourhood associations 
were the main bodies that used the consultation process and gave input on proposed 
boundaries.  
 
While there are well-founded concerns regarding the role of BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations as representative of interests within urban spaces, they may also serve as a 
helpful tool in understanding the power dynamics within urban governance. The WBR 
demonstrated that the creation of boundaries was undertaken with a particular set of 
principles based on what the court has set out as priorities for determining how boundary 
lines should be drawn. Neighbourhood associations are recognized as “communities of 
interest,” or the embodiment of belonging.1074 However, the consultants were not able to 
maintain all communities (as defined by BIAs and neighbourhood associations) intact, 
often with the argument that keeping such communities together would negate having the 
                                                
1073 Moore, supra note 202. 
1074 Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 144. 
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same approximate sized wards across the city.1075 For example, the Jane-Finch 
neighbourhood association identified community boundaries that the consultants thought 
would not fit within a single ward. The consultants recommended keeping other 
communities together within a single ward, including the North York BIA or keeping 
together communities that had previously been separated.1076  
 
Unlike existing scholarship suggesting that neighbourhood associations focus solely on 
utilitarian objectives such as property values, my observations of Toronto’s BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations point to varying objectives and purposes. These associations 
are not exclusively located within affluent neighbourhoods, nor are their members solely 
comprised of homeowners. In the ward boundary review, organizations from 
economically challenged areas attended public consultation meetings to argue that their 
residents, currently divided amongst three wards, should be kept intact, a proposal that 
was ultimately accepted by the consultants and incorporated into their recommendations. 
In the 2012-13 casino debate, resident associations located across various downtown 
wards framed their concerns on the basis of addiction and mental health issues 
experienced by their members, rather than the financial effects of having a casino nearby. 
The data on neighbourhood associations affirms this assertion: while associations are 
disproportionately within affluent neighbourhoods and are formed to address local 
planning proposals, the organizations exist throughout the city, often reflecting members 
with a range of ethnicities, and have purposes beyond planning matters. 
 
A second kind of representational exclusion is the prioritization of city-wide decision-
making by the ward councillor. As one city staff member told me, “They have a tendency 
to look at the issues in very isolated ways sometimes, they don’t connect it to the larger 
whole.”1077 This approach disproportionately affects the most marginalized of Toronto’s 
residents, whose needs are not isolated to a particular geography. This same staff member 
                                                
1075 Canadian Urban Institute et al, supra note 999. 
1076 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., & Thomas Ostler, 
“Round Two: Civic Engagement and Public Participation” (2016), online: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/56b4f6dbc2ea514e40c85edc/145470
0254510/TWBR+Round+2+Consultation+Report+FEB+2016.pdf> at 35-52. 
1077 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.  
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said, “What is it that the city needs, who are the people that are disenfranchised and 
marginalized, irrespective of where they are living. Of course they happen to be 
geographically located in certain areas. What is the best way of connecting them to jobs 
and connecting them to opportunities? How can we build capacities of those communities 
to be able to influence decision making that actually has a negative impact on them, as 
opposed to those who already have influence and have greater influence?”1078 The ward 
councillor may be the sole representative of local governance within the ward, where they 
politicize the debates and promote the perspective of those within the area to the possible 
detriment of effective and inclusive city-wide decision-making. The views of the public, 
or BIAs and neighbourhood associations, can be highly influential in councillor decision-
making where only the ward councillor is tasked with representation.  
 
Delaney wrote that the boundaries of one territorial unit often clash with those of 
another.1079 The boundaries separating territorial units are not merely about the lines 
themselves, but also the distribution of power.1080 This is evident in the politics of local 
and city-wide decision-making in Toronto. A study of the former Metro government 
suggested that one advantage of a two-tier municipal model was the separation of the 
“local” from the “regional.” This separation meant that a local councillor did not bear the 
burden of a regional decision that was disfavoured by residents. In Toronto’s case, this 
necessitates a clearer distinction between “local and “city-wide” issues and the creation 
of a governance model that liberates the councillor from such strict allegiance to local 
interests in making city-wide decisions.  
 
In addition, representation is connected to the accountability that bodies have to the 
public, as accountability validates and disciplines governance bodies. Accountability 
measures operate differently amongst wards, community councils, BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations. Wards emerge as the chief site of representation, tested 
during elections, but with few opportunities in between to keep these bodies accountable 
to residents as there are limited means by which a political representative in Toronto may 
                                                
1078 Ibid. 
1079 Delaney, supra note 1064 at 13. 
1080 Ibid. at 33. 
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be removed.1081 Even then, the stark rates of incumbency re-election challenge the degree 
to which elections serve as an accountability check on councillors. As local boards, BIAs 
are bound by the strictest accountability requirements, but there are no documented cases 
of BIAs having been removed by City Council. In the case of BIAs, the lack of 
accountability is attributed to their focus on business interests rather than other aspects of 
the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood associations fulfill a participatory and representative 
role, but are not formally accountable to the city or its residents. The accountability of 
neighbourhood associations is questioned on the basis that they favour the interests of 
homeowners and privileged members of the community.  
 
The overlay of these exclusions in representation was evident in the casino debates, 
particular as observed by the votes of councillors across the city. Many of the councillors 
who voted “no” to a downtown casino approved the Woodbine expansion eighteen 
months later, even without a localized forum to study its implications. No BIAs, 
neighbourhood associations or other bodies within or outside the area of the applicable 
ward mobilized, as had occurred in the 2012-13 debate, even where issues of concern like 
health and addiction remained the same. While NIMBYism offers part of the explanation, 
the exclusion of residents was exacerbated by a lack of access to a deliberative local 
governance body. Local governance is dominated by the ward councillor without a local 
governance model to challenge the councillor’s position. 
 
b) The implications of exclusion 
 
Local legal spaces may be constituted by legal rules. Even so, this legal reality is only 
one iteration of the “local,” in what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls the distinction 
between formal and organic law.1082 Under this view, formal local governance reflects 
top-down, government-imposed boundaries which create the rules and standards by 
which the public is meant to comply. Organic law, by contrast, is the bottom-up, 
                                                
1081 Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, Ch. 32. 
1082 Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 94. 
 	 279 
community-created legal understandings which can operate alongside or may end of 
coming into conflict formal rules.  
 
Like other laws, organic or informal notions of local governance may or may not have 
community legitimacy. This research has demonstrated that formal law sets the ward as 
the primary site of local governance, both in the creation of boundaries and the 
designation of councillors as representatives. The degree to which councillors engage 
with residents is up to them. The legal rules in regard to planning consultations are 
limited. Planning staff, developers and councillors have consultations to the extent 
needed to advance the matter through the political process. Other bodies disrupt the ward 
as local in three main ways: first, by articulating a different geographic notion of local 
that may extend beyond the “usual suspects” in neighbourhood representation; second, 
through rejecting existing practices and proposing new landscapes of local; and third, by 
proposing a new forum or “theatre” where local matters can be heard. 
 
First, neighbourhood associations and BIAs have different, smaller geographic 
boundaries than those of a ward. In some cases, neighbourhood associations exist 
exclusively to contest planning proposals. Others are created to articulate a different 
version of local, focusing on neighbourhood cohesion. While existing research imagines 
neighbourhood associations in particular to reflect a particular constituency of residents – 
homeowners, white, male, middle aged – the research shows more nuanced 
representation in the city. For example, as presented in Chapter 3, post-amalgamation 
neighbourhood associations focus less on planning disputes, have broadened their 
memberships, and in a limited number of cases have partnered with local social service 
agencies. 
 
Second, neighbourhood associations and BIAs may serve a reactionary role to proposed 
policies (whether planning related or otherwise) and may propose new landscapes of 
local. They may serve as a check on councillor authority and power by forcing 
themselves into planning processes as one of the main participants within consultations. 
This model of contestation and rejection of city decision-making processes gained 
 	 280 
traction following amalgamation, when the number of BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations increased substantially. On the other hand, these bodies may participate as 
the go-to parties when planning staff want input on proposals, on stakeholder groups, and 
in targeted sessions where they are consulted on planning initiatives. They may show up 
at community council meetings, City Council, and may launch appeals to the OMB. As 
such, they are both within and outside of decision-making, as parties included in 
consultation exercises, but as rejecters and testers according to their own versions of 
local. In the WBR, neighbourhood associations and BIAs revealed themselves as crucial 
actors in the consultation process, essentially defining the “communities of interest” 
within wards. 
 
Third, community councils serve as a contestation to the existing decision-making model, 
one that rejects the existing distinctions between “local” and “city-wide,” and asserts a 
local role that encompasses the breadth of the procedural bylaw. While community 
councils are legally embedded within the formal framework of city governance, their 
mandate has been limited to final approval of a limited number of delegated matters 
deemed “local” and a first round of decision making on some planning and heritage 
issues. Until they were seized as forums in the 2012-13 casino issue, community councils 
had little interaction with residents other than through deputations. While councillors 
worked with the Clerk’s Office to have community councils used in this capacity, they 
ultimately proved themselves as a meeting place within the official city process as 
another forum for local governance. This chapter later considers principles for such a 
model.  
 
Taken together, we see that the governance of Toronto’s local legal spaces are broader 
than, but eclipsed by the ward. BIAs and neighbourhood associations create alternative 
imageries of local through different versions of boundaries and memberships, some taken 
from a legal past, as seen during the WBR. More importantly, they reveal the gaps of 
inclusion of other iterations of local governance – those that fall outside the tidy confines 
of the ward. The next section asks how a local governance model premised on the urban 
commons could reimagine smaller-than-city governance. 
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II. Core  principles in designing local governance 
 
This next section articulates how Toronto could craft a local governance model that 
adopts the normative framework of the urban commons, as asserted by Foster and Iaione. 
These principles affirm the plurality of local boundaries and bodies, while at the same 
time minimizing the effects of exclusion and tensions. I propose that the four principles 
depicted in Figure 6.1 form the basis of a more inclusive, participatory local governance 
model in the City of Toronto. These principles are, first, that the geographic boundaries 
of local legal spaces are both spaces of belonging and places of representation. Second, 
the bodies that represent local governance must be open, accountable and fair. Third, that 
the terms “local” and “city-wide” are inadequate in framing which issues should be 
brought to localized populations for consideration. Fourth, Toronto’s local governance 
model must offer opportunities for community members to influence decision-making. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Principles of Local Governance Rooted in the “Urban Commons” 
 
Geographic	boundaries:	
Spaces	of	belonging	and	
places	of	representation
Accountable	
representation:	Open,	
transparent	and	fair
Localizing	“City-Wide”:	
Rethinking	the	“Local”	
and	“City-wide”	Binary
Participation	and	
decision-making:	Being	
heard	in	deliberations	
and	outcomes	
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1.  Geographic boundaries: distinguishing spaces of belonging and places of 
representation 
 
In this study, geographic boundaries are relevant because they demarcate the legal spaces 
to be governed. This dissertation has demonstrated that ward boundaries are the basis of 
Toronto’s formal local legal spaces. As seen in Chapter 5, a central tension in the WBR 
was between the need for wards to be roughly the same size as one another and the 
recognition that communities come in all shapes and sizes.  
 
This section considers how the urban commons framework can help rethink these spaces. 
The first principle of local governance advances that new spaces of local governance are 
needed, that such spaces must be collaborative, and the reimagined community councils 
may hold promise as new, collaborative spaces. 
 
a) New spaces of local governance 
 
 Local legal spaces differ in size and scale. Meaningful boundaries are not created from 
cookie-cutters; they do not fit neatly and with identical sizes alongside one another. 
Boundaries may not be contiguous but instead, exist as pockets here and there. As such, a 
conflicting boundaries of local do not negate the possibility of representation, but require 
a more multidimensional governance model.  
 
This means that wards, with their intended equal-sized boundaries across the city, should 
not serve as the sole vehicle for representation in local decision-making; more, not fewer, 
spaces of dialogue are needed. The 2012-13 casino debate emerged as an important 
lesson for this perspective. While councillors pushed to have the TEYCC as the venue for 
debate within the city’s formal governance structure, the community council took on a 
life of its own from an institutional perspective. It served as the main forum for debate 
and deliberation, in particular for those against the proposed development. It also led to 
the writing of numerous staff reports exposing deeper local effects, like pedestrian and 
vehicle traffic.  
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Just as community councils emerged as a potential for larger boundaries of local 
governance, the WBR demonstrated that local legal spaces may exist at a smaller scale. 
For example, the Kingston-Galloway/Orton Park neighbourhood association in 
Scarborough appealed to the WBR consultants about keeping their boundaries intact. In 
addition, the Jane-Finch area has straddled three wards over the last two decades and, in 
the proposed configuration, must still exist within two.1083 There are no other state-based 
iterations of local governance open to this community. Thus, the key point regarding 
boundaries of local is that a sense of belonging does not always match up with the 
institutional structures that are established to represent smaller-than-city spaces of 
representation.  
 
In Toronto, wards are used as boundaries of functional representation. Ward councillors 
coordinate for those within their boundaries, but communities may find themselves 
outside of or in conflict with the ward structure. As a senior staff member told me, “I 
think our problem is we have structures … And, structures by their definition have a 
tendency to develop a life of their own.”1084 Wards may be rigidly maintained for those 
who are reluctant to see innovation or change. In the WBR, ward councillors fiercely 
defended the existing ward model and boundaries, in part to maintain the life of their own 
of such institutions. In each of the case studies, the critical tension of the relative size and 
boundaries of local governance was whether that iteration connected to the decision-
making process.  
 
Particular geographies can also serve as spaces of time and memory. Temporality 
attaches meaning to particular spaces as sites of belonging. The meaning is not simply 
historical in nature; these spaces of memory are maintained as crucial in contemporary 
debates, too. These nostalgic connections to geographic lines differ from the technocratic 
                                                
1083 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., & Thomas Ostler, 
“Toronto ward boundary review: final report” (2016), online: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/t/5739fe5022482e97a8591392/146341
8450864/TWBRFinalReportMay2016.pdf>. 
1084 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.   
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nature of BIA and ward boundaries, and the functional, staff-driven lines of 
Neighbourhood Improvement Areas.  
 
The WBR revealed many examples of meaningful boundaries, areas of the city that 
created attachments due to past identities as towns or villages. In reviewing the WBR 
consultant reports, the names of decades-old entities appear again and again as 
boundaries worth maintaining within wards, with pleas to “keep them together” as though 
an electoral line dividing them would erase their presence altogether. Likewise, there was 
considerable negative public sentiment to erasing the former boundary of Scarborough 
through the placement of wards. To those who spoke out in opposition, Scarborough still 
has meaning as a place, and the maintenance of formal boundaries keeps relevance to that 
space even though the City of Scarborough no longer exists in any formal, legal sense.  
 
These former villages, towns, and cities are a form of ghostly presence that continues to 
frame local governance in Toronto. These ghost cities are contemporaneously embodied 
in many of the city’s older neighbourhood associations, for example, Swansea, the 
Annex, Rosedale and York Mills, four of the oldest organizations, were each once 
distinct municipal corporations. In addition to their current-day advocacy efforts, each of 
these organizations maintains historical records of the community.1085 The Scarborough 
Community Council, too, is a remnant of its pre-amalgamation history. This clinging to 
historical spaces is not exclusive to Toronto. As observed in Chapter 3, New York 
borough councils and community boards reflect pre-amalgamated spaces. Their presence 
is maintained by contemporary legal codes that set out the city’s local governance model.  
 
Some neighbourhood associations look backwards nostalgically at history, but also 
towards the future. They aim to have a continued presence in the governance of the city.  
 
Boundaries for belonging are not necessarily, and need not be, the same as the lines of 
institutional representation. There may be a plurality of local bodies that may overlap and 
                                                
1085 Not all neighbourhood associations have sentimental attachments; some neighbourhood associations 
organize to contest a proposed city development, to build infrastructure in and around a park, or to help 
bring social services together for local residents.  
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conflict, and they may not all neatly integrate with electoral boundaries. They key is to 
understand and respect the difference between boundaries of community belonging and 
those of institutional representation and, ideally, to provide opportunities for input for 
those who do not fall within the dominant framework. As such, reflection must be given 
to the interrelationships of these multiple boundaries of local, and the degree to which 
they have access to formal channels of local governance. 
 
b) A collaborative local legal space as the basis for local governance 
 
As detailed in Chapter 1, Foster and Iaione’s urban commons framework set out that, 
regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned, the city is a territorial space 
in which citizens claim to have a role or stake, a norm which is reinforced in law.1086 In 
this account, Foster and Iaione apply Ostrom’s thesis, which challenged the assumption 
that common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and 
inefficiency to the urban form. The common pool resources in the city context are 
particular urban spaces, which then becomes the sites of governance. Public-private 
organizations can work together to effectively play a role in governing specific city areas, 
but to do so they must incorporate “bottom-up” governance. The city as commons is thus 
a system of governance over particular city spaces, which incorporates subsidiarity, or 
delegated authority, and polycentrism, meaning multiple parties are working together. 
 
Foster and Iaione highlight that urban governance arrangements are voluntary and bind 
only those involved in the governance scheme. They note that such arrangements can 
have effects on many beyond the actors that are specifically involved: “[I]n the case of 
urban commons governance institutions the governance arrangement may affect the 
everyday life of all city inhabitants that fall within the boundaries of the governance 
scheme (think of the [BIAs], the decisions of which can have an impact also on those 
who are not part of the [BIA] governance).”1087 They do not attempt to solve this issue 
but encourage questions of accountability and legitimacy to be “raised and constantly 
                                                
1086 Foster & Iaione, supra note 44. 
1087 Ibid. 
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invoked” when querying collaborative governance in the urban commons.1088 
 
I suggest that local legal spaces may also be conceived as a common pool resource, with 
polycentric governance and boundaries that differ from those of the ward. Conceived of 
in this way, decision-making includes a broader range of voices. In such a model, no 
single party can be understood as the privileged local governance body within a specific 
geography, but one of many actors with a stake. Foster and Iaione use the term 
subsidiarity to “re-orient public authorities away from the central state to an active 
citizenry willing to cooperatively govern common resources.”1089 As detailed in Chapter 
3, the SCC ruled that the principle of subsidiarity enables broad deference to municipal 
governments based on their closeness to the residents that they represent.1090  While 
subsidiarity was invoked in this context in favour of enhanced authority for city 
governments, it applies equally to a more localized level.1091  
 
In Toronto, the ward is the main locus of local governance. Ward councillors are also the 
arbitrators of the use of community councils for measures beyond local planning and 
heritage matters. Ward councillors may help to drive the formation of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations, and enable access to decision-making within the ward. 
Neither community councils nor the ward level provides for active decision-making by 
BIAs or neighbourhood associations; these bodies are instead discretionary stakeholders 
in local decisions. From an urban commons perspective, this approach mirrors the chief 
dilemma of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, where actors may take action without 
regard for the effects on others.1092 Wards may have many bodies advocating on behalf of 
residents, businesses and other stakeholders, especially BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations, with varying degrees of formal connection to the city. Ward councillors 
have discretion over many issues, including local planning, spending on local 
development, and bringing together the various representatives to resolve conflicts and 
initiate projects. Put another way, while some councillors open the ward to involvement 
                                                
1088 Ibid. at 340. 
1089 Ibid. 
1090 Spraytech, supra note 177 at 3. 
1091 Frug, supra note 42 
1092 Foster & Iaione, supra note 44. 
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by a broader set of stakeholders, there is no institutional requirement that such practices 
take place. Local governance within the framework of an urban commons implies a 
polycentric and more participatory approach to local governance, challenging the 
councillor as the main arbitrator of decision-making.  
 
As detailed earlier in this dissertation, NIMBY concerns prompted academics Valverde 
and Young to point to the regional scale as a political level that can safeguard the 
interests of the most vulnerable.1093 However, since amalgamation, the emphasis on “city-
wide” level decision-making at the formerly regional scale has not led to a better quality 
of life for the city’s marginalized populations. Indeed, income disparities have widened 
across the city.1094 Clearly, another approach is needed. 
 
The question, then, is how to ensure inclusivity when micro-scales may focus on narrow 
interests to the detriment of a broader population? American scholars Richard Ford 
Thompson and Richard Schragger challenged the sacredness of the “local” as the ideal 
scale for the face-to-face interactions necessary for democratic dialogue and suggested 
that local decision-making has negative implications for historically disenfranchised 
groups, particularly those outside of the area in question. Critics of localized governance 
look mainly at the regional level to address inequality. American scholar Young 
concluded that, to promote the normative ideal of city life, cities themselves “should 
cease to have sovereign authority.”1095 Instead, “the lowest level of governmental power 
should be regional.”1096 She believed that local governments will act selfishly without 
regard for the needs of their neighbours, and that only through the adoption of regional 
policy will a more fair distribution of urban resources result.1097 Interestingly, Young’s 
critiques of the municipal level mirror those of Frug, Thompson, and Schragger regarding 
neighbourhood-based decision-making, suggesting that there is no ideal location or site of 
decision-making that can remedy issues of exclusion.  
 
                                                
1093 Young, supra note 141; Valverde, supra note 189. 
1094 Hulchanski, supra note 25. 
1095 Young, supra note 141. 
1096 Ibid. 
1097 Ibid. at 252-3. 
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How can a local governance framework incorporate multiple voices, broader than BIAs 
and neighbourhood associations, in what Foster and Iaione call “a visible, equal, 
contestable, and legitimate manner”?1098 I argue that the “city-wide” scale should not 
imply that the local community has no say over or involvement in decision-making. 
Scholars have proposed variations on how such involvement could look, including 
charrettes,1099 opportunities for deliberative participation,1100  and community-level 
institutions grounded in group-based “differentiated solidarity.”1101 In Toronto, this 
means opening space to local actors beyond the ward councillor, BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations in a more collaborative framework that includes decision-
making power. As Foster and Iaione put it, “thinking of the city as an institution that 
promotes collaboration all the way across and down as a way to ‘share’ the resources it 
controls can spur a host of innovative and progressive policies that address the social and 
economic inequality that is becoming a feature of 21st century urbanization.”1102  
 
c) Reimagined community councils as spaces for “local governance”? 
 
A Toronto councillor put the central issue of this dissertation this way, “Well, there you 
go, right, that’s the question all of this begs. The question all of this begs is, what are the 
conditions that lead to a large majority of the population both having good reason, like 
rational reason to be engaged in government, and the means and opportunity to do so. 
And until you solve that one, the rest is deck chairs.”1103 Reimagined community councils 
may hold promise as a better space for local governance.  
 
There is great potential for actualizing a more inclusive, participatory local governance 
framework within the existing legislative structure of Toronto’s community councils. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, until COTA’s introduction, provincial legislation was prescriptive 
                                                
1098 Ibid. at 252-3. 
1099 Frug, supra note 7 at 1104. 
1100 Fagotto & Fung, supra note 157. 
1101 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 9. 
1102 Foster & Iaione, supra note 44. 
1103 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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in relation to municipal authority, meaning that the city could only take action that was 
set out in the applicable legislation. COTA offers far broader powers. However, the 
legacy of municipal power in Toronto is such that councillors and staff may be reluctant 
to push the boundaries and introduce laws which are not clearly spelled out. As a staff 
member involved in the design of COTA told me, “[When you ask] ‘Are we allowed to 
do that? Can we do it?’ It’s pushing off responsibility, as opposed to ‘How can we?’ 
[O]ne thing to this day that I always say to my staff: if you ever go to legal to get advice, 
never ever, ever ask the question ‘Can we?’1104 When I asked what questions should be 
asked instead, this staff member told me, “What outcomes do we as a government want 
to achieve and then how do we get to those things, so what legislative measure do we 
need to put in place, what resources do we need to allocate, what programs do we need to 
put in place.”1105 
 
Under COTA, the City of Toronto can create a plurality of community councils with 
greater authority, non-councillor members, and a mandate to consider the localized 
effects of “city-wide” decisions. Such bodies would shift the balance of power from the 
ward to the community. One councillor, in discussing the immense amount of power held 
by a ward councillor, told me: “I’d like to think I used it for benevolent good. But I also 
think that you’ve got to get out. Anybody that’s there for more than two terms I get very 
nervous about. Because they play to the same crowd and you get elected by talking to the 
same people and you know, you’re protected by the things you did well and you’re 
inoculated from the things you did badly.” The answer, this councillor believes lies in 
further decentralization to the community, “The solution is to give the citizens more 
power. … If you want to limit the power of a local councillor, find a way to invest even 
stronger powers into the local community.”1106 
 
The case studies take a new form when seen through the lens of an urban commons. 
Applying the lens of an urban commons to the WBR, the following dynamic emerges. 
                                                
1104 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted.  
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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First, the relations at stake were the communities of interest versus the ward. BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations serve as the main determinants of communities of interest in 
consultation meetings. Other approaches to solicit input were used, such as surveys, but 
in general, the consultants referenced the commentary from those who attended meetings. 
The determination of local was linked to the meaning of “community of interest.” While 
the input extends beyond the “usual suspects” to areas of the city that are more politically 
and economically marginalized, the overall effect was limited to commentary on 
communities of interest. It was also curious that the consultants singled out direct 
consultation with BIAs, but not neighbourhood associations. On the one hand, this 
approach confirms the importance given to BIAs and neighbourhood associations as 
other parties with a claim to local representation. However, the use of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations as the basis to craft boundaries also points to the dependence 
on these organizations to the exclusion of other notions of local and a more holistic 
process to determine local governance. By excluding consideration of other aspects of 
local governance, the review emerges as a “business as usual” exercise, one that affirms 
the existing model of local governance. 
 
At the time that the 2012-13 casino debate emerged, it struck councillors as a “done 
deal.”1107 The mayor was in agreement and there was sufficient City Council support for 
the matter to sail through approval. The opposition from outside City Hall actively 
pursued support from the local councillors.1108 Already, the plurality of local voices 
emerged, all focused on the downtown casinos as the main point of objection. Thus, the 
spaces of local were the proposed casino sites and the areas that would be affected by a 
casino. They were the local boundaries in question.  
 
These sites as local thus reoriented local issues like traffic and effects on neighbours as 
equally important questions to the city-wide factors like tourism, the hosting fee, and 
jobs, as the Executive Committee had set out. In response, the TEYCC, as a governance 
                                                
1107 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
1108 Interview with members of No Casino Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada  (11 May 2015) – author 
conducted. 
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body, became the voice of the local boundaries, replacing the usual centrality of the 
councillor with the “theatre” of the subcommittee, a forum with more councillors, staff 
support, and formalized mechanisms for public participation. The reorientation of the site 
of the debate also shifted the lens of public participation. The 2012-13 review initially 
approached civic engagement through a city-wide lens, but the TEYCC took over as the 
chief vehicle to consult with BIAs and other stakeholders, suggesting that these parties 
had not been adequately included in the process. This shift also signaled that decision-
making was not merely a matter for politicians, but the necessary inclusion of a more 
institutionalized, polycentric governance model. 
 
By contrast, in 2015, the casino decision remained a city-wide issue, with no use of the 
community council as a forum for deliberation. In 2015, the ward councillor and the 
councillor adjacent were the major proponents of the casino, in their capacities as 
representative of the ward and as the deputy mayor responsible for economic 
development in this economically marginalized area of the city. No local BIAs or 
neighbourhood associations participated in the city-wide forums. There was no change in 
the geography of local, nor in the foci of debate, nor in the forums used to assess and 
mediate the issue. 
 
The 2012-13 casino decision showed the capacity for incrementally modifying local 
governance based on the existing model – to nudging rather than revolutionizing 
governance – through reorienting the forum of local governance. The 2012-13 casino 
debate offered an example of community councils as a new local legal space, querying 
how a more formalized role for the plurality of other actors, beyond the usual forums for 
public participation.  
 
Imagine, then, a community council model that draws from Foster and Iaione’s urban 
commons framework, yet is available to a broader range of residents, both as participants 
and deliberators. Community councils could expand their memberships to include an 
“active citizenry” willing to “cooperatively govern” localized spaces of the city.1109 
                                                
1109 Foster & Iaione, supra note 44 at 326. 
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Rather than having an uneven local governance model that privileges “a patchwork, 
instead of a network” of BIAs and neighbourhood associations as the local voice, these 
reimagined community councils could provide a more inclusive space for voices 
currently unheard in the model.1110  
 
2. Accountable representation: accessibility and fair process for local residents 
and businesses, and to the broader vulnerable public 
 
A second principle that emerges from this research is the necessity of accountability in 
representation. In adapting an urban commons framework to a reimagined local 
governance model, governance forums and the model more broadly must be transparent, 
accessible and fair. As stated in Chapter 3, the Bellamy Inquiry in 2005 exposed 
weaknesses in the governance structure of the City of Toronto.1111 At that time, the Chief 
Administrative Officer (now called the City Manager) detailed the measures that would 
be taken to address the governance issues and strengthen accountability.1112 The measures 
included “citizen-focused” principles and assessment criteria, including a governance 
model that “reflects the services that are important to the citizens of Toronto” and is 
“easily understood by the public.”1113 The report also noted the need for structures to be 
“adaptable, flexible, and innovative,” to promote effective inter-program and cross-
discipline collaboration, to adapt to changing public needs and service priorities, and to 
reduce barriers to innovation.1114 
 
One councillor explained their support of more community involvement in decision-
making as follows: “When local communities know they have responsibility, they take 
responsibility and they make rational decisions. When they don’t think they have a say, 
they take extreme positions in order to force the extreme position, or opposing, into sort 
                                                
1110 Ibid. at 336. 
1111 The Honourable Madam Justice Denise E., Bellamy, "Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry Toronto 
External Contracts Inquiry Report" (2004) 4 Executive Summary 1, online: 
<https://www1.toronto.ca/inquiry/inquiry_site/report/pdf/TCLI_TECI_Report_Executive_Summary.pdf 
1112 City Manager, Staff Report: Letter to Commissioner Bellamy on the Status of City of Toronto 
Initiatives, City of Toronto (11 April 2005), online: 
<www.toronto.ca/legdocs/2005/agendas/committees/adm/adm050426/it028.pdf>. 
1113 Ibid. at 17. 
1114 Ibid. at 17. 
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of beaten into submission.”1115 The councillor believes that, ultimately, more participants 
are ultimately better: “when you bring a hundred and fifty people around a table to try 
and make a decision about what’s best for the community, you end up with a decision, 
ultimately, which is best for the city. When you try to bring fifteen people from across the 
city to decide what works in a local community, the chances are you’re going to make a 
mistake.”1116 
 
In Toronto, accountability issues are three-fold: the dominance of the ward councillor, the 
confusion relating to BIAs, and the role of neighbourhood associations. While these 
measures focus on the administrative functions of city government (meaning the internal 
organizational structures and conduct of city staff), they apply to reflections on local 
governance. 
 
Ward-level representation as the formal arena of local governance creates a lack of 
accessibility and clarity. A foundational requirement of governance is that the public 
easily understand how forums may be accessed. As it stands, the ward-based governance 
model is unclear. It is not evident how a member of the public would engage in a local 
matter beyond contacting the ward councillor. Where a councillor is not approachable or 
responsive, a member of the public may be left with uncertainty as to how they may 
initiate change. The ward level does not provide a forum for clear access by residents or 
members of the public. The councillor has discretion to decide the extent to which 
engagement and community forums will take place. A model that doesn’t enable the 
public to engage in a democratic forum at the local level challenges the principle of 
fairness. As Grainger and Greene write:  
 
The cornerstones of government ethics rules – the rule of law, honesty, the 
prohibition of conflicts of interest, the prohibition against using public office for 
personal gain, the rules preventing undue influence, the promotion of fair 
procedures and objectivity, the promotion of accountability and openness – all stem 
from the principle of mutual respect. As human beings, we get used to carrying out 
                                                
1115 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
1116 Ibid. 
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our work the way we have learned to do it, and most of us think of ourselves as 
ethical without stopping to examine whether the way things are usually done might 
contradict the principle of mutual respect and the sub-principles that derive from it. 
Leaders who want to introduce real and lasting reforms to ethics in government 
need the ability to be able to examine carefully whether business as usual is really 
meets the ethical standards they claim to espouse.1117  
 
The problem with the dominance of the ward councillor extends more deeply than simply 
access; the larger issue is the extent to which councillors control innovation in local 
governance. As noted in an interview with a senior staff member who was involved in the 
two major governance reviews involving the possible inclusion of localized governance: 
“I think inertia kind of sets in. I think, I don’t know that the neighbourhood council idea 
ever got very far, because there was just so much political resistance.”1118 This dynamic 
was observed as well in the WBR process, where the Executive Committee’s reluctance 
to approve the external consultant’s recommendations reflected an inertia and 
contrariness to change.  
 
BIAs emerge as an uncertain arena of local governance. On the one hand, they are woven 
into city administration through the existence of a dedicated office, an approved budget, 
and accessible information on how they may be contacted. This suggests that they are 
like any other local board of the City, with the responsibility to deliver a set of services 
and accountability for how they use their funds. On the other hand, in local planning and 
other debates, they act as an interest group to be consulted, like  neighbourhood 
associations. This dual role creates confusion as to what role they serve (local board or 
interest group) and to whom they are accountable (the public or their members). This 
confusion played out in both the casino debate and the ward boundary review, where a 
privileging of the BIA voice happened. In the 2012-13 debate, the BIAs were named as 
the parties requiring particular consultation. In the ward boundary review, the BIAs were 
also singled out as a key stakeholder group to be consulted directly.  
                                                
1117 Brian Grainger & Ian Greene, "The Level of Political Leadership Required to Implement the Gomery 
and Bellamy Recommendations" (2006) Presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political 
Science Association York University 1 at 13, online: <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Grainger-
Greene.pdf>. 
1118 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted.  
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Neighbourhood associations serve as an impromptu force in local decision-making, 
which is often contingent on the councillor or staff engaged, but also dependent on the 
degree of influence of the association itself. There is understandable reluctance on the 
part of the City as to how they may be folded within its formal structure. The research in 
Chapter 3 showed that neighbourhood associations vary widely across Toronto. There are 
no clear standards for their organization or representation, which means uncertainty as to 
the legitimacy of the representational voice.  
 
The following quote, from an interview with a City of Toronto official, sums up the two 
possible iterations of neighbourhood associations: “[R]epresentation should be an 
outcome of communities self-organizing and creating that space for themselves. Or 
demanding that space for themselves where they need to be, no matter who speaks, that 
their voices need to be heard. As opposed to organized, rather dodgy groups, dodgy 
agendas, claiming representation on behalf of people. Be it individuals, or organizations 
from the NGO sector or social justice sector.”1119 Are neighbourhood associations self-
organized bodies demanding voice, even where they represent a very narrow set of 
interests, like BIAs? 
 
Neighbourhood associations would need modification to become more robust, reliable 
organizations across the city to meet the standard of accountable representation. At 
minimum, the city could provide information and training to neighbourhood associations, 
as it does with BIAs, to provide capacity on organizational structures, decision-making, 
and fairness. The city could also require that neighbourhood associations register as an 
interest group, as some staff have recommended, in a manner that does not result in an 
unfair degree of work for these small, sparsely funded organizations.  
 
A third option is to weave neighbourhood associations into the City’s governance 
structure in a more formalized way, as New York or Los Angeles does, with staff 
                                                
1119 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted. 
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support, operational funding, and space to weigh in on City policy.1120 Under this 
approach, the city could have a relationship with the neighbourhood associations that 
better mirrors what it has with BIAs. It could also monitor the composition of 
neighbourhood associations to understand whose voices are heard and to develop 
capacities for new voices to join the conversation.  
 
It is important to note that in all three of these options, there would be greater oversight 
of the organizations. As one councillor told me, in contrasting the funding received by 
BIAs and the corresponding accountability rules: “So, yes [BIAs] do have access to 
resources, but they’re legislatively restrained in very, very significant ways, about how 
they can deploy those resources. And I think providing resident associations with some 
kind of institutional money, or staff support would require putting rules in place.”1121 
What might be the results of such action? “There’s always a trade off, right? Use of 
public money requires constraint, that I think would effectively demobilize them, or 
constrain them to the point where you’d have other organizations pop up anyway.”1122 
The goal instead is to provide more accountability between these organizations and the 
public so that those who profess to “represent” are indeed doing so. Given the privileged 
role of neighbourhood associations in the overall governance model, and in particular in 
planning issues, fairness and accountability should not be disregarded. 
 
3. Localizing “City-Wide”: Rethinking the “Local” and “City-wide” Binary 
 
The City of Toronto distinguishes between “local” and “city-wide” in determining what 
matters may be delegated to community councils. The city views some issues, such as 
parking pads and speed limits, as “local” issues, while any matter that has implications 
beyond a single community council is a “city-wide” matter. In its categorization, the City 
of Toronto only delegates decision-making and deliberation on “local” issues to 
                                                
1120 Chemerinsky & Kleiner, supra note 156; Gregory Perrotta, “A Case for and Against the Borough 
President in Twenty-First Century New York” City (2013-14) 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 193. 
1121 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
1122 Ibid. 
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community councils. Any matter deemed “city-wide” must be considered by City 
Council.  
 
This dissertation argues that the current distinction between local and city-wide is 
artificial as it does not consider the interests of local residents in its categorization. The 
current model does not provide deliberative forums that allow residents to remain 
connected to city government, as community councils were created to do.  Instead, I 
advance the third component of local governance that “city-wide” decisions have local 
implications and, therefore, Toronto’s local governance model must make room for 
consideration of city-wide issues. Put another way, rather than conceptualizing a 
municipal issue as residing at a singular scale, a better approach is to acknowledge the 
localized effects of “city wide” issues.  
 
The mythology of the “local” issue suggests that certain matters are inherently smaller or 
larger scale and that governance forums should be divided on that basis. The reality is 
that transit systems, affordable housing, and casinos are as “local” in scope as they are 
“city-wide.” Cowen and Parlette write about the pitfalls of directing resources – and 
therefore responsibility – at the neighbourhood scale, particularly in economically 
disadvantaged communities, without recognizing that the remedies to neighbourhood 
matters are only really solvable at the municipal, provincial or even federal levels.1123 
This idea was echoed during an interview that I had with a senior city staff member, who 
said: “You can have a neighborhood lens, but it cannot be isolated to the neighborhood, 
because a neighborhood is part of a global supply chain.”1124 In this study, we see that 
“local’ and “city-wide” are not simply about the subject-matter, which is the basis upon 
which the distinction is made now. Instead, “local’ and “city-wide” may relate to the 
consequences of an issue. For example, in both the 2012-13 and 2015 casino decisions, 
the circumstances that made the matter “local” were the localized effects of a casino, not 
whether the subject matter itself was a local one.  
 
                                                
1123 Cowen & Parlette, supra note 153. 
1124 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted. 
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As raised by Cowen and Parlette, geographies of subject-matter problematize phenomena 
in particular communities rather than highlighting systemic or higher order causes and 
contributions.1125 The same dynamic can be said to take place in calling an issue city-
wide. This kind of articulation leads to a concentration on particular aspects of issues 
over others as evidenced in both of the casino debates, where the city-wide focus 
highlighted the economic implications above all others. In using the community council 
forum, city staff reports focused on local implications became part of the decision-
making discourse.  
 
The City of Toronto may consider multiple options in operationalizing this notion. First, 
City Council can set the broad, strategic policy frameworks of city-wide issues, while 
decision-making can be delegated to a smaller-than-city level. As one senior staff 
member from the City of Toronto told me, “[I]f you look at a city council agenda and you 
have on the same agenda the casino debate, which is a strategic city-wide … issue of 
huge policy significance [that] the council should be paying attention to. The same 
agenda is whether or not to cut down a tree in Mrs. Jones’s backyard.”1126 Likewise, local 
governance conceived as an urban commons would have some delegated powers. Areas 
of “huge policy significance,” including matters like housing and infrastructure, must 
have room for localized debate, even where ultimate decisions are maintained at the city-
wide level.  
 
As one councillor told me, the decision over a governance model comes down to the 
degree to which you want local government run by the public versus councillors: “If you 
want citizens to run the place, get rid of the party politics, let citizens choose their own 
representatives, and let citizens organize their decision making mechanism. You’ve gotta 
give away the power in order for the power to become effective.”1127 To this councillor, 
the casino debate showed the power of public involvement: “part of what the casino fight 
showed us, is that you can push back into the community to figure out political strength 
                                                
1125 Cowen & Parlette, supra note 153. 
1126 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author conducted. 
1127 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 July 2016) – 
author conducted. 
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and you will win those fights. And I don’t think there’s a fight that was more city-wide, 
broad base, more effective, in actually flipping local voters and local communities’ minds 
than this one was.”1128  
 
Other jurisdictions provide institutional support for local governance bodies, with non-
councillor representatives, spaces for such bodies to deliberate and debate, and staff 
support. For example, New York’s community committees have the authority to vote on 
matters that will ultimately be decided by City Council, but these votes are non-
binding.1129 Borough Presidents have also played a crucial role in city-wide decisions, 
both historically and at present.1130 Although a constitutional challenge in 1989 led to 
sweeping changes in New York City’s governance model by removing the Board of 
Control – where Borough Presidents had been key members – these local actors continue 
to exert substantial influence on city-wide decisions.1131 
 
Matters that on their face appear to be city-wide may have disparate, specific and 
localized effects for local communities. Artificially distinguishing issues as “local” and 
“city-wide” produces a single and limited lens, dismissing scalar consequences.  
 
4. Decision-making: participation as deliberation or outcome? 
 
To Tina Nabatchi and Matt Leighninger, “public participation” is an umbrella term that 
describes the activities by which people’s concerns, needs, interests, and values are 
incorporated into decisions and actions on public matters and issues.1132 They write that 
cities, in particular, are crucial and optimistic spaces of participation: “Cities, due to their 
compact size and contiguity, offer the greatest potential for the development of inclusive 
institutions for managing political conflict, create critical spaces for institutionalized 
forms of political debate and participation and facilitate new forms of political 
                                                
1128 Ibid. 
1129 Perrotta, supra note 1120. 
1130 Ibid. 
1131 Ibid. 
1132 Tina Nabatchi & Matt, Leighninger, Public Participation for 21st Century Democracy (Jossey-Bass, 
2015). 
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representation through civil society actors, operating within participatory governance 
mechanisms.”1133 Nabatchi and Leighninger endorse Sherry Arnstein’s conception of 
participation as a “ladder” with information dissemination on one end of the spectrum 
and direct decision-making on the other.1134  
 
As demonstrated in this dissertation, BIAs and neighbourhood associations have played a 
central role in local governance in Toronto and elsewhere. As noted in Chapter 1, 
Schragger Ford, Frug and Briffault have noted the concerns with this model of 
participation, in particular, the issues of fairness and exclusion. As a response, Young and 
Valverde advocate for the shift in decision-making to a regional level body.1135  
 
In Toronto, the ward is the main locus of local governance. Ward councillors are also the 
arbiters of the use of community councils for measures beyond local planning and 
heritage matters. Ward councillors may help to drive the formation of BIAs and 
neighbourhood associations, and enable access to decision-making within the ward. 
Neither community councils nor the ward level provides for active decision-making by 
BIAs or neighbourhood associations; these bodies are instead discretionary stakeholders 
in local decisions. From an urban commons perspective, this approach mirrors the chief 
dilemma of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, where actors may take action without 
regard for the effects on others.1136 Wards may have many bodies advocating on behalf of 
residents, businesses and other stakeholders, especially BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations, with varying degrees of formal connection to the city. Ward councillors 
have discretion over many issues, including local planning, spending on local 
development, and bringing together the various representatives to resolve conflicts and 
initiate projects. Put another way, while some councillors open the ward to involvement 
by a broader set of stakeholders, there is no institutional requirement that such practices 
take place. Local governance within the framework of an urban commons implies a 
                                                
1133 Ibid. 
1134 Sherry Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (1969) 35:4 Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners 216.  
1135 Young, supra note 141. 
1136 Foster & Iaione, supra note 44. 
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polycentric and more participatory approach to local governance, challenging the 
councillor as the main arbitrator of decision-making.  
 
Neighbourhood associations have not always been seen as oppositional towards 
progressive city planning. Indeed, they were at the forefront of pushing for a more 
inclusive planning model, one which considered the interests of the community. Up until 
the 1960s, experts made planning decisions without any public input.1137 This changed 
when neighbourhood associations began opposing planners, often because they disagreed 
with the vision that planners had for their neighbourhoods.1138 However, the views 
brought to bear on local planning were very much tilted towards those representing the 
associations, meaning those with political, social and economic capital.1139 In practice, 
the voices of renters, the less affluent, and underserved are unheard in local decision-
making forums.  
 
Scholars have written about the impact of BIAs and neighbourhood associations that 
represent affluent, white residents and businesses. What is less considered are the 
outcomes of participation efforts of neighbourhood associations in underserved areas. 
The focus on neighbourhood-based consultation also masks that many local matters that 
disproportionately affected poorer residents are rarely solvable by the municipal 
government alone. Unlike zoning or minor planning issues, matters of social justice, 
including homelessness and lack of affordable housing, cannot be meaningfully 
addressed and resolved by municipalities alone; it requires the cooperation and active 
involvement of all levels of government.  
 
If a model predicated on neighbourhood associations is fraught with issues, then what 
else? As one of the senior city staff members opined on the ideal model of consultation, 
“[Y]ou need to create a pipeline, you need to create mechanism for people to be able to 
                                                
1137 John Sewell, The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning (University of Toronto 
Press, 1993). 
1138 For more recent trends, see Hume, 2005; for similar trends in the U.S., see for example, Arnstein, 2003. 
1139 J. David Hulchanski, Philippa Campsie, Shirley B.Y. Chau, Stephen W. Hwang, Emily Paradis, 
“Homelessness: What’s in a Word?” In Hulchanski, J. David et al. (eds.) Finding Home: Policy Options for 
Addressing Homelessness in Canada (Cities Centre, University of Toronto, 2009) at 3. 
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express themselves and have influence on public policy and programming in a 
meaningful way and the voices be diverse and the voice be organized and all of that.”1140 
But how? In Toronto’s case, the traditional vehicles of engagement – online surveys, 
public meetings held in communities, and deputations at committee and community 
council meetings – bring in a small minority of residents.1141 Since 2013, the City 
Planning department introduced new measures to solicit input from a wider range of 
residents, recognizing that the existing engagement mechanisms are not reaching those 
who are impacted by local planning decisions. For example, City Planning now has “pop 
up planners” (POPs) who appear in areas across the city to get input from the public on 
particular policy proposals; has an advisory panel comprised of randomly selected 
Toronto residents; and relies increasingly on Twitter and other social media for 
feedback.1142 The initiative is noted in particular for generating far more feedback than 
typical engagement exercises.1143  
 
However, it remains uncertain the extent to which these new consultation efforts resulted 
in vastly different voices being heard, especially in the case of social media commentary. 
In the case of POPs and the advisory panel, there appear to be underserved constituents 
targeted for feedback. However, it is unclear whether this form of consultation has an 
impact on the ultimate decisions made. As noted in Chapter 1, scholars Cowen & Parlette 
undertook an expensive study of consultation efforts in one of Toronto’s poorest 
communities, concluding that such exercises can lead to “consultation fatigue.”1144 They 
observed significant fatigue when the same people are consulted again and again but are 
not given any decision-making power. The time consuming and ineffectual results of 
constant consultation are frustrating and difficult, and tax the time of already 
overstretched people working largely in precarious and low-paying jobs. Cowen and 
Parlette suggest that the weakness with current consultation methods is that they are 
distinct and disconnected from decision-making power. Besides, participation efforts do 
                                                
1140 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted. 
1141 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
(18 May 2016) – author conducted. 
1142 Ibid. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Cowen & Parlette, supra note 153. 
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not include skills building and leadership opportunities or other intangible benefits, 
making the process one-sided in favour of city departments, who engage to meet statutory 
or City Council requirements, but do not necessarily weave broader perspectives into 
their final reports.   
 
Part of the reason for this fatigue is that those conducting consultations expect such 
conversations to take place in the forums of their choosing, in a manner that conforms to 
their notions of consultation. What is missing from the research and analysis is the 
existing conversations on local issues that are already taking place. One of the people I 
spoke with, who is familiar in particular with the organizing of Punjabi and Sikh 
populations in Toronto, told me that those looking to engage these particular 
communities might not see the engagement already taking place. When reflecting on a 
question received from a colleague on how to consult communities and get people 
engaged, my contact said:  
 
Well, communities are actually pretty engaged, it’s just that you’re not in those 
engagement mechanisms... [T]hey are having conversations in communities where 
you don’t listen, or go, or understand what they’re talking about. Either you have a 
language difficulty of your own, or you just don’t understand what drives their 
thinking. So, it’s not that the communities are not politicized and particularly 
engaged, it’s just they’re engaged in ways that you don’t understand and you are 
not plugged into. [Rather than saying] “communities are not engaged,” …  say, 
“communities are engaged in ways that I’m not familiar with, so how can I find out 
where those communities’ conversations are taking place, whether they are in 
mosques or community centers, or, you know, people’s living rooms, wherever.” 
Because I know they’re happening, I live it on a daily basis, I can’t go anywhere 
without people having a political conversation. It’s just that none of the decision 
makers ever, ever, sit there and listen to us.1145  
 
This notion of existing conversations speaks to the tension between rational bureaucracy 
and messier forms of political action. Santos notes that the theoretical debates on the 
relationship between representative and participatory democracy often forget that these 
                                                
1145 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.  
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two concepts must work together.1146 He writes that participatory democracy in complex 
political environments always presupposes opportunities for delegation and 
representation.1147 Indeed, the model for this public engagement and involvement should 
be complex and sophisticated to reflect the importance of an overlapping, multifaceted, 
multiplayer decision-making at the municipal level. He favours this decisional 
complexity in contrast to the approach of Weber, who argues instead for rational 
bureaucracy.1148 Santos proposed the following hypothesis: “in internally differentiated 
societies, the stronger the bond between democracy and distributive justice, the more 
complex the methodology that guarantees such bond tends to be. The decrease of 
complexity that bureaucracy allows for cannot but bring about the loosening of the bond 
between democracy and distributive justice.”1149 Thus, a rational system of decision-
making misrepresents the messy reality of participatory democracy, which is 
interconnected with tugs and pulls of representation and delegation. 
 
The messiness that Santos speaks of requires the city to move back, to listen and to let 
other voices in. As one interviewee suggested, the local governance system “has to be 
more flexible and less rigid and the only way to make it less rigid would be the less the 
government plays a role, the government plays the role of a facilitator in the sense of 
setting up the mechanism, but not on running the mechanism.”1150 There would need to 
be less control of the forums of decision-making and of the conversations that will 
ultimately take place. In New York, this is at least partly achieved through the 
community board model, where anyone may attend a meeting and have a voice, where 
the members are not part of the government, and where city staff attends to document and 
report on what is said. Community boards raise opinions that are contrary to those of 
elected officials, which can lead to changes in proposed policies.1151 Los Angeles goes 
                                                
1146 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, Law and Globalization from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
1147 Ibid. 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Ibid. at 324. 
1150 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.  
1151 Richard C. Bass and Cuz Potter, “A Tale of Three Northern Manhattan Communities: Case Studies of 
Political Empowerment in the Planning and Developing Process” (2004) 31 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
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even farther by letting the public set the boundaries for the local bodies, by providing 
some funding for organizational needs, and by encouraging greater representation from 
the applicable communities. While some scholars laud this purported delegation to the 
local level as supporting communities to build capacity and encourage a broader range of 
participants, others suggest that these bodies attract people with the same demographics 
as neighbourhood associations, meaning unrepresentative of the populations they 
serve.1152   
 
In sum, these four principles – flexible boundaries, greater accountability, consideration 
of the “local” effects of “city-wide” decisions, and enhanced participation – point to the 
need for reimagined local governance in Toronto based on the urban commons 
framework. The City of Toronto has the legal authority to reimagine community councils 
within the inclusive, participatory framework of the urban commons. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The reimagination of local governance in the context of the urban commons is at the core 
of the dissertation. I asserted that local as an urban commons marries property, 
governance, and inclusivity. Local legal spaces must have room for the plurality of voices 
that have an interest in policies and decisions made at this level. At present, Toronto’s 
local governance model privileges the geography of the ward as the representative unit, 
with councillors serving a dominant role. BIAs and neighbourhood associations 
participate unevenly and with considerable dependence on councillor interests. Looking 
at local through the lens of the urban commons allows us to see the vast array of voices 
that are not typically seen and heard when decisions are made.  
 
The urban commons, ultimately, recognizes the messy nature of property. Progressive 
property theorists have struggled to identify the definitive qualities of this form of 
interest. What is clear is that the urban commons reflects an overlapping, polycentric set 
                                                                                                                                            
285; Peter Marcuse, “Neighborhood Policy and the Distribution of Power: New York City’s Community 
Boards” (1997) 16(2) Policy Studies Journal 277. 
1152 Chemerinsky & Kleiner, supra note 156 at 571. 
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of interests that legitimize a shared authority to govern, regardless of the property rights 
held by those engaged in the debate.1153 The urban commons, rooted in property law, 
speaks to the relationships at the core of a governance model.  
 
What, then, does this mean for local governance? First, local decision-making needs to be 
acknowledged as a legitimate site of governance. Neighbourhoods can trigger a sense of 
belonging and agency that lead to the creation of organizations. As a senior staff member 
that I interviewed told me, “[I]f a community, if there’s a neighborhood where people 
have been living there for thirty years, it doesn’t matter if they’re Italians, Ukrainians, 
and Polish. They’ve been living in the same community for thirty years, they’re likely to 
find something in common.”1154 Local governance should be acknowledged as an arena 
for public participation, not just for some local planning decisions, as exists now, but 
where “city-wide” matters are heard, too. The current approach of ward dominance over 
the local conversation gives far too much authority to the councillor and includes too few 
voices. In Toronto, this means re-imagining local governance. A new vision means 
incorporating a wider range of community members, an acknowledgment of the “messy” 
nature of local governance, and a way of hearing hard questions and sticky answers.  
                                                
1153 Ranasinghe & Valverde, supra note 47, at 329. 
1154 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.  
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Conclusion - Re-imagining Local Governance 
 
This dissertation was born from enthusiastic conversations with fellow municipal law 
nerds over the meaning of “local governance” in Toronto. What are the institutions that 
the public can access to create change in their communities? Is “local governance” 
geographically or subject based? My gut feeling was that, unlike in many other large 
metropolises, there was no clear answer to these questions. As such, I started this 
dissertation asking how the four main bodies that form Toronto’s local governance model 
– wards, community councils, neighbourhood associations and business improvement 
areas – overlap, and the effect of this overlap on inclusive participation.  
 
Informed by a mixed methodology that included case studies, document analysis, semi-
structured interviews, GIS mapping, basic descriptive statistics and participatory 
observation, this dissertation sought to test a conceptualization that, first, local 
governance is pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple normative orders 
known as “local legal spaces,” which cannot be considered self-enclosed, autonomous 
units; and second, that state iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, 
and spatial realities, through multiple overlapping institutions; incorporate other norms, 
orders, rules and practices; and include and exclude certain people and communities 
through the setting of boundaries and participation rules. This project advances the legal 
geography project by conceptualizing localized areas of the city as multiscalar and 
interlegal in themselves, with a local governance model that is inclusive of a plurality of 
formal and informal bodies and geographies. The dissertation also asserts a normative 
argument, that a local governance model that is based on the urban commons framework 
of Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione would provide a road map for more inclusive, 
participatory local governance. 
 
The conclusions that emerge from this dissertation are set out below, together with 
suggestions for future research.  
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I. Summing up: Toronto’s local legal spaces 
 
This dissertation is organized around three broad propositions. First, Chapter 3 
demonstrated that wards are a necessary, but not a complete account of local legal spaces 
in Toronto. Under COTA, certain decisions must be made by City Council, meaning (at 
present) the 44 councillors and mayor. Under this model, ward councillors exercise a 
considerable degree of power. However, wards are not the only means of conceptualizing 
local governance. As Santos asserts, there is a multiplicity of laws, institutions, and 
boundaries operating formally and informally. In Toronto, while wards serve a privileged 
role in the formal model, local legal spaces include the overlap and competing claims of 
community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations. Some wards and 
neighbourhood associations act have the same names and boundaries of towns and 
villages going back to 1834, the genesis of Toronto as a city. Community councils largely 
and symbolically reflect the pre-amalgamated municipalities. These boundaries reflect 
multiple conceptions of local legal spaces in the Toronto context, each enacted or 
governed with independent objectives and claims to representation based on the asserted 
boundaries, working like an accordion to reorient the scale of interest and decision-
making. They embody what Habermas observes as the ongoing negotiation between and 
within groups regarding the boundaries of “neighbourhood” or “community.”1155  
 
Thus, local legal spaces are both geographic and participatory, both of which assert 
norms of inclusion and exclusion. Boundary lines have consequences. Participation is 
contingent on the legitimization of the geographic boundary, either because a councillor 
has determined their interest in considering a particular matter, or a BIA or 
neighbourhood association exists in a specific part of the city. The boundaries of the local 
legal spaces include multifarious and overlapping bodies, marking who is and is not 
included within literal lines, but also regarding participation, as residents are less able to 
access or influence decision-making based on the state or non-state body in question.  
 
Second, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, BIAs and neighbourhood associations are more 
numerous and broader in their scope since the 1997 amalgamation. There appear to be 
                                                
1155 Habermas, supra note 195. 
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significant differences between these bodies, especially from a legal perspective. BIAs 
are local boards of municipal government, with delegated powers, city assistance, and 
direct involvement of councillors. While neighbourhood associations have no formal 
connection to the City of Toronto, they have transformed since amalgamation from 
largely focused on planning to take on other functions, including stepping into local 
government provision of services. However, there are important similarities between 
these bodies: both have doubled in number since amalgamation, are unevenly scattered 
across the city, and are disproportionately situated in the city’s most affluent areas. Their 
creation and involvement in local governance are perpetuated by the city councillor. Like 
the observations of Gerald Frug that neighbourhood-based governance can have 
significant implications on inclusivity, including the creation of the “other,” the data 
collected in this chapter shows that BIAs and neighbourhood associations perpetuate 
decision-making that is disproportionately focused on the interests of certain residents to 
the exclusion of other voices.1156 
 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations may conceal other “local” iterations or 
participants.1157 In Chapter 4, the 2012-13 casino debate, BIAs, and neighbourhood 
associations were engaged and involved, but the crucial advocates were instead No 
Casino Toronto, which triggered a major local opposition to a downtown casino. In the 
ward boundary review case study outlined in Chapter 5, the consultants did not create 
wards based on other notions of “communities of interest” like neighbourhood 
improvement areas or demographic information, instead relying on stakeholders to come 
forward with that information. Other communities of interest may not be identified based 
on the absence of neighbourhood associations and BIAs in all parts of the City. Thus, the 
focus on BIAs and neighbourhood associations may leave wanting other local groups 
who have less access to ward councillors or the mechanics of city decision-making. 
While an expansive review of the other local bodies was beyond the scope of this 
                                                
1156 Frug, supra note 7 at 1053. 
1157 Robert A. Dahl, Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (Yale University 
Press, 1963); and Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946- 1988 (University Press of 
Kansas, 1989). 
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dissertation, a further study could focus specifically on such bodies, including the nature 
of their access to city decision-making.  
 
Third, as explored in Chapter 6, this dissertation argues that principles drawn from Foster 
and Iaione’s version of the urban commons have the potential for creating a more 
inclusive local governance. Minor changes to the city’s governance structure could 
unsettle the power of the ward councillor and shifting the focus on participation from 
BIAs and neighbourhood associations to a broader public. Igor Vojnovic has concluded 
that community councils can be successfully used in the governance structures of 
amalgamated city governments.1158 This reimagined view of local governance is 
contingent on broad participation and inclusivity, empowered to consider the “local” 
effects of “city-wide” issues, rather than distinguishing them. The power of the ward, 
coupled with the narrow scope of BIAs and neighbourhood associations, undermines the 
flourishment that Foster and Iaione assert. Redesigned local governance offers an 
opportunity to realize an accessible entry to decision-making that avoids both the singular 
discretion of councillors and the narrow interests of BIAs and neighbourhood 
associations. Fundamentally, this reimagination means experimenting with a governance 
model that includes a wider range of voices and disrupting existing practices of a 
councillor-focused model. 
 
The principles underpinning this reimagined local governance model were sketched in 
Chapter 6. The City of Toronto has created a distinction between “local” and “city-wide” 
decision-making, with one route for each kind of decision. This dissertation queried this 
distinction in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, asking instead whether local issues may be city-wide, 
and vice versa. In the 2012-13 decision, the local issues were traffic, threats to local 
business, quality of life for nearby residents, and the effects on nearby vulnerable 
populations. In the 2015 decision, the local issue was the employment opportunities of 
residents.  
 
                                                
1158 Igor Vojnovic, “Municipal Consolidation, Regional Planning and Fiscal Accountability: The Recent 
Experience in Two Maritime Provinces” (2000) 13:1 Canadian Journal of Regional Science 49. 
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This challenges the “local” versus “city-wide” distinction present in the city’s procedural 
bylaw, the basis of which determines what may be delegated to community councils for 
deliberation or decision-making. In Santos’ conception of scale, a large-scale map shows 
less land but far more detail (“a miniaturized version of reality”) and small-scale more 
land, showing relative positions, but ultimately less detail.1159 The scales are a lens by 
which information is presented, whether the degree of detail or relative positions, a 
“zooming in.” Under Santos’ conception of scale, a ward or community council could be 
thought of in the context of large-scale law, where there is a zooming in on the localized 
area to study the effects on the community. “Local” issues may thus be “city-wide” 
issues, too. Transforming Jacobs’ notion that localized bodies fulfill the democratic ideal 
of representation that is closer to the community, suggesting separate, delegated powers, 
this framing instead suggests that smaller-than-city bodies can examine the localized 
effects of city-wide issues. A casino labelled “city-wide,” cannot be set aside from the 
local governance scale.  
 
A next step would be to put these principles into practice, sketching out the legal model 
that would result in these reimagined community councils. This dissertation began with 
an example of a live issue in Toronto: the local impacts of the city-wide Scarborough 
subway project. The reimagined community councils, premised on the urban commons, 
would provide an opportunity to give residents a voice.1160 
 
II. The limits of “local” literature 
 
In addition to practical implications of municipal governance, this dissertation illustrated 
some of the theoretical challenges of a review of the governance of local legal spaces. 
First, this dissertation revealed the need for more theoretical work, both diagnostic and 
normative, on the legal foundations of city governance tailored to the Canadian 
experience. An assertion raised in this project was the extent to which history matters, as 
illustrated in Chapter 3, whereby the city’s wards, community councils, and 
                                                
1159 See e.g. Santos, supra note 12. 
1160 Jennifer Pagliaro, “Scarborough residents question why subway plan gives them just one new stop,” 
Toronto Star (10 May 2017). 
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neighbourhood associations continue to reflect the towns and villages that used to lie 
within its borders. Likewise, the dissertation demonstrated that provincial action – and 
especially the spelling out of community councils at the time of amalgamation – mattered 
in the development of the city’s local governance model. 
 
However, much of the theory that seeks to explain local governance is drawn from 
American scholars. As argued in Chapter 1, the analysis from legal scholars Frug, 
Alexander, Schragger, and others focus on city governance from the perspective of 
American cities which have their legal histories of annexations and amalgamations, 
spatial inequality, and municipal responses unique to their jurisdictions. Moreover, 
relationships between cities and state governments differ than those of Canadian urban 
areas. These distinctions are relevant as applied to the structure of local governance in 
Canadian cities, whose legal models are constitutionally structured to allow for provincial 
determination and oversight over their affairs. In the American literature, regional 
governance is advanced as a model by which municipal power can be tempered, whereas 
in the Canadian case, regional governance is equally at the discretion of provincial 
governments. As such, the arguments of Young, Frug, and Ford that regional 
governments are the model by which “local” control can be dovetailed are less relevant in 
Canadian cities. It would be helpful to have further applications from the Canadian legal 
context to nudge and mold these theoretical frameworks. 
 
Second, and related, the notion of subsidiarity as a tool for understanding local 
governance should be further explored. This dissertation only touched on the relevance of 
subsidiarity as a further model for understanding delegation. Just before COTA’s 
introduction, Levi and Valverde wrote on the impact of subsidiarity in advancing 
municipal authority in the Canadian context. As noted in Chapter 3, after a decade of case 
law affirming this principle favourably for municipal governments, recent lower court 
decisions have begun to decide differently, narrowing the scope of what might rightly be 
within their authority. Two possibility future applications include the extension of 
subsidiarity to smaller-than-city areas of the city, applying Frug’s notion of 
“neighbourhood constitutionalism” in the Canadian context and examining how 
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subsidiarity should be applied to particular municipal governance decisions, especially 
where councillors benefit from the existing model.1161 
 
Third, this dissertation suggests further contributions to the emerging field of the urban 
commons, including how this theoretical framework may be used as a lens through which 
participatory governance can be normatively evaluated. Chapter 1 set out three rationales 
for the establishment of local governance bodies like community councils, including the 
retention of pre-amalgamation boundaries; the creation of government decision-making 
that is closer to the community; and a greater degree of efficiency in local governance, by 
allowing more delegation to local bodies. While each of these rationales are valid, I argue 
that recrafted community councils allow for local legal spaces that are molded by all 
residents, leading to a more inclusive, participatory governance framework.1162 The urban 
commons is a notion with many definitions, although in the context of legal theory is 
very much in the early stages of theoretical analysis. One possible inquiry could be the 
development of a typology for the application of the urban commons to types of property 
ownership, for example the private ownership claims of BIAs. A further study could 
involve the establishment of principles that would underpin localized areas operating 
within the context of an urban commons, including how such areas differ in their 
governance models and how these models may be evaluated. 
 
  
                                                
1161 Frug, supra note 7. 
1162 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the city: Urban land and the politics of property (Routledge, 2004) at 
154; Bruun, supra note 249; and Foster & Iaione, supra note 44. 
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Appendix A – List of Interviews 
 
Interview with members of No Casino Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (11 May 2015) 
– author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and 
Housing Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author 
conducted.  
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office, 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.  
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada (18 May 2016) – author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 
July 2016) – author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 
July 2016) – author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 
July 2016) – author conducted. 
 
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #4, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 
August 2016) – author conducted. 
		 348 
Appendix B - Toronto’s Business Improvement Areas 
 
 
 
Name%of%BIA
#%of%
Mem-
bers #%of%Cllrs Ward CC%area Yr%Created
Before%
Amalga-
mation Blocks Businesses
2015%
Budget
Budget%/%
Business Admin Marketing Maintenance Festivals
Total%vs.%
Budget Admin%
Marketing%
%
Maintenance%
% Festivals% Advocacy
Albion'IslingtonSquare 12 1 1 Etobicoke 2006 FALSE 4 167 197,261 1,181 $64,435 $63,000 $50,000 $45,000 113% 33% 32% 25% 23%
Baby'Point'Gates 9 1 13 Etobicoke 2010 FALSE 8 83 50,000 602 $8,838 $5,000 $17,900 $19,078 102% 18% 10% 36% 38%
Bayview'Leaside 9 2 22,'26 Mixed 2015 FALSE 3 170 190,033 1,118 $64,497 $47,250 $33,000 $35,000 95% 34% 25% 17% 18%
Bloor'By'The'Park 7 2 13,'14 Mixed 1987 TRUE 4 118 83,354 706 $8,200 $1,900 $35,400 $17,000 75% 10% 2% 42% 20%
Bloor'Street 5 1 27 TEY 2006 FALSE 7 89 1,650,000 18,539 $7,000 $10,000 $30,000 $62,700 7% 0% 1% 2% 4%
Bloor'West'Village 9 1 13 Etobicoke 1970 TRUE 12 400 387,898 970 $35,728 $79,000 $113,000 $96,000 83% 9% 20% 29% 25%
Bloor'Yorkville 15 1 27 TEY 1985 TRUE 125 2,500 3,019,696 1,208 $539,950 $125,400 $1,044,500 $538,500 74% 18% 4% 35% 18%
BloorTAnnex 8 1 20 TEY 1995 TRUE 7 109 239,892 2,201 $37,283 $21,882 $49,846 $20,800 54% 16% 9% 21% 9%
Bloorcourt'Village 14 2 18,'19 TEY 1979 TRUE 12 302 185,000 613 $48,900 $100,100 81% 26% 0% 54% 0%
Bloordale'Village 8 1 18 TEY 1976 TRUE 7 122 92,278 756 $9,580 $5,500 $8,000 $38,000 66% 10% 6% 9% 41%
Cabbagetown 12 1 28 TEY 1982 TRUE 11 200 195,626 978 $92,355 $6,500 $49,300 $53,000 103% 47% 3% 25% 27%
Chinatown 20 1 20 TEY 2007 FALSE 13 411 437,830 1,065 $162,627 $36,200 $78,300 $139,000 95% 37% 8% 18% 32%
ChurchTWellesley'Village 17 1 27 TEY 2002 FALSE 6 125 242,008 1,936 $85,424 $30,000 $65,293 $109,000 120% 35% 12% 27% 45% Pships
College'Promenade 10 2 18,'19 TEY 2005 FALSE 7 100 151,153 1,512 5,694 $7,000 8% 4% 0% 5% 0%
College'West 7 1 18 TEY 2013 FALSE 8 93 20,476 220 $3,423 $7,500 $750 $2,000 67% 17% 37% 4% 10%
Corso'Italia 10 1 17 Etobicoke 1984 TRUE 7 174 221,164 1,271 $60,267 $67,100 $79,100 $60,000 120% 27% 30% 36% 27%
Crossroads'of'the'Danforth 8 1 35 Scarborough 2008 FALSE 14 112 169,766 1,516 $40,825 4,700 $26,500 $72,000 85% 24% 3% 16% 42%
Danforth'Mosaic 21 429,'30,'31,'32 TEY 2008 FALSE 25 500 332,681 665 $76,057 $61,000 $125,000 $40,000 91% 23% 18% 38% 12%
Danforth'Village 9 2 31,'32 TEY 2006 FALSE 16 200 426,787 2,134 $67,868 $39,500 $203,500 $35,000 81% 16% 9% 48% 8%
Dovercourt'Village 8 2 18,'19 TEY 1984 TRUE 8 25 7,055 282 2,239 $5,250 $4,000 $0 163% 32% 74% 57% 0%
Downtown'Yonge 13 2 27,'28 TEY 2001 FALSE 42 750 2,583,899 3,445 $1,063,869 $266,080 $500,000 $508,500 91% 41% 10% 19% 20%
DufferinTWingold 11 1 15 North'York 2015 FALSE 120 100,000 833 $51,769 $24,700 $2,800 $10,000 89% 52% 25% 3% 10%
DuKe'Heights 14 1 8 North'York 2014 FALSE 70 1,321 1,159,368 878 $290,535 $107,000 $260,000 $0 57% 25% 9% 22% 0% Y'(mx)
Dundas'West 9 1 18 TEY 2006 FALSE 10 166 207,624 1,251 $63,672 $10,800 $99,300 44,500 105% 31% 5% 48% 21%
Dupont'by'the'Castle 7 3 20,'21,'22 TEY 2009 FALSE 20 60 84,108 1,402 $25,294 $2,160 $6,236 $3,700 44% 30% 3% 7% 4%
Eglinton'Hill 7 1 12 Etobicoke 1997 TRUE 5 81 26,123 323 $9,877 $3,650 $5,250 $6,500 97% 38% 14% 20% 25%
Emery'Village 13 1 7 Etobicoke 2003 FALSE 70 2,500 2,500,034 1,000 $586,442 $1,052,000 $303,094 $131,000 83% 23% 42% 12% 5%
Fairbank'Village 9 2 15,'17 Mixed 2007 FALSE 10 115 240,682 2,093 $62,439 $3,505 $31,393 105,250 84% 26% 1% 13% 44%
Financial'District 12 2 20,'28 TEY 2013 FALSE 46 1200 1,543,714 1,286 $386,116 $562,803 $105,250 68% 25% 36% 7% 0% Y
Forest'Hill'Village 7 2 21,'22 TEY 1979 TRUE 9 68 195,859 2,880 $55,678 $38,500 $36,500 $31,500 83% 28% 20% 19% 16%
Gerrard'India'Bazaar 13 2 30,'32 TEY 1981 TRUE 12 100 133,386 1,334 $48,317 $7,500 $20,500 $143,000 164% 36% 6% 15% 107%
Greektown'on'the'Danforth 15 2 29,'30 TEY 1972 TRUE 13 400 424,297 1,061 $121,839 $62,000 $172,500 $888,000 293% 29% 15% 41% 209%
Harbord'Street 6 1 20 TEY 1985 TRUE 8 49 34,739 709 $2,872 $6,530 $12,300 $4,800 76% 8% 19% 35% 14% Pships
Hillcrest'Village 12 1 21 TEY 1984 TRUE 7 100 96,088 961 $24,805 $10,500 $13,400 $46,500 99% 26% 11% 14% 48%
Historic'Queen'East 16 1 28 TEY 2006 FALSE 20 159 0 0
Junction'Gardens 11 2 13,'14 Mixed 1973 TRUE 9 220 275,434 1,252 $121,217 $49,400 $47,200 $82,500 109% 44% 18% 17% 30%
Kennedy'Road 13 2 37,'40 Scarborough 1980 TRUE 10 300 255,816 853 $27,627 $37,500 $129,500 $0 76% 11% 15% 51% 0%
Kensington'Market 11 1 20 TEY 2009 FALSE 20 240 135,667 565 $50,267 $9,750 $15,200 $45,000 89% 37% 7% 11% 33%
Korea'Town 14 2 19,'20 TEY 2004 FALSE 9 148 93,283 630 $26,389 $8,732 $33,482 $40,000 116% 28% 9% 36% 43%
Lakeshore'Village 11 1 6 Etobicoke 1973 TRUE 11 150 98,446 656 $14,457 $7,700 $45,600 $26,700 96% 15% 8% 46% 27%
Leslieville 12 2 30,'32 TEY 2013 FALSE 19 36 110,000 3,056 $52,067 $13,423 $2,500 $30,000 89% 47% 12% 2% 27%
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Name%of%BIA
#%of%
Mem-
bers #%of%Cllrs Ward CC%area Yr%Created
Before%
Amalga-
mation Blocks Businesses
2015%
Budget
Budget%/%
Business Admin Marketing
Maintenanc
e Festivals
Total%vs.%
Budget Admin%
Marketing%
%
Maintenanc
e% Festivals% Advocacy
Liberty(Village 15 2 14,(19 TEY 2001 FALSE 28 500 291,658 583 $169,145 $50,000 $53,500 $60,000 114% 58% 17% 18% 21%
Little((Portugal 8 2 18,(19 TEY 2007 FALSE 6 132 54,500 413 $22,822 $2,000 $11,500 $41,950 144% 42% 4% 21% 77%
Little(Italy 12 1 19 TEY 1985 TRUE 14 178 379,928 2,134 $55,000 $42,000 $52,000 $234,000 101% 14% 11% 14% 62%
Long(Branch 15 1 6 Etobicoke 1987 TRUE 6 113 63,793 565 $22,081 $3,000 $51,300 $24,000 157% 35% 5% 80% 38%
MidtownNYonge 12 1 22 TEY 2015 FALSE 9 140 149,443 1,067 $34,677 $20,000 $3,000 $20,000 52% 23% 13% 2% 13%
Mimico(by(the(Lake 8 1 6 Etobicoke 1985 TRUE 10 51 53,842 1,056 $18,711 $8,462 $14,000 $8,000 91% 35% 16% 26% 15%
Mimico(Village 7 1 6 Etobicoke 1997 TRUE 6 39 32,420 831 $2,528 $7,900 $3,035 $15,000 88% 8% 24% 9% 46%
Mirvish(Village 9 2 19,(20 TEY 2005 FALSE 6 97 0 0 $8,977 $2,000 $10,500 $6,500
Mount(Dennis 7 1 11 Etobicoke 1974 TRUE 7 61 15,948 261 $7,440 $300 $11,750 $950 128% 47% 2% 74% 6%
Mount(Pleasant 10 1 22 TEY 2008 FALSE 7 200 157,512 788 $58,507 $25,100 $44,500 $35,000 104% 37% 16% 28% 22%
Oakwood(Village 8 2 15,(17 Mixed 2008 FALSE 9 106 0
Ossington(Avenue 11 1 19 TEY 2014 FALSE 4 126 54,012 429 $4,627 $13,475 $30,000 89% 9% 25% 0% 56%
Pape(Village 6 1 29 TEY 1986 TRUE 4 80 88,700 1,109 $18,757 $500 $22,300 $40,750 93% 21% 1% 25% 46%
Parkdale(Village 12 1 14 TEY 1978 TRUE 11 340 237,159 698 $111,353 $10,500 $91,906 $48,330 111% 47% 4% 39% 20%
Queen(Street(West 10 1 20 TEY 2008 FALSE 11 300 277,180 924 $80,082 $15,500 $21,900 $54,500 62% 29% 6% 8% 20%
Regal(Heights(Village 10 1 17 Etobicoke 2000 FALSE 8 120 72,352 603 $20,083 $8,000 $26,500 $17,000 99% 28% 11% 37% 23%
Riverside(District 11 1 30 TEY 1980 TRUE 10 120 186,120 1,551 $94,119 $8,500 $35,450 $21,732 86% 51% 5% 19% 12% Pships
Roncesvalles(Village 10 1 14 TEY 1985 TRUE 16 270 235,529 872 $55,582 $7,500 $64,950 $276,100 172% 24% 3% 28% 117%
Rosedale(Main(Street 13 2 22,(27 TEY 2000 FALSE 8 193 262,796 1,362 $66,781 $7,000 $87,800 90,000 96% 25% 3% 33% 34%
Sheppard(East(Village 10 2 41,(42 Scarborough 2007 FALSE 10 500 177,230 354 $32,427 $92,900 $37,850 $0 92% 18% 52% 21% 0%
shopthequeensway.com 10 1 5 Etobicoke 2012 FALSE 27 300 125,000 417 $28,477 $1,000 $12,000 $25,000 53% 23% 1% 10% 20%
St.(Clair(Gardens 9 1 17 Etobicoke 1985 TRUE 7 125 67,776 542 $9,463 $1,500 $42,300 $14,085 99% 14% 2% 62% 21%
St.(Lawrence(Market(Neighbourhood11 1 28 TEY 1994 TRUE 20 1200 1,014,120 845 $246,067 $103,000 $231,000 $150,000 72% 24% 10% 23% 15%
The(Beach 9 1 32 TEY 2004 FALSE 26 390 235,328 603 $79,127 $20,500 $47,500 $67,050 91% 34% 9% 20% 28%
The(Danforth 11 2 29,(30 TEY 1986 TRUE 8 350 297,539 850 $109,477 $37,500 $85,828 $104,500 113% 37% 13% 29% 35%
The(Eglinton(Way 11 2 16,(22 Mixed 1987 TRUE 9 121 310,271 2,564 $141,580 $78,500 $81,900 $60,000 117% 46% 25% 26% 19% Y((Mx)
The(Kingsway 12 1 5 Etobicoke 1973 TRUE 6 250 346,190 1,385 $79,622 $21,200 $80,500 $305,900 141% 23% 6% 23% 88%
The(Waterfront 15 2 20,(28 TEY 2004 FALSE 9 255 704,100 2,761 $330,827 $102,000 $20,500 $255,000 101% 47% 14% 3% 36%
Toronto(Entertainment(District 22 2 20,(28 TEY 2008 FALSE 156 1,800 2,079,199 1,155 $429,211 $537,300 $360,331 $46,700 66% 21% 26% 17% 2% Y
Trinity(Bellwoods 9 1 19 TEY 2007 FALSE 9 108 51,603 478 $10,515 $20,250 $18,489 95% 20% 39% 0% 36% Y
Upper(Village 6 1 21 TEY 1983 TRUE 9 139 99,388 715 $11,137 $2,800 $74,600 $3,000 92% 11% 3% 75% 3% Y((Mx)
Uptown(Yonge 19 2 16,(25 North(York 2005 FALSE 9 400 212,130 530 $68,359 $43,855 $34,770 $47,500 92% 32% 21% 16% 22%
Village(of(Islington 7 1 5 Etobicoke 1986 TRUE 8 198 100,249 506 $26,967 $40,700 $42,400 $4,600 114% 27% 41% 42% 5%
West(Queen(West 17 2 18,(19 TEY 2005 FALSE 20 400 308,303 771 $87,095 $19,800 $135,000 $19,100 85% 28% 6% 44% 6%
Weston(Village 6 1 11 Etobicoke 1979 TRUE 8 160 105,529 660 $74,874 $3,800 $32,600 $38,600 142% 71% 4% 31% 37%
Wexford(Heights 11 1 37 Scarborough 2004 FALSE 12 245 199,506 814 $69,797 $12,000 $55,950 $228,200 183% 35% 6% 28% 114%
Wilson(Village 16 1 9 North(York 2013 FALSE 12 200 275,169 1,376 $73,288 $26,500 $102,200 $11,000 77% 27% 10% 37% 4%
Wychwood(Heights 9 1 21 TEY 2002 FALSE 8 124 75,377 608 $21,675 $34,200 $27,030 $6,500 119% 29% 45% 36% 9%
YongeNLawrence(Village 7 2 16,(25 North(York 2000 FALSE 12 314 201,927 643 $72,327 $42,950 $53,000 $30,700 99% 36% 21% 26% 15%
YorkNEglinton 8 1 15 North(York 1981 TRUE 7 200 257,492 1,287 $129,427 $20,000 $31,000 $109,500 113% 50% 8% 12% 43%
Key: # - number; Cllrs – councillors; CC - community council; Yr – year; % - percentage 
 
Sources: City of Toronto. Business Improvement Areas (2017); Original research (Alexandra Flynn). 
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Appendix C - Toronto’s Neighbourhood Associations 
ABC Residents Association (ABC) 
5 Greencrest Circuit/70 Stevenvale Road 
Aberdeen Avenue Residents Group 
Active18 
Annex Residents’ Association  
Ashdale Village Residents Association 
Atkinson Housing Co-op/Alexandra Park Residents' Association  
Avenue Road - Eglinton Community Association (ARECA) 
Avondale Community Condominium Association  
Balmy Beach Residents Association 
Bathurst Finch Network 
Bathurst Quay Neighbourhood Association 
Bay Cloverhill Community Association 
Bayview Cummer Neighbourhood Association 
Bayview Village Association (BVA) 
Beach Hill Neighbourhood Association 
Beach Lakefront Neighbourhood Association 
Beaconsfield Village Residents' Association 
Bedford Park Residents Association  
Bedford-Wanless Ratepayers Association 
Bloor Street East Neighbourhood  
Bloor West Village Residents Association 
Bloordale CIA 
Brockton Triangle Neighbours 
Cabbagetown South Resident's Association 
Carleton-Davenport Village Residents Association 
Casa Loma Residents Association 
Castle Hill Neighbourhood Association 
Centennial Community and Recreation Association 
Christie Pits Residents' Association 
Church Wellesley Neighbourhood Association 
CityPlace Residents' Association 
College–Ossington–Dufferin–Argyle 
Collier Asquith Neighbourhood Association 
Concerned Citizens of Quarry Lands Development 
Connaught/Lonsmount Area Ratepayers Association (CLARA) 
Corktown Residents [and Business?] Association 
Coronation Community of West Hill 
Cottingham Square Community Association 
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Curran Hall Community Association 
Danforth East Community Association (DECA) 
Davenport Neighbourhood Association (DNA) 
Deer Park Residents Group Inc. 
DIGIN 
Don Mills Residents Inc.  
Don Vale Cabbagetown Residents Association  
Don Valley East Residents Association 
Dovercourt College Residents' Association 
Dovercourt Park Community Association 
Downsview Lands Community 
Dufferin Grove Residents' Association 
East Beach Community Association 
East Rouge Old Lansing Community Association 
Edithvale-Yonge Community Association 
Edwards Gardens Neighbourhood Association  
Eglinton Park Residents Association 
Fifeshire Road Area Community Association 
Forest Hill Homeowners Association  
Fort York Neighbourhood Association 
Friends of Kensington Market 
Garden District Residents Association 
Garment District Neighbourhood Association 
Gerrard East Community Organization 
Glen Agar Residents Association 
Glen Andrew Community Association 
Glenorchy Residents Association  
Gooderham & Worts Neighbourhood Association 
Governors Bridge Ratepayers Association  
Grange Community Association 
Greater Yorkville Residents' Association 
Greenwood Community Association 
Guildwood Village Community Association (GVCA) 
Harbord Village Residents' Association 
Heathwood Ratepayers Association 
Henry Farm Community Interest Association 
Highland Creek Community Association 
High Park Residents Association 
Hillcrest Ratepayers Association 
Homewood Avenue Neighbourhood Association 
		 352 
Humber Bay Shores Condominium Association 
Humber Valley Village Residents' Association 
Huron-Sussex Residents Organization 
Islington Ratepayers and Residents Association 
Junction Residents Association 
Kensington Market Action Committee 
Kensington Residents Association 
King Spadina Residents Association (possibly succeeded by TEDRA) 
King West Residents Association 
Kingsway Park Ratepayers Inc. 
Lansing Community Association 
Lawrence Park Ratepayers Association  
Leaside Property Owners' Association (LPOA) 
Liberty Village Residents Association 
Long Branch Residents Association 
Lytton Park Residents' Organization (LPRO) 
Malvern Community Coalition 
Markland Wood - Markland Homes Association (MHA) 
Maryvale Community Association 
McGill-Granby Village Residents' Association 
Midland Park Community Association 
Mimico Residents Association 
Moore Park Residents Association  
Morningside Heights Residents Association 
Mount Dennis Community Association 
Mulock Avenue Residents' Association 
New Toronto Good Neighbours 
Niagara Neighbourhood Now 
North Bendale Community Association 
North Rosedale Ratepayer's Association (NRRA) 
Northcliffe Village Residents' Association 
Norwood Park Neighbourhood Association 
Oakwood Village Community Asociation (5 Points Community Action) 
Old Mill Community Association 
Old Millside Residents' Association 
Old Orchard Grove Ratepayers Association 
Oriole Park Association  
Ossington Community Association 
Palmerston Area Residents Association 
Parkdale Residents Association 
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Parkview Hills Community Association 
Parkway Forest Community Association 
Playter Area Residents’ Association 
Queen-Beaconsfield Residents' Association 
Queen Street West Residents Association 
Queensway Residents' Association 
Rathnelly Area Residents Association  
Regal Heights Residents' Association 
Regent Park Network 
Residents Rising Community Association 
Richmond Gardens Ratepayers and Residents Association 
Ritchie–Herman–Golden–Silver 
Rockcliffe Smythe Community Association 
Roncesvalles-Macdonell Residents' Association (RMRA) 
Scarborough Village Neighbourhood Association 
Seaton Village Residents' Association 
Sheppard-Leslie Homeowners Association (SLHA) 
Sherwood Park Residents Association 
Silverview Community Association (SCA) 
South Armour Heights Residents Association 
South Corso Italia Neighbourhood Association  
South Eglinton Ratepayers' and Residents' Association (SERRA) 
South Perth and Sterling Road Residents Association 
South Rosedale Ratepayers' Association (SRRA) 
St Clair West Village Residents' Association 
St. Andrews Ratepayers Association  
St. Jamestown Network 
St. Lawrence Neighbourhood Association 
Summerhill Residents Association 
Sunnyside Community Association 
Swansea Area Ratepayer's Association (SARA) 
Teddington Park Residents Association 
The Beach Triangle Residents Association 
The Crescent Town Tenants Association 
The Goldhawk Community Association 
The Kew Beach Neighbourhood Association 
The Pocket 
The West Kingsway Ratepayers' Association 
Thorncrest Homes Association Inc. 
Toronto Beach East Residents' Association 
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Toronto Entertainment District Residents’ Association (TEDRA) 
Toronto Harbourfront Community Association 
Toronto Islands Community Association 
Trefann Court Residents Association 
Trinity Bellwoods Community Organization 
Upper Jarvis Neighboroughood Association 
Upper Middle Gainsborough Residents' Association 
Uptown Yonge Neighbourhood Alliance 
Victoria Village Ratepayers Association 
Village at York Residents Association 
Wellington Place Neighbourhood Association 
West Bend Community Association 
West Lansing Homeowners Associations 
West Rouge Community Association WRCA 
Weston Village Residents' Association 
Willowdale N.E. Neighbourhood Association 
Winchester Park Resident Association 
Woodbine Park Residents' Association  
Yonge Corridor Condominium Association 
Yonge Ridge Homeowners Association 
York Mills Gardens Community Association 
York Mills Heights Residents Association 
York Mills Valley Association  
York Quay Neighbourhood Association 
 
 
Sources: Topping, David. “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015); 
Federation of North Toronto Residents Associations, "Member Associations" (2016) FONTRA; 
Confederation of Resident & Ratepayer Associations in Toronto, "MM7.1 Request to Protect 250 year old 
Red Oak Tree at 76 Coral Gable Drive City Council Meeting No. 7: June 10, 2015" (2015) CORRA; 
Federation of Urban Neighbourhoods (Ontario), "Members and Their Affiliates By Municipality" (2016). 
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Appendix D - Data on Neighbourhood Associations 
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Huron&Sussex+Residents+Organization 1968 Y Y Y Y Y
Junction+Residents+Association 1999 Y Y Y Y Y
Kensington+Market+Action+Committee 1997 Y + Y + Y Y Y
Lawrence+Park+Ratepayers+Association+ 1956 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Leaside+Property+Owners'+Association+LPOA1950 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Long+Branch+Residents+Association 2015 + Y Y Y
Lytton+Park+Residents'+Organization+LPRO 1970 Y Y Y Y Y
Markland+Wood+&+Markland+Homes+Association+MHA1962 Y Y Y Y
McGill&Granby+Village+Residents'+Association1978 Y Y Y Y Y
Mimico+Residents+Association 2005 Y + Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mount+Dennis+Community+Association 1975 Y Y Y Y Y
North+Bendale+Community+Association 1961 Y Y Y + Y Y Y + + +
North+Rosedale+Ratepayer's+Association+NRRA1949 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Northcliffe+Village+Residents'+Association 2008 + Y Y Y Y Y
Norwood+Park+Neighbourhood+Association2007 + + + Y Y Y
Oakwood+Village+Community+Asociation+(5+Points+Community+Action)2005 + Y + Y Y Y Y
Old+Orchard+Grove+Ratepayers+Association1985 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Oriole+Park+Association+ 1954 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ossington+Community+Association 2012 Y + + Y Y Y Y
Palmerston+Area+Residents+Association 1985 Y Y Y Y Y
Parkdale+Residents+Association 2005 Y Y Y Y
Playter+Area+Residents’+Association. 1972 Y
Queen&Beaconsfield+Residents'+Association2005 Y
Rathnelly+Area+Residents+Association+ 1963 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Roncesvalles&Macdonell+Residents'+Association+RMRA1973 Y Y + Y
Sheppard&Leslie+Homeowners+Association+SLHA2004 Y
Silverview+Community+Association+SCA 1974 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
South+Armour+Heights+Residents+Association1988 Y Y + Y Y Y Y
South+Corso+Italia+Neighbourhood+Association+2009 + + Y Y
South+Eglinton+Ratepayers'+and+Residents'+Association+SERRA1065 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
South+Rosedale+Ratepayers'+Association+SRRA1931 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
St.+Andrews+Ratepayers+Association+ 1988 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Swansea+Area+Ratepayer's+Association+&+SARA1929 Y + Y Y Y
The+Beach+Triangle+Residents+Association 1985 Y + Y + Y
The+Pocket 2012 Y Y Y
The+West+Kingsway+Ratepayers'+Association1950 Y Y Y + Y Y
Thorncrest+Homes+Association+Inc. 1975 Y Y Y Y
Toronto+Beach+East+Residents'+Association+(no+website)2008 Y Y + Y Y
Toronto+Islands+Community+Association 2005 + Y Y Y
Trefann+Court+Residents+Association 2008 + Y Y Y Y
Uptown+Yonge+Neighbourhood+Alliance 2013 Y Y Y Y Y
Victoria+Village+Ratepayers+Association 1960 Y + Y + Y Y Y
West+Bend+Community+Association 1990 Y Y Y Y Y
West+Rouge+Community+Association+WRCA1983 Y Y Y Y
Willowdale+N.E.+Neighbourhood+Association2008 Y Y Y Y
Winchester+Park+Resident+Association+(see+brochure)1975 Y Y + Y Y Y
Yonge+Corridor+Condominium+Association 2000 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
York+Mills+Gardens+Community+Association1975 Y Y Y Y Y
York+Quay+Neighbourhood+Association 2003 Y Y + Y Y Y
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ABC$Residents$Association$ABC 1957 Y Y Y $ Y $ $ Y $ $ $
Balmy$Beach$Residents$Association 2004 $ Y$ Y $ $ Y $ $ $
Bathurst$Finch$Network 2009 $ Y Y $ Y Y $ $ Y Y
Bathurst$Quay$Neighbourhood$Association2000 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bay$Cloverhill$Community$Association 1995 Y Y Y Y Y
Bayview$Cummer$Neighbourhood$Association1978 Y Y $ Y Y
Bayview$Village$Association$BVA 1956 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Beach$Hill$Neighbourhood$Association$I$http://www.beachhill.org/p/aboutIbhna.html2012 Y Y Y
Beach$Lakefront$Neighbourhood$Association2007 Y $ Y
BedfordIWanless$Ratepayers$Association 2011 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bloor$Street$East$Neighbourhood$ 2002 Y Y Y Y
Bloor$West$Village$Residents$Association 2005 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bloordale$CIA 2013 $ $ Y Y Y
Brockton$Triangle$Residents$Associationhttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/brocktonneighbours2006 $ Y
Cabbagetown$South$Resident's$Association2002 Y Y Y
Casa$Loma$Residents$Association 2009 Y Y Y
Castle$Hill$Neighbourhood$Association 1990 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Centennial$Community$and$Recreation$Association1949 Y y Y Y Y Y
Christie$Pits$Residents'$Association 2012 Y Y Y
Church$Wellesley$Neighbourhood$Association2011 Y $ Y Y Y Y Y Y
College–Ossington–Dufferin–Argyle 2011 $ $ Y
Concerned$Citizens$of$Quarry$Lands$Development2003 Y Y Y Y
Connaught$/$Lonsmount$Area$Ratepayers$Association$CLARA1998 Y Y Y
Corktown$Residents$[and$Business?]$Association1975 Y Y Y $ Y Y
Coronation$Community$of$West$Hill 2005 Y Y Y Y Y
Danforth$East$Community$Association$I$DECA2007 Y Y Y Y Y
Davenport$Neighbourhood$Association$DNA2007 $ $ Y Y Y
Deer$Park$Residents$Group$Inc. 2008 Y Y Y Y
DIGIN 2002 $ $ Y Y Y Y
Don$Vale$Cabbagetown$Residents$Association$1975 Y Y $ Y Y Y
Dovercourt$College$Residents'$Association2015 Y Y Y
Dovercourt$Park$Community$Association 2013 Y
Downsview$Lands$Community 1995 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Edwards$Gardens$Neighbourhood$Association$2005 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Eglinton$Park$Residents$Association 2007 Y Y Y Y
Forest$Hill$Homeowners$Association$ 1947 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fort$York$Neighbourhood$Association 2012 $ Y $ Y
Friends$of$Kensington$Market 2013 Y $ Y Y
Garden$District$Residents$Association 1989 Y Y Y Y
Garment$District$Neighbourhood$Association2015 $ $ Y Y Y Y
Glen$Agar$Residents$Association 2014 Y Y Y
Glen$Andrew$Community$Association 1960s $ Y Y Y Y
Gooderham$&$Worts$Neighbourhood$Association2001 Y $ Y Y Y Y Y
Governors$Bridge$Ratepayers$Association$ 1980 Y Y Y Y
Grange$Community$Association 2008 $ Y Y Y Y
Greater$Yorkville$Residents'$Association 1990 Y $ Y Y Y Y Y
Guildwood$Village$Community$Association$GVCA1958 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Harbord$Village$Residents'$Association 1999 Y Y Y Y Y
Heathwood$Ratepayers$Association 1985 Y Y Y Y Y
Henry$Farm$Community$Interest$Association1978 Y $ Y Y Y Y Y Y
Humber$Bay$Shores$Condominium$Association1997 Y Y Y Y Y
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Sources: Topping, David. “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015); 
Federation of North Toronto Residents Associations, "Member Associations" (2016) FONTRA; 
Confederation of Resident & Ratepayer Associations in Toronto, "MM7.1 Request to Protect 250 year old 
Red Oak Tree at 76 Coral Gable Drive City Council Meeting No. 7: June 10, 2015" (2015) CORRA; 
Federation of Urban Neighbourhoods (Ontario), "Members and Their Affiliates By Municipality" (2016); 
Original research (Alexandra Flynn). 
		 358 
Appendix E - Comparison of ward/electoral boundary approaches of other municipalities 
Municipality Population Councillors Average ward 
pop. 
Last review Consultant 
/commission? 
Final ward 
decision-maker 
Ottawa, ON 883,391 23 38,408 2005 Yes City Council* 
London, ON 366,150 14 26,154 2005 (as of 2011, 
required every term 
of council) 
No City Council* 
Mississauga, ON 713,443 11 64,858 2005 No City Council* 
Halifax, NS 390,095 16 24,395 2014 (required every 
8 years) 
No Nova Scotia Utility 
and Review Board 
Winnipeg, MB 663,617 15 44,421 2009 (required every 
10 years) 
Information 
unavailable 
City Council* 
Regina, SK 193,100 10 19,310 2014 (required at 
least every 3 election 
cycles) 
Independent 
commission  
Independent 
commission 
Edmonton, AB 812,201 12 67,683 2016 No City Council 
Calgary, AB 1,096,833 14 78,345 2016 Ward Boundary 
Commission  
City Council 
Vancouver, BC 603,500 10 Councillors 
elected at large 
N/A N/A N/A 
New York, USA 8,406,000 5 borough 
presidents; 51 
councillors 
164,824 2013 (required every 
10 years) 
Independent 
commission  
United States 
Department of 
Justice 
Chicago, USA 2,719,000 50 aldermen 54,380 2012 (required every 
10 years) 
No City Council 
Los Angeles, 
USA 
3,884,000 15 councillors 252,847 2011 (required every 
10 years) 
Independent 
commission  
City Council 
* Ward decisions made by City Council may be appealed to a quasi-judicial municipal board. 
Source: Alexandra Flynn, “(Re)creating Boundary Lines: Assessing Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review Process” (2017) 32 IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance 
and Governance 1 at 12. 
